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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

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IX

Spanish America: Independence and Emancipation

The sansculottes of France
Have made the world tremble
But the shirtless ones of America
Will not be far behind.

The American Carmagnole (1810)

Among us there are no sansculottes

El Patriota de Venezuela (1810)

Hear, oh mortals! the sacred cry:
Freedom, freedom, freedom!
Hear the noise of broken chains;
See the throne of Equality the noble.

Argentine national anthem (1813)

For a long time the Peruvian, oppressed,
dragged the ominous chain;
condemned to cruel serfdom,
For a long time he moaned in silence.
But as soon as the sacred cry of
Freedom! was heard on his coasts
he shakes the indolence of the slave,
he raises his humiliated head.

Peruvian national anthem (1821)



The Independence Struggle in Spanish South America

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

ce Struggle in Spanish South America

Despite the abolitionist proclamation agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the programme of monarchical and colonial rehabilitation, which formed the substantive part of the Congress's work, returned to Spain, France, Denmark and the Netherlands those American slave colonies over which they had lost control as a direct or indirect consequence of the Napoleonic Wars. Colonial slavery was recognised and upheld by the Congress as were the restored rights of the various metropolitan monarchies of Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands. All these powers consented to a formal ban on the Atlantic slave trade, but Spain and Portugal were permitted a few years to restock their plantation colonies before the ban came into force; subsequently neither the Iberian powers nor France took the steps necessary to suppress a continuing illegal traffic. The United States implemented its own ban on slave imports but failed to concert measures with Britain for the ending of the clandestine traffic to other territories. The ending of the wartime commercial blockades reopened the European and North American markets for plantation produce; the elimination of St Domingue, recently the largest supplier, gave extra scope to planters elsewhere.

But the prospects for the restored colonial slavery of 1815 were clouded by memories of the revolutionary epoch, by doubts concerning the viability of the regimes of monarchical reaction and, most immediately, by the challenge of the liberation movements in Spanish America. The Spanish Empire had been shattered by Napoleon's invasion of the Peninsula and the subsequent war. Prior to 1808 the Spanish American colonies had been unresponsive to the revolutionary appeals of the age. The imperial authorities and their local allies had been strong enough to contain internal unrest and to keep contraband down to an acceptable level. The imperial authorities had been forced to suppress Indian uprisings, such as that of Tupac Amarú in 1780–82, or slave conspiracies, such as those in Venezuela in the 1790s, or popular resistance to new taxes, such as in the revolt of parts of New Granada in the 1780s, but prior to 1808 the structure of empire itself had been almost unchallenged. The Venezuelan patriot Miranda led an invasion in 1806 but attracted little support even in a province with a tradition of contraband and political defiance. On the one hand, the revenues from the silver mines of Upper Peru and Mexico supported a strong apparatus of metropolitan control; on the other the creole elite had been unwilling to move because of its dependence on the imperial infrastructure and its fear of the mass of Amerindians, mestizos, mulattos and blacks.

The relaxation of commercial restrictions and the interruptions of war had allowed Spanish American planters and ranchers to buy slaves and expand their operations. The slave proprietors of late colonial Spanish America were not absentees, unlike so many in the British or French West Indies, and were thus in some respects better placed to defend their slaveholdings. Slavery was, it is true, marginal in Mexico and Central America and still a secondary presence in most of Spanish South America in 1810, but in a number of regions there were nearly as many free people of African descent as slaves; outside the mountainous Andean region free and enslaved blacks and people of colour often possessed strategic significance in the social formation. Large-scale plantation slavery now flourished in Cuba, where the cultivation of sugar and coffee helped to employ around 200,000 slaves by the second decade of the nineteenth century; the smaller island of Puerto Rico had 17,500 slaves, about half of whom worked on plantations. The two island colonies were traditionally Spanish strongpoints on the route back to Spain; their fate is considered in the next chapter. Mainland Spanish America contained about 225,000 slaves, but slavery was a diffuse and secondary form of property or labour. Outside the plantation enclaves in Venezuela and Peru the great landowners did not, like Caribbean planters, have their principal wealth invested in slave crews. But many of them did own a few slaves, whom they valued as servants, craftsmen or even trusted agents. Slaves had always been prized possessions in Spanish America; the *dueño de esclavos* had status as well as a valuable piece of property. Any man with a white or pale complexion in Spanish America could aspire to be a gentleman (*hidalgo*); a man who owned a slave was a *señor*, a lord and master.

In Mexico and Central America there may have been between 10,000 and 20,000 slaves; these slaves, and the more numerous free descendants of slaves, were found as port-workers, artisans, or domestics in the principal towns, or as foremen and labourers on the plantations or in the mines. Slaves were expensive both to buy and to maintain, since the cost of living was high. In Mexico as in other parts of Spanish America slaves were sometimes placed in positions of trust and responsibility. The great majority of those who worked the silver mines were free labourers earning quite high wages. In the major urban centres there were many more free blacks, mulattos and mestizos than slaves. In New Granada, roughly the future Colombia, there were 45,000 slaves in 1778, concentrated in the port towns or the gold workings of the Choco and Cauca. Slaves comprised about 5 per cent of the total population of the Viceroyalty at this time, though their numbers may have declined as the gold workings became less profitable; a number of the 368,000 *mestizos* in New Granada, though

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in the main ethnically Indo–European, would have had some African ancestry. There were about 5,000 slaves in the Presidency of Quito (Ecuador) – principally concentrated, like the free blacks, on the coast around Guayaquil. In the Captaincy General of Venezuela there were as many as 87,000 slaves out of a total population of 900,000 in 1800; moreover there were thought to be 24,000 fugitive slaves and 407,000 *pardos* of partly African descent in this latter province. The Venezuelan slaves were concentrated in the cacao groves of the central coastal region and constituted the largest enclave of plantation economy in Spanish South America. In Chile in 1812 there were said to be 10,000–12,000 slaves, while the free blacks, numbering 25,000–32,000, comprised a little over 3 per cent of the population. In Peru there were some 40,000 slaves working in the towns and plantations of the coastal region, where they comprised at least a quarter of the population, with free blacks and mulattos being equally numerous: those of African descent were believed to be better adapted to the more humid lowlands. Few free or enslaved blacks were to be found in the Andean region, where most of Peru's population of over a million was to be found. The Presidency of Charcas in Upper Peru (Bolivia) contained 4,700 slaves working mainly as domestics or artisans or on estates in the vicinity of La Paz. In the region of Rio de la Plata and its hinterland at least 30,000 slaves comprised about a tenth of the sparse population; the population of free blacks and mulattos was of the same size. The slavery of the La Plata region derived from its historic role as an entrepôt in the traffic between Africa and Spanish South America, notably Charcas with its mines; the slaves were employed as domestics, artisans, porters, muleteers and estate workers.[1]

In the last decades of the Spanish empire the imperial authorities sometimes looked to the free black or mulatto population of the New World as a potential counterweight to the white Spanish Americans with their autonomist aspirations. When the British seized Havana in 1762 the creole elite had put up only a feeble resistance and had soon settled down to trading briskly with the occupiers. This episode had delivered a shock to the colonial authorities and encouraged them to look increasingly to free blacks and mulattos as recruits to the militia. The newly created or expanded coloured militia units were subordinate to the metropolitan regulars, with some men of colour appointed as junior officers. All free blacks were required to register with the *caja de negros*, which would draw up a roster of militia service. In 1789 Madrid issued a new code governing the condition of slaves and bearing on the racial caste system. New World planters disliked this metropolitan attempt to regulate slavery, even though it was accompanied by no effective invigilation or sanction. The system of racial caste

privileges, which governed tax exemptions, office-holding and legal rights, was also relaxed in favour of those free blacks and mulattos who could afford to purchase certificates suspending their disabilities. In law those of mixed blood were barred even from wearing Spanish dress. The native white *criollos* of Caracas complained in 1795 when the instrument known as *gracias al sacar* allowed *pardos* (free mulattos) to purchase the privileges of whiteness. In a number of strategically vital imperial centres – Havana, Mexico City, Lima, Buenos Aires – free mulattos and blacks comprised a third or more of the militia forces available to the colonial authorities by the turn of the century.[2]

The favours bestowed by the imperial authorities on some *pardos* and free blacks did not threaten slavery and were quite compatible with a modified caste system; indeed the value of the concessions made to individuals depended on a context in which people of colour did not, as of right, enjoy full citizenship. Nor did such assumptions dent the traditional view that Indian ancestry, especially if noble and distant, was more acceptable than black ancestry. Some Indian *caciques* had received titles of nobility and could claim legal immunities. For a white to marry a black or mulatto involved loss of caste, and in some instances was legally prohibited; on the other hand, in the early days of the Conquest Spaniards had been happy to marry the daughter of a *cacique*. Most 'pure' Indians kept to themselves; blacks and mulattos, whether free or enslaved, lived side by side with the whites, usually performing the more menial tasks disdained by the latter. Caste divisions helped to constitute the imperial order; they were matched by a complex set of corporate privileges and exemptions, extended to municipalities, professional bodies, militia units and ecclesiastical institutions. The more 'enlightened' Spanish officials, impatient of creole privileges and particularism, were willing selectively to relax caste discrimination.

Spain had allowed African slaves to be introduced to the New World to strengthen its hold on newly conquered territories and to plug gaps in the fabric of empire; on the eve of the liberation struggles this was still the role of some slaves and free blacks in Spanish America, who were found in the towns, and along the lines of communication, working as artisans, labourers and domestics. The last decades of the eighteenth century, and the first years of the nineteenth, witnessed a new rise of silver output, mined by free waged workers, supplemented in Peru by the *mita* system of communal forced labour. However, in Mexico a significant proportion of the free workers of the mining zone were of partly African descent, since African slaves had in former times comprised a quarter or a third of the mining work-force. Only in New Granada were slaves engaged in mining – in this case panning for gold

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in the river valleys of the South-east. The numbers still employed in the gold workings had dropped by the end of the eighteenth century, with mine owners finding that the deposits were not sufficiently good to justify the trouble and expense of maintaining a large slave labour force. In this part of New Granada slaves, former slaves, or their descendants, often clung on as tenants or squatters to the land allotted to them for their subsistence.

In most parts of Spanish America agriculture was organised by haciendas or ranches where few or no slaves were employed. In the regions of settled agriculture the subjugated Indians furnished the bulk of the dependent labour force; free mestizo or *pardo* cattlemen worked the ranches. In most provinces there were a few sugar plantations mainly catering to the local market – such as those found in Tucuman (Argentina), coastal Peru, or the basin of Cuernavaca (central Mexico) – but by the late colonial period the proportion of slaves in these patriarchical establishments had declined and the main labour force were dependant *peones* of partly African descent.

The historic strongpoints of the Empire were established in the major mining zones of Mexico and the Andes, and in the Caribbean along the lines of communication with the metropolis. In these areas the impulse to independence was stifled. The independence movements were to be more vigorous in areas where slaveholding ranchers and planters were to be found: the River Plate, Venezuela, New Granada and the Pacific coast lowlands. In the backlands of South America there was a sizeable fugitive slave and free black or mulatto population, engaged in ranching and subsistence agriculture. These were areas where there were few Indians but many partly Hispanicised people of mixed blood, *mestizos* (usually meaning a mixture of Indian and white), *pardos* (black and white), and *zambos* (Indian and black).

The vast interior of the continent had always beckoned to slave runaways and rebels. Survival in the South American backlands was not easy but probably not as difficult as in North America, whose Western grasslands were dominated by powerful and warlike Indian nations. In Venezuela slave-based development was concentrated in the province of Caracas and even there it was limited and modified by the possibility of escape to the interior; slaves in the commercial agricultural zone did not work in gangs under supervision but were assigned quotas and required to deliver given quantities of the cash crop to their owner. Venezuelan agricultural slavery conceded significant work autonomy to the slave, though *mayorales* would severely punish those who failed to make the required deliveries. Some slaves even grew cacao on their *conucos* or garden plots. While some slaves became estate administrators other slave cultivators might convert themselves by degrees into manumitted

tenants. These arrangements lent an extra resilience to slavery in Venezuela and possibly encouraged in slave-owners a boldness reminiscent of the Virginian planters of the 1770s. The 1795 slave rebellion in the western province of Coro was a rare instance of open and organised contestation of slavery, and had been quite swiftly defeated, with some three hundred rebels, free men of colour as well as slaves, losing their lives. While Coro itself was to be a centre of royalist strength in the independence period the central zone around Caracas, where most plantation development was concentrated, produced the first republican attempts.[3]

In most parts of Spanish South America slave resistance and flight, and the availability of others forms of dependent labour, had checked the emergence of large-scale slavery; together with the relative frequency of manumission, slave escapes had helped to produce the growth of a free or fugitive black or *pardo* population. The last quarter of the eighteenth century had witnessed a multiplication of the number of *palenques*, or fugitive slave settlements, in mainland South America, especially in Venezuela and New Granada; in Peru and Rio de la Plata there had been slave revolts on the former Jesuit estates in the 1760s and 1770s when these had been sold off to new owners. Insecure conditions in the backlands were inimical to large-scale slavery but they were quite compatible with surviving pockets of personal bondage, as vulnerable individuals sought the protection of powerful *hacendados* or caudillos. In the more central regions the urban rich and large landowners or ranchers would own some slaves whom they would employ as domestics or managers (*mayordomos*).

The creole aristocracy and middle class resented metropolitan patronage and trade restrictions. *Peninsulares* received a disproportionate share of the most lucrative or influential posts; in law Spanish office-holders were barred from marrying creoles in their regions of jurisdiction. While some aristocratic creoles were co-opted into the structures of imperial government, or enjoyed membership of municipal bodies with real powers, the policies and personnel imposed by Madrid easily offended an increasingly self-confident local elite. *Comercio libre* allowed any Spanish merchants to trade with the colonies but left in place a metropolitan monopoly, raising the prices of all manufactured imports for Spanish colonists. The white creoles found even the less privileged *gachupines* to be grasping and officious. By the late colonial period the traditional caste structure was unable to absorb without strain the growth of large intermediary layers between the Peninsular

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e intermediary layers between the Peninsula

Spaniards and white creoles on the one hand and the subjugated Indians or blacks on the other. The so-called *castas*, those of mixed Indian, European and African ancestry, comprised an ever larger proportion of the population. The mestizos and mulattos were partly Hispanicised in culture and those with skills or education would be in competition for jobs and privileges with local whites; since *pardos* were prone to be somewhat more Hispanicised the competition they offered to white creoles was that much stronger. The latter were still known as *españoles* but increasingly thought of themselves as Americans; the term *criollos* was less popular with them since it could imply mixed blood.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were only about 160,000 *Peninsulares* and 3 million native whites out of a total population of about 14 million in Spanish America. While there were 6–7 million living in Indian communities the diverse but semi-Hispanicised *castas*, numbering 4–5 million, were more numerous than the whites and were growing steadily as a proportion of the population as a result of inter-marriage and acculturation.[4] Spanish power and the imperial society of orders more easily controlled, contained and accommodated the Indian village communities, with their recognised *caciques*, than the free-floating population of *castas* found both in newer commercial centres and in the backlands. When the imperial authorities were challenged by the creole aristocracy they would appeal both to *pardos* and to the loyal Indian communities, with their privileged *caciques*, but in doing so they themselves put at risk the ultimate coherence of the imperial order.

The first tentative steps towards autonomy or independence were not made until the metropolis was paralysed by the Napoleonic invasion. The empire did not encounter serious internal opposition until its metropolis was already occupied and impotent. The creole aristocracy of Spanish America waited for more than a generation after 1776, partly because it was restrained by fear of the Indians and the *castas* beneath them and partly because mining, the most dynamic economic sector, both depended upon and could sustain an imperial bureaucracy and military establishment.

Prior to the French invasion of Spain in 1808 Napoleon captured the Spanish monarch and persuaded him to abdicate in favour of Joseph Bonaparte. For a time resistance to the invaders was co-ordinated by a central junta which refused to recognise the Bourbon abdication and accepted alliance with Britain. French advances in 1809–10 dispersed the junta and forced it to appeal to all parts of the kingdom to organise their own resistance. Loyalist forces retreated to the enclave around Cadiz; the council based on Cadiz, which continued to claim jurisdiction over Spanish America, was naturally attentive to the interests of this

historic monopoly entrepôt. Liberals gained the upper hand in Cadiz – they established a constitutional regency, convoked the Cortes and elaborated the constitution of 1812. Spanish America was given representation but not in proportion to population; resident *peninsulares* were to vote but not those with African blood. Some Mexican delegates opposed these arrangements, which aimed to keep creole representations in a permanent minority. These same delegates advocated the ending of slavery; some Spanish liberals responded by proposing abolition of the slave trade. All such proposals failed, but created a stir none the less.

