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## **ABSTRACT**

### **FROM “THE PROJECTS” TO HOUSES: PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT, POVERTY DECONCENTRATION, AND RESIDENT SELF-SUFFICIENCY IMPACTS ON PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS AT HOPE VI DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY**

**Michael Brown**

Since 1992, public housing authorities (PHAs) throughout the United States have been building public housing rental and owner-occupied housing in place of demolished or rehabilitated distressed public housing and simultaneously attempting to deconcentrate poverty and improve self-sufficiency among the affected residents. The distressed housing is usually dilapidated, poorly designed, poorly constructed, poorly maintained, and poorly managed; the residents are very poor, are in constant fear of crime and violence, and have little hope. Previous attempts to address these problems have been piecemeal and often inadequate.

Based on recommendations by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1992, the U.S. Congress launched the HOPE VI program to remedy severely distressed conditions in public housing to make the developments physically desirable and economically viable to both middle and lower income households. HOPE VI went a step further than previous reform initiatives by providing human services to residents to help them transition from dependence on welfare and other government aid programs to economic self-sufficiency.

Administered by HUD and targeting the worst affected developments, HOPE VI cash grants to housing authorities facilitate redevelopment of the distressed properties. Typically, PHAs build new replacement housing only but some sites have both rehabilitated and new housing. To eliminate the extreme poverty at distressed sites, PHA relocate most of the residents to other public housing sites and presumably, to better housing and to low-poverty neighborhoods in the private market. The residents receive supportive services to help them increase employment

and income, achieve housing and economic self-sufficiency, and to reduce dependency on government assistance.

In this dissertation, I explored the physical improvements, poverty deconcentration, and self-sufficiency improvements undertaken through the HOPE VI program at three distressed public housing developments in Camden, New Jersey. The Housing Authority of the City of Camden has completed redevelopment at McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres and currently redeveloping Roosevelt Manor. Different redevelopment strategies were used at the three sites: partial demolition, site and building redesign, rehabilitation, and construction of new housing at McGuire Gardens and complete demolition, site and building redesign, and construction of new housing at Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor. Utilizing information from several sources, I examined redevelopment impacts on current public housing residents at the new HOPE VI sites. The primary data sources were a survey of HOPE VI public housing householders at the two completed sites through face-to-face interviews, interviews with HOPE VI officials, analysis of HOPE VI administrative data, HUD data sets, census data, and the HOPE VI site redevelopment plans. Study findings show major physical transformations and substantially reduced concentrations of poverty at all three sites but negligible improvements in self-sufficiency outcomes among residents.

**FROM “THE PROJECTS” TO HOUSES:  
PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT, POVERTY DECONCENTRATION, AND RESIDENT  
SELF-SUFFICIENCY IMPACTS ON PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS AT HOPE VI  
DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY**

**by**

**Michel C. Brown**

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**APPROVAL PAGE**

**FROM “PROJECTS” TO HOUSES:  
PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT, POVERTY DECONCENTRATION, AND RESIDENT  
SELF-SUFFICIENCY AT HOPE VI DEVELOPMENTS IN CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY**

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This Dissertation is dedicated JaVon, my only child; my father Lindon (RIP), whose hard work and commitment to his children motivates me and whom I miss a lot; my mother, Dotty, whose humbleness is worthy of emulation; and to my brothers Omar, Peter, Keith, Ken, Richard; and sisters Kay, Joy, Dahlia, and Lynette. This is for the whole family.

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**CHAPTER 1**  
**INTRODUCTION**

**1.1 Research Background**

Across the nation, public housing authorities (PHAs) are building housing developments with public housing and homeownership housing to replace distressed public housing developments and attempting to deconcentrate poverty and improve resident self-sufficiency. The displaced residents relocate to other public housing and to private housing and some of receive supportive services to empower them towards greater economic well-being and less dependence on government. At redeveloped sites, private management replaces PHA management. The driving force behind this physical and human redevelopment exercise in America's problem-plagued public housing system is the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administered Homeownership and Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE) VI program. Through multi-million grants to PHAs, HOPE VI funds relocation, site and building improvements, and resident services that promote resident's economic and social well-being.

Camden is one of 132 cities with failing public housing developments that received HOPE VI grants and carried out substantial improvements in living conditions at the most problems developments. Since receiving a 1994 HOPE VI grant, the Housing Authority of the City of Camden (HACC) has pursued an aggressive redevelopment program that to date has reconfigured and rehabilitated one development and replaced two other developments with new "New Urbanism" type mixed-income and mixed-tenure housing communities. The developments have fewer units and are less dense, and in the cases of the mixed developments have both public housing and homeownership housing. The impacts on the developments, surrounding areas, and on residents have been substantial. This study explores these impacts.

After reviewing the Final Report and Recommendations of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH), which cited alarmingly poor living conditions in

six percent of the nation's public housing, in late 1992, the U.S. Congress authorized the urban redevelopment program called HOPE VI to provide funding to address the problems that the Commission raised. The Commission reported that due to severe physical deterioration, extreme poverty, unbearable social and economic distress among residents, crime, and violence, at least 86,000 public housing units required immediate intervention. The problems resulted from years of neglect, maintenance backlog, segregation, poor design and construction, ineffective management, segregation and isolation, and an unsupportive policy environment. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Department launched the HOPE VI program in 1993 and began awarding HOPE VI implementation (now revitalization) grants that year to PHAs to rebuild their worst properties. In the first two funding cycles, 13 PHAs among 64 in the 40 most populous cities and the 24 PHAs HUD considered "troubled" received implementation grants.

Even though in the 1949 U.S. Housing Act Congress pledged "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family," the main purpose of the public housing program is to assist families with severe housing needs to find safe and decent housing. However, as the NCSDPH reported, public housing is frequently anything but safe, decent, or in suitable living environments. At some sites, living conditions were so distressing for so long prior to HOPE VI, that hopelessness prevailed (Denson 2004). Public housing did not begin that way however; it was set up to eliminate "slum" conditions in "blighted" communities but over time some developments deteriorated to the level of the conditions they were to eliminate. Where public housing exists, some observers now see warehouses for the poor (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009, Turbov and Piper 2005, Rongerude 2007). There are several reasons for the decline including location in disadvantageous areas, underfunding, and bad policies in addition to those already mentioned (Schill and Wachter 1995). HOPE VI grants fund rehabilitation, demolition, new construction, resident services, and relocation expenses. By 2009, PHAs had demolished well over 100,000 distressed housing units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010) and relocated most of the residents to private housing and other public housing.



HOPE VI grants also fund activities to improve the economic and social well-being of resident to improve housing and economic self-sufficiency and to reduce welfare dependency. It is an attempt to correct years of substandard public housing and the damage to residents and surrounding communities (Turner, Popkin and Rawlings 2008). By December 2009, HOPE VI grants had contributed to improving or set to improve living conditions at 254 of the worst public housing redevelopments. HOPE VI activities affect population characteristics, public safety, management, residents' lives, and neighborhoods communities in one way or another but outcomes vary from site to site. Policy expectations include improvements to sites and buildings, improvements in resident economic self-sufficiency, neighborhood improvements, and greatly reduced poverty. This study explores impacts on residents at three sites in Camden, New Jersey.

## **1.2 Previous Research**

In previous studies, researchers noted that HOPE VI has given residents new hope that public housing as they know it will end, that their distressed living condition will improve, and their lives will be transformed from isolation, poverty, despair, and hopelessness and that they will become more self-sufficiency (Elliot, Gotham and Milligan 2004). But, as the NCSDPH Final Report alluded and former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros stressed, "... it was not enough to eliminate the most distressed public housing buildings—we needed to dramatically reorient the workings of public housing as a system" (Cisneros 2009, p. 6). Studies have explored different goals in HOPE VI, including neighborhood impacts, physical design, income mixing, and relocation outcomes for voucher holders. In 1996, Abt Associates did a baseline assessment and the Urban Institute has done several HOPE VI studies for HUD that assessed the program's impacts. Studies that examined physical redevelopment, poverty deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency reported that HOPE VI has reduced poverty concentrations onsite and in surrounding neighborhoods, transformed the physical environments but has not produced meaningful improvements in self-sufficiency at redeveloped sites.

### 1.3 Research Objectives and Significance of Study

This study investigated HOPE VI's impacts on public housing residents at the three HOPE VI sites in Camden, New Jersey. The areas of focus are physical improvement, poverty deconcentration, and self-sufficiency. Camden suffers from severe economic, social and physical distress in much the same way distressed public housing does. The research explored site and resident characteristics before and after redevelopment to identify significant changes using quantitative and qualitative data from: interviewing tenants in a tenant survey to understand impacts from residents' perspectives, archival records, the housing authority administrative records, census reports, HUD's Resident Characteristics Reports, and interviews with HOPE VI officials and residents. Fifty-seven HOPE VI public housing tenants from McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run responded to questions about site improvements, housing quality, and self-sufficiency services. The survey was done at the first two sites only because re-occupancy had not yet begun at the third site due to implementation setbacks. Resident Characteristics Reports from HUD's Multi-Family Tenant Characteristics System provided outcome data to compare with interview data. The overall study results are limited by incomplete or lack of in-depth information about original households before relocation and about self-sufficiency programs implemented.

The study is most relevant to public housing policy. The findings may help to identify program shortcomings and areas of policy interventions and help to identify and prioritize future research. Of the 160 public housing developments nationwide that received revitalization grants in the first 10 years, only 15, including one in this study, completed redevelopment within 10 years. Two of the three sites in this study have been operating for three and six years. The research highlights differences resulting from different implementation strategies for each project. Most other studies addressed one project or compared outcomes at sites in different jurisdictions, not within the same HA. The results may inform future policy decisions as well.

#### 1.4 HOPE VI Program: Background and Evolution

HOPE VI has been the main vehicle driving HUD's efforts to redress decades of physical and social deterioration in public housing by redeveloping the most distressed or obsolete sites. It is the latest program in HUD's "Homeownership and Opportunities for People Everywhere"<sup>1</sup> series that began in 1990.<sup>2</sup> Following the NCSDPH final report, Congress authorized the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create an urban redevelopment demonstration program to rebuild severely distressed public housing (Cisneros 2009). HOPE VI seeks to eliminate "unfit" living conditions in severely distressed public housing and improve residents' lives. The main components of the program are physical redevelopment, which includes rehabilitation and demolition of existing units and construction of new units), poverty deconcentration, community and self-sufficiency services, management and policy reforms (Popkin, et al. 2002). The QHWRA noted that the main objectives were to:

- revitalize sites on which distressed public housing projects are located and contribute to improving the surrounding neighborhood(s);
- provide housing that avoids or decreases the concentration of low income families;
- improve the living environment for residents of severely distressed public housing projects through demolition, rehabilitation, reconfiguration, and replacement of whole developments or portions thereof; and
- build sustainable communities.

After the mid-1990s changes, HUD website noted that the amended objectives were to:

- change the physical shape of public housing through site redesign, rehabilitation and/or demolition, and replacement with new mixed-income housing
- lessen concentrations of poverty by encouraging greater income mixing among residents and encouraging working families to move into public and market-rate housing in the new developments

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<sup>1</sup>The study uses HUD's definition for HOPE VI, "Homeownership and Opportunities for People Everywhere" not "Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere" as many researchers frequently do.

<sup>2</sup> HOPE I (HOPE for Public and Indian Housing Homeownership) provided planning and implementation grants to tenant groups for ownership of public or Indian housing. HOPE II (Homeownership for Multi-family Units) financed homeownership in multi-family projects. HOPE III (HOPE for Homeownership of single-family Homes) financed homeownership of Federal, State, and local non-public housing to first-time low-income families, HOPE IV (HOPE for the elderly) financed homeownership for seniors, and HOPE V is the Youth Build program.

- establish supportive services to help public housing residents get and keep jobs and become more self-sufficient and less dependent on public assistance, and
- build partnerships with public, private, and non-profit parties to leverage resources to plan and implement improvements at distressed public housing.

It is important that HOPE VI residents transition from dependency to self-sufficiency and towards that goal, the program provides supportive services to original and new residents to facilitate their transition to work and out of assisted housing. To a great degree, HOPE VI's success therefore rests on the effectiveness of the services residents receive (Goetz 2010).

In the first few years, HOPE VI grants were up to \$50 million to public housing authorities for demolition, rehabilitation and/or new construction, and support services to residents (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). In most instances since the late 1990s, HAs replaced entire developments with new developments. HOPE VI developments are physically different from the original developments. Unlike the original sites, HOPE VI sites usually have single-family public housing and non-public housing units. Some HOPE VI sites that have only public housing are grant recipients from the first four funding cycles. Those sites have mostly rehabilitated units.

Physically, HOPE VI developments provide residents substantially improved living conditions and lower levels of poverty but there are concerns about the large percentage of original residents whom the program displaces, about relocation outcomes for original residents, and about the availability of services to help original residents improve their economic and social well-being. Some original tenants receive vouchers to move to private housing in non-poor neighborhoods but they do not always end up in better housing or better neighborhoods. In fact, even families that moved to less poor neighborhoods still struggle to sustain themselves (Crowley 2010, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Some relocated residents move to better housing but some move to worse or equally poor housing and neighborhoods. Popkin, Levy and Buron (2009) noted that residents with complex problems and the most serious housing needs are among those who end up in equally poor or worse housing and neighborhoods conditions. Only about 24 percent moved back after redevelopment (Crowley 2010).

A large number of demolished units are not replaced and this makes relocation more challenging. According to National Low Income Housing Commission President, Sheila Crowley, HOPE VI demolitions dislocated 78,000 families because the program was “more about the real estate than it was about the people” (Crowley 2009, p. 230). Some researchers noted that HOPE VI was most effective at replacing distressed developments with mixed-income developments. They also criticized the program for the large number of original tenants who are not allowed to return after redevelopment, for the many residents whose whereabouts are unknown, and for its poor record in helping residents to become self-sufficient (Popkin 2010, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).

Despite these criticisms, the program received positive feedback for creating well-designed homes and removing entrenched poverty at distressed sites but critics decried the poor self-sufficiency and relocation outcomes (Popkin 2009, Goetz 2004). Some observers see HOPE VI as the most comprehensive attempt to date to correct systemic problems in public housing and a vital tool to deconcentrate poverty. For example, HUD Secretary, Shaun Donovan (2009) said HOPE VI was one of America’s best ever weapons to fight concentrated poverty.<sup>3</sup> At a HOPE VI seminar at the Urban Institute in 2009<sup>4</sup>, Vice President at the Brookings Institution and former Chief of Staff at HUD during HOPE VI’s formative years, Bruce Katz stated:

It’s generally considered ... to be one of the most successful urban regeneration initiatives in the past half century. In little more than 15 years, this program tore down; more importantly, redeveloped hundreds of the most distressed public housing projects in the country; projects at the time that were essentially warehouses for the very poor and in the process, increased opportunities in dozens of distressed urban neighborhoods that prior to this effort, were characterized by lawlessness and decline.

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<sup>3</sup>Comments made at a seminar entitled “From Despair to Hope: Two HUD Secretaries on Urban Revitalization and Opportunity” at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, July 2009.

<sup>4</sup>Katz gave the opening remarks at the release seminar of the new Brookings Institution book From Despair to Hope: HOPE VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities at the Brookings Institution on July 14, 2009.

Low income housing advocates charge that HOPE VI has failed the families that the program was set up to assist. The Center for Community Change (2003) and National Housing Law Project (2002) charged HOPE VI with gentrifies poor neighborhoods and therefore reducing the already inadequate stock of low-income housing. They also likened the displacement of residents to the displacement of poor residents from their homes by urban renewal projects in the 1950s and 1960s. Harvard Law Review (2003) described HOPE VI as a massive experiment to transform public housing to mixed-income housing. The program was supposed to expire after 10 years but in that time, 15 of the 160 funded projects were completed.

#### **1.4.1 Role of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing**

The basis for creating the HOPE VI program was the recommendations of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing. For about 18 months, this congressionally appointed Commission investigated and documented public housing problems and innovative ways local authorities used to address problems and formulated a National Action Plan to alleviate conditions that lead to distress (NCSDPH 1992). The Commission made site visits; studied successfully revitalized schemes; and interviewed residents, PHA staff and officials, and housing industry professionals and documented its findings and recommendations in a Final Report in 1992. The report noted that the majority of public housing units were physically sound except for about 86,000 units that were “severely distressed”<sup>5</sup> and not fit for human habitation. These sites had severely deteriorated units, and residents lived in such extreme social and economic deprivation, fear of violence, and greatly diminished hope that required more than the traditional bricks and mortar remedy. Most of the problems concern residents, not the dwellings. “Severely distressed” therefore refers to both physical and social distress. The commission found:

- Severe physical deterioration that endangered residents’ health and safety

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<sup>5</sup>The NCSDPH defined four criteria for “severely distressed” conditions to exist: (1) development requires work to correct original design deficiencies, (2) contributes to public or private disinvestments; (3) residents are primarily unemployed, low-income families with children who depend on public assistance; and (4) suffers from high crime rates

- A high proportion of developments in depressed communities
- High levels of crimes and fear of crime that prevented residents from moving about the developments and neighborhoods
- Concentrated poverty and despair, joblessness, and limited employment opportunities
- Isolation from mainstream public and commercial services
- Residents needed extra support to function effectively outside public housing
- Low educational achievement among residents
- High levels of physical and mental health problems among residents, and
- Interventions to address distressed conditions were often inadequate and late

The National Action Plan proposed addressed the physical environment, residents' social and economic needs, neighborhood conditions, management, and housing policy (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, Moshette 2007, Popkin, Katz, et al. 2004, NCSDPH 1992). In this plan, the Commission emphasized that physical redevelopment alone would not suffice and recommended that residents' needs be given as much attention as physical redevelopment to enable residents to become economically secure (NCSDPH 1992). The proposed 10-year recommended public-private investment to eliminate physical and socioeconomic distress, reduce dependency, and improve management. In October 1992, the US Congress authorized the urban redevelopment demonstration program called HOPE VI to fund innovative ways to revitalize the worst public housing.

#### **1.4.2 Redevelopment Grants and Grantees**

From 1993 to 2009, HUD awarded nearly \$6.55 billion in 620 HOPE VI grants in 132 cities (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). The purpose of these awards was to facilitate comprehensive investments in public housing sites, buildings, and people. As Table 1.1 shows, 254 awards were revitalization grants that accounted for \$6.1 billion or nearly 94 percent.

From the remaining \$450 million, \$395.32 million went to 287 demolition-only grants, 35 planning grants, 45 neighborhood network grants, and 24 main street grants. Revitalization grants cover demolition, rehabilitation, new construction, land acquisition, relocation, and other supportive services. HUD awarded demolition-only grants from 1996 to 2003 only for PHAs to demolish dilapidated buildings and fund relocation of residents. The 287 demolition grants, which accounted for 46 percent of the 620 grants and six percent of the funds, funded the demolition of 56,755 units in 127 housing authorities. On several occasions, these grants preceded revitalization grants. Overall, the 254 revitalization grants and 287 demolition grants funded total demolition of more than 100,000 units but replacing 51 percent. This has reduced the overall number of low-income units (McCarty 2005). The 35 Planning grants HUD awarded from 1993-1995 funded technical assistance in relation to revitalization and demolition plans, while the 45 Neighborhood Network grants from 2002-2003 funded computer facilities for residents. Since 2005, HOPE VI has also awarded 24 Main Street grants ranging from a few thousand dollars to \$1 million to municipalities with less than 50,000 residents to build affordable housing.

For the first three years of the program, only PHAs in the 40 most populous cities and PHAs cited on HUD's list of "troubled housing authorities" on March 31, 1992 were eligible for HOPE VI grants (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 1997, Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Camden qualified as one of the 24 cities with troubled housing authorities. Fiscal years 1993-1995 awards ranged from 16 million to \$50 million and at least 80 percent of each revitalization grant had to be spent on improving the physical environment. After 1995, the grants became smaller. HUD assesses applications on potential impact, need, PHA capability, quality of the proposed community and social services, and involvement of resident and service agencies (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Before disbursing grant funds, HUD approves all revitalization plans and budgets and the revitalization plans must detail the community and supportive services proposed and participation of residents and local social service agencies. Accepted plans become project blueprints (Abt Associates, et al. 1996).



**Table 1.1** HOPE VI Funding, 1993-2008

Year	Revitalization		Demolition		Planning		Total	
	Amount (\$)	Grants	Amount (\$)	Grants	Amount (\$)	Grants	Amount (\$)	Grants
1993	299,000,000	6	No award		1,000,000	2	300,000,000	8
1994	752,674,507	20			2,725,472	6	755,399,979	26
1995	485,850,863 <sup>a</sup>	13			11,026,609	27	496,877,472	40
					<b>14,752,081</b>	<b>35</b>		
1996	403,463,070	20	69,571,850	22	Neighborhood Network		473,036,958	42
1997	497,355,108	23	955,000	4			498,312,132	27
1998	531,565,222	28	57,084,319	50			564,084,319	78
1999	571,287,001	21	40,738,389	32			612,027,442	53
2000	513,805,464	18	49,994,436	26			563,799,900	44
2001	491,774,238	16	74,964,992	43			566,741,290	59
2002	494,267,265	28	42,379,319	41	5,000,000	25	536,651,584	94
2003	433,016,652	24	59,634,870	69	4,967,500	20	497,621,138	113
2004	126,884,932	7	No award		\$9,967,500	45	126,884,932	7
2005	156,895,528	8			156,895,528	8		
2006	71,900,000	4			71,902,010	4		
2007	88,855,000	5			88,857,012	5		
2008	97,246,691	6			97,246,691	6		
2009	113,600,000	6			113,600,000	6		
Total	\$6,129,441,541	254			\$395,323,175	287		

Source: HUD 2007, HOPE VI Program Authority and Funding History

URL: <http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/about/fundinghistory.pdf>

Note: <sup>a</sup> Includes eight first round Revitalization grants totaling \$349,999,018, five second round revitalization grants totaling \$103,257,000 and \$32.9 in Amendment funds & \$5 million for Campus of Learners projects.

After 2003, annual HOPE VI appropriations dropped precipitously (Table 1.1) as the George Bush administration attempted to eliminate the program claiming it was too costly and that the goal to eliminate 100,000 distressed units had been met. When the administration requested no HOPE VI funding in 2004 and 2005, Congress appropriated the meager sums of \$150 million for 2004 and \$144 million for 2005 (McCarty 2005) and in 2007, reauthorized HOPE VI for another seven years (Sard and Staub 2008).

### 1.4.3 Policy and Program Evolution

The HOPE VI program started out primarily to provide grant funds to PHSs to rehabilitate distressed developments and to support resident empowerment initiatives. Since the mid-1990s however, the program has evolved into a market-based model promoting mixed public/private financing and building mixed-income developments in place of distressed developments. New policies and regulations introduced in the latter half of the 1990s changed HOPE VI priorities and project financing and impacted population and design characteristics at HOPE VI developments. In this evolution, the focus shifted from rehabilitation to demolition and new housing in mixed-income developments, and from community development to resident self-sufficiency. Poverty deconcentration became the central focus as well as HUD made several important changes to counteract threats by the Republican-led Congress that came to power in 1994 to abolish HUD and the HOPE VI program. Probably the most fundamental change HUD made was to link distressed public housing explicitly to concentrated poverty (Zhang 2004). The NCSDPH had already done so in its final report in stating that the overconcentration of poor households was a major contributor to the social problems in distressed public housing. For many years, researchers debated the role poverty plays in the problems of distressed developments but now HUD directly connects distressed public housing to concentrated poverty. Recent scholarship has also attributed social problems in distressed public housing to their extreme concentrations of poor families. With this change, HOPE VI began to address concentrated poverty in public housing and its high socioeconomic costs more directly. With poverty deconcentration as the organizing framework, HOPE VI strategies shifted from rehabilitation to demolition and new construction, public-private financing, and mixing public housing and non-public housing in the same development for the first time (Zhang 2004). These changes fundamentally changed the way the federal government provides public housing services to needy families (Goetz 2002) as well.

HUD Secretary Cisneros formalized the new public-private partnership when he signed an agreement with the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) in 1996 to adopt New Urbanism

design principles as the preferred design paradigm in HOPE VI (Bohls 2000). HUD also introduced a “mixed financing” model, which changed the financing arrangements for HOPE VI projects from public funding to public and private financing. The change gave private investors decision-making powers in HOPE VI projects but also allowed HAs to use HOPE VI grants to leverage more redevelopment funding from private and other public sources. Mixed financing is now a requirement for HOPE VI grants, particularly because revitalization grants got progressively smaller. Virtually all HOPE VI funded projects since 1996 emphasize mixed-income housing, reported Morris & Lewis (2003). HUD implemented the mixed-finance rule to encourage the development of mixed-income communities, to expand redevelopment opportunities, and to encourage private investment (Clark 2002, Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002). Mixed-financing has become so popular that from 1996 to 2002, HOPE VI grant recipients leveraged nearly \$2 for every HOPE VI dollar received (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2002). This GAO study also noted that more than 50 percent of all leveraged funds came from public sources such as HUD, state and local governments, instead of private sources. All HOPE VI developments that utilized mixed-financing are mixed-income developments. Because mixed-financing is now a requirement for HOPE VI revitalization grants, mixed-income housing is also standard in HOPE VI developments. In the HOPE VI context, mixed-income housing refers to developments that integrate owner-occupied units (homeownership), Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funded units, and public housing units in one development. Because homeownership units usually do not have eligibility limits, HAs may not use HOPE VI funds to construct owner-occupied units. In limited cases, HAs use public funds to build homeownership units. In such cases, the units are “affordable” homeownership housing” not “market rate” housing and have eligibility restrictions.

Congress also repealed the “one-for-one” replacement rule in 1995 after HAs complained that it limited their ability to redevelop distressed sites. This rule had mandated HAs to replace each public housing unit demolished with another hard unit (Cisneros 2009). No longer restricted

by the one-for-one rule, HAs have built fewer units than they demolished and have replaced many public housing units with homeownership units, which reduced the housing stock that is affordable to low-income families while private investors reap substantial financial rewards.

**Table 1.2** Housing Policy Changes Impacting HOPE VI Program

Policy	Explanation	Impact on HOPE VI
<b>One-for-One Replacement Rule</b>	In 1988, Congress implemented the one-for-one replacement rule to ensure that each public housing unit removed is replaced with another hard unit to avoid reducing public housing units. Congress lifted the rule in a 1995 Rescission Bill. The change took effect in March 1996.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No impact on HOPE VI demolition and disposition requests submitted before the Rescission Bill.</li> <li>• Reduce unit density</li> <li>• Reduced the overall number of public housing units</li> </ul>
Federal admission preferences: Repealed	Households involuntarily displaced, households in substandard housing, households paying more than 50 percent of income for rent, Repeal of federal preference in public housing	Locally-bases admission preferences
<b>Mixed Income Strategies</b>	<p>The 1937 Housing Act restricts public housing to households earning below 80 percent of the Area Median Family Income (HAMFI) and 75 percent must have income below 50 percent of HAMFI.</p> <p>Two strategies used to mix income. One uses preference rules to diversify household incomes, combined with ceiling rents and work preference policies. The other strategy mixes market rate housing with public housing units.</p>	<p>It broadened the range of household incomes but kept large proportions of original residents out of HOPE VI developments.</p> <p>Has not been shown to have positive influences on social networking among public housing residents.</p>
<b>Mixed-Financing (Leveraged HOPE VI)</b>	<p>Mixed financing combines HOPE VI and other investments such as LIHTC, HOME, CDBG, or private funds to redevelop HOPE VI sites.</p> <p>HUD began to promote mixed-financing to stretch HOPE VI dollars, especially at sites with 500 units. It became a reality when HUD ruled that private entities could own public housing units if they operate them as public housing.</p>	It allowed public housing authorities to develop mix new public and private housing in mixed-income settings.

*Source:* A Historical and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI, Volume 1 Cross-site Report (1996)

To avoid separating public housing units from non-public housing units at redeveloped sites, HUD requires the public housing units to be interspersed with homeownership and tax credit units. All units in a mixed-income development should also be of the same standard and have the same amenities so that public and non-public units are visually indistinguishable from the outside. This policy does not appear to be strongly enforced however because the public

housing and private units at the completed mixed income site and other HOPE VI sites visited in other cities are neither well-integrated nor visually indistinguishable. Given these changes, HOPE VI developments operate with different rules from traditional public housing because PHAs now have greater leverage to set operating terms.

#### **1.4.4 Planning and Design**

HUD's agreement with the Congress for the New Urbanism in 1996 made New Urbanism design principles the preferred planning and design paradigm in HOPE VI. The CNU entered the public housing arena after intensive lobbying for inner-city design opportunities in response to criticisms that the movement focused too much of its activities on middle-class suburban developments. It found a willing partner in HUD Secretary and a New Urbanism advocate, Henry Cisneros, who signed the agreement for HUD. Some analysts view HOPE VI sites as urban laboratories for New Urbanism (Bohls 2000) as a result. At HUD'S urging and to the exclusion of other planning and design guidelines, housing authorities routinely plan their HOPE VI redevelopment projects using New Urbanism design principles. By adopting this one design philosophy, HUD and housing authorities are continuing the previous practice of using a single design philosophy, such as the use of modernist architecture in 1930-1960s public housing developments, to design HOPE VI developments. By excluding other design ideas, HOPE VI limits design innovation to only those that fit this one design philosophy and therefore stifles local design innovation.

According to the New Urbanism Charter, New Urbanism emphasizes higher-density, pedestrian-friendly, transit accessible developments; low-rise single-family housing instead of apartments; and a diverse range of housing types to accommodate diverse populations. Site visits and reviewing reports of HOPE VI developments in several cities indicate that they usually exhibit several New Urbanism features. They often use architectural styles from the surrounding areas. In addition, traditional public housing often features multi-family in high-rise buildings but HOPE VI developments typically feature single-family townhouses style units, semi-detached,

and detached forms in at much lower densities than before. Single-family housing eliminates shared interior space, which some analysts believe contributed to crime and physical deterioration in public housing (Newman 1980). In addition, in contrast to the original developments, HOPE VI developments emphasize through streets that are contiguous with local neighborhood streets to connect the development to the community.

Architecturally, HOPE VI sites look markedly different from their predecessors. At distressed developments, the amount of land used for housing and infrastructure tended to be low but it is very high at HOPE VI sites. Poor land utilization left developments with large uncontrolled and indefensible outdoor space that scholars said fostered illicit drug activities and other crimes (Newman 1980, Newman 1996). HOPE VI encourages much higher land utilization to counteract the unintended negative consequences. Using single-family housing instead of multi-family housing increases site utilization and applying Defensible Space principles minimize public space but set clear distinctions between public and private areas. For example, at Baldwin's Run in Camden, site utilization is 75 percent compared to 20 percent at Westfield Acres, which it replaced (HACC 2000). HOPE VI developments typically have fewer total units and fewer public units than the original developments (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, Goetz 2004, Pitcoff 1999) as a way to reduce density and concentrated poverty and to attract families that are more affluent.

According to the HUD website, in the first 15 years, HOPE VI grants provided financing to redevelop more than 75,000 distressed public housing units (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2010). Some of these units were renovated and some were demolished and replaced but not all demolished units were replaced. HUD reports that its principal intention is to break up pockets of extreme human deprivation in public housing communities and to replace dilapidated housing units. According to HUD website data, by 2009 HOPE VI had committed \$6.5 billion in grants (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). As of September 30, 2009, HAs had completed redevelopment of 107 sites while redevelopment was in

progress at another 141 sites. At the same time, of the 94,367 public housing units demolished, 80,130 were replaced and 78,347 were occupied while 72,718 households were relocated (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009).