News of the events in Spain encouraged the municipalities of the American provinces to take their fate into their own hands. The Spanish American juntas had nothing to fear from the French and were not disposed to defer to the Liberals in Cadiz. To begin with the Spanish American juntas declared that their aim was simply to uphold the legitimate rights of Fernando VII, pending his restoration. These juntas were based in the first instance on existing institutions, though those which aspired to self-government or freer trade usually convoked a *cabildo abierto* or meeting open to leading men in the province. In some cases the juntas were dominated by creole interests with autonomist pretensions; in others members of the colonial establishment concerned to defend metropolitan interests predominated.

The defence of the rights of the Bourbon dynasty was, in itself, an eminently conservative cause. The imperial establishment in Havana, Peru and Mexico proved sufficiently strong to contain the autonomist impulse of the colonial population, though not without a stiff struggle in Mexico and significant concessions in the case of Cuba. In Peru and Upper Peru there were still lively memories of the great Indian uprising of Tupac Amaru in the 1780s and this helps to explain the ease with which Spanish officials retained control there. In Havana a pro-independence conspiracy led by Juan Aponte, a free Negro, was swiftly suppressed; on the other hand, the flouting of trade restrictions by Cuban merchants and *hacendados* was ignored by Spanish officials.[5]

Gran Colombia

Venezuela, with the largest concentration of slaves in mainland Spanish America, was to be the principal battle ground in the first phase of the independence struggle. The news of developments in Spain led to the emergence of a creole-dominated junta in Caracas in April 1810. Venezuela became the first province to declare its independence in July 1811. This declaration reflected the growing influence in Caracas of a

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letrados and aristocrats; this was patronisec
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Members of Venezuela's leading landowr
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Royalist opposition to the Caracas junta
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Patriot Club, drawing support from the younger generation of creole *letrados* and aristocrats; this was patronised by Francisco de Miranda, the pioneer of Spanish American independence who, after winning fame as a French revolutionary general in 1792, had conspired with Pitt against Spain and urged Wilberforce to use his influence to support American independence. The imperial establishment in Caracas was weaker than in Mexico and Peru while the creole aristocracy had long enriched itself by the practice of contraband and the defiance of imperial authority. Even if the project of independence did not command universal assent within the creole oligarchy, the new Venezuelan Republic strove to make itself acceptable to it. Republican leaders sought to offer a new freedom and security to the large landowners and new opportunities to frustrated members of the creole middle class. They decreed that a National Guard would patrol the plantation zone and ensure the continuing subordination of the slaves and *pardos*. A projected franchise based on property holdings recognised the wealthy proprietors as the true rulers of the country. Members of Venezuela's leading landowning families – the Bolivars, Tavars, Toros, Blancos and Machados – lent their support to the Republic. The Republic's social conservatism was coupled with attacks on clerical privilege and the announcement of a ban on the slave trade. Royalist opposition to the Caracas junta was organised to the West, South and East in the provinces of Coro, Maracaibo and Guayana. The royalist counter-offensive mobilised the *pardo* militia and evoked support from all those who distrusted the creole aristocracy; royalist commanders encouraged slave resistance to patriot slave-owners. The Republicans fell back on an enclave around Caracas and appointed Francisco de Miranda as Dictator. Miranda issued a decree ordering that 2,000 slaves should be enrolled to fight for the Republic, while the state would compensate their owners; after ten years' military service these slaves would be manumitted. Moderate as it was this decree still encountered opposition within the republican ranks; it was itself soon overtaken by royalist counter-measures. Spanish priests and colonial officials were prepared to back *pardo* resistance to the pretensions of the creole aristocracy and even to denounce the mistreatment of slaves by patriot proprietors; the threat of servile insurrection was designed to show vacillating creole proprietors the folly of republican independance. Royalist commanders were happy to enroll slaves fleeing from patriot slave-owners. The Spanish Archbishop of Caracas, Coll y Prat, declared that the republican authorities and the planters who supported them should be resisted; he later claimed that his statements sparked a royalist slave revolt. The Archbishop doubtless exaggerated, but it was indeed the case that several thousand blacks in the coastal zone

acquired arms; they acted in concert with the royalist forces converging on Caracas, without necessarily sharing their objective of restoring metropolitan authority. Besieged by a motley coalition of opponents, failing to establish a sufficiently broad social base and weakened by a terrible earthquake, the first Venezuelan Republic collapsed after only a year. Republican determination was also sapped by news of the proclamation of the liberal 1812 constitution by the Cortes in Cadiz. The Republicans capitulated on condition that the persons and property of their supporters would be respected. The restored colonial regime itself lacked authority or unity of purpose and the terms of the capitulation proved difficult to observe. Bands of *pardos* and escaping slaves refused to lay down their arms and return to their previous condition. Republican forces continued to hold out in some areas, including along the border with New Granada.[6]

In 1813 Simon Bolivar, one of the younger republican partisans, led a daring new republican advance from Cartagena to Caracas. The Second Republic was proclaimed in January 1814. Bolivar urged that a 'terrible power' was needed to crush the Spaniards and overcome republican disunity. Bolivar offered more vigorous leadership, based on accentuating the potential conflict of Americans against the Peninsular Spanish, and diminishing all sources of division amongst the creoles themselves. Bolivar met the often arbitrary and cruel repression of the colonial authorities with the declaration of a 'war to death' against Spaniards based on an explicit double standard: any Spaniard who refused to give positive support was liable to execution while creoles would be treated leniently, even if they had colluded with the Spanish authorities. Bolivar was himself a leading member of the creole aristocracy, but he was willing to proclaim a sweeping civic equality for all those of free American birth. But egalitarian proclamations could not immediately dispel the identification of the republican cause with the white creole elite, nor save the Second Republic from the fate of the First. Bolivar did not have the military or political apparatus to give reality to his social programmes and proclamations; the column with which he had reconquered Caracas was less than a thousand strong. The clash between Republicans and royalists allowed the bands of fugitive slaves and free-lance *pardos* to act on their own account, making *ad hoc* alliances where necessary. The creole aristocracy failed to throw its united weight behind the Republic but its strength was sufficiently imposing to deter the republican forces from appealing to the slaves or *pardos* against it.

The royalists had also attracted the support of some of the military chiefs of the plains cattlemen, the *llaneros*; the republican cause was doomed unless it could win the support of the formidable horsemen of

the *llano*. The First Republic had unwis
ordenanzas del llano, which sought to impose
private property on the grasslands and cattle
llaneros, many of whom were men of colour,
the status and property-conscious *mantuan*
proprietors of Caracas were called. Some of
led by plebeian Spanish immigrants, such
commanders Tomás Boves and Tomás Mor
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force drawn from both *llaneros* of the interior
region; Morales, a Canary Islander, became
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the *llano*. The First Republic had unwisely issued decrees, the *ordenanzas del llano*, which sought to impose tidy juridical concepts of private property on the grasslands and cattle herds of the interior. The *llaneros*, many of whom were men of colour, felt little in common with the status and property-conscious *mantuanos*, as the white *criollo* proprietors of Caracas were called. Some of the *llanero* columns were led by plebeian Spanish immigrants, such as the legendary royalist commanders Tomás Boves and Tomás Morales; Boves was a petty merchant from Andalucia who established himself as the chief of a large force drawn from both *llaneros* of the interior and *pardos* of the coastal region; Morales, a Canary Islander, became one of Boves's principal lieutenants. Yet royalist influence among the *llaneros* was not deep-rooted and many Southern *caudillos* had no wish to see a strong imperial authority. The eruption of slave resistance further complicated the picture. Some slave-owners had the resources to retain authority in the main zone of plantation agriculture; there were slaves who thought life safer if they stuck to the cacao groves, or who were unwilling to abandon family attachments, but those who wished to escape had more opportunities to do so. Columns of *pardos* or fugitive slaves roamed throughout the countryside and would happily plunder the towns and the rich, even if they did not always see the need to generalise slave insurrections. A veritable social explosion sent the republican forces reeling in 1814 and favoured an anomalous victory for the royalist cause. An irregular armed force of 19,000 men, mainly *llaneros* and *pardos*, returned Venezuela to loyalism just at the moment when an effective monarchist regime was restored in the Peninsula.[7]

With the ending of hostilities in the Peninsula Fernando VII suppressed the constitution and despatched veteran troops to bolster imperial authority in the Americas. Bolivar had withdrawn to New Granada (Colombia) towards the end of 1814 and in the following year sailed for Jamaica in order to rethink the strategy of liberation and re-group the republican forces. Other partisans of independence retreated to the backlands. Pablo Morillo, a Spanish general who had distinguished himself in the war against the French, arrived in Venezuela with 10,500 troops to reinforce the restored monarchical and colonial regime. Morillo was disconcerted by the extent of destruction and by the 'loyalist' forces from whom he was to take over. One Spanish official observed that the war against the Republicans had transformed the *pardos*: he noted that this experience had produced even in the loyal ones (*pardos*) a very mistaken idea of the subordination and duties of the good vassal'. Another wrote: 'the very army of Boves, and of Morales, is in rebellion against the white class; its total force of negroes and mulattos refuses to obey; they have

pursued several white officers and killed others . . . so that one can say that the idea of a war of colours has become widespread.'[8] Morillo's force was large enough to overawe the irregulars. The death of Boves in one of the last engagements with the Republicans probably made it easier for Morillo to establish his authority. While he speedily reconquered most of New Granada his administration always confronted severe problems in Venezuela itself. Some of the 19,000 irregular troops were sent to New Granada, while most of the remainder were ordered to disband. Many former royalist partisans found that it made sense to team up with the remnants of the patriot resistance.

The restoration of the old order meant the restoration of official caste discriminations and attempts to rehabilitate the power of masters over their slaves. This might have gratified white creole proprietors but many of them also felt the heavy hand of Spanish repression, often administrated by despised plebian officials or immigrants from the Canary Islands or the Basque country. Morillo, acutely short of finances and supplies, resorted to a policy of wholesale sequestration of estates owned by patriots; amongst the 205 haciendas seized from 101 families were 110 cacao groves, 41 sugar plantations and 29 coffee plantations.[9] These estates yielded 912,000 *pesos* to the royal treasury in 1815–16 – a considerable sum though by no means large enough to cover the needs of Morillo's army. The running or leasing of these estates gave the colonial regime and military a quite direct stake in slavery. The Spanish authorities in Venezuela also imposed forced loans and sent urgent requests for money to the Intendancy in Cuba. Though imperial authority was successfully restored in Mexico, and had not been strongly challenged in Peru, the events of 1808–14 had completely disrupted the mining economy and the flow of silver across the Atlantic. The complex arrangements for the extraction, transport and taxation of specie were difficult to reassemble; security whether on land or at sea was appallingly bad. In the meantime the empire was afflicted by severe fiscal crisis and Spanish commanders were driven to extortionate levies which could only narrow the basis of their local support. The Captaincy General of Cuba, with its flourishing plantation economy and absence of armed conflict, was in a more fortunate position. It served as a place of refuge for royalist *émigrés* and a base for the resupply of the forces on the mainland. The loyalty of the Cuban oligarchy was encouraged in 1817 and 1818 by suspension of the tobacco monopoly; plantation development was favoured by the import of 10,000–20,000 slaves a year and by a decree which converted traditional *encomiendas* into freely alienable landed property. The Havana authorities began remitting large sums of cash to the Spanish authorities on the mainland; with the rapid advance of Cuba plantation slavery acquired a new

importance in the pattern of Spanish America tampered with.[10] When their backs wer commanders were still prepared to arm slave manumission. But they knew that the emp general policy of slave emancipation. Ar monarchists in Madrid were not attracte ideology, though they might be proud of Sp After their two defeats the Republicans of *Tie* from a very different Caribbean source.

The reverses of 1811–15 persuaded Boliv coherent social programme, as well as more were needed if the liberation struggle was to The British authorities he approached in Jan see the colony used as the launching-pac mainland and so Bolivar moved to the significant option itself reflected the suppor attracted from a cosmopolitan layer of free many of them with contacts in Haiti. P Cartagena, the island of Margerita and La damage to Spanish sea communications. Th Louis Brion, Renato Beluche, Louis Aury formerly an adjutant to Victor Hugues. V contacts in republican Haiti their crews, blacks or *pardos*, kept alive the rough and 'brethren of the coast'. This was a mil weaknesses but it was not one deeply respe property, let alone slavery. Through the gc appealed to President Pétion for help in re struggle in Venezuela.

In appealing for support to the Repub rejecting the deep-seated prejudices and tal in Haiti Bolivar was given immediate acc outlined to Pétion his plans to roll back liberate the continent. Pétion was prepare Bolivar but only if the Venezuelan would u all the lands he liberated. Bolivar agreed help to assert a new Spanish American recruitment and give free blacks and mula taint of slavery would be removed fr expedition assembled by Bolivar represente republican cause: it comprised seven ship 6,000 men, a printing press, and a numbe *franceses* as they were called. This was th

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importance in the pattern of Spanish American empire and could not be tampered with.[10] When their backs were to the wall Spanish commanders were still prepared to arm slaves and offer them eventual manumission. But they knew that the empire could not afford any general policy of slave emancipation. And of course the ultra-monarchists in Madrid were not attracted to abolitionism as an ideology, though they might be proud of Spain's humane slave code. After their two defeats the Republicans of *Tierra Firme* received support from a very different Caribbean source.

The reverses of 1811–15 persuaded Bolivar that a more radical and coherent social programme, as well as more decisive military measures, were needed if the liberation struggle was to be re-engaged with success. The British authorities he approached in Jamaica were not prepared to see the colony used as the launching-pad for an invasion of the mainland and so Bolivar moved to the Republic of Haiti. This significant option itself reflected the support the republican cause had attracted from a cosmopolitan layer of free-lance traders and corsairs, many of them with contacts in Haiti. Patriot privateers based on Cartagena, the island of Margerita and La Guaira, had caused great damage to Spanish sea communications. The corsair captains included Louis Brion, Renato Beluche, Louis Aury and Jean–Baptiste Bideau, formerly an adjutant to Victor Hugues. While these men cultivated contacts in republican Haiti their crews, with a high proportion of blacks or *pardos*, kept alive the rough and ready egalitarianism of the 'brethren of the coast'. This was a milieu with its own political weaknesses but it was not one deeply respectful of any type of private property, let alone slavery. Through the good offices of Brion, Bolivar appealed to President Pétion for help in relaunching the independence struggle in Venezuela.

In appealing for support to the Republicans of Haiti Bolivar was rejecting the deep-seated prejudices and taboos of his class. On arrival in Haiti Bolivar was given immediate access to the President. Bolivar outlined to Pétion his plans to roll back the royalist offensive and liberate the continent. Pétion was prepared to give substantial help to Bolivar but only if the Venezuelan would undertake to free the slaves in all the lands he liberated. Bolivar agreed. Slave emancipation would help to assert a new Spanish American identity; it would facilitate recruitment and give free blacks and mulattos the reassurance that the taint of slavery would be removed from people of colour. The expedition assembled by Bolivar represented a major effort to revive the republican cause: it comprised seven ships, arms and ammunition for 6,000 men, a printing press, and a number of Haitian military men, *los franceses* as they were called. This was the first of several expeditions

from Haiti bringing men and supplies to the coast and islands of Venezuela.[11]

Bolivar henceforth adopted a policy of military manumission and urged a more general emancipation policy on his civilian and military colleagues. For their part the Spanish authorities still had *pardo* militias and as many as 2,000 slaves, or former slaves, fought in the regular units. But the Spanish commanders were obliged not only to respect the rights of law-abiding slave-owners but were at least formally bound by the imperial system of racial privilege; Morillo unsuccessfully asked the King for permission to annul all caste discrimination. The republican commitment to civic equality gradually acquired a degree of substance and credibility as mestizos and *pardos* were confirmed in positions of responsibility and command. On the other hand, many republican leaders, while prepared to welcome into their columns the fugitive slaves of royalist proprietors, did not feel that they could simply expropriate the property of patriot slave-owners. Concern for the rights of the patriot slaveholder was to prove a major restraint, though one which could be partially neutralised, in the case of adult male slaves, by appeal to the republican principle of universal liability to military service.