In a departure from the past, HOPE VI projects include community and supportive services to give residents the assistance they need such as childcare, counseling, and job training and placement. HUD allows housing authorities to use up to 20 percent of each revitalization grant for community and supportive services, relocation, and self-sufficiency programs (American Planning Association 2003, U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003).

#### **1.4.5 Role of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA)**

From the first HOPE VI award in 1993 until 1999, HOPE VI operated primarily through annual congressional appropriations and grant agreements between HUD and HOPE VI grantees. Congressional appropriations included numerous evolving statutes, laws, regulations, legal opinions, and implementation strategies that HUD incorporated into annual Notices of Funding Availability (NOFA). HUD used NOFAs to announce the availability of grant funds, application requirements, selection processes, rule changes, and new HOPE VI provisions (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). Past NOFAs announce: a) removal of preferential access to public housing for very poor families; b) repeal of the public housing one-for-one replacement rule; c) repeal of federal preferences for public housing, adoption of mixed-income and mixed financing rules; and easing HUD determined admission rules to HOPE VI sites (Duffy 2005, Salama 1999, Zhang 2004). NOFAs and grant agreements also provide guidance for residents' involvement in the HOPE VI redevelopment process. For example, in fiscal year 2002 NOFA, HUD included guidelines for residents and communities to participate in planning, implementing, and managing redevelopment plans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002). HOPE VI grant agreements outline the activities, schedules, and documents that HUD requires from grantees.

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA) authorized the HOPE VI program for the first time in Section 502, which amended Section 24 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. The QHWRA enacts into law many reform provisions in earlier HUD and Congressional bills to revitalize distressed public housing. The Act also introduced several major changes to the public housing program to promote work, end dependency, and move poor residents out of high poverty neighborhoods. PHAs are required to reduce the concentration of extremely low incomes families in public housing; promote housing and economic self-sufficiency; decrease dependency on public assistance; help families transition out of public housing. It also authorized adoption of mix-financing and replacement of distressed public housing with mixed income housing in the latter half of the 1990s (Lewis and Sinha 2007).

#### **1.4.6 Impact**

HOPE VI's success depends largely on its effectiveness in improving residents' lives. Revitalization at distressed sites has been slow but dramatic (Solomon 2005). Some neighborhoods near grant sites experienced increased economic activity and some have not. Similarly, many families moved away and improved their living situation but many have not had that benefit. Relocation has also reduced concentrated poverty considerably at most sites but the incentives towards self-sufficiency and transitioning from public housing so far produced few positive results in terms of employment and income (Boston 2005, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Consequently, affordable housing advocates have expressed concerns about gentrification, loss of permanent affordable housing, and displacement of vulnerable families and individuals (Keating 2000; National Housing Law Project 2002; Zhang 2004; Pitcoff 1999). Keating (2000) likened HOPE VI to the discredited urban renewal program of the 1950s and 1960s. He claimed that like urban renewal, HOPE VI uses federal money to get private redevelopment into so-called "blighted" neighborhoods at the expense of poor, vulnerable families. Observers have also



likened HOPE VI to urban renewal because the program forces residents to move without ensuring they have better replacement housing (National Housing Law Project, et al. 2002).

Collins et al.'s (2005) evaluation of HOPE VI projects in Boston questions the HOPE VI strategy of relocation and replacement of original tenants to encourage self-sufficiency because relocated residents were among the most disadvantaged, most did not received HOPE VI services, and because displacement and income mixing negatively affected residents' sense of community. Based on HOPE VI outcomes in Chicago, Kingsley et al. (2003) reported that since many of the displaced residents ended up in other distressed communities near the original sites not much deconcentration had taken place. The Government Accountability Office (2003), the Center for Community Change (2003), and the National Housing Law Project (2002) lamented the reduction in public housing units and the small percentages of original residents who returned after redevelopment. Despite the criticisms, on its website, HUD claims that HOPE VI has succeeded in deconcentrating poverty and empowering residents towards self-sufficiency.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2003) noted that in the first 10 years, about 50 percent of 49,000 relocated residents were moved to other public housing while 31 percent received housing vouchers to move to private housing to deconcentrate poverty. The remaining 20 percent included about six percent who were evicted and 14 percent who left public housing voluntarily. Using program data through March 2000, Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit (2003) reported similar relocation statistics as the GAO. The program does not guarantee original residents automatic right to return. Instead, HUD requires HAs to work with residents to establish the return criteria and requires HAS to assist residents to satisfy the return criteria during the redevelopment period (GAO 2003). The strict selection policies and the small proportions of returnees to redeveloped properties have drawn heavy criticism from several sources (Center for Community Change 2003, National Housing Law Project, et al. 2002). In theory, each housing authority sets its own return criteria but in reality, the implemented criteria are very similar across

PHAs while the return rates varied from 10 percent at some sites to 100 percent at a few sites (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, Sard and Staub 2008).

Residents also receive supportive services such as education, skills training and job preparation to equip them with tools to make them function more effectively in the labor market and in business in order to improve their economic and social well-being and to help them transition from welfare to work. Combining physical redevelopment with economic self-sufficiency services makes HOPE VI a unique public housing program.

Since HOPE VI attempts to transform the physical and social environment and address the negative effects of concentrated poverty (Goetz 2004), redevelopment projects combine rehabilitation, demolition, and new construction with relocation and income mixing to accomplish its goals (Oakley and Burchfield 2009). At first, the main goal was to demolish or rehabilitate 86,000 distressed dwellings but that target was increased to 100,000 units. Resident self-sufficiency did not play a substantial role during the first three years. By the end of 2002, HUD had approved funding to demolish 140,000 units (McCarty 2005), which far exceeded even the revised target of 100,000 units. (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009, Sard and Staub 2008, McCarty 2005). PHAs planned to develop 111,000 HOPE VI units to replace the demolished units but only between 49,000 and 53,000 of the replaced units were to be public housing. That means PHAs plan are to replace less than 40 percent of the demolished units.

To offset the loss of public housing units, HUD awards tenant-based housing vouchers but the number of such vouchers awarded have been fewer than the number of units lost (Sard and Staub 2008). Additionally, HUD has not developed the necessary outcome-oriented goals and measures to improve residents' economic status. Results in this area have been disappointing. Critics describe the program as effective at replacing distressed public housing with new mixed-income housing but label it "ineffective" when it comes to helping families achieve self-sufficiency (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003, National Housing Law Project, et al. 2002). The researchers concluded HOPE VI has failed the public housing residents that it should

have assisted. Given these criticisms, HOPE VI recipients need to balance physical redevelopment needs with residents' socioeconomic needs.

Public housing has historically embraced one design paradigm then changes it for another a few decades later. As Franck (1994) explained, we HOPE VI replaces modernist-type public housing designs for New Urbanist designs, we should not forget that the public housing models that rejected as outdated and problematic were fine achievements when first introduced.

## **1.5 HOPE VI in Camden**

The Housing Authority of the City of Camden's long-term goal is to modernize all public housing in the city and the agency has aggressively sought HOPE VI and other funding to achieve that goal. To date, the housing authority has received three HOPE VI grants and housing officials anticipate receiving another grant in 2010 to demolish and build a new Branch Village development. The grants have been pivotal to the complete rehabilitation of one development, and demolition and rebuilding of two other developments. The first two projects are complete but construction is still in progress at the third site.

### **1.5.1 McGuire Gardens**

Opened in 1954 to house 368 families in east Camden but plagued with violence, illicit drugs, and physical deterioration since the 1970s, the HACC renovated the development after just 40 years, using a 1994 \$42,000,000 HOPE VI revitalization grant. In 2003, a completely redesigned McGuire Gardens reopened with 178 rehabilitated and 75 new units but remains 100-percent public housing and is the only site with both rehabilitated and new housing. Redevelopment was completed in 2003.

### **1.5.2 Westfield Acres**

For 64 years, Westfield Acres housed public housing residents in east Camden but was afflicted with physical decay, crime and poverty in recent decades before the HACC demolished all 514

apartments using a \$3 million HOPE VI demolition grant to make way for a new development. Today, 78 public housing units and 119 affordable owner-occupied units occupy the site. A separate section has a 74-unit facility for seniors. The HACC built this new mixed-income development after receiving a \$35 million revitalization grant from the HOPE VI program. The HA also built 300 units in three off-site properties. This development is completed.

### **1.5.3 Roosevelt Manor**

Using the \$20 million HOPE VI grant in 2004 as catalyst, the HACC is currently building a new development at the original site and more than 400 other units at Chelton Terrace and other offsite locations in the neighborhood. The original site is projected to get a mix-income, mixed-tenured development consisting of 86 affordable homeownership units and at least 144 LIHTC and public housing rental units. This is the most complex and most costly of the three HOPE VI projects to-date. The projected cost is \$120,000,000. It is the most complex of the three HOPE VI projects because it involves two developments, Roosevelt Manor and Chelton Terrace, and neighborhood-wide improvements to parks and a new neighborhood library.

## CHAPTER 2

### FEDERAL PUBLIC HOUSING: A POLICY REVIEW

The federal government began providing low-rent housing to eligible families on a large scale in 1934 then expanded it into a national public housing program in 1937. By the time the public housing act was enacted, more than 25,000 families already lived in government owned, low-rent housing developments. Today there are about three million public housing residents in 13,000 housing developments. Much has changed since the contentious congressional debates surrounding the first public housing bill in 1937. Design, financing, and construction methods have changed but ideology remains a strong feature in public housing design. Physical design as a means of social control remains a strong part of public housing ideology.

#### 2.1 Public Housing Today

Through HUD, the federal government operates several different subsidized housing programs, including public housing (Schwartz 2006). In 2007, the public housing program consisted of 3,153 public housing authorities (PHAs), 13,000 housing developments, 1.2 million housing units, and about three million residents (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009). Between 1995 and 2007, the program lost about 140,000 units primarily because of demolitions under the HOPE VI program (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009).

Public housing developments and public housing agencies vary in size from very small to very large but most of them are small (Table 2.2). About 77 percent of the 13,000 developments have fewer than 100 units and about 88 percent of PHAs control less than 500 units each. Collectively, PHAs that have less than 500 units account for 29 percent of all public housing units (Table 2.1) and PHAs that have more than 5,000 units (large PHAs) account for about 34 percent of the public housing units. The majority of severely distressed developments are run by large PHAs (Schwartz 2006).

**Table 2.1** U.S. Public Housing Developments by Number and Percentage of Units

Project Particulars	Public Housing Units						
	1-10	11-25	26-50	51-100	101-249	250-500	501+
Number of projects	872	2,349	3,608	3,125	2,127	576	201
Percentage of projects	7%	18%	28%	24%	17%	4%	2%
Total units	6,014	44,333	141,802	241,236	331,652	194,855	205,080
Percent of total units	0.5	3.8	12.2	20.7	28.5	16.7%	17.6%

Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authorities website (August 23, 2010)  
[http://www.clpha.org/facts\\_about\\_public\\_housing](http://www.clpha.org/facts_about_public_housing).

**Table 2.2** U.S. Public Housing Units based on PHA Size

PHA Category	PHA Size (no. of units)	Number of Agencies	Percent of Agencies	Number of PH Units	Percent of Units
Very Small	1-500	2,772	87.9	353,965	29.4
Small	501-1,500	271	8.6	221,138	18.4
Medium	1,501-3,000	86	2.7	218,021	18.1
Large	5,001-7,501	12	0.4	71,350	5.9
Very Large	7,501-15,000	8	0.3	79,995	6.6
Extremely Large	> 15,000	4	0.1	259,667	21.6
<b>Totals</b>		<b>3,153</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,204,136</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Council of Large Public Housing Authorities, 2006

About 60 percent of U.S. public housing developments are in cities and most of them are in poor neighborhoods. Another 19 percent are in suburbs and 21 percent are in rural areas. More than 33 percent are in heavily poor or heavily minority census tracts but only 7.5 percent are in census tracts with less than 10 percent poverty. Further analysis reveals that 37 percent of public housing units are in census tracts where poverty exceeds 40 percent and more than 50 percent are in neighborhoods where the population is majority African-American. Such a large share of public housing developments in either high poverty neighborhoods or neighborhoods with predominantly non-Caucasian populations shows that public housing serves mostly poor people. This reality is consistent with the program's mission to serve families with low incomes whom the private housing market does not serve.

In 2007, median household income in public housing nationwide averaged approximately \$11,295, which was just 29 percent of median income for the entire United States (Council of

Large Public Housing Authorities 2009). Critics complain about the high proportion of public housing residents who depend on welfare but statistics indicate that roughly half (49 percent) of the non-elderly, non-disabled tenants had wages and salaries as their primary source of income. About 32 percent of public housing households (330,000 households) are elderly and about 31 percent (320,000 households) are disabled and most of them depend heavily on social security, pensions, and disability income. When the analysis includes these residents, social security, pensions, and disability income, not welfare, become the main source of income for 55 percent of all public housing tenants (Council of Large Public Housing Authorities 2009). Caucasians accounted for about 51 percent of the public housing population in 2010 and African-Americans account for about 46 percent. About 23 percent were Hispanic. These statistics are important to understanding the nature of the socioeconomic problems confronting distressed public housing.

## **2.2 Public Housing Program Begins**

When the public housing program began in 1937, the federal government had already constructed several low-rent housing developments for low-income families. Before then, the federal government played a limited role in housing the poor. Its role was limited mainly to implementing policies and programs to improve living conditions and population and environmental health. Opposition by policymakers and private housing market stakeholders to any direct government provision of low cost housing to needy families derailed previous government attempts to help the poor. Serious changes probably began after Jacob Riis published *How the Other Half Lives* in 1890, which highlighted the very unsanitary living conditions in New York City tenements. In response, the government implemented several measures to promote public health and safety in housing. Not satisfied, housing reform advocates demanded measures other than building codes and tenement housing reforms in order to eliminate slum conditions and improve housing for the poor. The first federal government built housing resulted from the private market failures that precipitated the Great Depression in the 1920s and 1930s

and the accompanying severe economic dislocations that shifted the political climate more favorably towards a government-run housing program. Such a program began in 1934 but its was primarily set up to help revive the collapsed housing industry, provide jobs, and clear slums. To do this, Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1934 and created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure private loans to builders and homebuyers as a way to stimulate housing construction (von Hoffman 2000). This initiative was one piece of the large infrastructure program that the Roosevelt administration implemented soon after assuming office in 1934 to stimulate economic growth (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997, von Hoffman 1996). By 1937, the Public Works Administration had built 58 housing developments and about 25,000 low-rent units around the country for low-income working families (Lusignan 2002). The units were intended as temporary shelter to eligible families since the idea of a permanent government-run housing program was unacceptable to many policy-makers (Hirsch 2008). Three years later, amidst intense opposition, public housing became a reality when Congress enacted the United States Housing Act of 1937. The previous program eventually folded into this new program.