At a time when the property and persons of all able-bodied male citizens were liable to conscription, it was difficult to argue that Patriot-owned male slaves should remain apart in some purely private sphere. If every able-bodied citizen was expected to contribute to the liberation effort, why should slaves be exempt? And if a man's horse or cattle could be commandeered, why not his slave? The needs of the struggle against the occupying army frequently dictated obligatory recruitment. The republican authorities sometimes allowed proprietors to offer a slave as a substitute, just as others might be allowed to buy themselves out of military service. If such procedures failed to produce enough recruits then republican chiefs proceeded simply to impress those who had failed to enlist and to demand a levy from slave-owners of one in five or one in ten of their slave crews. Masters whose slaves had been commandeered in this way could claim compensation from the republican authorities – the latter was usually given in the form of public bonds or title to public lands. As may be imagined these proceedings were rarely as elevated as the rhetoric with which Republicans celebrated their commitment to anti-slavery; nevertheless they did have anti-slavery consequences. The slaves enrolled were promised manumission; perhaps only a minority survived the dangerous career of the patriot soldier, but some escaped and very few were ever re-enslaved.

In Bolivar's absence republican resistance had developed in many

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o welcome into their columns the fugitive
tors, did not feel that they could simply
f patriot slave-owners. Concern for the rights
was to prove a major restraint, though one
:utralised, in the case of adult male slaves, by
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·operty and persons of all able-bodied male
ɔcription, it was difficult to argue that Patriot-
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ıy frequently dictated obligatory recruitment.
:s sometimes allowed proprietors to offer a
as others might be allowed to buy themselves
f such procedures failed to produce enough
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ɔ demand a levy from slave-owners of one in
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ıeir commitment to anti-slavery; nevertheless
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epublican resistance had developed in many

parts of Venezuela's huge territory, under the leadership of local *caudillos* strongly committed to regional interests and regional autonomy; they ignored or flouted schemes or decrees they found elaborate or inconvenient, whether these were favourable or unfavourable to slave proprietors. The arrival of Bolivar's expedition helped to focus revolt and furnish it with a leadership and strategy; however, the strength of the Spanish garrison in the coastal region eventually led Bolivar and the main republican forces to withdraw to the interior where contact was made with sympathetic *llanero* commanders. Bolivar used his military authority to decree the liberty of slaves in Carúpano and some other coastal districts; some slaves were recruited but the decrees could subsequently be countermanded by patriot planters of the region. The allies and supporters Bolivar was to find along the upper reaches of the Orinoco, Apure and Meta were quite disposed to challenge the property rights of slaveholders, indeed some of them were fugitive slaves. Bolivar decreed that all the slaves of Guayana and Apure were free; in the *llanos* there were not enough slaveholders to contradict him.

Bolivar saw dangers as well as advantages in the new balance of social forces within the republican camp. He opposed what he saw as tendencies favouring *pardocrácia*, supposedly a regime in which rule by the *castas* would displace rule by whites. General Piar, a prominent republican *pardo*, was tried and executed, charged with insubordination and encouraging people of colour to organise separately and against the whites; however, equally insubordinate white generals, such as Mariño, were not so severely dealt with.[12] Though Piar had promoted people of colour, he does not seem to have urged a more radical anti-slavery policy than did Bolivar. Bolivar's hostility to *pardocrácia* was no doubt reassuring to white creoles; like his abolitionism, it also can be seen to reflect his determination to promote nation-building against any sectional interest, and to stress the antagonism to *peninsulares* over and against other social antagonisms.

In the years 1818–19 Bolivar's continental vision was joined to the *élan* of the republican *llanero*, General José Antonio Páez, and they proceeded to deal hard blows to the occupying power. At the first Congress held by the republican forces, at Angostura in February 1819, Bolivar delivered an address that included a passionate appeal for the abolition of slavery; he also promised land to the landless. He urged a 'balanced' constitution, supposedly on the British model, in which an elected legislature would be checked by a hereditary senate, an independent judiciary and the *poder moral* of the executive. The Liberator undoubtedly hoped that his anti-slavery commitments would favourably impress the British government; he had visited London in

1810 and been introduced to Wilberforce by Miranda. The Congress of Angostura elected Bolivar as President but was unenthusiastic about the Liberator's espousal of abolition and of British constitutional forms. The Congress gave Bolivar the authority he needed to drive out the Spanish; as commander he could continue with a sweeping policy of military manumission. But Venezuela's political leaders refused to declare any immediate or general emancipation of the slaves: such a policy, they feared, would push slave-owners into the royalist camp, unleash the uncontrollable forces of servile and racial revolt, and bring few more recruits to the revolutionary armies than a policy of selective and controlled manumission. The freeing of royalist-owned slaves who had fought in the forces of liberation was confirmed, but patriot planters were entitled to compensation and often held positions which enabled them to block, or limit, the conscription of slaves.

In the year following Angostura Bolivar and Páez pushed back Spanish power in Venezuela and undertook major operations in New Granada. Bolivar's forces were not large and prevailed by virtue of swift and bold moves across vast distances: the layer of *pardos* and former slaves in the liberation army sometimes proved more willing to undertake such operations than localistic white creoles. After crossing the Andes Bolivar defeated the Spanish at the battle of Boyacá (August 1819), opening the path to the viceregal capital of Bogotá and enabling him to unite the free territories of Venezuela and New Granada in the Republic of Gran Colombia. The patriot forces in New Granada had maintained a stubborn resistance to Spain without achieving even the degree of coherence and unity which first Miranda and then Bolivar had imposed on Venezuela. Cartagena had established its own semi-autonomous coastal Republic with the help of the privateers. A patriot government had been established in the mining region of Antioquia in 1813–14 and one of the patriot leaders, J.F. Restrepo, had promulgated a 'free womb' decree. But divisions within the patriot ranks and sporadic advances by the Spanish forces seem to have deprived this decree of other than symbolic significance. The Patriots of New Granada found it easier to unite in support of Bolivar than to recognise one of their own number as chief of the revolution. The arrival of Bolivar's forces in 1819 was generally acclaimed, though there was some resistance to the policy of military manumission. When the columns of Bolivar's Granadan lieutenant, Francisco de Paula Santander, reached the gold mining region of the Cauca, Bolivar urged on him sweeping military manumission, but Santander was anxious not to alienate the proprietors of the region. Bolivar pointed out that the slaves made reliable and hardy soldiers and if manumitted would identify their own fate with the *causa pública*. Making use of bad as

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well as good arguments he argued that if slaves were not allowed to die for their country then the African element would loom larger in the population when the war was over – as was happening, he suggested, in Venezuela. However, the slave-owners resisted the conscription of their chattels and Santander remained unwilling to use the necessity of war to impose manumission. Bolivar himself sought to encourage patriot slave-owners by freeing all the remaining slaves on his own estates, to the number of about a hundred, in 1820.[13]

Spanish resistance in South America was greatly weakened in 1820 when a large expeditionary force gathered at Cadiz refused to embark for the New World and instead demanded the return of the constitution of 1812. Liberal politicians and military dominated the Madrid government until the French intervention of 1823, which restored full power to Fernando VII. The Spanish Liberals had little grasp of the nature of the conflict in America. They gave Spanish Americans representation in the Cortes and offered an armistice to those fighting for independence. Their ambition was to restore imperial unity. General Morillo was still in command of the Spanish forces in Venezuela and New Granada. Short of men, Morillo offered Spanish citizenship to all blacks and *pardos* who would fight in his army. As ordered he negotiated a truce with the Republicans. These actions provoked disarray and outrage in the Spanish camp. The truce allowed Republicans openly to canvass their views. In Maracaibo, still nominally controlled by Spain, local authorities persecuted a group of *pardos* who had demonstrated support for Spain and its King.

Once it became clear that the Spanish Liberals were unwilling to concede independence hostilities resumed. The patriot army inflicted a decisive defeat on the Spanish forces in June 1821 at Carabobo. A largely British-recruited Foreign Legion made a contribution to the patriot victory. Spanish control of the northern littoral had been destroyed.

The Republic of Gran Colombia formally adopted a Manumission Law at the Congress of Cúcuta in 1821. It also adopted a Constitution in which full citizenship was reserved to literate men with property worth 100 *pesos*. In an address to the Congress Bolivar implored it to endorse slave emancipation as a 'reward for Carabobo'. The Manumission Law stipulated that henceforth children born to slave mothers should be free. However, the emancipationist content of this legislation was deferred by clauses which required the *emancipados* to work for their mother's owner until the age of eighteen, to reimburse the latter for the supposed costs of their maintenance. Bolivar urged the Congress not to confine itself to freeing only future generations while allowing

the living to languish in bondage. In deference to this plea the law also set up Manumission Boards, financed by locally administered inheritance taxes, with the power to buy the freedom of slaves from their owners.[14]

While it remained to be seen whether the local proprietors would make effective use of this legislation the Manumission Law enacted at Cúcuta certainly associated the South American cause with anti-slavery. By contrast the Liberal authorities in Madrid continued to uphold slavery as a strategic imperial interest. Though they made concessions in many areas they could not afford to endorse any measures against slavery – Cuban remittances ran at $3.2 million in the years 1820–23. In 1822 Madrid could even appear more solicitious of slaveholder interests than Fernando VII had been in 1814; it sent its American representatives a warning that the delicate institution of slavery should be respected at all costs. This warning was the more necessary since some Liberals did sympathise with abolitionism. A Manumission Law was vainly proposed to the Cortes by, ironically enough, a Cuban delegate elected by the radical *menu peuple* of Havana; the same man unsuccessfuly pleaded for colonial self-government.[15]

The patriot victory at Carabobo had confined Spain's forces in New Granada and Venezuela to a few coastal strongpoints. But most of Peru, Upper Peru and Ecuador remained in Spanish hands. Republican action against slavery tended to be associated with military operations, creating, as they did, a pressure for manumission. In mobilising for the liberation of Ecuador Bolivar was forced to order particularly heavy levies of the slave population of Colombia, since many *llaneros* were unwilling to follow him so far from their native habitat; as always desertions and illness had taken a far higher toll of the patriot ranks than battle casualties. In José Antonio de Sucre Bolivar found a lieutenant willing to brush aside the complaints of the slave-owners.

Revolution in the Southern Cone

The independence movements of the River Plate region faced a less formidable Spanish power than had the liberation forces in Venezuela but encountered grave problems by virtue of their own disparity. The impulse to creole self-assertion had been revealed in 1806–7 when the militia, including *pardo* detachments, had acquitted itself well in defeating the expedition of the British Admiral Popham. In May 1810 a creole-dominated Assembly in Buenos Aires established an autonomous junta there. After a fierce struggle the junta was taken over by a radical

faction led by Rivadavia. One of the ways signalled its ascendancy was to publish a de the conservative and monarchist forces enjo merchants of Buenos Aires, many of whor the slave trade. In February 1813 a Co *libertad de vientres*, namely freedom for th The sixth article stipulated that 'the childrer must remain in the house of their masters (t age of twenty'. Until the age of fifteen the payment and should be paid one *peso* a years. Subsequent decrees made provision and *libertos*. The Assembly also decreed tl the territory of the United Provinces wou angered the Brazilians and some of the c Assembly did not declare for complete certainly concerned to establish the author reaching self-government. The anti-slavery time when it was known that anti-slav proposed to the Cortes at Cadiz. The Ass own credentials in this field and, as a Buen immortalise the 'first instants of its r offending against property rights.'[16]

This cautious method of enacting aboli of the 15,000 or so slaves of Buenos Aires urged the slaves to blame Spaniards for h state from which no decree could reall become another's personal property. Assembly to adopt one further meas implications, namely the conscription o service with the revolutionary armies.[17] N proportion of their male slaves of mi completion of five years' military servi would be legally free. In May 1813 the A 7 and 8, comprised of over a thousand Aires; in 1816 the coloured battalio compulsory purchase of 576 slaves of S could avoid military service by contr proprietor might then be enrolled in a r light, local police duties. The regiments d hard to fill and not infrequently vagal drafted into them. Unless they had some were vulnerable to arbitrary military ir regarded as particularly acceptable recr

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faction led by Rivadavia. One of the ways in which Rivadavia's group signalled its ascendancy was to publish a decree against the slave trade; the conservative and monarchist forces enjoyed the support of the large merchants of Buenos Aires, many of whom had some involvement in the slave trade. In February 1813 a Constituent Assembly enacted *libertad de vientres*, namely freedom for the children of slave mothers. The sixth article stipulated that 'the children of *castas* who are born free must remain in the house of their masters (*patrones*) until they reach the age of twenty'. Until the age of fifteen the *liberto* was to work without payment and should be paid one *peso* a month during the next five years. Subsequent decrees made provision for the education of slaves and *libertos*. The Assembly also decreed that any slaves introduced to the territory of the United Provinces would be free, a provision that angered the Brazilians and some of the *caudillos* of the interior. This Assembly did not declare for complete independence but it was certainly concerned to establish the authority that would underpin far-reaching self-government. The anti-slavery decrees were endorsed at a time when it was known that anti-slave trade measures had been proposed to the Cortes at Cadiz. The Assembly wished to establish its own credentials in this field and, as a Buenos Aires newspaper put it, to immortalise the 'first instants of its moral existence ... without offending against property rights.'[16]

This cautious method of enacting abolition meant that the condition of the 15,000 or so slaves of Buenos Aires had not been altered; patriots urged the slaves to blame Spaniards for having reduced them to a legal state from which no decree could really free them, since they had become another's personal property. Military necessity led the Assembly to adopt one further measure with some anti-slavery implications, namely the conscription of slaves and free blacks for service with the revolutionary armies.[17] Masters were obliged to sell a proportion of their male slaves of military age to the state; on completion of five years' military service these involuntary recruits would be legally free. In May 1813 the Assembly established Battalions 7 and 8, comprised of over a thousand slaves conscripted in Buenos Aires; in 1816 the coloured battalions were reinforced by the compulsory purchase of 576 slaves of Spanish masters. Slave-owners could avoid military service by contributing a slave recruit; the proprietor might then be enrolled in a militia or guard unit, with only light, local police duties. The regiments destined for the front lines were hard to fill and not infrequently vagabonds or criminals would be drafted into them. Unless they had some powerful protector, free blacks were vulnerable to arbitrary military impressment. That slaves were regarded as particularly acceptable recruits is suggested by a penalty

imposed on non-slave-owning Spaniards; they were required either to buy a slave for the army or to pay $200.[18]

The provinces of the interior were eager to shake off colonial rule but were anxious that Buenos Aires should not replace Spain as the new metropolis and arbiter of their commerce. These provinces wished to regulate their own trade with the outside world and not suffer dictation from the merchants and officials of Buenos Aires. The resistance of the interior provinces was both geographically and politically heterogeneous; some caudillos resented the anti-slavery measures of the Assembly of 1813, others, more responsive to the large *pardo* population, proved willing to go further. The gaucho leader Artigas first urged the need for a federation of autonomous states and then led armed defiance of both Spain and of the *porteños*. Artigas and his followers in the *Banda Oriental* (nucleus of the future Uruguay) maintained their independence with great difficulty; in 1817 they reached a separate commercial agreement with British consular officials. Artigas was himself a *caudillo* who originally enjoyed the support of fellow *estancieros*, the large cattle-ranchers. But in the course of sustaining his challenge he proposed swingeing taxation of the wealthy and a more radical approach to slave emancipation than that adopted by the Congress of 1813.

The *Reglamento provisorio* issued by Artigas in 1815 proclaimed the confiscation of royalist property and the distribution of land to all those willing to work it, specifically including the mulattos and former slaves. A contemporary noted:

> There is no doubt a considerable fermentation has been excited amongst the slaves by his proclamations, and it is extremely probable very many of them will escape and join his army. . . . The general feeling amongst people of property, not only on this side of the River Plate but also on the opposite one, is against Artigas, whose popularity, although considerable, is entirely confined to the lower orders of the community.[19]

The radical approach pursued by Artigas led the Portuguese authorities in Brazil to combine with the forces of Buenos Aires against him. Other *caudillos* of the interior failed to support him and he was eventually obliged to withdraw, defeated, to Paraguay in 1820.

However, the vigour with which Artigas had fought nourished a sense of American independence and impressed the military in Buenos Aires, whose leaders had repeatedly failed to extend the revolution to Upper Peru and who had given ground to the Portuguese in the struggle to maintain the misnamed 'United Provinces' of the River Plate. The United Provinces had not declared their independence until 1816 and were subsequently stuck in a mainly defensive posture, resisting royalist

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expeditions from Upper Peru. So long as Spanish power remained entrenched in the Andes the independence of the fractious provinces of the River Plate could not be secure, nor could they have much hope of recovering land lost to royalist Brazil.

The forces and strategy needed to consolidate American independence in the south, and to advance upon the Spanish forces in Peru, were assembled by General José San Martín, leader of the Army of the Andes based in the eastern province of Cuyo. San Martín planned to liberate Chile and advance up the coast to Lima, outflanking the Spanish forces which had repulsed several direct attacks from the United Provinces. At least a half of San Martín's soldiers were to be *pardos* or blacks, and many of them former slaves, including the Eighth Battalion. General Miller, the British second-in-command of the Eighth Battalion, wrote that these soldiers, mostly former house slaves, were 'distinguished throughout the war for their valour, consistency and patriotism. . . . Many of them rose to be good non-commissioned officers.'[20] While General Belgrano had expressed low regard for the blacks, San Martín saw them as a crucial resource in extending the revolution. As Governor and commander of Cuyo he made vigorous use of the manumission powers latent in the decree of 1813. In the province of Cuyo there were 4,200 slaves, 13,000 Indians and mestizos, and 8,500 free blacks out of a total population of 43,000. San Martín enrolled 780 slaves in the province compared with 1,500 free men; slaves of military age not recruited to the Army of the Andes were enrolled in auxiliary detachments. Masters whose slaves were conscripted were compensated by receiving land allocations; in a number of cases Spanish prisoners replaced slaves in the workshops or on the estates. San Martín was later to display little sympathy for democracy but, perhaps in an effort to consolidate his base, the Mendoza electoral regulations of 1817 stipulated that all free men over twenty-one years old, including manumitted ex-slaves and free *pardos*, were entitled to vote.[21]

Crossing the Andes with 5,000 men San Martín joined forces with the Chilean forces led by Bernardo O'Higgins. In an address to former slaves before the battle of Chacabuco in February 1817 San Martín pointed out that they were now full citizens and warned them that the Spanish already had offers from merchants in Santiago to buy captured blacks and return them to slavery. San Martín eventually defeated the Spanish at a decisive engagement, the battle of Maipú, in 1818.

Neither slavery nor the imperial establishment were very strong in Chile. The fact that there were only 10,000 slaves in Chile had encouraged the Chilean autonomists to adopt anti-slavery measures, albeit moderate ones, at an early period. A junta led by creole officials

had set about organising self-government in 1810. Without ever formally declaring independence it had convoked a Congress dedicated to elaborating a new constitution in 1811. Following a factional struggle, the more conservative deputies were purged. Manuel de Salas, Secretary of the Congress, then presented to it a law which banned the slave trade, freed the children of slave mothers and freed slaves brought to Chile for more than six months; slavery was denounced as contrary to the spirit of Christianity and humanity; slave-owners were urged to treat their slaves kindly.[22] This law was approved and made Chile the first Spanish American territory to adopt the *libertad de vientres*. The passage of the law had a considerable impact on the slave population of Santiago. Some 300 slaves, some it was later claimed carrying knives, came forward to demand their liberty and to offer themselves as soldiers for the *patria*. This caused some alarm and seven of the leading members of the *liga de esclavos* were arrested. The junta had enacted a measure in August 1811, two months before the 'free womb' decree, allowing the military recruitment of slaves – half their pay was to go as compensation to their former owners and they were only to be enlisted with the latter's consent. In Chile as elsewhere in South America there was often a gap between law and reality; a supplementary decree of May 1813, noting with distress that the term *esclavo* still appeared in parish registers for new-born infants, made this an offence.[23] As royalists advanced into Chile in the following year the radical patriot commander Carrera, who had already liberated his own slaves, secured agreement for raising a regiment of *Ingenuos*, or manumitted slaves; their masters were compensated, as before, but did not have to consent. However, this measure was soon overtaken by events, as a royalist restoration suspended all patriot legislation.

The victories of the Army of the Andes in 1817 and 1818 led to the resuscitation of earlier laws relating to slavery. Slaves were enrolled in the patriot forces and the coloured militia and police of Santiago distinguished itself at the battle of Maipú. The *libertad de vientres* was reasserted but no further steps taken to promote military manumission. For five years after 1818 nothing further was done for Chile's three or four thousand remaining slaves. They were themselves too few to constitute much of a social or political force, though the persistence of slavery remained a symbolically charged issue. The young Republic's energies were drained by the continuing struggle against Spain. O'Higgins, as *Director Supremo*, put the resources of the Chilean government at the service of San Martín.

In 1820 San Martín used Chile as the springboard for an attack on Peru, where Spain's Viceroy, administrators and garrison still held undisputed sway. Peru had a population of a little over a million, some

600,000 of whom were Indians, living in co labour levy of the *mita*; some 300,000 concentrated in the mining regions and urbar in regions of subsistence agriculture adjacen slaves and 40,000 free blacks and mulatto menial labour force in Lima and the coastal greatly predominated among the 140,000 Indians and mestizos made them hesitant to movement. Following the great convulsion Amarú, there had been further more local revolt. Tupac Amarú had declared an end to slaves were rare in the Andean region – there in Cuzco some of whom joined Tupac Amar of Lacamarca rose in rebellion in 1806 the project to turn them into *mitayos* and *yanac* Inca term for slave. However, the landow prospect of turning Indian villagers into cha was to subordinate them to periodic forcec Indians to a uniform degree of depen concessions extended to particular commur conflicts.[24]

With the aid of a Chilean fleet commanc Martín established an expeditionary force or in September 1820 and, joining forces wit patriots, began a slow advance on Lima. liberating army were men of colour. By F belonging to royalists had been conscript made no general appeal to the 'lower orde the British commodore Bowles, there was obtain 'an undue preponderance' and disposition dangerous in any country but r where the unenlightened portion of the c (particularly the slaves and Indians) a formidable'.[25]

San Martín's strategy was to use mili Peruvian oligarchy to desert the Spanis successful *pronunciamento* at Cadiz in fa tional regime strengthened San Martín's support of the Peruvian aristocracy. The S believing that the empire could only be sa removed the duly appointed Viceroy, Pez was not acting decisively enough; they re own number, General José de la Serna. Pe

anising self-government in 1810. Without ever dependence it had convoked a Congress dedicated ew constitution in 1811. Following a factional nservative deputies were purged. Manuel de Salas, gress, then presented to it a law which banned the children of slave mothers and freed slaves brought an six months; slavery was denounced as contrary stianity and humanity; slave-owners were urged to dly.[22] This law was approved and made Chile the an territory to adopt the *libertad de vientres*. The ad a considerable impact on the slave population of slaves, some it was later claimed carrying knives, lemand their liberty and to offer themselves as *a*. This caused some alarm and seven of the leading *de esclavos* were arrested. The junta had enacted a 1811, two months before the 'free womb' decree, recruitment of slaves – half their pay was to go as ir former owners and they were only to be enlisted sent. In Chile as elsewhere in South America there tween law and reality; a supplementary decree of vith distress that the term *esclavo* still appeared in new-born infants, made this an offence.[23] As nto Chile in the following year the radical patriot , who had already liberated his own slaves, secured ıg a regiment of *Ingenuos*, or manumitted slaves; ompensated, as before, but did not have to consent. sure was soon overtaken by events, as a royalist d all patriot legislation.

he Army of the Andes in 1817 and 1818 led to the ier laws relating to slavery. Slaves were enrolled in and the coloured militia and police of Santiago t the battle of Maipú. The *libertad de vientres* was rther steps taken to promote military manumission. 1818 nothing further was done for Chile's three or aining slaves. They were themselves too few to a social or political force, though the persistence of symbolically charged issue. The young Republic's ned by the continuing struggle against Spain, *ctor Supremo*, put the resources of the Chilean ervice of San Martín.

rtín used Chile as the springboard for an attack on s Viceroy, administrators and garrison still held eru had a population of a little over a million, some

600,000 of whom were Indians, living in communities subject to the labour levy of the *mita*; some 300,000 mestizos were mainly concentrated in the mining regions and urban centres of the Andes, or in regions of subsistence agriculture adjacent to them; about 40,000 slaves and 40,000 free blacks and mulattos furnished the principal menial labour force in Lima and the coastal lowlands. Though creoles greatly predominated among the 140,000 or so whites, fear of the Indians and mestizos made them hesitant to support the independence movement. Following the great convulsion of 1780, led by Tupuc Amarú, there had been further more localised outbreaks of Indian revolt. Tupac Amarú had declared an end to personal bondage, though slaves were rare in the Andean region – there were said to be 300 blacks in Cuzco some of whom joined Tupac Amarú. When the 'free Indians' of Lacamarca rose in rebellion in 1806 they attacked the landowners project to turn them into *mitayos* and *yanaconas* – the latter being the Inca term for slave. However, the landowners of Peru had no real prospect of turning Indian villagers into chattel slaves – their true aim was to subordinate them to periodic forced labour and to reduce all Indians to a uniform degree of dependence, cancelling out all concessions extended to particular communities in the course of past conflicts.[24]

With the aid of a Chilean fleet commanded by Lord Cochrane, San Martín established an expeditionary force on the southern coast of Peru in September 1820 and, joining forces with a contingent of Peruvian patriots, began a slow advance on Lima. A high proportion of the liberating army were men of colour. By February 1821 4,180 slaves belonging to royalists had been conscripted. However, San Martín made no general appeal to the 'lower orders' since, as he explained to the British commodore Bowles, there was a danger that these would obtain 'an undue preponderance' and manifest 'a revolutionary disposition dangerous in any country but more particularly in this ... where the unenlightened portion of the community are so numerous (particularly the slaves and Indians) and at the same time so formidable'.[25]

San Martín's strategy was to use military pressure to induce the Peruvian oligarchy to desert the Spanish cause. The news of the successful *pronunciamento* at Cadiz in favour of a Liberal constitutional regime strengthened San Martín's hand in negotiating for the support of the Peruvian aristocracy. The Spanish military commanders, believing that the empire could only be saved by emergency measures, removed the duly appointed Viceroy, Pezuela, on the grounds that he was not acting decisively enough; they replaced him with one of their own number, General José de la Serna. Peru and Upper Peru were now

the only sizeable territories controlled by Spain in South America and their defence was vital to the empire's prospects of survival. Amongst the measures taken by the new Viceroy was the conscription of 1,500 slaves to strengthen the depleted royalist garrison; the owners of the slaves were promised compensation while the slaves themselves were promised manumission at the end of six years' service.

Despite the promises given by La Serna, his action in conscripting slaves was disturbing to the *hacendados* of the region and was a factor in encouraging some of them to side with San Martín's expeditionary force. San Martín's forces entered Lima in July 1821 and several thousand citizens signed a declaration of independence for Peru a few days later. San Martín was declared Protector of the new state. In the following month the new authorities issued a decree establishing *libertad de vientres* and banning the slave trade. But they hesitated to offer manumission to all slaves prepared to fight against Spain. The restraint of San Martín and the revolutionary junta reflected the continuing importance they attached to winning the support of the Peruvian oligarchy. The junta was somewhat bolder in its declarations concerning the Indian tribute, announcing its abolition in August 1821; the Indian levy was a fiscal instrument whose suppression created a problem for the treasury rather than property-holders.[26]

The Spanish garrison successfully held out in Callao, Lima's port, and prevented the liberation army from consolidating their coastal bridgehead. San Martín's forces suffered illness and demoralisation. In November 1821 the revolutionary authorities offered freedom to the slaves of Spaniards who were willing to fight for the new nation, but not to similarly disposed slaves belonging to Patriots. Threatened with a royalist advance on Lima, the Republicans organised a slave militia; San Martín declared that twenty-five members of this force, chosen by lot, would be manumitted after payment of compensation to their owners. But despite such restraint the ragged conflict between Spanish and republican forces promoted the disintegration of the slave regime. Slaves were recruited on an *ad hoc* basis by commanders whose columns had been thinned by illness; and, of course, the disruption of war allowed slaves to escape.

In a number of the early Republics the quickly changing political conflict led to the successive enactment of laws or constitutions which contradicted one another. In none did the somersaults follow one another so swiftly as in Peru, at least so far as slavery was concerned. Threatened by royalist successes the conservative Peruvian leader the Marquis of Torre Tagle, a member of San Martín's administration and himself a large landowner, at last consented on April 11th 1822 to decree a general levy of slaves, taking one-fifth of those in the towns

and one-tenth of those on rural estates. verifying the fitness of the slave recruits, for and for conceding manumission after leng drawn up. Two weeks later, on April 25th, *Retracción de manumisiones*; the military s doubtless the *hacendados* had made their comedy was repeated the next year, with decree issued in January being revoked o more than three-quarters of the members men of colour, many of them former sla *criollos* volunteering to liberate Peru was blacks, formed into a *Batallón de Ci* responsive. The Indian populations of th geographically and politically beyond th movement. Free-lance *montoneros* infiltr from Argentina as well as the Peruvi communities were as likely to harass as some of whom acted as predators rather eventually evacuated Callao but no pro Serna's main forces, which continued to bulk of Peru's population lived.[27]

The cautious Peruvian strategy of lib victories of Bolivar and Sucre in Colomb forces occupied Quito, following Sucre's 1822. Bolivar enjoyed executive power enrol and manumit those slaves he deem Martín sought to persuade Bolivar to revolution in Peru at the celebrated con 1822; failing to do so he withdrew, le Northern Liberator. In March and April army, commanded by Sucre, to marc disintegrating forces of liberation in Per Lima in September. By a decree of Congress appointed Bolívar dictator.

After great efforts Bolivar and Sucre 8,000 men to the sierra; about half of th Serna was strongly entrenched with a la Indian auxiliaries, though somewhat distr ultra-royalist faction. In December 182 defeat on La Serna at the Battle of Ayacu of Spain's South American empire. Th regime in Upper Peru was brought d remaining outposts of Spanish resistance

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and one-tenth of those on rural estates. Elaborate procedures for verifying the fitness of the slave recruits, for compensating their masters and for conceding manumission after lengthy terms of service were drawn up. Two weeks later, on April 25th, the same official decreed a *Retracción de manumisiones*; the military situation had improved and doubtless the *hacendados* had made their opposition clear. A similar comedy was repeated the next year, with a sweeping manumission decree issued in January being revoked on March 1st. Nevertheless, more than three-quarters of the members of the liberation army were men of colour, many of them former slaves. The numbers of white *criollos* volunteering to liberate Peru was very disappointing. The free blacks, formed into a *Batallón de Cívicos Pardos*, were more responsive. The Indian populations of the *altiplano* remained both geographically and politically beyond the range of the liberation movement. Free-lance *montoneros* infiltrated the Andean provinces from Argentina as well as the Peruvian coast; but the Indian communities were as likely to harass as to welcome these guerrillas, some of whom acted as predators rather than liberators. The Spanish eventually evacuated Callao but no progress was made against La Serna's main forces, which continued to hold the interior where the bulk of Peru's population lived.[27]

The cautious Peruvian strategy of liberation contrasted with the victories of Bolivar and Sucre in Colombia and Ecuador. Colombian forces occupied Quito, following Sucre's victory at Pichincha in May 1822. Bolivar enjoyed executive power in Ecuador and was able to enrol and manumit those slaves he deemed suitable for his army. San Martín sought to persuade Bolivar to assume leadership of the revolution in Peru at the celebrated conference of Guayaquil in July 1822; failing to do so he withdrew, leaving the way clear for the Northern Liberator. In March and April 1823 Bolivar assigned a large army, commanded by Sucre, to march to the assistance of the disintegrating forces of liberation in Peru. Bolivar himself arrived in Lima in September. By a decree of February 1824 the Peruvian Congress appointed Bolívar dictator.

After great efforts Bolivar and Sucre brought an army of nearly 8,000 men to the sierra; about half of them were *pardos* or blacks. La Serna was strongly entrenched with a larger Spanish force and many Indian auxiliaries, though somewhat distracted by the disaffection of an ultra-royalist faction. In December 1824 Sucre inflicted a crushing defeat on La Serna at the Battle of Ayacucho. This was the death-knell of Spain's South American empire. The quasi-independent royalist regime in Upper Peru was brought down in April 1825 and the remaining outposts of Spanish resistance surrendered within the year.