Passage of the new legislation, which is also known as the Wagner-Stegall Act was not without problems. Despite the obvious benefits, extreme and sustained opposition in Congress and from the National Association of Real Estate Board (NAREB), the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), the Mortgage Bankers Association, and others in the building and real estate sectors weakened the legislation that lawmakers passed (Bauman 1994, Schwartz 2006, von Hoffman 1996). To get the required votes to pass the legislation, supporters in Congress agreed to include several extra provisions to protect the interests of the real estate and private home-building stakeholders from competition from public housing. One provision mandated the removal of at least one unit of so-called 'slum' housing from the local housing supply for each public housing unit constructed to prevent a net increase in housing supply locally. Another provision ensured that public housing went strictly to poor working families. This provision set maximum income limits for eligible families. The limits were set very low to make sure that only



families who could not afford private housing qualified and assured critics that public housing would not directly affect the demand for housing in the private market. Continuing the precedence set in 1934, the legislation also tied the construction of public housing to job creation, economic expansion, and slum clearance in blighted neighborhoods. The program was not primarily intended to provide low-rent program for low income families (Schwartz 2006). Consequently, from the start, housing itself has never been the central focus of the public housing program (Marcuse 1994). Starting with the first program that began in 1934 and continued under the 1937 U.S. Housing Act that launched the public housing program, Congress tied government-run housing programs to slum clearance and neighborhood improvement. That policy has not changed even under HOPE VI. Many of the problems that plagued public housing over the years are directly attributable to the ideology, compromises, and the lack of focus on housing for low-income families starting with the original public housing legislation. Since then, the numerous amendments made to address issues and concerns and strengthen the program made it more complex and more difficult to administer.

Inadequate oversight and funding from HUD and ineffective PHA leadership made it difficult for housing authorities to provide safe and decent housing. Relentless opposition from the private housing industry also thwarted important policy initiatives such that they often resulted in contradictions and unintended consequences. One example is the 25 percent rent cap that was meant to keep public housing affordable for families with real needs but ended up concentrating extremely poor families. Interestingly, the house building industry that opposed public housing from the beginning supports the mixed financing rule in the HOPE VI program but only because private developers receives substantial financial benefits.

The 1937 U.S. Housing Act also established the current public housing structure whereby local public housing authorities operated public housing under state law while the federal government, through the United States Housing Authority, provided funding, administrative and policy oversight. This system came about because federal courts ruled that the federal

government did not have the legal authority to directly build public housing or acquire property by eminent domain for that purpose. Consequently, while the United States Housing Authority (USHA), which Congress established through the 1937 Housing Act, retained administrative responsibilities for public housing, municipalities set up PHAs as independent bodies to develop, own, and operate public housing locally (von Hoffman 2000).

Giving direct responsibility for developing and operating public housing to PHAs appeased the opposition but it resulted in serious siting problems. Instead of strengthening the program, this arrangement weakened it and contributed to some of the intractable problems that affected public housing. One problem was that municipal authorities' had the final say regarding the location of public housing projects. Municipalities, not HAs, also decided if the locality accepted public housing and suburban towns routinely refused. The over-concentration of public housing in central cities is a direct result since cities had the blighted neighborhoods that were targeted for redevelopment and the slum residents that needed housing assistance. Municipalities that built public housing also had to contend with community opposition, which forced housing authorities to build projects in areas of least resistance--poor inner-city communities. Additionally, until Congress outlawed racial segregation in housing markets in 1968, most public housing developments were racially segregated. There were more "whites only" projects and they were built in more desirable locations than the slums where "blacks only" projects were built (Schwartz 2006). Chapter 3 discusses the consequences of these decisions on public housing.

### **2.3 Design and Construction**

The public housing program had been around for only 55 years when Congress authorized the HOPE VI program in late 1992 but it had already experienced two major shifts in design and three changes in design paradigm (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995, Wynter 2005). Each stage reflected different design values and ideologies concerning public housing. The developments that were built during the 1930s and early 1940s had mostly walk-up buildings

arranged around closed or semi-enclosed courts. Introduction of modernist architecture began a transition to much larger developments on superblocks without through streets and having either low-rise or high-rise buildings or both low-rise and high-rise buildings. Since the 1980s, and particularly since HOPE VI, there has been a major shift from high-rises and large-scale developments to smaller-scale, low-rise, low-density properties with private outdoor space on sites with through streets (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995). The common feature in all the design phases is the dominant role of one design paradigm.

### **2.3.1 The 1930s and 1940s**

The early designs emphasized the temporary nature of public housing and avoidance of competition with housing from private builders regarding quality and appearance. Although envisioned as transitional housing, the early designs attempted to provide “good housing” to the residents who were mostly families experiencing temporary economic difficulties during the Great Depression and war veterans and their families (Wynter 2005). Reinforcing their temporary status and minimized costs, developers used simple designs and skimmed on construction material (Wynter 2005, Schwartz 2006). That meant using non-durable building materials and internal systems and outfitted units only with items essential for temporary shelter.

Pre-WWII public housing plans attempted to provide “good housing” and “wholesome living” environments for residents with the assumption that good housing would improve neighborhood conditions and residents’ behavior (Wynter 2005). Good housing and wholesome living meant creating developments with ample space for air, sunlight, gardens, and play areas for children, but no through traffic. Some developments were built near to stores, social and civic facilities, and public transportation (Wynter 2005). The developments were mostly low-rise walk-up buildings in the form of garden apartments and row houses around enclosed or semi-enclosed courts and aligned to streets (Franck and Mostoller 1995). Apartment buildings were next to streets and most apartments faced interior courtyards. Some developments were built in

superblocks or large parcels of land assembled for slum upgrading purposes. On these assembled parcels, local streets often dead-end at the developments. The intention was to give each project a distinct identity and to separate it from the surroundings. Developments built in the 1940s began the transition to open-courts. After 1945, public housing designs transitioned from semi-enclosed courts to an open space design. The open space designs were an attempt to maximize air and sunlight and the housing built was considered to be a major improvement over the neighborhood housing replaced (Franck 1994, Franck and Mostoller 1995).

World War II interrupted the construction of public housing in 1942 as the United States government shifted its focus to housing for the expanded military. At that time, 370 developments were already completed or under construction (Lusignan 2002) but work halted at most unfinished sites. During the war, about 1,500 public housing units and 625,000 temporary military units were completed (Lusignan 2002, Thompson 2006). This shift to military housing created a backlog in the rest of the society, which escalated into a housing crisis when thousands of military personnel returned after the war. In response, the federal government converted a large number of temporary military housing units to public housing units (Lusignan 2002). Analysts believe this temporary fix created numerous problems later because these temporary buildings had short life spans.

### **2.3.2 The Urban Renewal Years: 1949 to 1973**

The Housing Act of 1949 reauthorized public housing and expanded the program by 810,000 units. The goal was to build these units over the next six years but it took 20 years. Other major goals included eliminating urban blight through slum clearance and providing decent housing to every American family (von Hoffman 2000). This legislation continued the trend of loading baggage onto public housing by marrying it to slum clearance, which, by default, restricted the housing to the poorest people and to disadvantaged urban communities. The Act also capped construction costs and eligibility income and limited the rent that tenants paid to 20 percent of a

comparable private unit in the same area as the public unit. Public housing construction was so tightly bound to slum clearance that at least one “slum housing” unit had to be demolished for each public housing unit built. These limitations were due to opposition from people with vested interests in the status quo and from people who ideologically opposed public assistance to the poor (von Hoffman 2000).

When work to complete the 810,000 housing units lagged well below the required rate, Congress expanded the slum clearance provision in the 1949 legislation and included it in the U.S. Housing Act of 1954. That legislation vastly expanded slum clearance to create a separate program called “urban renewal” to clear “slums” and accelerate public housing construction. The urban renewal program (Title 1) was slum clearance on a grand scale. The program authorized \$1 billion in loans to help cities acquire and tear down “blighted” properties and use the land for public housing and other purposes. However, numerous racial and other controversies surrounding urban renewal retarded the construction of public housing units. With widespread opposition to urban renewal, sustained opposition to public housing, and poor management of the redevelopment process, two decades passed before the 810,000 public housing units were completed in 1969 (Bauman 1994). Several aspects of the public housing program rejected in the HOPE VI program were implemented through the 1949 and 1954 housing legislations.

Under urban renewal, public housing design and construction changed to large-scale developments in superblocks of either high-rise buildings in cities or low-rise buildings on wide expanses of land. In many cities, smaller sized walk-up buildings and semi-enclosed courts gave way to large and widely spaced apartment blocks on sites characterized by openness and low utilization of land for buildings. The low land utilization was to convey the highly valued idea of “openness” (Franck 1994). These features highlighted the dominance of the modernist architecture movement during this era, in the same way New Urbanism dominates HOPE VI designs today. High-rise public housing became extremely popular in cities because it allowed the city authorities to build more units and therefore accommodate more tenants. In developing these

high-rise buildings, social planning was clearly deficient because site and building layouts were not conducive to meeting residents' needs, communal living, or the openness of the site that was intended (Franck 1994). The buildings were particularly not conducive to the needs of families with children. The consequences became apparent very quickly at some sites such as the massive Pruitt Igoe development in Saint Louis. This development was so problematic to operate that it lasted merely two decades. Whether high-rise or low-rise, modernist developments typically were built on superblocks and therefore were very conspicuous in their neighborhoods because they looked different from surrounding properties in design and scale.

Externally, the buildings all look the same. Many low-rise developments looked like military barracks or had other institutional appearances. Despite the open design, the developments were inward looking and detached from their surroundings. Unlike many developments that were built in the 1930s with communal facilities, the modernist developments did not have amenities or community services (Franck 1994).

There were other major differences between the early public housing developments and the modernist developments as well. The buildings in the early developments were aligned with streets but the modernist era developments had buildings that were detached from streets (Franck 1994). The inward orientation of the apartments and the superblocks that interrupted the local streets grid isolated the developments from their surroundings (Schwartz 2006).

Construction cost minimization was a big feature during this period as well and because of that, builders often cut corners on design, construction, and inside fittings such as lighting fixtures. The units were very basic, often lacking simple amenities such as closet doors (Franck 1994, Schwartz 2006). Since public housing served poor people and was to be used as transitional housing, the units were very basic. This was not a smart decision because it helped to undermine public housing and helped to cement the image that public housing was housing for the poor.

For nearly two decades, urban renewal demolished more homes than the number of housing units built. The program received sharp criticism for heavy-handedness, poor planning,

social and racial equities, and corruption (Bauman 1994, von Hoffman 1996, von Hoffman 2000). The systematic destruction of predominantly poor African-American communities and their replacement with public works projects justifiably received sharp criticisms because the projects that resulted were often hostile to the neighborhoods. Critics aptly called urban renewal "Negro removal" (Hirsch 1985). The controversies surrounding urban renewal led to uncertainty and a sense of crisis in public housing in the late 1960s that the complete demolition of the massive Pruitt Igoe housing project, only 20 years after it was completed epitomized that sense of crisis. A big part of the problem was that some developments had begun to foster some of the same slum conditions they were created to replace and Pruitt Igoe represented the image of high-rise public housing developments as failure. The Nixon administration then halted construction of all new public housing units in the early 1970s. This might well have been a politically motivated maneuver by the Republican administration (Republicans were known for opposing public housing) but it helped to accelerate the move from government-run public housing projects towards increasing use of private sector-focused alternatives that began in the 1960s.

### **2.3.3 From 1974 to 1992**

After the temporary ban, public housing construction effectively ended in 1974 after Congress passed the 1974 Housing Act that outlined a new direction in federal housing assistance. This new direction emphasized an increased role for private sector involvement in public housing. The severe contraction in public housing construction limited the majority of new public housing units to mainly units for elderly households or as replacement for demolished units (von Hoffman 2000). Interestingly, many of the new developments for seniors were high-rise developments. In the 1970s, the Section 8 voucher program that was introduced in 1974 supplanted public housing as the largest subsidized housing program for low-income families in the country.

The 1980s brought a return to smaller-scale and low-rise family developments to public housing and rejection of high-rise developments. Since few family developments were built in the

1980s, design and construction addressed redevelopment, maintenance, and repair of existing properties until HOPE VI began. This third design phase emphasized private yards, re-introduction of through streets, row housing, and other low-rise buildings around semi-enclosed or fully enclosed courts (Franck 1994, p. 27). Unlike the inward orientation of the housing built under urban renewal; through streets, buildings with frontage and entries onto streets, privatized outside spaces, individual front yard and backyard, and individual street number addresses are all highly valued features of family developments built since 1980, including HOPE VI housing. However, HOPE VI designs are dominated by a new movement called New Urbanism (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 for details).

All three stages reveal an overreliance on physical design to achieve social policy goals but it was most pronounced in the second stage. Von Hoffman (2000) argued that modernist designs reflected a naïve reliance on physical design to achieve social reforms because designers and planners believed “good design” would convey middle-class standards of conduct to lower-income people. Even though the urban renewal program cemented ties between public housing and neighborhood development, results indicate that it hobbled public housing.

Twenty years after urban renewal, HOPE VI proponents reject high-rise developments and target them for demolition on the assumption that they were inappropriate for families and a source of misery in distressed developments. While living in high-rise buildings may have been risky for many public housing families, the same is true for many low-rise buildings as well but high-rise buildings are viewed as inappropriate for public housing families with children.

## **2.4 Tenant Policy**

One rationale for creating a public housing system was to rid urban neighborhoods of slums and the dilapidated housing in them but over the years, some developments began to exhibit some of the slum-like conditions they were built to destroy. Today, public housing conjures images of dilapidated buildings in very distressed inner city neighborhoods and housing extremely poor



families. One reason for this negative image is tenant policies. In the early years, tenant policies emphasized two-parent working-class households. Under urban renewal, that policy was changed to give preference to disadvantaged households and households that urban renewal dislocated. In comparison, under HOPE VI, the goal is to mix households with diverse economic means, from extremely low-income to households earning above 80 percent of area median income.

The early public housing developments were segregated but they served working families primarily. They received no operating subsidy from the federal government and were expected to be self-supporting. Some housing authorities did not even accept families on relief because they required tenants to have enough income to pay rent that covered the operating cost of the units they occupied (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Tenant policies and practices in these early developments reflected the goal of making public housing temporary housing for poor working families until they acquired enough financial resources to become housing self-sufficient and move out of public housing (Franck 1994). PHAs used rent policies to enforce that regime (Franck 1994). At first, public housing authorities determined the rent that tenants paid. Some housing authorities charged a fixed fraction of a tenant's adjusted income; some based the rent on unit size and some charged a minimum rent to the poorest households and a fraction of adjusted income for higher income tenants. Although there was a rent ceiling of 30 percent of tenants' adjusted incomes, developments had no need for subsidies because rental income was enough to meet operating expenses (Schwartz 2006). Tenants whose incomes exceeded the allowed income limits were required to vacate public housing.

Until the 1950s, public housing also promoted tenant selection policies and practices that favored two-parent families and racial segregation until Civil Rights legislation banned segregation in housing in 1968 (Rosenbaum 1994). Because race was a factor in a family's eligibility for public housing, in most instances, Caucasian families and African-American families lived in separate developments and had different services. "Whites only" developments

were often built in more desirable locations than “blacks only” projects that were often built in poor inner-city communities.

The 1949 Housing Act brought several changes in tenant policies in response to pressures from stakeholders in the real estate and private home building sectors to restrict public housing even more to the poorest tenants to protect their private business interests (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). One of the rules required a 20 percent difference between the lowest income at which the local private market supplied housing and the highest income eligible for public housing. Households in the 20 percent gap qualified for neither public housing nor private housing and most likely had to bear extraordinary housing cost burdens. Another rule required PHAs to evict tenants whose incomes exceeded the upper income limit and a third gave priority admission or preferences to veterans and families that the slum clearance program displaced (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). The priority preferences allowed large numbers of poor [black] families that urban renewal projects dislocated to move into public housing (Bauman 1994, Solomon 2005). While the federal government implemented these amendments to restrict public housing to the lowest income earners, the same federal government simultaneously implemented Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Federal Highway Administration policies to encourage working-class families to purchase private homes in suburbs (Abt Associates, et al. 1996). The FHA did not lend money but it guaranteed private loans, which made suburban home purchases a lot cheaper. Because of these policies, economic and racial segregation increased in public housing and the surrounding communities and neighborhoods.