In the meantime the Republic of Chile had moved to suppress slavery, though not under the leadership of O'Higgins. Chile's first *Director Supremo* was forced to resign in 1823. He had committed the country's scant resources to the Peruvian conflict without achieving any decisive result. Indeed the manifest deterioration of the position of the liberation forces in Peru in 1822–3 greatly alarmed patriot opinion. O'Higgins was also opposed by members of the landed aristocracy who had been alienated by his suppression of titles and attempt to abolish *mayorazgo* (entail). The more liberal patriots were opposed to O'Higgins's dictatorial style and to his refusal to sanction the military manumission of slaves. However, the motley coalition of urban Liberals and provincial *caudillos* who ejected O'Higgins found difficulty in constructing a successor regime. A Constitutional Convention was held at which a call was made to emancipate all slaves; the chief author of this decree was a lawyer and veteran patriot leader, José Miguel Infante. The Chilean Emancipation Law, more radical than any adopted in North America, was unanimously endorsed by the Senate at a time when it was at loggerheads with the new *Director Supremo* or chief of state, General Ramón Freire. Doubtless the Senate, and the Liberal politicians who now controlled it, saw the slave question as one which would embarrass Freire and his Minister of Government, Mariano de Egaña, a Liberal who had always proclaimed abolitionist convictions. Freire and Egaña informed the Senate that they could not accept an emancipation decree that did not indemnify slave-owners for the loss of their property. But the Senate, aware of the strength of patriotic and popular opinion on which it could count, maintained that emancipation should be accompanied by no compensation. In July 1823 the new *Director Supremo* and his Government Minister gave way, though the latter issued 'regulations' which stipulated that slaves could only obtain their freedom by registering with the police, when they would have to prove that they had a job or were properly married. The office of the Supreme Director received two protests against the abolition of slavery: one from a group of respectable women complaining that the law would cause unhappiness and insubordination amongst domestic slaves; the other supposedly from 200 slaves arguing that they did not want to lose the protection and welfare afforded to them by their masters. However, these were the last attempts to defend slavery in Chile.

Both because of the small number of slaves affected and because of the lack of compensation, Chilean abolition might be compared to emancipation in Massachusetts; but the fact that it was openly legislated by the government, rather than smuggled in the back-door by judicial decision, gave it a more radical and clear-cut character. The

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Chilean treasury was exhausted and in no position to fund compensation for the slave-owners. Expropriation of the latter was widely accepted both because many other proprietors had been taxed for the war effort and because Chile's few thousand slaves worked as domestics; unless they were conscripted into the armed forces – admittedly a probable fate for those of military age – they were likely to remain in the service of their masters who would suffer no real loss. Slavery lacked economic weight and slaveholding was a minor source of wealth even for most slaveholders. Nevertheless, Chilean emancipation was a striking patriotic gesture and facilitated recruitment to the army and navy of those who had been protected from conscription by their slave status.[28]

Some *de facto* slaveholding may have survived in Chile for a few years after 1823; certainly it survived for over two years in the Spanish-controlled parts of the national territory, notably the off-shore island of Chiloé, whose surrender completed the liberation of South America in January 1826. The republican commitment to abolition was to be reiterated in all basic documents over the next decade. Even the authoritarian and paternalist constitution proposed by Juan Egaña, son of the previous government Minister, in December 1823 confirmed that there could be no slaves in Chile. For a few years Chilean political life was dominated by struggles within the oligarchy. The diverse factions of Liberal *pipiolos* (novices), Conservative *pelucones* (bigwigs) and Liberal–Conservative *estanqueros* (state contractors) or *o'higginistas* were agreed in upholding both the formal freedom of all citizens and the real subordination of the mass of exploited peasantry. While the landed oligarchy was largely white the peasant *inquilinos* and *peones* were mostly coloured. But no faction supported the restoration of a formal caste system or the reinstitution of slavery. A mulatto officer who had distinguished himself at Maipú, José Romero, was promoted to the Captaincy of the *Batallón Cívico* in 1830 and was subsequently nominated to an honorary post with the Chamber of Deputies. The Liberal Constitution of 1828 and the Conservative Constitution of 1833 both reiterated that there were no slaves in Chile. The Liberal/patriotic interlude of 1823–9 had legislatively discredited and destroyed slaveholding; with the succeeding Conservative regime the country's compact size permitted the creation of a government of greater competence, integration and authority than was to be found in the other succession states of South America. The suppression of slavery became a fact as well as a law. The decree of 1823 and its subsequent reaffirmations made Chile the first properly constituted Spanish American Republic to abolish slavery outright.[29]

The Chilean example encouraged Bolivar to capitalise on his

triumphs by proposing new anti-slavery measures in neighboroughing Peru and Bolivia. The Liberator's objective was to establish authoritative government not to embark on some universal crusade against slavery; indeed prior to the Congress of Panama in 1826 Bolivar made it quite clear that consolidation in South America would take priority over attempts to spread the revolution to Spain's slave colonies in the Caribbean.[30]

The Post-Independence Settlement in South America

The victories of Bolivar and Sucre gave them enormous prestige and appeared to make them the arbiters of the nations they had liberated. Bolivar recommended a constitution for Peru and laws for Bolivia that would inaugurate a programme of extensive slave manumission. He saw the survival of slavery as a derogation of proper sovereignty, a mark of primitiveness and parochialism. Abolitionist measures would help to assert a new American civic ideal based on the rejection of caste distinctions and odious discriminations. While he did not favour immediate, outright emancipation, he did urge the new states to fund manumission boards which would arrange for the systematic freeing of slaves. In the aftermath of war there were still some thousands of slaves in Peru and a general shortage of labour made *hacendados* very unwilling to lose those that remained to them. Bolivar proposed that the Peruvian Constitution of 1826 should include a clause committing the state to the emancipation of the slaves; this was removed by the delegates on the grounds that it would be inimical to agricultural recovery in coastal Peru. The new Peruvian government also restored the tribute levied from the Indian communities, since the government suffered a chronic lack of funds. The recalcitrance of the Peruvian proprietors was born of a failing rather than thriving plantation agriculture.[31]

An attempt was made to restore slave discipline in the Peruvian plantation zone in 1825, with new controls over slave movements and prohibitions against allowing slaves access to arms. But even the influential coastal *hacendados* knew that they could not return to slavery those who had fought in the liberation armies. The Peruvian plantations were left with slave crews containing disproportionate numbers of women, children and old people. The slave population overall had dropped to perhaps a half its former size, if the *libertos* owing labour to their mothers' owners are included. The purchase tax on slaves was eliminated in 1825 and it is possible that some may have been brought to the country, perhaps from Brazil, despite the previous

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bans. However, the plantation economy of the coastal zone did not prosper; it lacked either a well-balanced or skilled work-force, or a prosperous internal market, while freight charges to Europe were exorbitant. The dismal fate of O'Higgins, the former dictator of Chile who had been given a Peruvian sugar plantation by San Martín, illustrates some of the problems. In an attempt to modernise his estate he bought an English steam-engine to grind the cane; the slaves and *libertos* were housed in barracks named after his victories or fellow Liberators. But try as he might O'Higgins failed to restore the estate to viability and was obliged to devote more land to subsistence cultivation. He lacked the sort of skilled workers hired or trained by the Cuban planters and his work-force was desultory and disorderly. When invited to review the passing-out parade of the Peruvian military academy in 1828, O'Higgins had to decline since his old uniform was in tatters and he could not afford a new one.[32]

With several disappointing experiences behind him Bolivar sought to establish in the new Republic of Bolivia a more effective and imposing system of government. Strong government powers, conferred on a President-for-life, were to be balanced by guarantees for the liberty of the individual, including a provision which outlawed slavery. In Bolivar's view the state should be the embodiment of a 'moral power' and not the plaything either of special interests or of the populace. The General Assembly of the new state voted to give Bolivar a million dollars in recognition of his services. He would only accept the money on condition that it was used to purchase the freedom of 1,000 slaves. The money was never paid. Bolivar's draft of the constitution declared that 'all those who until now have been slaves are Bolivian citizens; and they are thereby freed by the publication of this constitution; a special law shall determine the amount to be paid as indemnity to their former owners'. Bolivar's text was amended by the delegates to read that the slaves were now citizens 'but they cannot abandon the house of their former masters except in the form which a special law shall determine'.[33] There were very few slaves in Bolivia – they were thought to number 4,700 – but those there were owned by the white creoles who dominated the new state. The latter were prepared to envisage an end to slavery as a juridical status but only if their former chattels remained servile dependants. Unlike Chile in 1823 there was now no military pressure for manumission or concessions to a more expansive patriotism; moreover some of the Bolivian slaves were concentrated on estates near La Paz, giving slavery somewhat greater economic weight. But perhaps the decisive reason for the recalcitrance of the Bolivian delegates was simply that they had tired of Colombian tutelage, with its large ambitions and concern for abstract issues. Bolivar and Sucre, who

could only count on their own increasingly unpopular Colombian or Venezuelan troops, had no choice but to give way to the Bolivian oligarchy. When Sucre withdrew from La Paz in 1828 the question of slavery in Bolivia had not been clearly resolved; in 1831 and on later occasions slavery was declared at an end. But the real situation of the former slaves remains unclear, since Bolivia's political classes, though possessed of a definite sense of national identity, lacked the will or capacity to sustain a proper government or state despite the Liberator's hopes.

In the last years of his life Bolivar grandiosely planned to recover from the setbacks he had encountered by leading a Union of the Andes, encompassing Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. But by 1830 his plan was in ruins and he was himself obliged to step down as President of Colombia; he died in December of that year. The Liberator had returned to Gran Colombia in 1826 in the hope of bringing order and purpose to this disunited Republic. The Venezuelans resented the government in Bogotá, which had been entrusted to Santander, the executive Vice-President. Colombia itself resembled a congerie of mini-republics, or rather an incongruous juxtaposition of latifundist fiefdoms and rural communes of former slaves and Indians hostile to republican authority. The Bogotá authorities had raised large loans in Europe which had been eaten up by salaries or frittered away in half-complete development projects. Attempts to introduce regular steam services along the River Magdalena proved abortive.

The Liberator was angered to discover that only 300 slaves had been manumitted by the boards established for that purpose in 1821. In a decree of 1827 he attempted to strengthen the *Juntas de Manumisión* and ordered that their funds should be spent within one year on manumissions, starting with the oldest and most deserving slaves. The failure of the juntas was rooted in the fact that they were beholden to the local possessing classes who had no interest in liquidating slave property. In unscrupulous hands the Manumission Boards could devise ways of prolonging the servitude of the *manumisos* by alleging that they would otherwise become vagabonds. The reform of the Manumission Boards obliged them to levy the inheritance tax more systematically and to render a proper accounting to the central government. However, Bolivar was not prepared for a confrontation with the slave-owning *hacendados*. Bolivar's aim was to restore the unity and integrity of Gran Colombia by accommodating prevailing interests and concentrating on the main enemy – Santander's Liberalism, with its legalistic attachment to the federal principles of the 1821 constitution and policy of saddling Colombia with expensive foreign loans and allowing monied interests a free rein. Bolivar also opposed the localism of the landed proprietors

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and of the military *caudillos* thrown up by the liberation struggle, but he saw Santander's liberalism as the greater threat. Bolivar was painfully aware that the new race of *caudillos* were interested in the state as a source of land titles and salaries rather than *poder moral*. But he believed he could make use of his old ties to the military to defeat the prostitution of the state to financial interests and deploy his prestige to discipline localistic landowers.[34]

In a fateful move Bolivar endorsed the claim of Páez to be the military and political chief of Venezuela; the veteran *llanero* now owned huge estates, including plantations worked in part by slave labour. Bolivar hoped that Páez would help him to check Santander. The aftermath of the independence struggle had left several competing leadership factions and continuing struggles over the precise social content of the new order. Blacks and *pardos* were involved in several attempted revolts in the years 1824–8, initially against Santander, subsequently against Bolivar. Soldiers who had been discharged without pay were particularly restless, while others could not see why white *letrados* should enjoy the lion's share of public posts. Páez, as an uneducated mestizo, could appeal demagogically to such resentments despite being one of the largest latifundists in Venezuela. As a result of republican legislation the collective property of Indian communities had been made alienable, thus exposing them to the risk of dispossession; mestizo peasants had little possibility of buying land which was sold in large lots or conferred on military or political leaders. A commitment to the market and private property inclined Liberals like Santander to endorse such developments. Santander's Liberals defended the 1821 Manumission Law both on principle and in the hope that it would release labour on to the market. Bolivar could see no solution to Colombia's social problems except the construction of a custodial political monopoly based on virtuous veterans of the liberation struggle. The assassination of Sucre in 1830 on a visit to the south-east was a heavy blow to him.

Bolivar's reintegration into the Bogotá regime made him the target of the revolt of Admiral Padilla, a *pardo* or *zambo* corsair who rallied to the Liberal opposition and received backing from the people of Cartagena and the coast, including many people of colour. Like Piar before him Padilla was executed. Bolivar had sided with Páez, and crushed Padilla, largely because the former was Santander's opponent, the latter his ally. Despite Padilla's colour and vaunted Liberalism it is unclear that, even if successful, he would have been either more willing or more able to promote slave emancipation than Bolivar.[35]

Páez proclaimed the Venezuelan Republic in 1830; by the time of Bolivar's death in December Gran Colombia was no more. The new

state modified the Manumission Law; *libertad de vientre* remained, but the *libertos'* period of obligatory service was extended from eighteen to twenty-one years and they were obliged to prove subsequent gainful employment to the Manumission Boards. On the other hand the new government confirmed Bolivar's wartime decrees freeing all the slaves in the provinces of Apure and Guayana; to have done otherwise would have provoked a rebellion amongst the *llaneros* of these provinces.[36]

The population of slaves and *libertos* was surprisingly large. Despite the devastation of war and civil war, despite slave uprisings and escapes, despite royalist support for *insurrección de otra especie* and republican abolitionism, slavery remained quite widespread in the new state. The census of 1834 revealed that Venezuela contained just under 36,000 slaves and *libertos* (children of slaves still obligated to serve their mother's master), with Caracas accounting for 20,600 of this total.[37] At the outbreak of the independence struggle there had been over 80,000 slaves. Venezuela's population had suffered greatly during the fighting, dropping by as much as a third between 1811 and 1821. Thus the decline in the number of slaves was somewhat heavier than that of the population as a whole, but the residual slave population still sizeable. The plantation economy had been hit by the war and Venezuela's exports of cacao also fell by a half; the prices of all plantation products dropped by a half or more as Brazil, Cuba and the United States expanded their output. The survival of slavery did not correspond to a particularly vigorous plantation sector. The plantations which had employed slaves – cacao groves and sugar estates – became of greatly reduced importance. In the 1820s and 1830s coffee replaced cacao as Venezuela's most important export crop; the coffee estates were worked predominantly by wage labourers or tied peasants, with only a few slaves.[38]

The persistence of slavery in Venezuela can be explained in a number of ways. The *conucos* given to the slaves encouraged them not to leave the plantation/hacienda; during the war slaves had sometimes extracted further concessions from their masters. Military manumission had only been offered to adult male slaves of military age; though some relatives might also have gained freedom, slave women and children in principle remained in servitude. Moreover slaves who distrusted the Patriots, or who saw no advantage in exchanging a military for a civilian master, tried to evade military manumission. The survival of slavery in Venezuela, as in some other parts of South America, will have reflected the very insecure conditions that prevailed during and after the independence struggle. With rival armed columns roaming the country, not to speak of simple bandits, the slave could easily find the master's

household a place of refuge that it would which it would be wise to return. The pr was compounded by that of economic insec Venezuela and other parts of the South Ar of economic competition at a time of rec Atlantic world. The growth of the coffee enough nor secure enough to compensate fo for the mass of poorer Venezuelans, even if precarious. The police were urged to roun courts were empowered to condemn them special pleading of the slave-owner that protection and welfare could have had som post-independence period in Spanish Amer

However, the strongest reason for th probably economic – the value of slave property and as collateral. The Manumissio which then acted as a guaranteed minimun when there were only 12,000 slaves left in was still greater than that of the year's dominated Venezuelan politics for most of be closely associated with the interests merchants; the latter advanced credit to sl of their slave property and were conse slavery.

For a similar mixture of reasons sla though no challenge was made to the pr Law of 1821. Endemic conflict between created conditions in which government a effectivity; but such conflict did not favo slaveholding. In mid-century there were stil and *libertos* in Colombia, though this figu this Republic, as elsewhere in Spanish S often pressured to enlist in the army to ens service was widely unpopular because discipline. The recruitment of *libertos* su reducing their own liability to military se rulers, since *libertos* were generally more with their ties to the major exploited comm that, with whatever delays, slavery was on the *liberto* was unenviable, but it was not slave. Even a 'free womb' law that was ta deprived slave-owners of the positive required. The fact that Manumission l

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household a place of refuge that it would be unwise to forsake, or to which it would be wise to return. The pressure of political instability was compounded by that of economic insecurity. Independence exposed Venezuela and other parts of the South America to the withering blast of economic competition at a time of recession in many parts of the Atlantic world. The growth of the coffee economy was neither strong enough nor secure enough to compensate for this. The conditions of life for the mass of poorer Venezuelans, even if free, were undoubtedly very precarious. The police were urged to round up all vagabonds and the courts were empowered to condemn them to penal labour. The hoary special pleading of the slave-owner that he furnished the slave with protection and welfare could have had some substance in the immediate post-independence period in Spanish America.[39]

However, the strongest reason for the survival of slavery was probably economic – the value of slaves not as labourers but as property and as collateral. The Manumission Boards posted slave prices which then acted as a guaranteed minimum. As late as the early 1850s, when there were only 12,000 slaves left in Venezuela, their capital value was still greater than that of the year's coffee crop.[40] Páez, who dominated Venezuelan politics for most of the period 1830–48, was to be closely associated with the interests of latifundists and large merchants; the latter advanced credit to slave-owners against the value of their slave property and were consequently disposed to defend slavery.

For a similar mixture of reasons slavery survived in Colombia, though no challenge was made to the principle of the Manumission Law of 1821. Endemic conflict between Liberals and Conservatives created conditions in which government and law lacked authority and effectivity; but such conflict did not favour the growth of large-scale slaveholding. In mid-century there were still claimed to be 20,000 slaves and *libertos* in Colombia, though this figure may have been inflated. In this Republic, as elsewhere in Spanish South America, *libertos* were often pressured to enlist in the army to ensure their freedom.[41] Military service was widely unpopular because of poor pay and arbitrary discipline. The recruitment of *libertos* suited the mass of citizens by reducing their own liability to military service; it also suited the new rulers, since *libertos* were generally more reliable than Indian recruits, with their ties to the major exploited community. However, it did seem that, with whatever delays, slavery was on the way out. The position of the *liberto* was unenviable, but it was not the same as that of a chattel slave. Even a 'free womb' law that was tampered with, or half-ignored, deprived slave-owners of the positive legal framework that they required. The fact that Manumission Boards set slave prices and

maintained a register did promise an eventual end to outright slavery, as it became impossible to claim that some fit young man or woman was really forty years old.

Ecuador rejected Gran Colombia in April 1830, its dominant classes believing that Bogotá's free trade and *laissez-faire* policies were inimical to their commercial and agricultural interests. The new Republic was contested by the Liberals of Guayaquil but temporarily welcomed by the proprietors of the Cauca, formerly part of New Granada; some of the latter were attracted by the possibility that the new Republic would be more indulgent to slaveholders. But in 1832 Ecuador was forced to return the Cauca to Colombia. The adhesion of Guayaquil, with its *pardo* and free black population, and a compact between the Liberal and Conservative factions led to agreement that the classic Manumission Law was still in force. The military administration of Sucre and Bolivar had left few slaves and *libertos* in Ecuador, though some were still to be found in the interior.[42]

The Buenos Aires constitution of 1819, a document reflecting *porteño* interests, stated that there were no slaves in the United Provinces of the River Plate. When Buenos Aires' claims were challenged by the Federalists of the interior both sides recruited slaves to their armies. During the years 1821–4 the pioneer patriot Rivadavia regained influence and sought to impose a doctrinaire Liberalism and utilitarianism on those parts of the country controlled by the government in Buenos Aires. Rivadavia's ambitious plans for the United Provinces, inspired by his correspondence with Bentham, included the introduction of modern industry, the eradication of slavery, a public educational system and the elaboration of a stringent new labour code, fiercely penalising laziness and vagabondage. These schemes proved hopelessly to over-estimate the administrative and financial resources at the disposal of the government and Rivadavia was forced out. In practice Argentinian manumission did not go beyond the decree of 1813; it meant that female slaves and their children were to be found as domestics in the house of their owners; male *libertos* reaching the age of eighteen were conscripted to the army and often did not become free citizens until they finished lengthy service in it. In 1826 a corsair landed in Patagonia with a hundred slaves; these were declared to be *libertos* simply by virtue of having landed on the soil of the United Provinces – and were then promptly impressed into the army.[43]

In the years 1825–8 the United Provinces had need of soldiers because of its efforts to free the *banda oriental* from Brazilian occupation. The war against the Brazilian Imperialists led to the establishment of Uruguay in 1830, a Republic in which there were very few slaves, though still a sizeable population of *pardos* and blacks; the

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early anti-slavery of Artigas and military manumission during the later liberation struggle help to explain this, though doubtless some slave-owners sold their slaves to Brazilians while they could. When the Uruguayan constitution of 1830 declared slavery at an end, it may have exaggerated but only a little; the constitution was otherwise a document of moderate liberalism conferring political rights only on property-holders. The British favoured the independence of Uruguay, both because it opened its markets to British merchants and because it banned the slave trade. Uruguay's independence was menaced by both Argentina and Brazil; this led some Uruguayan leaders to appeal for British and French support. The country was convenient both to Brazilian slave smugglers and as a place of refuge for Brazilian slaves fleeing their masters. When parts of the country were occupied by Argentina some slaves were reintroduced. In 1842 and again in 1846 the Uruguayan government decreed that there could be no slavery in the country; on the first occasion there were said to be 300 slaves on Uruguayan soil. The Brazilian government continued to demand the return of escaping slaves and sometimes Brazilian masters would send slave-catching teams into Uruguay to recover them.[44]

In the mid-1820s there were still some 6,000 slaves left in Buenos Aires. The shortage of labour in the whole region of the Rio de la Plata encouraged slaveholders to retain as many slaves as they could. A certain amount of slave trading as well as slaveholding took place in Argentina during the 1820s. It was tolerated for a while by the truculent Federalist *caudillo* Juan Manuel de Rosas, who ruled Buenos Aires from 1829. Proximity to Brazil and conflicts with the Unitarians in Uruguay gave opportunities to the Brazilian slave-traders. But Rosas, whose dictatorship was to last until 1852, did not renounce the Manumission Laws. Moreover, he made a point of cultivating a following amongst the urban blacks, whose fraternities and festivals he patronised. The numbers of slaves and *libertos* steadily declined as a consequence of military manumission and the working out of the 1813 law. Rosas saw his mission as being to re-establish order, discipline and respect for the landed proprietors. He was both ruthless and effective in pursuing this goal. Slaveholding was eventually limited by the consequent check to rampant localism and preparedness to enforce legal contracts. Slave-holders were at least obliged to respect the letter, if not the spirit, of the Manumission Laws; in Mendoza a surprisingly large number of the few remaining slaves in 1853 were listed as being forty years old, so that they just escaped being *libertos*.[45]

Slavery probably survived more vigorously than elsewhere in the Spanish River Plate region in Paraguay, within the isolationist and patriarchal regime of the dictator José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia.

Artigas found refuge in Paraguay and land was made available to his ex-slave soldiers. But the Paraguayan leader was a foe not of slavery but of those who claimed to control the River Plate. He responded to the blockade of Paraguay with a complete embargo on trade with the riverine Spanish American states. In this way he protected Paraguay's traditional economy, with its haciendas and *obrajes*, from foreign competition and the disruptive effects of free trade. By the 1830s there were some 25,000 slaves in Paraguay, as many or more as there had been in the last days of Spanish rule. Thousands of these slaves worked in state-owned workshops and estates set up either because *émigrés* had abandoned them or because they filled a national need. However, this was not the intensive slavery of the Caribbean plantations. The Hispanic slave codes, limiting hours of work and strokes of the lash or stipulating a minimum diet, may have been more rigorously enforced in independent Paraguay than they had ever been in the Spanish American empire. Both the medieval *Siete Partidas* and the Code of 1789 were incorporated into Paraguayan law. The commercial isolation of the Republic meant that the remorseless pressure of production for an unquenchable market was replaced by the more fitful pressure of production for local needs. On the death of Francia in 1840 his own slaves were freed. In 1842 the independence of Paraguay was reaffirmed, the suppression of the slave trade reiterated and a law of the 'free womb' adopted. The only country with which Francia's Paraguay had normal trading relationships had been Brazil; the cautious abolitionist decree of 1842 was partly designed to remove the country from the cross-fire between the participants and antagonists of the Brazilian slave trade.[46]

With Paraguay's acceptance of the 'free womb' all of Spanish America had committed itself to an eventual rejection of chattel slavery; a more radical conclusion had already been reached in Mexico.

Mexico and Central America

Mexico achieved independence from Spain not as the result of a protracted but ultimately victorious struggle, as in most parts of South America, but rather through the exhaustion of the imperial power and the growing self-confidence of a largely counter-revolutionary creole elite. The only genuine struggle for independence in Mexico, that led by Hidalgo and Morelos in 1810–15, was defeated, though in ways which weakened both Spanish rule and slavery.

In Mexico the established colonial order was already in disarray prior to Napoleon's invasion. The government in Madrid had

attempted to sequester the rich holdings o
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Viceroy to express sympathy with the
mortgages had been called in by the Chur
of the Viceroy provoked the *Peninsulares*
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Mexico. The seizure of power by the ultra
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commercial agriculture and manufacture
north-west of Mexico City.

The conspirators had realised that the
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African descent; in 1792 the mines of Gu
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In January 1811 Hidalgo's ill-organise
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Hidalgo's movement had rallied most wh

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ıvasion. The government in Madrid had

attempted to sequester the rich holdings of the Church to help finance war against Britain, but in so doing had menaced the colony's entire system of credit. The disturbances in the Peninsula encouraged the Viceroy to express sympathy with the creole proprietors whose mortgages had been called in by the Church. The autonomist leanings of the Viceroy provoked the *Peninsulares* to organise his removal; this coup was led by the Spanish owner of a sugar plantation in central Mexico. The seizure of power by the ultra-Spanish faction provoked a middle-class creole conspiracy against Spanish rule, which in turn detonated a popular uprising in the Bajío, a region of dynamic commercial agriculture and manufacture adjacent to the mining zone north-west of Mexico City.

The conspirators had realised that they needed to mobilise Indian support and had turned to Miguel Hidalgo, a rural priest who spoke Indian languages and was himself perhaps of mixed blood. Few of the labourers and small proprietors of the Bajío were incorporated in traditional Indian communities; the mining boom and its associated prosperity had been interrupted by international uncertainties, conflicts over sequestration and the struggles between rival factions. Food prices had risen sharply; large latifundists and merchants, many of them Spaniards, made a killing. Urging that the *castas* and Indians were victims of fraud, monopoly and extortion, Hidalgo attacked Spanish property and power, soon attracting a ragged armed force 80,000 strong, whose roaming bands would destroy mining buildings and equipment. Guanajuato was sacked in September 1810 and Guadalajara seized shortly thereafter. A movement that invoked the protection of the Virgin of Guadaloupe, and that claimed to be acting as the custodian of Mexico while its monarch was in captivity, mobilised *campesinos* and miners against wealthy *Peninsulares*, generally sparing the lives of rich creoles but not their property. Hidalgo proclaimed the end of the Indian communal tribute system and the suppression of all types of personal bondage. In December 1810 Hidalgo declared from the Palace of Government in Guadalajara that slavery was ended in Mexico. No more than a handful of slaves are likely to have directly benefited from this proclamation, but the rich did own some slaves, while significant numbers of the population of the region would have been of partly African descent; in 1792 the mines of Guanajato recorded a work-force of 3,176 whites, 2,389 mestizos (part Indian) and 2,469 mulattos (part African).[47] While some miners rallied to Hidalgo he also received support from the predominantly Indian *campesinos*.

In January 1811 Hidalgo's ill-organised forces were defeated outside Mexico City by Spanish regulars and creole militia; the radicalism of Hidalgo's movement had rallied most white creoles behind the Spanish

administration and had prompted the mine-owners to create a permanent military force of their own. The Liberals in Cadiz made an effort to accommodate creole reformism by giving Mexico a score of representatives in the Cortes; though some creoles demanded representation based on Mexico's total population. In March 1811 Hidalgo himself was captured and executed. But this was not the end of the uprising. Small guerrilla groups continued the struggle for independence and liberty. José Maria Morelos, another rural priest of mixed descent, assumed leadership of the rebellion and created a small but effective and disciplined armed force. Morelos argued: 'When kings are absent, sovereignty resides solely in the nation; and every nation is free and entitled to form the type of government which it pleases, and not to remain the slave of another.'[48] Morelos declared that all should be equal and that henceforth no distinction should be made between whites, Indians and *castas*. Blacks and mulattos enlisted in his column, some of them former slaves. A radical group amongst his followers, the *Guadalupes*, advocated the distribution of land to the cultivators and the creation of collectively owned agencies for buying and selling agricultural produce. Morelos seems to have endorsed these proposals, at least as a war measure, in the *medidas politicas*. At the Congress of Chilpancingo in 1813 Morelos sponsored a formal Declaration of Independence and the issuing of a decree which confirmed the suppression of slavery in the new nation. Doubtless because of the small number of slaves in Mexico Morelos had little difficulty persuading other leaders of the revolt to accept abolition; in contrast his plans for breaking up landed estates were controversial, even within the ranks of his own movement. In 1815 Morelos was captured and executed by Spanish forces. By 1816 the revolt was extinguished everywhere but in the south, where a small column of independence fighters led by Vicente Guerrero, a follower of Morelos, still held out.