The amount PHAs charged for rent became more controversial in 1969 and 1970 when the two Brooke Amendments limited the amount tenants paid for rent to 25 percent of their income and mandated federal subsidies to PHAs to make up the difference in rental income and operating expenses. These payments began in 1975 that were never enough but only after PHAs were already having serious financial difficulties and forced to defer repairs and maintenance. It was a noble idea to make public housing affordable to the poorest families and most likely

produced short-term gains. However, the full ramification of this policy without adequate budgetary support to PHAs soon became apparent because it produced devastating adverse and unintended outcomes in public housing developments and surrounding areas.

The rules to restrict public housing to low income people and the institutional policies that encouraged working-class families to leave public housing and middle-class Caucasian families to leave cities for suburbs transformed public housing in fundamental ways between 1949 and 1970. While income limit rules forced economically better off tenants with jobs from public housing, federal preferences allowed and urban renewal forced large numbers of non-working and very poor families into public housing. Expulsion of higher income tenants from public housing because their income exceeded the allowed limits deprived PHAs of urgently needed operating funds. The financial position of housing authorities also worsened when Congress gave public housing preference to families that urban renewal projects displaced because it decreased rental income.

The decreases in the median household income among public housing tenants after the policy change supported that charge. Median household income in public housing declined from 57 percent of the national median household income in 1950 to 41 percent in 1960 to 29 percent in 1970, and to less than 20 percent by 1990 (Schwartz 2006). With tenants' average income declining, PHAs received less rental income than operating costs. Although tenant changes forced Congress to implement a federal subsidy program for public housing authorities in the 1969 Housing Act to cover operating deficits (HACC 2009), successive administrations never remitted sufficient funds to make up the deficits. Unable to fund operating costs fully, PHAs routinely deferred repairs and maintenance and so the physical facilities deteriorated faster. To address this problem, Congress fiddled with the rent policy once more by increasing the rent ceiling to 30 percent again in 1981. The policy change apparently had little effect because in 1989, Congress appointed the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing to investigate living conditions in public housing and to recommend a remediation plan.

The federal highway program and the FHA mortgage insurance program produced demographic changes in public housing because they pulled working class Caucasian families away but restricted African-Americans to inner-city communities and to public housing (Jackson 1985, Salama 1999, Zonta 2005). Along with the segregationist practices of the urban renewal program, the racial discriminatory policies and practices pursued helped to create concentrated poverty conditions in public housing and a preponderance of single-parent, female-headed, welfare-dependent, black families (Massey and Denton 1993). Given these outcomes, social scientists charged that federal government policies concentrated very poor families in public housing (Bratt 1989 and Rohe 1995, cited in Anthony 2005, von Hoffman 2000) and allowed public housing to become “warehouses for the poor” (Bratt 1985, Fuerst 1985).

These public policies produced population changes that resulted in more African-Americans in public housing than Caucasians for the first time in the 1960s. By 1980, African-Americans were about 48 percent of public housing residents nationwide while Caucasians were 38 percent with most being elderly residents (Bratt 1985). In 2010, the Caucasian population was about 51 percent but the majority remained elderly residents. Also, by 2004 most public housing households were one-parent, female-headed, largely unemployed, and dependent on government. Nearly 75 percent of public housing householders were females in 1985 and 50 percent of them were dependent on welfare (Bratt 1985). In Table 2.3 below, HUD’s Resident Characteristic Report shows a slight increase in the Caucasians population to 51 percent in 2009 but the African-American population stayed at 46 percent. Some of the changes most likely resulted from HOPE VI relocation policies that reduced the low-income population in public housing but how much is due to HOPE VI is unclear.

With construction of new public housing virtually ended, the federal government focused on repair and maintenance of the existing public housing stock (Thompson 2006) but by the 1980s public housing was widely perceived as a failure (Miseon 2010). Years of neglect, discrimination, isolation, location in distressed neighborhoods, prejudice, shortsighted and racist

tenant policies, design flaws, and poor management converged to produce intolerable levels of crime and disorder, physical deterioration, poverty, and isolated public housing residents. Poverty become so highly concentrated and average income reached so low that in the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, congress created a new income category called “extremely low-income”. In this category, a family of four has annual income of less than 30 percent of area median income. To prevent concentrated poverty, the requirement for public housing was set much lower than that for tenant-based voucher and certificate eligibility.

**Table 2.3** Characteristics of U.S. Public Housing Families in 1995, 2004 and 2010

Particulars	Percentage		
	1995*	2004	2010
Household Type			
Elderly with no children	34	32	30
Non-elderly, disabled with no children	9	31	16
Other, no children	8		14
Families with children	49	43	41
Female Headed with Children	Unknown	38	36
Income Relative to Area Median	(1997)		
30 percent or less	71	-	55
31 to 50 percent	21	-	17
51 to 80 percent	6	-	7
81% or higher	3	-	3
Unknown	-	-	18
Average Annual Income		\$10,398	\$13,406
Source of Income (families with Children)			
Work	31	31	32
Welfare	47	16	30
SS/SSI/Pension	?	55	55
Other	21	17	22
No Income	-	-	2
Race and Ethnicity			
White, non-Hispanic	37	50	51
Black, non-Hispanic	47	46	46
Hispanic	14	20	24
Asian, Pacific Islander or Native American	3	2	3

*Sources:* \*U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (2002), U.S. Public Housing Resident Characteristics Report (April 2009-July 2010)

The ceiling for new tenant-based voucher recipients was set at 75 percent and 40 percent for new project-based public housing recipients (Olsen 2003). The QHWRRA also allowed PHAs to increase ceiling rents to 30 percent of a family's adjusted income. The QHWRRA, which authorized HOPE VI, also announced the federal government's intention to use HOPE VI to promote mixed-income housing, poverty deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency.

## **2.5 The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)**

The Department of Housing and Urban Development or HUD has administered public housing since 1965. HUD took over from the United States Housing Authority, which administered public housing from inception in 1937. HUD's creation elevated public housing administration to a Cabinet-level department headed by a Secretary. The US Housing Act of 1965 authorized HUD on September 9, 1965 as part of President Lynden Johnson administration's "Great Society" program to develop and execute federal housing and urban policies including public housing. HUD unified the disparate federal housing agencies under one organization. Its core responsibilities includes increasing homeownership, assisting low-income renters, fighting discrimination in housing markets, assisting the homeless with housing, and improving urban neighborhoods. Concerning public housing, HUD's mission is to help low-income renters "obtain decent, safe, and affordable housing" (Thompson 2006, p. 4) by expanding access to affordable housing, improving the physical quality of public and assisted housing, improving management and accountability of public and assisted housing, helping residents progress towards self-sufficiency, and increasing housing opportunities for all including elderly and disabilities people.

The FHA is the main vehicle that HUD uses to increase homeownership but the FHA does not lend to homeowners. Instead, it insures private mortgages against default. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 attempted to add 6 million new low-income dwellings over the next 10 years.

Despite the ideological battles and the alternatives available, public housing remains a vital source of shelter for families and individuals that the private market ignores (Bauman 1994), albeit for a dwindling number of people. Nevertheless, many Americans view public housing as a failed welfare policy. Of the nearly 1,400,000 public housing units in use at the start of the 1990s, extremely poor living conditions made at least 86,000 of them uninhabitable (NCSDPH). It may not be the full extent of the problem, as some observers suggest, but based on my review of the issues, the problems manifest the unyielding and unnecessary burdens of job creation, slum clearance, and income limits policymakers repeatedly placed on public housing (Bauman 1994) despite their repeated failures. Maybe now is the time for a new beginning devoid of the ideological baggage in design, construction and service provision.

## **2.6 Public Housing in Camden**

### **2.6.1 Original Developments**

In Camden, public housing followed a similar trajectory to most other cities and was affected by the same set of issues. Consequently, many of the issues already discussed also apply in Camden. Public housing in this city began on April 20, 1938 with Westfield Acres as its first development. Tenants began to occupy the 514 units two months later in May. By 1944, three other family developments were completed and two more in the 1950s. The four high-rise developments for elderly tenants built in the 1960s and 1970s completed 10 developments and 2,224 rental units. Before HOPE VI began, the city had seven public housing family developments and three high-rise developments for seniors, and another 2000 Housing Choice Voucher units.

Westfield Acres actually predated the 1937 Housing Act and the HACC. The Works Projects Administration (WPA), which planned, financed, and built it, started its construction in 1936. It was one of the 50 slum clearance housing projects that the WPA built (Writers Program of the Works Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). Table 2.4 shows the list of public

housing developments in Camden in 1999, the year HOPE VI rehabilitation began at McGuire Gardens. Branch Village, which has 279 units opened in 1944, Ablett Village with 306 units opened in 1942, and Chelton Terrace with 200 units opened in 1944 (HACC 2005, 2006, 2007).

**Table 2.4** HACC Public Housing Projects in 1999

Development	Census Tract	Year	Location	Units	Type	Ownership/ Management
Westfield Acres	6011.02	1937	Rosedale	514	Family: 4-story mid-rise	HACC
Branch Village	6017	1941	Centerville	279	Family: 2 story townhomes	HACC
Ablett Village	6009	1942	Downtown	306	Family: 2-story apartments	HACC
Chelton Terrace	6017	1943	Centerville	200	Family: 2 story townhomes	HACC
McGuire Gardens	6013	1954	Marlton	367	Family: 2 story +townhomes	HACC
Roosevelt Manor	6017	1955	Centerville	268	Family: 2 story townhomes	HACC
Kennedy Tower	6013	1966	Marlton	100	Senior High-rise	HACC
Westfield Tower	6011.02	1970	Dudley	103	Senior High-rise	HACC
Mickle Tower	6003	1974		104	Senior High-rise	HACC
Royal Court				93	Family High-rise	HACC
<b>Total Pre-HOPE VI Units</b>				<b>2,334</b>		

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2000 Revitalization Plan, Roosevelt Manor 2003 Plan

Widespread racial segregation in public and private life in the USA also affected public housing in Camden. Westfield Acres and Ablett Village (for war workers) were built exclusively for Caucasians in the more prosperous Rosedale and Cramer Hill neighborhoods respectively, while Chelton Terrace and Branch Village were built for “negroes” in Centerville. Centerville then was and still is a poor neighborhood with a predominantly African-American population and remains so to this day (HACC 2003, U.S. Census Bureau 1999, 2000). In the 1950s, the HA built two other family properties and three elderly-only developments and another family development between 1960 and 1975. McGuire Garden opened a short distance from Westfield Acres in 1954 in Marlton and Roosevelt Manor opened one year later in 1955 in Centerville. Royal Court near the downtown area was the other family development but the year it opened is not known. The three high-rise elderly developments were built in 1966, 1970, and 1974 (Table 2.4). Kennedy Tower was built next to McGuire Gardens and Westfield Tower was built next to Westfield



Acres. All three elderly properties are in East Camden neighborhoods. Today, the population in East Camden is an eclectic mix of people from several races and ethnicities but most are of African descent. Hispanics make up more than 40 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).

Before HOPE VI, all 10 developments were clustered in five of the 21 census tracts. Five of the developments are in Tract 6011.02 and 6013 in East Camden; three are in Tract 6017 in South Camden, one is in Tract 6003 in the downtown area; and one is in Tract 6009, which adjoins Tracts 6011.02. In the neighborhoods with more than one development, the developments are clustered. For example, the three family developments in South Camden--Roosevelt Manor, Branch Village, and Chelton Terrace--are all in Centerville and clustered in the southwestern part of the neighborhood. The HOPE VI program seeks to reduce this clustering of public housing projects in the city. Thus, four separate developments--Baldwin's Run, Baldwin's Run Senior Tower, Baldwin's' Run II, and Carpenters Hill-- replaced Westfield Acres.

### **2.6.2 HOPE VI and Other Developments**


Before HOPE VI, there were 10 developments with 2,334 units and approximately 4,000 residents. Including HOPE VI sites, the HACC public housing portfolio consists of eight family properties and five elderly/disabled only properties (Table 2.3). Five developments are now in East Camden--Baldwin's Run, Baldwin's Run II, Baldwin's Senior, Carpenters Hill, and Westfield Tower in Rosedale plus McGuire Gardens and Kennedy Tower in Marlton. With four developments, three family developments and a new elderly-only development (Table 2.4 and Table 2.5), Centerville has the highest concentration of public housing. The family developments include five HOPE VI and three traditional properties (Table 2.4). There are now four elderly sites (Table 2.4). With additional HOPE VI units completed, in 2009, there were 1,823 units in 12 properties but the total number of units is still less than the number prior to HOPE VI. The HACC manages five properties and private firms manage the others. Westfield Acres redevelopment added three new properties--Baldwin's Run for seniors, Carpenters Hill, and Baldwin's Run II.

HOPE VI site plan documents indicate that deferred maintenance, obsolescence, poverty and vandalism have left most of the public housing stock in very poor shape. With HOPE VI and other funding, four developments now have new or renovated units. Non-HOPE VI funding allowed the HACC to demolish all 200 units at Chelton Terrace and build 166 new single-family replacement townhomes.

**Table 2.5** HACC Housing Developments in 2009

<b>Development</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Units</b>	<b>Type</b>	<b>Management</b>
<b>HACC Owned and Managed Sites</b>					
Branch Village	1941	Centerville	279	Family: 2-story townhomes	HACC
Ablett Village	1943	Downtown	306	Family- 2-story Apts.	HACC
Kennedy Tower	1966	Marlton	87	Senior High-rise	HACC
Westfield Tower	1970	Dudley	103	Senior High-rise	HACC
Mickle Tower	1974	Downtown	104	Senior High-rise	HACC
Chelton Terrace	2005	Centerville	167	Two-story family townhouses	HACC-Private
<b>Non-HOPE VI Units</b>			<b>1,046</b>		
<b>HOPE VI Sites (All privately owned and managed)</b>					
McGuire Gardens HOPE VI	2003	Marlton	253	Family: 2-story townhomes	HACC-Private
Baldwin's Run HOPE VI	2007	Rosedale	197	1 & 2-story family houses	Private-Private
Roosevelt Manor Senior	2007	Centerville	130	Seniors: 3-story mid-rise	Private -Private
Baldwin's Senior HOPE VI	2008	Rosedale	75	Seniors: 4-story mid-rise	Private -Private
Carpenters Hill	2008	Rosedale	49	13 LIHTC and 36 public housing family duplexes	Private-Private
Baldwin's Run II (20 public housing units)	2008	Rosedale	73	1 & 2-story single-family	Private-Private
Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI	2008	Centerville	105	1-3 story single-family	Private -Private
<b>HOPE VI Units</b>			<b>882</b>		
<b>Total Units</b>			<b>1,928</b>		

*Source:* Westfield Acres HOPE VI 2000 Revitalization Plan, Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Plan, January 2008 HOPE VI Coordinator Interview.



**Figure 2.1** Pre-HOPE VI Public Housing Age in 1993

*Source:* HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Volume II

### 2.6.3 Residents

HACC and HUD data show that public housing residents in Camden reflect the city's demographic makeup of slightly more than 50 percent African-American and more than 40 percent Hispanic. All six family developments in 1992, prior to HOPE VI, housed more than 50 percent African-American residents while the Hispanic population ranged from 11 percent to 43 percent (Table 2.6). At each site, the Caucasian population was overwhelmingly Hispanic.

The majority of public housing households have a single, unemployed female head of household and children under the age of 18 years. At most sites, more than 50 percent of the population relied heavily on public assistance.

**Table 2.6** Ethnic Make-Up in HACC Family Developments, 1992

Development	Percent of Households			Number of Residents
	African-American	Hispanic	Caucasian	
Ablett Village	66	29	5	677
Branch Village	84	15	1	528
Chelton Terrace	84	11	5	484
McGuire Gardens	54	43	3	1,128
Roosevelt Manor	91	8	1	543
Westfield Acres	91	26	8	1,453

*Source:* HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Volume II, 1996

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Where we live makes a big difference in the quality of our lives, and how the places in which we live function have a big impact on the quality of our society.