Fearful of the popular rebellion the great majority of whites and of the propertied, whether creole or Spanish, had united behind the imperial power. By so doing the creole militia and military had won some influence within the system of government. The *Cabildo* of Mexico City espoused a moderate autonomism from the beginning of the imperial crisis. A key member of the *Cabildo*, José Miguel Guridi y Alcocer, had represented Mexico in the Cortes at Cadiz in 1811; he had there unsuccessfully urged colonial self-government, the distribution of unoccupied land and the abolition of slavery. He had argued that unless serious reforms were adopted the popular revolt would prevail. Guridi returned to become treasurer of the *Cabildo* of Mexico City and one of those waiting for an occasion to reopen the question of institutional reforms.[49]

The 1820 revolt in Spain had a deep Spanish regime in Mexico. Control of the p were held for deputies to the Cortes. T pronouncements which issued from the Lib landowners and the Church without offerin to creole autonomism. In this confused mander in southern Mexico, a first-gener Itúrbide, issued the *Plan de Iguala*, es Mexican monarchy: 'All inhabitants of distinction between Europeans, Africans an monarchy, with access to all positions ac virtues.'[50] Itúrbide enlisted the support of t a soldier during the insurgency of Morelos conservative interests. However, the officia to enter negotiations with Vicente Guerrero *Iguala*, calculating that it would at least d also gained the support of the Liberals in M was appointed to the sovereign council of the Spanish royalist troops went over t representative of the regime in Madrid, a was subsequently disavowed, signed a trea determination. In September 1821 Mexican with Itúrbide as President of the Regen monarch was found. A Commission on Sla the sovereign council; it reported that there left in Mexico and that they were employe Vera Cruz. On October 13th 1821, two w Independence, the sovereign council issued of slaves and declaring the freedom of all This decree sounded abolitionist, thoug Extra pressure to endorse anti-slavery ma military situation; the fort of San Juan de where there were many free blacks as well places still in the hands of troops loyal t

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The 1820 revolt in Spain had a deeply disruptive effect on the Spanish regime in Mexico. Control of the press was lifted and elections were held for deputies to the Cortes. The stream of decrees and pronouncements which issued from the Liberals in the Cortes alarmed landowners and the Church without offering any substantive concession to creole autonomism. In this confused situation the royalist commander in southern Mexico, a first-generation creole named Agustín Itúrbide, issued the *Plan de Iguala*, establishing an autonomous Mexican monarchy: 'All inhabitants of New Spain, without any distinction between Europeans, Africans and Indians, are citizens of this monarchy, with access to all positions according to their merits and virtues.'[50] Itúrbide enlisted the support of the Church, and his record as a soldier during the insurgency of Morelos earned him the respect of all conservative interests. However, the official armistice had allowed him to enter negotiations with Vicente Guerrero, who supported the *Plan de Iguala*, calculating that it would at least destroy Spanish rule. Itúrbide also gained the support of the Liberals in Mexico City; Guridi y Alcocer was appointed to the sovereign council of the new monarchy. Many of the Spanish royalist troops went over to Itúrbide, while even the representative of the regime in Madrid, a liberal general whose action was subsequently disavowed, signed a treaty recognising Mexican self-determination. In September 1821 Mexican independence was declared, with Itúrbide as President of the Regency Council while a suitable monarch was found. A Commission on Slavery had been established by the sovereign council; it reported that there were just under 3,000 slaves left in Mexico and that they were employed mainly in the ports, notably Vera Cruz. On October 13th 1821, two weeks after the Declaration of Independence, the sovereign council issued a decree banning the import of slaves and declaring the freedom of all those born on Mexican soil. This decree sounded abolitionist, though it left Africans in slavery. Extra pressure to endorse anti-slavery may have been provided by the military situation; the fort of San Juan de Ulúa, just outside Vera Cruz, where there were many free blacks as well as slaves, was one of the few places still in the hands of troops loyal to Spain.[51]

After defeating a Bourbon monarchist faction, Itúrbide declared himself Emperor Agustín I in May 1822. His supposed commitment to abolition did not prevent him from plotting, albeit unsuccessfully, to add to his dominions Cuba, with its rich slave plantations. However, Iturbide was forced out by Federal Republicans in March 1823. While the Republic reaffirmed the suppression of the slave trade, the exact status of slaves or former slaves under the terms of the 1824 constitution devolved upon the constituent states of the Federation. In a number of states the movement of Hidalgo and Morelos had

popularised radical social programmes which now reappeared; these included state purchasing agencies and the abolition of slavery. Between 1825 and 1827 a number of states suppressed slavery outright until there was enough support for a Federal measure. In 1829 Vicente Guerrero was able to mark his brief occupancy of the Presidential Palace by decreeing the suppression of slavery throughout Mexican territory.[52]

Mexican emancipation directly affected only a few thousand slaves. In some ways it may be compared to the suppression of slavery in Chile at about the same time. But it encouraged the enemies of slavery elsewhere and angered the slave-owners, or would-be slave-owners, of the Mexican state of Texas – these being mainly North American interlopers who were moved to set up their own Republic of Texas (1836) in which slavery was again legalised. In contrast to the early Chilean Republic, Mexico in the 1830s was a huge, sprawling and diverse state some parts of which were effectively beyond the reach of the writ of the Federal government. Forms of personal bondage may have survived in the Yucatan or in the wilder reaches of California. But, as the reaction of the Texan slaveholders suggests, the Mexican government at least had an authority worth challenging; silver output had dropped off considerably but it still gave Mexico greater resources than the other Spanish American states.

The creole oligarchy of Central America avoided any major confrontation until 1821–2 when it declared the adhesion of the Captaincy General of Guatemala to the Mexican Empire. In so doing it also adopted, at least formally, the abolitionist decree of October 1821. With the fall of Itúrbide the United Provinces of Central America declared their independence from Mexico. At a meeting of the Constituent Assembly held in 1824 José Simeón Cañas y Villacorta, a deputy from El Salvador, pleaded that without further delay it should be made clear that 'our enslaved brothers should be declared free citizens'.[53] The measure actually adopted decreed that slaves could no longer be born in Central America and established a fund to promote slave manumission. Over the next two decades the United Provinces broke up into the separate states of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. None of the successor states sought to challenge the abolitionist provisions of 1824 and the subsequent development of a modest cash crop sector in agriculture did not depend on slave labour.

The struggle for independence in Spanish America had engaged extraordinary energies. Slaves and former slaves had comprised between a quarter and a half of those who had risked their lives against the

Spaniards. The liberty and equality of the in countless manifestos and constitutions: womb' had been enshrined in many laws. Vicente Guerrero could now hold the hig pyramid continued to be light-skinned at bottom. Slavery had been lamed and the dismantled. The subjugation of Indian ar virtually unscathed; indeed *laissez-faire* exposed to dispossession and exploitation

Slavery was a doomed institution and y a number of the new Republics. It had be Mexico and Chile, where the slaves comp population. It had shrivelled to insignifi America, where there had likewise been and where the main 'social question' munities. The successor states of Gran C populations as did parts of the River Pl slavery was part of the traditional H perfectly congruent with the continuatic personal dependence. On the other, new greater involvement with Atlantic ma respect for private property. Even tho Republics were only a third or a quarte 1810, in some cases much less, it wo capital sum to buy out their proprietors

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The setting up of Manumission Boa of slaves led to a most paradoxical successor states of Gran Colombia. possible forms of collateral, since the reserved price. The Manumission Bo pyramid of credit in countries wh notoriously unstable and public bonds

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Spaniards. The liberty and equality of the citizen had been proclaimed in countless manifestos and constitutions; manumission and the 'free womb' had been enshrined in many laws. A few mestizos like Páez or Vicente Guerrero could now hold the highest positions but the social pyramid continued to be light-skinned at the top, dark-skinned at the bottom. Slavery had been lamed and the formal caste system largely dismantled. The subjugation of Indian and mestizo peasants survived virtually unscathed; indeed *laissez-faire* principles left some more exposed to dispossession and exploitation than before.

Slavery was a doomed institution and yet it stubbornly lingered on in a number of the new Republics. It had been entirely suppressed only in Mexico and Chile, where the slaves comprised 1 per cent or less of the population. It had shrivelled to insignificance in Bolivia and Central America, where there had likewise been very few slaves to start with and where the main 'social question' related to large Indian communities. The successor states of Gran Colombia retained sizeable slave populations as did parts of the River Plate region. On the one hand, slavery was part of the traditional Hispanic American order and perfectly congruent with the continuation of social relations of direct personal dependence. On the other, new social relations, encouraged by greater involvement with Atlantic markets, demanded the utmost respect for private property. Even though slaveholdings in the new Republics were only a third or a quarter as large as they had been in 1810, in some cases much less, it would still require a substantial capital sum to buy out their proprietors.

The new governments, desperately short of cash as they were, saw no possibility of funding a compensated programme of slave emancipation. Most of the new states borrowed in the early years from foreign banks and found it impossible to maintain interest payments or the value of their public bonds – hence the latter could not be offered in compensation. The British government encouraged the new Republics to commit themselves to a ban on slave imports, but it also urged them to adopt free trade and low tariffs. British influence, favouring priority to paying off foreign loans, itself helped to deprive Spanish American governments of the resources they would have needed to finance the sort of emancipation acceptable to Britain.

The setting up of Manumission Boards prepared to buy the freedom of slaves led to a most paradoxical and unexpected result in the successor states of Gran Colombia. Slaves became one of the best possible forms of collateral, since they were backed by a guaranteed reserved price. The Manumission Boards thus helped to sustain a pyramid of credit in countries where financial institutions were notoriously unstable and public bonds of doubtful value.

The compromise measure of *libertad de vientre* had been adopted in in Chile in 1811, in the Río de la Plata in 1813, in Gran Colombia and Peru in 1821 because it respected both patrimonial authority and private property. It freed the unborn and conferred only a conditional freedom on the *libertos*, who could be pressured to perform further service for their master or the state. Its effects had been somewhat anticipated by military manumission, though many freed in this way will have perished in the wars.

In Spanish America as elsewhere a racial caste spirit survived even more tenaciously than the residual black slavery. The old caste system had in its own way regulated racial competition and conflict. It had usually combined small privileges as well as large disabilities. The new system of racial relations would take time to consolidate itself. The greater intrusion of market relations entailed novel, and sometimes virulent, antagonisms which could cluster around colour and inherited ethnic identifications. In Venezuela and Colombia *pardos* had acquired formal equality and some held municipal office or commands in the army. In the Spanish American Republics the free black or mulatto enjoyed more rights and a somewhat better position in society than did the free Negro in the Northern United States, a relevant but not demanding standard of comparison.

Beyond the compromise abolitionism usually implemented the Spanish American liberation struggle had also thrown up a more radical anti-slavery current, notably in the movements led by Hidalgo and Artigas, but their impact had been reduced by defeat. Significantly these movements had been prepared, at the limit, to expropriate landowners as well as slave-owners; in the parlance of the epoch they were 'agrarians', willing to challenge large-scale private property in all its forms. Radical anti-slavery currents had not gained the upper hand, nor had blacks and *pardos* themselves possessed the social weight to destroy slavery outright. But they had inflected the course of the liberation struggle to which they contributed so much and persuaded a number of the Patriots and Liberators, including Bolivar in his better moments, to satisfy some of their demands.

In 1810 Spanish American slavery had been a secondary, perhaps declining, force. However, the mainland did contain nearly quarter of a million slaves and they constituted a major component of the labour force in the vicinity of Caracas and Lima, in some of the valleys of New Granada and such provinces as Córdoba in Río de la Plata. But for the anti-slavery consequences of the liberation struggle these elements of a slave system could have been stimulated and redeployed, much as happened to slavery in Virginia in the period after 1815. Thus coffee cultivation developed apace in the hills bordering the Caribbean in the

1820s and 1830s – and largely because of the this did not take place on the basis of slave labo of slave labour in mainland Spanish Ameri within a wider economy of commodity-pro frustrated by imperial regulation, others independence commercial agriculture could d The pre-independence arrangements between often already in transition, partly in response resistance and revolt. Following independe commercially dynamic sector found they had t usufruct of land to a semi-autonomous pe undertake systematic cultivation. Slavery had t and decaying status than an element in a mo survived as retainers of the *hacendados* in th but even here their cultivation rights made the Life was still hard for peasants and labo discipline maintained by the *mayorales* of disintegrated.

Around the year 1830 the new states of S obscure exception of Paraguay, possessed m legislation than any of the remaining Europ World. Indeed British and French abolitionis by reports from independent Spanish America the South American Republics had put slaver throughout their national territory. Whatev slaves left in Spanish America there was no intervention or some dramatic domestic cou slave system arising in these lands, as manif cotton states of North America. In this American independence marked a major adv independence.

Notes

1. For information on the slave populations of th for New Granada, Chile, Buenos Aires and Puerto Ric *la esclavitud en América Latina*, Buenos Aires 1974, Cuba, Fernando Ortiz, *Los negros esclavos*, Havana 19 Bohigas, *Sobre esclavos, reclutas y mercaderes de qu* Venezuela, Miguel Acosta Saignes, *Vida de los negr* 1978, p. 164, and Federico Brito Figueroa, *Historia e* vols, I, Caracas 1966, p. 160; for Bolivia, R.A. Humpl *on the Trade and Politics of Latin America*, London Ayala, *Lucha politica y origen de los partidos en Ecua* Hugh Hamill, *The Hidalgo Revolt*, Gainesville, Flori

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1820s and 1830s – and largely because of the advances of anti-slavery this did not take place on the basis of slave labour. In 1810 the enclaves of slave labour in mainland Spanish America had been suspended within a wider economy of commodity-producing haciendas, some frustrated by imperial regulation, others protected by it. With independence commercial agriculture could develop along new paths. The pre-independence arrangements between masters and slaves were often already in transition, partly in response to the pressure of slave resistance and revolt. Following independence *hacendados* in the commercially dynamic sector found they had to pay wages or grant the usufruct of land to a semi-autonomous peasant if they wished to undertake systematic cultivation. Slavery had become more of a residual and decaying status than an element in a mode of production; slaves survived as retainers of the *hacendados* in the declining cacao sector, but even here their cultivation rights made them seem more like *peones*. Life was still hard for peasants and labourers, but the ferocious discipline maintained by the *mayorales* of the *grandes cacaos* had disintegrated.

Around the year 1830 the new states of Spanish America, with the obscure exception of Paraguay, possessed more advanced anti-slavery legislation than any of the remaining European colonies in the New World. Indeed British and French abolitionism were to be encouraged by reports from independent Spanish America. Unlike the United States, the South American Republics had put slavery on the road to extinction throughout their national territory. Whatever the ultimate fate of the slaves left in Spanish America there was no question – barring foreign intervention or some dramatic domestic counter-revolution – of a new slave system arising in these lands, as manifestly was happening in the cotton states of North America. In this important sense Spanish American independence marked a major advance over North American independence.

Notes

1. For information on the slave populations of the Spanish American provinces see, for New Granada, Chile, Buenos Aires and Puerto Rico, Hebe Clementi, *La abolición de la esclavitud en América Latina*, Buenos Aires 1974, pp. 45, 63–4, 89, 93–4, 188; for Cuba, Fernando Ortiz, *Los negros esclavos*, Havana 1914, p. 23; for Peru, Núria Sales de Bohigas, *Sobre esclavos, reclutas y mercaderes de quintos*, Barcelona 1974, p. 105; for Venezuela, Miguel Acosta Saignes, *Vida de los negros esclavos en Venezuela*, Havana 1978, p. 164, and Federico Brito Figueroa, *Historia económica y social de Venezuela*, 2 vols, I, Caracas 1966, p. 160; for Bolivia, R.A. Humphreys, ed., *British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of Latin America*, London 1940, p. 208; for Ecuador, Enrique Ayala, *Lucha politica y origen de los partidos en Ecuador*, Quito 1982, p. 39; for Mexico, Hugh Hamill, *The Hidalgo Revolt*, Gainesville, Florida 1966, p. 195.

2. Jorge Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire*, Cambridge, Mass. 1980, p. 79.

3. The peculiarities of Venezuela plantation slavery in the late colonial epoch are examined in Gastón Carvallo and Josefina Ríos de Hernández, 'Notas para el Estudio del Binomio Plantación–Conuco en la Hacienda Agrícola Venezolana', in *Agricultura y sociedad: tres ensayos historicos*, Equipo Sociohistorico, Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, June 1979, pp. 4–14, 23–35.

4. James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America: History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 316–20, 338.

5. José Luciano Franco, 'La Conspiración de Aponte, 1812', *Ensayos históricos*, Havana 1974, pp. 125–90. For official indulgence towards Cuba's plantation economy and export trade see Roland T. Ely, *Cuando reinaba su majestad el azucar*, Buenos Aires 1963, pp. 60–77.

6. John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, London 1974, pp. 184–206. For the Republic, see also Manuel Vicente Magallanes, *Historia política de Venezuela*, I, Caracas 1975, pp. 173–94; and for the Spanish counter-mobilisation see Stephen K. Sloan, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815–1820*, Columbus, Ohio 1974, pp. 29–42, and Germán Carrera Damas, *Tres temas de historia*, Caracas 1961, pp. 207 *et seq.*

7. See Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, Albuquerque, New Mexico 1948, for a powerful evocation of Bolivar's campaign (pp. 155–200), of the Venezuelan plains with their cattle, rivers, seasonal lakes and wild inhabitants (pp. 201–13), and of the collapse of the Second Republic (pp. 214–32).

8. These observations are quoted in Sloan, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela*, p. 71.

9. Sloan, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela*, pp. 158, 162. Carvallo and Rios de Hernandez quote regulations of 1817 and 1818 aimed at restoring plantation discipline in their paper, 'Notas para el estudio del binomio plantación–conuco', *Tres ensayos*, pp. 29–31.

10. The texts of the decrees on Cuban economic reforms are printed in Pichardo, *Documentos para la historia de Cuba*, pp. 261–7. Spain's fiscal crisis was so acute that the royal government sold Florida to the United States for $5 million in 1819, thus also permitting General Jackson to complete his ruthless campaign against the Seminoles and blacks of the region. In the previous year Fernando VII accepted $2 million from Britain in return for endorsing an anti-slave trade treaty which his officials thereafter ignored; the money was used to buy a war fleet from the Tsar.