Dreier, Mollenkopf and Swanstrom, 2001

#### 3.1 Neighborhoods Matter

Originally, public housing served the working poor to help them back on their feet. The program was set up to be transitional housing, not permanent housing for poor families but that is what it has become. Analysts and policymakers say the social pathologies and human and physical distress plaguing public housing resulted from concentrating poor families (Crump 2002, Jargowsky, *Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City* 1996, Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Admission preferences favoring disadvantaged families reshaped public housing resident profile in the 1950s and 1960s and contributed to huge increases in concentrated poverty. As a result, researchers have concluded that concentrated poverty was a one of the main reason behind the decline in social, economic and physical conditions in public housing developments nationwide. Since the mid-1990s, concentrated poverty has taken center stage in debates about living conditions in public housing and HOPE VI, which attempts to address physical distress and concentrated poverty, represents the federal government's most visible response. The program is based on a body of social science research known as "neighborhood effects" (Goetz 2010). This literature suggests that neighborhood conditions influence opportunities for residents in important ways (Jencks and Mayer 1990). Some researchers believe factors such as the absence of positive role models and high-quality services like education and housing in poor urban neighborhoods retard life outcomes for residents. Conversely, positive role models and high quality services improve outcomes (Varaday 2004).

For example, the literature suggests that residents of distressed public housing suffer extra hardships because they live in distressed urban neighborhoods with a lot of crime, low social capital low economic opportunities, poor public services, and have limited opportunities for upward mobility (Ellen and Turner 1997, Jargowsky 1996, Jencks and Mayer 1990, Wilson 1987). The mechanisms through which housing and neighborhood conditions impact the quality of people's lives are not always clear but the consensus is that they are integrally connected. In low poverty neighborhoods with good quality public services like schools, many residents are college-educated and have decent paying jobs and crime tends to be low. In contrast, in poor neighborhoods with poor public services, many residents do not even have a high school education and do not have jobs, and crime tends to be a problem. The 1992 Final Report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing declared that concentrated poverty was a major contributor to public housing distress and HUD has reframed the debate about distressed public housing to focus it on concentrated poverty. So what is concentrated poverty?

### **3.2 Concentrated Poverty**

Concentrated poverty refers to neighborhood poverty of 40 percent or more. It is defined as the proportion of the poor population that resides in neighborhood with at least 40 percent poverty (Jargowsky 1996). Neighborhoods refer to census tracts or clusters of census tracts and the federal poverty level is the poverty benchmark used to determine poverty levels (Berube 2008, Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). Census tracts vary widely in size, economic and social characteristics, demographic composition, and population size but are the smallest well-defined geographic unit for which detailed physical, social, and economic data are available in the USA. Their populations range from 2,500 to 8,000 people. Census blocks and census block groups are smaller and equally well-defined geographic units that would be better representations of actual neighborhoods but detailed physical, social, and economic data are not available at those levels.

Research indicates that before the 1970s concentrated poverty was rare in American cities but became problematic in the 1970s and truly alarming in the 1980s before declining in the 1990s (Danziger and Gottschalk 1987, Jargowsky 1996, Jargowsky 2003). When researchers recognized this phenomenon in the 1980s, it was already a crisis. The following alarming census tract data indicate the severity of the problem between 1970 and 1990 (Danziger and Gottschalk 1987, Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). In the 1970s, concentrated poverty in the 50 largest cities in the U.S. increased by almost 66 percent from about 974,000 (2.5% of the population) to more than 1.6 million (4.3% of the population). Poverty in general increased by nearly 12 percent in cities and by 8 percent for the entire United States (Danziger and Gottschalk 1987). This trend continued in the 1980s as the number of high-poverty tracts doubled and the number of people who lived in those tracts jumped from four million in 1979 to eight million in 1989. In cities, poverty increased from 12 percent to 18 percent of the urban population (Jargowsky 1996). Even absolute poverty declined nationally yet the urban poor became poorer, more isolated, and more concentrated in physically, economically, and socially distressed urban areas (Goetz 2000, Jargowsky 1996). Thus, as Peterson (1991) concluded, although the national poverty rate settled to around 13 percent, urban residents were at greater risk of becoming poor. The situation improved in the 1990s but remains precarious; the number of high poverty areas decreased by 25 percent and the number of poor households living in those areas declined by 1.3 million.

Another problem with concentrated poverty is that the people who experience it are overwhelmingly black. From 1970 to 1980, the poor black population in extreme poverty tracts increased by 164 percent but by only 24 percent for poor Caucasians (Wilson 1987). During this time “black” poverty stayed stubbornly above 33 percent while “white” poverty hovered around 10 percent and Hispanic poverty jumped to 39 percent (Peterson 1991). Looked at more broadly, the picture shows that just 13 percent of the U.S. population is African-American but they comprise more than half of the nation’s poor and about half of the concentrated poor (U.S. Census Bureau 2000, Jargowsky 1996, Kasarda 1993). In addition, the expansion in concentrated

poverty coincided with a large increase in female-headed households in poverty. Roughly 25 percent of the poor population lived in female-headed households in 1960 but was 40 percent in 1987 (Peterson 1991). In an age of declining social support to the poor, if this trend continues, the consequences could be explosive for family life and urban governance.

The forces that produce concentrated poverty are many and varied (Berube 2008). Research suggests that the wholesale migration of Caucasians from cities to suburbs and of African-Americans from the rural South to northern cities contributed to the disproportionate share of African-Americans in concentrated poverty. Despite this evidence, the HOPE VI program does not address this issue. Racialization of concentrated poverty was not a key objective in this study but is mentioned here because it plays such a big role. Cities often built public housing to restrict African-Americans to certain areas in a city to prevent diminution in property values and other undesirable effects when “blacks” move into “white” neighborhoods (Myerson and Banfield 1955, 210; in Goetz 2003). When the U.S. Congress finally outlawed such racially orchestrated housing policies, most developments were already built and operational.

### **3.2.1 Theorizing Concentrated Poverty.**

The current urban poverty literature cites four categories of events that led to concentrated poverty: economic restructuring and de-industrialization (Wilson 1987); racial discrimination in housing markets that reinforced racial and ethnic segregation (Massey and Denton 1993); government intervention (Schill and Wachter 1995); and migration and suburbanization (Berube 2007, Goetz 2003, Jargowsky 1996). Berube also cites family structure. No one factor alone fully explains concentrated poverty however.

The macro-economic change thesis states that African-Americans became more spatially concentrated in the inner city when the structure of metropolitan area economies changed from industrial to service based. The racial discrimination thesis addresses discriminatory and shortsighted urban development policies and practices favoring suburbanization of middle-

income Caucasians (Berube 2007; Goetz 2003). Much of the contemporary scholarship on urban poverty builds on Wilson's thesis about concentrated poverty in African-American urban neighborhoods and the resulting dysfunctional environments. The debate about urban poverty is not new but Wilson's thesis provided a bridge between the divergent structural theories of liberals and the behavioral explanations of conservatives. Most importantly, by highlighting the horrendous conditions in poor black communities, Wilson brought the pernicious effects of extreme geographic concentrated poverty into mainstream policy discourse.

In his influential book titled *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Innercity, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, University of Chicago sociologist, William J. Wilson, notes that poor urban families in the 1970s lived in concentrated poverty "ghettos" while early post-World War II poor urban families lived in stable communities with strong social connections. He theorized that the effects of changes in urban economies trumped race as the dominant factor in creating and maintaining concentrated poverty. He argued that the deepening spatial concentration of black poverty in the innercity resulted from sharp changes in the economic environment that reduced economic opportunities for African-Americans (Wilson 1987). He further argued that "neighborhood effects" contributed to the cycles of poverty afflicting African-Americans in central cities and that de-industrialization hit African-American neighborhoods the hardest, which caused existing poverty to worsen.

Sociologists have since geocoded survey data to link individual characteristics to family characteristics and to neighborhood conditions at various spatial levels (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008, Jencks and Mayer 1990). A multitude of studies found evidence supporting Wilson's thesis that neighborhood conditions affect the residents' socioeconomic outcomes (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, et al. 1993).

**3.2.1.1 Economic Restructuring (De-industrialization).** Economic restructuring or de-industrialization refers to the transformation of urban economies from a manufacturing base to



service-based economies driven by information technology. The hypothesis describes the structural changes in metropolitan area economies that resulted in long-term economic decline in manufacturing and rural agricultural and extraction inductive industries. The hypothesis posits that urban economies underwent a post-industrial revolution characterized by capital-intensive restructuring in the industrial and manufacturing sectors and a rapid and massive shift to knowledge-based, information-backed services (Wilson 1987, Wilson & Aponte 1985). This is a widely accepted explanation for the rapid increase in concentrated poverty during the 1970s and 1980s.

Wilson argued that until the 1970s, urban economies depended largely on producing industrial and consumer goods but that changed dramatically between 1970 and 1990 as the information technology revolution reoriented the urban economy from producing manufactured goods to producing services. Wilson theorized that the deindustrialization of urban economies impacted the black community much more than any other racial group because blacks relied more heavily on the industrial economy for employment and decent wages in low-skilled jobs. The closure of many industrial enterprises and their relocation overseas or to suburban areas left these low-skilled workers without jobs and the means to sustain their families and communities. Less skilled and less educated than Caucasians, African-Americans were not prepared for the job opportunities that the expanding service sector afforded them. Even when jobs were available in manufacturing plants that moved to suburbs that surround central cities, limited or no transportation access from cities made it difficult for city dwellers to take the available jobs. This spatial mismatch between suburban jobs and central city labor is has been a subject of much debate as well (Wilson 1987).<sup>6</sup> With increasing suburbanization of decent-paying manufacturing jobs, joblessness and poverty soared among African-Americans. Joblessness among adult males was most devastating in inner-city neighborhoods with concentrated poverty and particularly at public housing sites with large African-American populations, reasoned Wilson (1987). He

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<sup>6</sup> For a detailed discussion of the “skills mismatch” hypothesis, see Kasarda (1983)

argued that Caucasians fared much better than African-Americans because they were better prepared, better educated, and had the advantage of living nearer to the job centers.

Wilson based much of his de-industrialization thesis on earlier research by Kasarda in 1980 and 1983 showing that poor minorities were most vulnerable to structural economic changes as cities transitioned from goods-producing economies to high-tech, service-based economies. Kasarda's research also showed that economic shifts helped to polarize the labor market into high-wage and low-wage sectors and that relocation of major manufacturing firms from central cities marginalized low-skilled workers and deprived them of stable employment.

**3.2.1.2 Suburbanization.** Suburbanization refers to the large migration of people from central cities to outlying areas near cities. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, businesses and middle-income and upper-income white households left cities for suburbs. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which included fair housing and other civil rights, helped to loosen racial restrictions that kept influential African-Americans in inner-city neighborhoods. With the restrictions loosened, affluent African-Americans also migrated to suburbia in large numbers in the 1970s and 1980s to take advantage of the better job opportunities and living conditions. There is little doubt that suburban migration negatively affected predominantly African-American neighborhoods (Wilson 1987). Proponents of the black suburbanization hypothesis argue that in earlier times, racial discrimination in housing and labor markets forced successful black families to live in predominantly African-American neighborhoods but their presence helped to stabilize those neighborhoods. In contrast, their departure left those neighborhoods with their most economically disadvantaged residents and without the means to sustain basic neighborhood social and economic life. The presence of economically stable families not only helped to "buffer" black neighborhoods against hard times but also helped to transmit positive attitudes towards work, family life, and education to succeeding generations. Successful and stable middle-class residents helped black neighborhoods to maintain viable businesses and social institutions like churches

and schools but their departure deprived the neighborhoods of these valuable elements. Eventually, poverty and neighborhood isolation took over, Wilson (1987) argued. The absence of successful residents also deprived black neighborhoods of positive role models and contributed to problem behaviors and social dislocations (South and Crowder 1999, Wilson 1987). Over time, many urban neighborhoods became over-concentrated with poor families who were dependent on public housing and welfare.

Wilson's public policy prescription for this demise of black neighborhoods and the emergence of an "underclass" is that programs created to alleviate poverty, joblessness, and related social dislocations should focus on changing the social, economic, and structural issues that contribute to neighborhood decline rather than trying to change "ghetto" people culture (1987, p. 138).

**3.2.1.3 Racial Discrimination in Housing.** Racial discrimination in housing refers primarily to institutional and non-institutional policies and practices that reinforce neighborhood racial and ethnic segregation. It has played an integral part in the development of public housing in the USA and despite legislation against such activities, housing discrimination against non-Caucasian homebuyers and renters persists (L. Freeman 2005, Turner, Ross, et al. 2003). Because discrimination produces fewer housing options for non-Caucasians and low-income people, it forces them to live in high-poverty areas. It is therefore one of the main drivers of concentrated poverty in public housing (Massey and Denton 1993). Wilson highlighted economic change as the main contributor to concentrated poverty in the 1970s and 1980s while acknowledging that racism was a major contributor. Other researchers also disagree with the diminished role Wilson ascribed to racism. In a study published in 1995, Goering, Kamely and Richardson (1995) noted that most public housing developments were located in poor and racially isolated neighborhoods. More than 40 percent lived in census tracts with majority African-American populations and about 30 percent lived in developments located in tracts with fewer than 10 percent African-

Americans. African-Americans in public housing live in predominantly African-American neighborhoods but Caucasians in public housing live in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods. Bratt, Stone and Hartman (2006) also contend that people of color are less able to compete in the housing market because of persistent discrimination.

Massey and Denton (1993) argue that pervasive and destructive racial segregation in housing markets substantially contributed to the alarming levels that concentrating poverty reached in the 1970s and 1980s. Their study of U.S. urban populations in the 1970 and 1980s found that social, economic, and political activities at all levels of society created and reinforced segregation of residential space by race and ethnicity. Rather than economic restructuring or suburbanization, institutional and non-institutional discrimination against African-Americans led to residential segregation and concentrated poverty.

Massey and Denton used census data to show the effects of systematic racial and class discrimination against African-Americans in housing markets and the wider economy by public and private institutions and by individuals. In analyzing residential patterns between different racial groups in 125 large cities in the 1970s, they found location patterns that were completely different from pre-1970 patterns. Unlike the invasion-succession-assimilation patterns of earlier European immigrants, the results for African-Americans revealed extreme levels of segregation between African-Americans and other racial groups. Extreme segregation or “hyper-segregation” occurs when black neighborhoods have only other black, hyper-segregated neighborhoods bordering them. In the 25 largest cities, African-Americans are the most hyper-segregated racial or ethnic group (Massey and Denton 1993). Unlike poor African-Americans, poor Caucasians do not live in hyper-segregated communities; most live in middle-class census tracts bordering other middle-class census tracts. Based on their findings, Massey and Denton concluded that urban policies and practices in the U.S. foisted concentrated poverty upon African-Americans neighborhoods. They argued that segregation forces poor African-Americans to live in racially segregated and poor inner-city neighborhoods, which often meant living in distressed public

housing projects. Pervasive hyper-segregation limits relocation opportunities for African-Americans and forces them to live in distressed neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993).

In Yonkers, NY for example, nearly all of the city's subsidized housing units were built deliberately in the southwestern part of the city where the population is predominantly African-American and Hispanic. The city has about 13,000 public housing units and the overwhelming majority and nearly all other subsidized housing units were concentrated in this one part of the city (Briggs, Darden and Aidala Winter 1999, Keating 1999). While not as disproportionately concentrated as in Yonkers, in Camden, NJ, three of the city's six family developments and 38 percent of the public housing units are concentrated in Centerville neighborhood, whose population is also predominantly "African-American.

**3.2.1.4 Government Policies.** Government policies also contributed significantly to concentrating poor and non-Caucasian families in public housing. For example, building the vast majority of public housing developments in poor neighborhoods ensures that the residents are always going to be poor. Schill and Wachter (1995), who examined how public housing contributed to concentrated poverty, explained that the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling that blocked the federal government from decisions regarding the location of public housing was one such decision. That Supreme Court ruling left the decision about where to locate public housing to local governments and localities were free to accept or reject public housing. While suburban townships routinely refused public housing, many cities had declining neighborhoods with severely deteriorated housing and so they accepted public housing as replacement for some of the dilapidated properties. It is therefore no coincidence that public housing is concentrated in cities rather than dispersed throughout metropolitan areas.

Some policies that were implemented during the urban renewal era to make public housing more affordable made worsened concentrated poverty in public housing. Such policies include rent ceilings and income limitations. Rent ceilings brought more economically

disadvantaged families into public housing and income limitations forced tenants whose incomes exceeded the ceiling to move out (Schill and Wachter 1995). These policies had good intentions but ended up constraining attempts to provide the affordable, safe and decent housing that the U.S. Congress pledged in the 1949 U.S. Housing Act (Abt Associates Inc 1996, Popkin, Katz, et al. 2004, Schill and Wachter 1995). Wilson (1987) also explained that the 1968 Civil Rights Act, although well intentioned; unwittingly helped to increase concentrated urban poverty because it freed wealthier African-Americans to move from the city better housing and neighborhoods in the suburbs and left the poor in the inner city. Federal Highway Administration and Federal Housing Administration policies and programs, discussed in Chapter 2, also led to concentrated poverty in public housing. The Federal Highway Administration encouraged Caucasian middle-class families that highway construction projects displaced to move to the suburbs and the Federal Housing Administration loan guarantees made buying suburban homes more affordable during the urban renewal era (Abt Associates Inc 1996).

### **3.2.2 Critique**

Concentrated poverty in American cities in general but in public housing in particular has many origins but mostly appear to be economic or racial in nature. Government policies, institutional and individual actions contributed to the problem. The result is that no single theory adequately explains this phenomenon. To address neighborhood concentrated poverty, analysts need to know the mechanisms through which concentrated poverty results in neighborhood distress and negative behavior. Massey and Denton (1993) argue that because of racial discrimination, when city economies decline, the economic and social impacts on African-Americans and Caucasians differ. However, the reality is that the causal factors that each theory poses do not necessarily contribute to urban decline or severely distressed conditions in public housing in every neighborhood or to the same extent. The relative contribution of each factor depends on the characteristics of each city, neighborhood, and housing development. Changes in the economic

structure of metropolitan areas and de-industrialization, government policies, suburbanization, and social factors like racial discrimination all helped to fuel concentrated poverty.

A full explanation of the causes of and solutions to severely distressed public housing should therefore consider all factors. A theoretical framework that incorporates both structural economic changes, behavioral factors such as racial discrimination, and public policy interventions will likely result in a better understanding of and solutions to concentrated poverty. Even if racial discrimination is no longer the main factor, it is still prominent in the housing industry and one of main reasons that attempts to build racially and economically integrated neighborhoods have had limited success to date (Massey and Denton 1993). Since HOPE VI attempts to address concentrated poverty in public housing, the strategies used should also address all the social, physical, and economic factors that led to the problem in the first place.

### **3.2.3 Effects of Concentrated Poverty**

In public housing, concentrated poverty places a double or triple burden on residents. Not only are most residents very poor, the distressed developments are located in communities that are themselves severely disadvantaged (NCSDPH 1992). Social scientists noted that public housing has some of the worst cases of concentrated poverty in the United States (Goetz 2002, Greenbaum 2002) while Schill and Wachter (1995) argued that concentrated poverty in public housing precipitates neighborhood disinvestment and decline. Due to concentrated poverty, some researchers even describe public housing as “vertical ghettos” while some refer to the most disadvantaged segment of the public housing population as “underclass” (Hirsch 1996 in Goetz 2005, p 7; Wilson 1987).

Researchers believe that concentrated poverty negatively affects the well-being of residents, families, and neighborhoods (Kasarda, 1993; Massey and Denton 1993; Jargowsky 1996; Wilson 1987). These effects include private sector disinvestment, high crime rates, higher local government costs, reduced housing values, underperforming schools, and restricted access

to good healthcare services and good job opportunities (Kneebone and Berube 2009). Due to neighborhood effects, in comparison to affluent neighborhoods, very poor neighborhoods tend to have high rates of single-parent families, welfare dependency, and school-dropouts; low rates of owner-occupied housing; high rates of vacant housing; and poor infrastructure services (Berube 2007, Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997, Clark 2005, Jargowsky 1996, Jencks and Mayer 1990, Rosenbaum Stroh & Flynn 1998, Wilson, 1987). These impacts undermine the ability of the residents to get and keep decent jobs and achieve economic self-sufficiency (GAO 2007). Residence in very poor neighborhoods limits access to mainstream social and economic support systems and opportunities (Turner and Rawlings 2005). Goetz (2002, p. 3) quoted former HUD Secretary, Henry Cisneros as saying, “One of the greatest challenges to America’s urban future is the persistent concentration and isolation of poor people and minorities in the central cities ....” One analyst suggested that concentrated poverty “... poisons not just race relations but also our attitudes toward education, law-enforcement, and city life itself” (Lehmann 1991, p. 35, cited in Goetz 2002, p. 3). People who live in concentrated poverty have diminished hope.

Some observers argue that people who live in concentrated poverty lack access to mainstream social and economic opportunities and it undermines their long-term life chances (Turner and Rawlings 2005). Given these challenges, the urban poor usually find it extremely difficult to get jobs that pay decent wages to get them off welfare (Wilson 1987). Wilson theorized that concentrated poverty and income inequality breed the “underclass”: that is, a group of people who are systematically isolated from mainstream social and economic life and whose conduct often contradicts mainstream American values. Several other studies confirm positive association between neighborhood conditions and resident outcomes.

Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) reported that adolescents from wealthy neighborhoods achieve better educational outcomes and superior cognitive development compared to adolescents from poor neighborhoods. They concluded that these findings showed the superior resources and



neighborhood services, role models, and the direct labor-market connections that the children from the wealthy neighborhood had.

Other researchers reported similar neighborhood effects as Wilson did. Currie and Yelowitz (2000), Turner and Ellen (1997), and South and Crowder (1999) show the impact of adverse neighborhood quality on family formation and the impact on economic well-being. Currie and Yelowitz's (2000) research among children living in public housing and children living in private housing reported that children who live in public housing experienced less stability and were less satisfied with their neighborhoods and housing than were children from wealthy communities. For example, the children from public housing were more likely to change schools.

South and Crowder (1999) used census and longitudinal data from the 1968 and 1986 Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine relationships between neighborhood socioeconomic disadvantage and the timing of first marriage and the chance of premarital childbearing among young women in concentrated poverty neighborhoods. They found strong evidence to support Wilson's contention that concentrated poverty reduces the availability of marriageable men but found no significant difference between the marriage chances of African-American women and Caucasian women who live in severely disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Hogan and Kitagawa (1985), who studied pregnancy rates among unmarried African-American teenagers in both poor and wealthier neighborhoods, found higher pregnancy rates among teenage girls from poor areas than among teenage girls from wealthier neighborhoods. Crane (1991) used a longitudinal study to measure neighborhood quality using the "percentage of high-status workers in neighborhoods". This study found that school dropout rates for African-American students increased dramatically when the percentage of high-status workers in the neighborhoods studied fell below 5.6 percent.

A comprehensive review of the neighborhood effects literature by Ellen and Turner (1997) noted that most neighborhood effects studies found correlations between neighborhood

characteristics and individual outcomes. Employment studies found positive correlation between employment and neighborhood characteristics and between earnings and neighborhood characteristics. Some studies reported that residents from poorer neighborhoods had poorer quality public education, childcare, medical care, and after-school services than residents from more affluent neighborhoods. Regarding social networks, most studies found that people whose social networks have few employed persons were less likely to have connections to employment opportunities than were people with connections to employed individuals.

Most neighborhood effects studies use neighborhood poverty rate as proxy for neighborhood quality. A neighborhood with a high poverty rate is of a poor quality and a neighborhood with a low poverty rate is a good or high quality neighborhood. That assumption implies that relocation from a poor neighborhood to a non-poor neighborhood will improve the economic and social well-being of relocatees. However, some studies show positive outcomes from such relocation but other studies show negative outcomes for some populations. Research by Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn (1998) suggests that poorer neighborhoods exert stronger influences on residents than the influence that affluent neighborhoods exert on their residents. If this is so, the presence of so-called positive role models in a neighborhood may not be as relevant as generally indicated. This information may be relevant to HOPE VI since the program advocates relocation from distressed public housing to neighborhoods with low levels of poverty.

In general, many studies found detrimental impacts of concentrated poverty on residents but policy prescriptions are rare. One of the few analysts that proposed policy solutions is Wilson (1987). He proposed mixed-income housing as an alternative in the belief that the mixed-income approach provides positive role models for low-income tenants. Although little empirical evidence exists to validate the mixed-income approach to public housing, HOPE VI has been emphasizing mixed-income housing since the mid-1990 but has not given sufficient attention to other aspects of concentrated poverty such as racial discrimination. Consequently, even HOPE VI housing is concentrated in the same racially concentrated neighborhoods as before.

### 3.3 Deconcentrating Poverty: Residential Mobility Programs

Relocation of families from very distressed public housing developments is a key part of HOPE VI's drive to eliminate concentrated poverty in public housing. About residential mobility, the Gautreaux and MTO programs offer valuable research insights (Berube February 2007). These programs attempted to improve the lives of public housing families by moving them to low-poverty neighborhoods (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010).

#### 3.3.1 The Gautreaux Program

The Gautreaux program emanated from a class-action lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) by tenants led by Dorothy Gautreaux in 1966 alleging racial discrimination in site selection and unit allocation by the CHA (Rosenbaum and Rubinowitz Summer 2000). Federal courts agreed with tenants and imposed a desegregation remedy to rectify this long history of systemic racial discrimination towards African-Americans (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008). The goal was to move African-American public housing families to neighborhoods with 30 percent or fewer African-American residents. In 1998, the program had facilitated the dispersal of about 7,000 low-income African-American families from inner-city housing projects to low poverty and less segregated neighborhoods throughout the six-county Chicago metropolitan area (DeLuca, et al. 2010).

In the 1969 and 1976 rulings, the courts ordered the CHA to stop building other large-scale public housing developments in African-American neighborhood, and to provide small-scale housing in white neighborhoods for black residents. To ensure that desegregation occurred, the court excluded neighborhoods with more than 30 percent African-Americans from consideration. Participating families received rent subsidies that allowed them to live in private sector housing at the same cost as public housing. Led by the non-profit group Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, the Gautreaux program helped black public

housing residents and families on waiting lists to move into private suburban homes and to revitalizing neighborhoods in the city of Chicago.

Results from Gautreaux program studies show mixed outcomes for relocated residents. Rosenbaum and Popkin (1991) reported several positive outcomes. Adults who relocated to the suburbs were much more likely to find jobs; high school graduation rates among children who moved to suburbs increased; and high school graduates were more likely to attend college get better paying jobs than their peers who relocated within the city limits (Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn 1998). Spence (1993) also found higher employment levels, higher labor force participation, higher high school graduation rates, and better college attendance records among families that moved to less racially concentrated suburban neighborhoods than among families that stayed within Chicago city limits. These positive findings emboldened housing mobility advocates to argue for a similar program nationwide to give poor residents access to social capital that connects them to job opportunities, reduce extreme poverty, and improve conditions in inner-city neighborhoods (Spence 1993). These findings have been influential in HOPE VI's evolution such as the increasing use of relocation and income integration in HOPE VI developments as strategies to deconcentrate poverty.

### **3.3.2 The Moving to Opportunity (MTO) Program**

The MTO was a ten-year experimental program to assess residential mobility outcomes among public housing families when they move from distressed public housing in high poverty neighborhoods to private housing in low-poverty neighborhoods after relocation counseling. The experiment tested the hypothesis that families that live in areas of concentrated poverty would benefit from improved access to better paying jobs, better schools, and better housing by moving to low-poverty neighborhoods (Collins, et al. 2005, Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn 1998). Using volunteer families from New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston, and Baltimore (Goetz 2004; HUD website 2010), the experiment assessed long-term effects on employment, housing,

and education by assigned randomly each family to either a control group, a comparison group, or an experimental (treatment) group. Families in the control group received no subsidy and no counseling; families in the comparison group received housing vouchers and no relocation restriction while the experimental group received relocation counseling and housing vouchers valid only in low-poverty neighborhoods (DeLuca, et al. 2010).

Research done five to seven years the MTO began shows mixed but encouraging outcomes. Overall, families in the treatment group lived in better neighborhoods and adults experienced improved mental and physical health (e.g., reduction in depression and obesity) after moving. Studies also indicate that girls in the treatment group showed improved mental health but boys in the treatment group displayed worse emotional and behavioral outcomes than boys who remained in public housing, the control group (Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010). In a Baltimore study, some families that moved initially to better housing in lower poverty neighborhoods later returned to poor neighborhoods (Clark 2005). About half of the families moved to neighborhoods where poverty increased in the 1990s, including families who made long-term moves to high-poverty neighborhoods where they had families and friends. Despite the apparent overall improvements in housing quality and mental well-being, based on employment, earnings, and welfare dependency outcomes, MTO families did not improve in economic self-sufficiency, which was expected to be the main outcome. Although final evaluation results are not yet available, the results suggest that relocation from high-poverty to low-poverty neighborhoods may not be a sufficient condition for achieving economic self-sufficiency.

Gautreaux and MTO results suggest caution regarding the assumed benefits of residential mobility because they have not provided clear pathways for how to deconcentrate poverty in public housing. They provide vital information to guide planning but do not answer all questions about the efficacy of residential mobility to residents who live in distressed public housing. In the Gautreaux program for example, inherent differences between families that moved to the suburbs and families that stayed in the city rather than differences due to neighborhood location and

quality may have affected some of the positive outcomes. With predefined operating parameters, the MTO is sharply different from the HOPE VI program in which projects vary from site to site and where the rules are often confusing or unclear. Officials should therefore not expect the same results from the two programs (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Unlike the MTO however, in HOPE VI, entire housing developments are rehabilitated or demolished, relocation is involuntary, relocation assistance is inconsistent and it is not available to every family, and residents are expected but not required to move to low poverty neighborhoods. The parameters are clearly different in HOPE VI (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).

While the research indicates that residential mobility as a poverty deconcentration tool has merit, it does not improve living conditions in high-poverty neighborhoods. Instead, residential mobility takes the best from these areas, which leaves them more disadvantaged than before (Goetz 2004).

### **3.4 Poverty Deconcentration in HOPE VI**

Studies of HOPE VI projects enrich understanding of how the program affects residents and neighborhoods (Hanlon 2010). These studies show impacts on residents' lives and shed light on the validity of relocation as a means to deconcentrate poverty. The following studies illustrate HOPE VI's effectiveness. HUD sponsored cross-site studies provide a comparative framework for assessing program outcomes across several sites but most of the results were preliminary (Hanlon 2010) because the projects were incomplete.

In terms of poverty deconcentration the "HOPE VI Resident Issues and Changes in Neighborhoods Surrounding Grant Sites" study in 2003, which examined HOPE VI effectiveness, the Government Accountability Office reported that poverty deconcentration varied widely at the 160 HOPE VI sites studied and found no conclusive evidence to support HOPE VI residential mobility assumptions about its effectiveness. The study examined: a) the types of housing to which original residents had moved, b) the share of original residents expected to return after

redevelopment, c) how 1996 grantees involved residents in the HOPE VI process, d) the types of community and supportive services that residents received, and e) changes in neighborhoods surrounding sites that received 1996 fiscal year grants. The study found that the largest percentage of relocated residents moved to public housing sites not slated for rehabilitation and that grantees expected about 50 percent of original residents to return after revitalization. It also found that 31 percent of original tenants received vouchers to rent homes in the private market but 6 to 14 percent were evicted or they moved on voluntarily. Relocation to other developments was generally not positive but there were improvements in education, income, and housing conditions in most neighborhoods surrounding grant sites. Additional assessments at four sites showed inconsistent and mixed results. Most of the 160 projects were incomplete however so it is likely that some results improved after completion.