11. Paul Verna, *Pétion y Bolívar*, Caracas 1980, pp. 150–72. This work sheds much light on the Caribbean revolutionary milieu of the epoch and on the subsequent vicissitudes of the relationship between Haiti and republican Colombia/Venezuela. In 1816 Pétion probably wished to check monarchist and colonialist reaction as well as to convert the Venezuelan Republicans to an anti-slavery policy.

12. Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, pp. 290–320. At this period, as later, Bolivar managed to combine willingness to challenge slavery, and a commitment to civic equality, with racial fears which led him to be very hostile to any hint of *pardo* separatism. His anti-slavery record is documented and stressed in J.L. Salcedo–Bastardo, *Bolivar: A Continent and Its Destiny*, Richmond, Surrey 1977, pp. 103–12. Bolivar's hostility to 'black power' is dwelt on by Leslie Rout, *The African Experience in Spanish America*, Cambridge 1976, pp. 176–9.

13. Bolivar's letter to Santander is quoted in Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. 93–4. The slaves freed by Bolivar in 1820 probably belonged to estates administered by the Spanish authorities since 1814.

14. John Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela*, Westport, Conn. 1971, pp. 46–50; Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, p. 99. The Manumission Law was presented at Cúcuta by delegates from Antioquia who knew exactly how far the proprietors of the region could be pushed on this question. By this time the slavery of western Colombia appears to have been in transition towards a species of *peonaje* and the former *cuadrillas* were rare. James Parson, *Antioqueño Colonization in Western Colombia*, Berkeley 1949, pp. 50–53, and David Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia*, Westport, Conn. 1970, p. 168.

15. For Cuban remittances see Jacobo de la *estadístico, histórico, de la Isla de Cuba*, Madrid Madrid's instructions to American representatives see *of America*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1983, pp. 145 (in 181 delegate to the Cortes, Padre Félix Varela, argued that stabilised if slavery was abolished; he advocated a n deprive slave-owners of their capital. The political fr thinly disguised independence. The text of his pro *Documentos para la historia de Cuba*, pp. 269–75.

16. *El redactor*, February 1813, quoted in Clemei *América Latina*, p. 54.

17. G.A. Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos*

18. Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. 59–7 on black and *pardo* regiments did offer some guarant an empty gesture; see Tulio Halperin–Donghi, *P Argentina in the Revolutionary Period*, London 197

19. Quoted in John Lynch, *The Spanish America*

20. Quoted in Lynch, *The Spanish American Rev*

21. José Luis Masini, *La esclavitud negra e* Mendoza 1962, pp. 13, 25, 43–50.

22. Guillermo Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esc* 1973, pp. 38–9.

23. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en*

24. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. *caciques* who had fought against Tupac Amarú, was royalist restoration of 1814; the spectacle of armed whites to rally to the royalists.

25. Quoted in Lynch, *The Spanish American Rev* and royalist slave recruitment policies see Timothy *Government in Peru*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1979, pp. 1

26. Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, p. 103.

27. Anna, *The Fall of Royal Government in I* decrees are reprinted in Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos*

28. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en*

29. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en* ranks and honours bestowed upon Romero were of th he should achieve recognition in the 1830s, at the ha *pelucones*, may have been related to the rebirth of a

30. *Selected Writings of Bolivar*, compiled by Vic York 1951, II, p. 499.

31. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolution: esclavos reclutas*, pp. 120–27.

32. Stephen Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins and* 1968, p. 225; Humphreys, ed., *British Consular Re*

33. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. of Spanish American independence struggles systema in this it reflects the prominence given by the Liber actions concerning the status of slaves.

34. Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, pp. 597–623. Santan the plans of some of Bolivar's supporters to turn Cc Because the Liberals supported republican legality a be aligned with a *pardo* constituency. (C. Parra–Pere Madrid 1957, pp. 106–10.) The differences betw concern slavery; neither man proposed simply endir contemplate renunciation or enfeeblement of the 18 said of all of their successors.

35. Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, pp. 633–4; Lynch, *Th*

nsurrection or Loyalty; The Breakdown of the Spanish e, Mass. 1980, p. 79.
Venezuela plantation slavery in the late colonial epoch are and Josefina Ríos de Hernández, 'Notas para el Estudio del en la Hacienda Agrícola Venezolana', in *Agricultura y oricos*, Equipo Sociohistorico, Centro de Estudios del ral de Venezuela, Caracas, June 1979, pp. 4–14, 23–35.
tuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America: History of Colonial* Cambridge 1983, pp. 316–20, 338.
, 'La Conspiración de Aponte, 1812', *Ensayos históricos*,
For official indulgence towards Cuba's plantation economy T. Ely, *Cuando reinaba su majestad el azucar*, Buenos Aires

nish American Revolutions, London 1974, pp. 184–206.
nuel Vicente Magallanes, *Historia política de Venezuela*, I, and for the Spanish counter-mobilisation see Stephen K. *ezuela, 1815–1820*, Columbus, Ohio 1974, pp. 29–42, and s *temas de historia*, Caracas 1961, pp. 207 *et seq.*
Simon Bolivar, Albuquerque, New Mexico 1948, for a r's campaign (pp. 155–200), of the Venezuelan plains with kes and wild inhabitants (pp. 201–13), and of the collapse 214–32).
e quoted in Sloan, *Pablo Morillo and Venezuela*, p. 71.
and Venezuela, pp. 158, 162. Carvallo and Rios de of 1817 and 1818 aimed at restoring plantation discipline in studio del binomio plantación–conuco', *Tres ensayos*, pp.

ees on Cuban economic reforms are printed in Pichardo, *de Cuba*, pp. 261–7. Spain's fiscal crisis was so acute that orida to the United States for $5 million in 1819, thus also complete his ruthless campaign against the Seminoles and evious year Fernando VII accepted $2 million from Britain i-slave trade treaty which his officials thereafter ignored; the r fleet from the Tsar.
Bolivar, Caracas 1980, pp. 150–72. This work sheds much olutionary milieu of the epoch and on the subsequent ip between Haiti and republican Colombia/Venezuela. In to check monarchist and colonialist reaction as well as to blicans to an anti-slavery policy.
, pp. 290–320. At this period, as later, Bolivar managed to ge slavery, and a commitment to civic equality, with racial y hostile to any hint of *pardo* separatism. His anti-slavery ssed in J.L. Salcedo–Bastardo, *Bolivar: A Continent and Its* 77, pp. 103–12. Bolivar's hostility to 'black power' is dwelt *an Experience in Spanish America*, Cambridge 1976, pp.

ander is quoted in Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. ivar in 1820 probably belonged to estates administered by 1814.
Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela 46–50; Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, p. 99. The nted at Cúcuta by delegates from Antioquia who knew rs of the region could be pushed on this question. By this lombia appears to have been in transition towards a specie *drillas* were rare. James Parson, *Antioqueño Colonization* 1949, pp. 50–53, and David Bushnell, *The Santand* Westport, Conn. 1970, p. 168.

15. For Cuban remittances see Jacobo de la Pezuela, *Diccionario geográfico, estadístico, histórico, de la Isla de Cuba*, Madrid 1859, 4 vols, I, pp. 389–90. For Madrid's instructions to American representatives see Timothy Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1983, pp. 145 (in 1814), pp. 274–5 (in 1822). The Cuban delegate to the Cortes, Padre Félix Varela, argued that constitutional liberty could only be stabilised if slavery was abolished; he advocated a manumission policy that would not deprive slave-owners of their capital. The political freedom he advocated for Cuba was thinly disguised independence. The text of his proposals will be found in Pichardo, *Documentos para la historia de Cuba*, pp. 269–75.
16. *El redactor*, February 1813, quoted in Clementi, *La abolición de la esclavitud en América Latina*, p. 54.
17. G.A. Andrews, *The Afro-Argentines of Buenos Aires*, Madison 1980, pp. 113–37.
18. Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. 59–76. The dependence of Buenos Aires on black and *pardo* regiments did offer some guarantees that manumission would not be an empty gesture; see Tulio Halperin–Donghi, *Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina in the Revolutionary Period*, London 1975, pp. 193–5.
19. Quoted in John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, London 1973, p. 78.
20. Quoted in Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. 86.
21. José Luis Masini, *La esclavitud negra en Mendoza, epoca independiente*, Mendoza 1962, pp. 13, 25, 43–50.
22. Guillermo Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, Santiago de Chile 1973, pp. 38–9.
23. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, pp. 50–52.
24. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. 165. Pumacahua, one of the Indian *caciques* who had fought against Tupac Amarú, was drawn into creole resistance to the royalist restoration of 1814; the spectacle of armed Indian columns soon caused most whites to rally to the royalists.
25. Quoted in Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 174–5; for republican and royalist slave recruitment policies see Timothy A. Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1979, pp. 172–4.
26. Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, p. 103.
27. Anna, *The Fall of Royal Government in Peru*, pp. 196–7; the contradictory decrees are reprinted in Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. 110–19.
28. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, pp. 60–97.
29. Feliú Cruz, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Chile*, pp. 98–107, pp. 120–52. The ranks and honours bestowed upon Romero were of the second rather than first class; that he should achieve recognition in the 1830s, at the hands of a government of conservative *pelucones*, may have been related to the rebirth of anti-slavery in Europe at this time.
30. *Selected Writings of Bolivar*, compiled by Vicente Lecuna, ed. by H.E. Bierk, New York 1951, II, p. 499.
31. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 275–6; Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, pp. 120–27.
32. Stephen Clissold, *Bernardo O'Higgins and the Independence of Chile*, London 1968, p. 225; Humphreys, ed., *British Consular Reports*, p. 177.
33. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. 289. This admirable general history of Spanish American independence struggles systematically notes their record on slavery; in this it reflects the prominence given by the Liberators themselves to declarations and actions concerning the status of slaves.
34. Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, pp. 597–623. Santander for his part was antagonistic to the plans of some of Bolivar's supporters to turn Colombia into a monarchy or empire. Because the Liberals supported republican legality and a wider franchise, they tended to be aligned with a *pardo* constituency. (C. Parra–Perez, *La monarquía en Gran Colombia*, Madrid 1957, pp. 106–10.) The differences between Santander and Bolivar did not concern slavery; neither man proposed simply ending slavery but equally neither would contemplate renunciation or enfeeblement of the 1821 law – something which cannot be said of all of their successors.
35. Masur, *Simon Bolivar*, pp. 633–4; Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp.

263–4. Padilla's alignment with Santander reflected both support for Liberalism and gratitude towards a man who had built up the Colombian Navy. Santander spent most of the money received from the foreign loans acquiring war *matériel*, including a dozen *pailebots* and two splendid frigates; when plans to invade Cuba were shelved this left the Colombian Navy rather over-equipped. (David Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia*, p. 264, and Enrique Uribe White, *Padilla*, Bogotá 1973.)

36. Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela*, pp. 61–94. This is the best study I know of slavery and abolition in independent Spanish America. Altogether less than a thousand slaves were to be freed by purchase under the Manumission Laws (p. 154). In 1839 the period of obligatory service for *manumisos* was further extended from twenty-one to twenty-five years. Up until the point where the first *manumisos* would be freed the total number of slaves and *manumisos* grew; one source quoted by Lombardi suggests that there were nearly 50,000 slaves and *manumisos* in 1844, over a year before *manumisos* born in 1821 could claim freedom (p. 162).

37. Brito Figueroa, *Historia económica y social*, I, p. 247. The figures in this count may have been somewhat inflated, since slave-owners had an interest in boosting the numbers of slaves they declared, with a view both to enhancing their credit-worthiness and to future compensation in the event of emancipation.

38. The price of cacao in Venezuela dropped from $45 a *fanega* in 1810 to $20 a *fanega* in 1820 and was still at $20 in 1830; cotton dropped from $15 a quintal in 1810, to $10 in 1820 and $8 in 1830; coffee dropped somewhat less drastically from $12 a quintal in 1810 to $8 in 1820 and $8 in 1830. (Brito Figueroa, *Historia económica y social*, p. 224.) Debt peonage is a complex topic, but for an argument that it bound small producers to merchants in the coffee economy, see William Roseberry, *Coffee and Capitalism in the Venezuelan Andes*, Austin (Texas) 1983, pp. 89–96.

39. This suggested source of persisting enslavement might be compared to the forms of self-sale found in early modern Russia, with its destitute and vulnerable poor and insecure borderlands; see Richard Hellie, *Slavery in Russia: 1450–1725*, Chicago 1982, especially pp. 333–5. Statistics on the actual extent of slavery in independent Venezuela are difficult to have confidence in; nevertheless they do sometimes suggest an increase in the population of slaves and *libertos* which could relate to 'voluntary' re-enslavement. It is likely that the reproduction rates of slaves and *manumisos* were higher than those for freedmen or other propertyless Venezuelans.

40. Lombardi, 'The Abolition of Slavery in Venezuela', in Robert Brent Toplin, ed., *Slavery and Race Relations in Latin America*, Westport, Conn. 1974, p. 242. The crucial role of slaves in the credit structure is also brought out by Lombardi, *The Decline and Abolition of Negro Slavery in Venezuela*, pp. 110–11. The implications for the financial system of collateral whose value would begin to contract as *manumisos* approached freedom had already been pointed out by Venezuelan 'Liberals' hostile to the Manumission Law in the days of Gran Colombia. (See Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia*, p. 169.)

41. Núria Sales, *Sobre esclavos reclutas*, p. 89.

42. Bushnell, *The Santander Regime in Gran Colombia*, p. 291; Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. 256; Ayala, *Lucha Politica*, pp. 37–51.

43. Clementi, *La abolición de esclavitud en América Latina*, p. 57; for Uruguay see Ema Isola, *La esclavitud en el Uruguay*, Montevideo 1975, pp. 293–323.

44. John Lynch, *Argentine Dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829–1852*, London 1982, pp. 119–23; Masini, *La esclavitud negra en Mendoza*, p. 52. According to Lynch free blacks in the Argentine in the 1820s had a mortality rate nearly three times as high as that of slaves; this tends to support the thesis suggested in the discussion of the persistence of slavery in Venezuela that it could reflect the very insecure and vulnerable situation of poor free blacks and *pardos* (see note 39 above).

45. Josefina Pla, *Hermano negro: la esclavitud en Paraguay*, Madrid 1972, especially pp. 55–111.

46. Enrique Florescano, *Origen y desarrollo de los problemas agrarios de México, 1500–1821*, Mexico 1971, pp. 152–5.

47. Hugh M. Hamill, *The Hidalgo Revolt*, Gainesville, Florida 1966, p. 136.

Clementi, *La abolicion de la esclavitud en América Lat*
48. Quoted in Lynch, *The Revolutions of Spanish*
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America; see, for example, the remarks of Hidalgo qu
p. 111. For the use of emancipationism to mobilise th
Hamill, *The Hidalgo Revolt*, p. 195.
49. Elsa Gracida and Esperanza Fujigaki, 'La r
Enrique Semo, ed., *México: un pueblo en la historia*,
especially pp. 37–8; see also T.E. Anna, *The Fall of t*
City, Lincoln, Nebraska 1978, pp. 107, 195–6; and Do
pp. 163, 181–95.
50. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p.
51. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp.
52. Clementi, *La abolición de la esclavitud en Am*
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Clementi, *La abolicion de la esclavitud en América Latina*, p. 109.

48. Quoted in Lynch, *The Revolutions of Spanish America*, p. 313. The sentiments expressed here were not unusual and the use of the term 'slavery' to describe the condition from which Americans were seeking to escape was very widespread. Hidalgo and Morelos also warned of the danger of a 'war of races' in terms similar to those used in South America; see, for example, the remarks of Hidalgo quoted by Clementi, *La abolición*, p. 111. For the use of emancipationism to mobilise those of partly African descent see Hamill, *The Hidalgo Revolt*, p. 195.

49. Elsa Gracida and Esperanza Fujigaki, 'La revolución de independencia', in Enrique Semo, ed., *México: un pueblo en la historia*, Mexico City 1983, pp. 11–89, especially pp. 37–8; see also T.E. Anna, *The Fall of the Royal Government in Mexico City*, Lincoln, Nebraska 1978, pp. 107, 195–6; and Dominguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty*, pp. 163, 181–95.

50. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, p. 320.

51. Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions*, pp. 323, 332.

52. Clementi, *La abolición de la esclavitud en América Latina*, p. 112.

53. Clementi, *La abolición de la eslavitud en América Latina*, p. 125. For Costa Rica see C.F.S. Cardoso, 'La formación de hacienda cafetalera en el siglo XIX', in E. Florescano, *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina*, pp. 635–66.