The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study (Buron, et al. 2002) was the first systematic cross-site study examining relocation outcomes for original residents and the most comprehensive study of resident outcomes in the HOPE VI program to date. This retrospective survey examined relocation outcomes for original householders at eight sites that received revitalization grants between 1993 and 1998. The results provide a snapshot of the living conditions and well-being of former residents as of spring 2001—two to seven years after the HOPE VI grants were awarded. At the time of the study, redevelopment was in progress at six of the eight sites so the results describe work-in-progress. The results indicate that some residents moved to lower-poverty neighborhoods with slightly more racial diversity and to neighborhoods with significantly less crime. Poverty rates at grant sites also declined by 12 percent on average. Additionally, voucher recipients who moved to private housing experienced more positive outcomes than households who moved to other public housing developments. For example, 45 percent of families who moved to another public housing site reported serious drug problems in the neighborhoods compared to 23 percent of voucher holders. Part of the problem is that a large percentage of residents relocated to neighborhoods with high levels of segregation, poverty, and crime. At least

42 percent moved to high-poverty neighborhoods and 76 percent to neighborhoods with at least 89 percent non-Caucasians.

Despite the lack of baseline data, the findings provide vital information about HOPE VI outcomes. Even though the findings at six of the eight sites were preliminary, the results were not as positive for HOPE VI as expected because most relocated residents did not move to improved living conditions.

The HOPE VI Panel Study (Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002) is a quasi-experimental study that examined effects on the lives of original residents. The research examined long-term location, neighborhood condition, physical and mental health, and socioeconomic outcomes for original residents at five HOPE VI sites in different cities that received HOPE VI grants in 2000. Using a sample of 887 heads of household from the five Panel Study sites, researchers conducted interviews at two-year intervals starting just before relocation began in 2001. In-depth interviews with 70 adults and children provided additional information. The latest findings indicate that HOPE VI had benefited many households who relocated to less poor communities but had negligible economic impact, even among households that moved to less poor neighborhoods.

The “Interim Assessment of the HOPE VI Cross-Site Report” (Holin, et al. 2003) explored HOPE VI’s impacts on residents, developments, and neighborhoods at 15 sites in 15 cities soon after re-occupancy began to determine the changes made since the award was announced. This study used baseline data from the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Survey. The baseline assessment contains information about residents, developments, and surrounding neighborhoods for the 15 grant sites at the HOPE VI award date and early implementation results. Study results indicate that on average, HOPE VI residents had higher incomes, were more likely to be employed, were better educated, had smaller households, and were more likely to be elderly than pre-HOPE VI residents.



“False HOPE” (National Housing Law Project, et al, 2002) criticized the HOPE VI program for lacking clear standards, lacking hard data on program results, and for misleading and contradictory statements from HUD about the program. The report noted that HOPE VI had moved away from the problems that the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing identified and from the goals stated in the HOPE VI statutes. The study cited concerns about the exclusion of original families from HOPE VI sites, reductions in public housing units, and a lack of information about HOPE VI outcomes.

### **3.5 Physical Redevelopment**

The most noticeable manifestation of the quality of life in a public housing development is the appearance of the physical environment. Physical appearance is also the most visible evidence of HOPE VI impacts on distressed public housing communities. Many factors contributed to physical deterioration in severely distressed developments. Poor design and construction, insufficient funding for maintenance and repair, poor management, and HUD policies that withheld funding for managerial inadequacies when the developments desperately needed the funds. However, considering the strong ideologies underlying past public housing design, improving public housing quality requires new design ideas. HOPE VI brought new design ideas to public housing but just as in the past, this program also adheres to the use of one design paradigm. A plurality of design ideas encourages diversity and greater local inputs in the design process and helps to avoid uniformity in design across jurisdictions. By using New Urbanism as the only design paradigm, HOPE VI is no different from the past whereby a single paradigm produced uniform building and site designs from city to city.

Distressed public housing developments face several issues regarding site layout, building form and orientation, construction quality, amenities, and indoor and outdoor spacing for private and public uses. At some developments, units are aligned with streets but have entries that face interior courtyards (Franck 1994). The NCSDPH (1992) noted that most distressed public

housing were in blighted urban neighborhoods and were physically separated from mainstream social and commercial services or neighborhood diversity. The report noted that distressed developments were often too large and too dense and some suffered from inferior construction and widespread use of shared spaces like stairways, corridors, and elevators (NCSDPH 1992). HUD therefore requires HOPE VI applicants to propose physical redevelopment plans that demonstrate significant changes to the physical environment and use at least 80 percent of the HOPE VI grant for physical redevelopment.

HOPE VI adopted the position that public housing built in the modernist tradition negatively affected residents' quality of life (Goetz 2003) and therefore requires significant design changes. Physical redevelopment constitutes the major component of the HOPE VI program. HOPE VI appears to be a sort of laboratory to test the newest ideas about the physical design of public housing. Public housing designs that were once viewed as attractive HOPE VI rejected as inappropriate for public housing now. The main target has been developments with apartments in high-rise buildings (elevator building of six or more stories), which social scientists and architects believe to be inappropriate for low-income families, and particularly for families with children (Newman 1973, Newman 1996) and housing in buildings with barracks-like designs that are today seen as too institutional in appearance. The HOPE VI program also rejects superblocks because analysts said that type of design isolated housing developments and the residents from their communities. Similarly, shared entrances and large open spaces common to large traditional developments are security risks today although they were viewed as advancements when they were built (Franck 1994). In HOPE VI, these previously widely used features are rejected for New Urbanism and Defensible Space designs. New Urbanism and Defensible Space promote different design principles from the design of modernist public housing developments, such as low-rise buildings, single-family units, and lower density (Zimmerman 2003). New Urbanism promotes a return to traditional neighborhood types the street

grid, private outdoor space, diverse housing types, and integrating public housing into the neighborhood fabric.

The HOPE VI program emphasizes the use of Defensible Space principles to accomplish “good design” and as a way to enhance safety by putting residents in control of the spaces outside their dwelling. The program also emphasizes designing the housing site in way that makes residents less vulnerable to crime. The strategy puts residents in control of the spaces outside their dwellings by emphasizing physical and symbolic features that distinguish public and private spaces, minimizes the amount of public space, stresses buildings oriented towards streets and individual entrances to units (Newman 1973, Newman 1996). Defensible Space and New Urbanism share some common principles. Both promote smaller scale family developments in place of large, impersonal developments. HOPE VI developments possess most of these features. The choice of a single design philosophy allows for little design flexibility locally since PHAs are required to use New Urbanism designs. Another design philosophy might be just as appropriate or more appropriate even. In the 1950s and 1960s, modernist architecture dominated public housing design but modernist architecture is no longer considered credible for public housing.

### **3.6 Self-Sufficiency**

Before the 1980s, public housing residents received little direct assistance from HUD to overcome poverty and dependency. Despite criticism that public housing policies focused too narrowly on brick and mortar solutions, public housing polices primarily addressed housing needs. However, times have changed and so have public housing values and the public housing landscape (Franck 1994). Researchers now believe that providing a basic dwelling unit is not enough to adequately address the socioeconomic needs of poor families and get them out of poverty. The most vulnerable families often need additional support to help them achieve economic independence and self-sufficiency (NCSDPH 1992, Rohe 1999, Shlay 1993).

The self-sufficiency component or the “people side” of HOPE VI attempts to address this concern. HUD requires HOPE VI grantees to provide support services to tenants to help them escape poverty and welfare dependency and to achieve economic self-sufficiency (Sard 2002, Shlay 1993). Previous programs include Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) and Project Self-Sufficiency. In 1997, HUD had 23 different programs targeting self-sufficiency and economic opportunity for those receiving housing assistance (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 1997). These programs aimed to transform public housing from being permanent housing for the poor to “way stations” for families needing temporary housing assistance (Rohe 1999). Family Self-sufficiency programs help families with Housing Choice Vouchers to gain employment, become financially independent, and move away from government cash assistance. In FSS programs, housing authorities work with welfare agencies, businesses and other local agencies to develop programs that enable voucher holders to get jobs that pay living wages and lead to economic independence. (A living wage is the minimum earnings that a full time worker needs to meet his/her and family basic housing, clothing, food, healthcare, childcare, and transportation needs.) The program offers education, job training, employment counseling, substance abuse treatment and counseling, household skill training, childcare, transportation, and homeownership counseling (HUD website).<sup>7</sup> The FSS is the program that is most similar to the HOPE VI self-sufficiency program.

Community and Supportive Services provide self-sufficiency assistance to all residents whether or not they intend to return after redevelopment (HACC 2009). This is required under the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. The Act requires HAs to implement measures to reduce or avoid concentrated poverty in public housing and to provide services that help residents achieve economic self-sufficiency. Typically, HOPE VI self-sufficiency programs include job training, counseling, childcare and health-care services, transport, and education assistance. Since families in distressed public housing have some of the most pressing

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<sup>7</sup>Details available at [www.hud.gov/v/offices/pih/programs/hcv/fss.cfm](http://www.hud.gov/v/offices/pih/programs/hcv/fss.cfm)

socioeconomic needs, self-sufficiency programs that meet their needs are crucial to achieving HOPE VI's goals.

The effectiveness of past self-sufficiency programs in alleviating poverty among public housing families is not clear because research is sparse in this area (Rohe 1999). The Family Self-Sufficiency program has received good reviews about its potential benefits to participants (Sard 2002) but information about actual outcomes is scarce. Most program reviews address program potential rather than actual outcomes, which make it difficult to draw reliable conclusions. Although evaluation research about self-sufficiency programs in HOPE VI is thin, there are indications that well planned and carefully implemented self-sufficiency programs can have positive impacts on poverty in public housing (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). However, several HOPE VI studies show that self-sufficiency is the least successful aspect of the program because few residents show improvements in their economic situation (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Part of the problem is that standard programs may not be appropriate for all families. For example, families with serious mental or physical health problems do not benefit from standard self-sufficiency programs (Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002).

### **3.6.1 What Does Self-Sufficiency Mean?**

Part of what makes it challenging for PHAs to implement well-planned self-sufficiency programs is the lack of clarity about the definition of self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency is an important aspect of HOPE VI and therefore PHAs need to have a clear understanding of what it means and how to evaluate resident's progress. Although HUD has not defined self-sufficiency, in the studies reviewed, researchers tend to equate self-sufficiency with economic self-sufficiency generally and independence from welfare in particular (Silva and Harris. 2004). In that sense, self-sufficiency does not necessarily mean freedom from all government assistance, only independence from welfare. Normally, other public assistance programs such as free school lunch, Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit, and housing subsidies are not included in

discussions about self-sufficiency requirements. Resin, Ronda and Muzzio (2001) noted that economic self-sufficiency means independence from welfare generally but not from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families or public housing.

HUD defines an economic self-sufficiency program as a program to encourage, assist, train, or facilitate economic independence or provide work for assisted families (HACC 2009) but provides no clear guidance for HAs to determine objectively when a tenant achieves self-sufficiency. Neither has it provided any measurable standard for HAs to use to assess self-sufficiency outcomes. Having no clear standard or guidance from HUD, HAs use their own interpretations. As a result, it is difficult to compare results across housing authorities. With no clear outcome goals, HAs focus too much on inputs and process rather than on outcomes. In Camden for example, the HACC views self-sufficiency as a continuous process of economic and social self-improvement in residents. There is no defined stage at which self-sufficiency is achieved nor is there any specific measurable indicator of progress (Pagan 2008).

Since 1996, self-sufficiency has received much more attention than during the previous three years. Passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996 and the Public Housing Reform Act of 1998 pushed self-sufficiency to the forefront of public housing policies and forced HAs to implement measures to address residents' non-housing needs. The 1996 Welfare Reform Act requires HAs to adopt measures to improve self-sufficiency and decrease dependency of public housing residents on public assistance programs. The 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA), which authorized the HOPE VI program for the first time in 1999, mandated community service for non-working, non-elderly, non-disabled adult residents in public housing. HAs may spend up to \$5,000 per housing unit on self-sufficiency services (Finkel, Lennon & Eisenstadt 2000, in Collins, et al, 2005).

At first, HUD required HOPE VI grantees to formulate community service goals to strengthen the entire public housing community (Holin, et al. 2003) but after Welfare Reform in 1996 and Public Housing Reform in 2008, the focus shifted from community building to

individual responsibility. Part of that responsibility included the requirement that non-working tenants perform community service in order to continue receiving housing assistance but HAs were not equipped to provide self-sufficiency services.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **METHOD**

The purpose of this research was to examine impacts of physical redevelopment, poverty deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency services on living conditions and the lives of public housing households at HOPE VI developments in Camden, New Jersey. The research focused on HOPE VI residents at the site of the original public housing development. The study uses quantitative and qualitative data from several sources, including face-to-face interviews with: returning and new public housing tenants at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run, HOPE VI officials, and the property manager and social worker at McGuire Gardens. Non-public housing residents and residents from offsite HOPE VI properties were not interviewed. Other key data sources were HOPE VI administrative reports, HOPE VI studies, HUD publications, census data, public Housing Resident Characteristic Reports, press releases from HUD and the HACC, and newspaper reports.

#### **4.1 Research Questions**

The study addressed eight research questions about physical redevelopment, poverty deconcentration, and resident self-sufficiency services (Table 4.1).

##### Physical Design:

- What building and site designs were used to develop the three HOPE VI sites?
- How do these designs compare to housing designs in the neighborhood?
- How do the physical characteristics of each HOPE VI development compare to the original development?
- How do HOPE VI residents view the physical design changes?

##### Poverty Deconcentration:

- How has redevelopment affected concentrated poverty at HOPE VI sites?



- How has redevelopment affected population characteristics at redeveloped sites?
- What impact has redevelopment had on public housing residents' main income sources?

Resident Self-Sufficiency:

- What types of self-sufficiency and supportive services were available to residents?
- What are the impacts of the self-sufficiency services on employment, earnings, and education among public housing residents?

**Table 4.1** Research Questions and Data Sources, and Data Collection Methods

Focus	Research Questions	Sources and Instrument
Physical Improvements	What building and site designs were used to develop the three HOPE VI sites?	HOPE VI design documents Site observation
	How do these designs compare to housing designs in the neighborhood?	Site observation HOPE VI redevelopment plans Other HOPE VI projects
	How do the physical characteristics of each HOPE VI development compare to the original development?	Site observation, redevelopment plans, HOPE VI Coordinator interview
	How do HOPE VI residents view the physical design changes?	Householder surveys
Poverty Deconcentration	How has redevelopment affected concentrated poverty at HOPE VI sites?	HOPE VI quarterly and annual reports, other HA reports Interviews with HOPE VI Coordinator and HOPE VI CSS Coordinator
	How has redevelopment affected population characteristics at redeveloped sites?	Resident Characteristics Reports Household Survey HACC Administrative reports
	What impact has redevelopment had on public housing residents' main income sources?	HOPE VI Household Survey
Self-Sufficiency	What types of self-sufficiency and supportive services were available to residents?	Housing authority HOPE VI reports, HOPE VI household survey HOPE VI redevelopment plans HOPE VI CSS plans HOPE VI Coordinator interview
	What are the impacts of the self-sufficiency services on employment, income, and education among public housing residents?	HACC reports HOPE VI householders survey

## 4.2 Site Selection

The projects studied were selected after reviewing documents about HOPE VI and public housing programs and researching HOPE VI projects in New Jersey. I used the information gathered to develop four site selection criteria. Using these criteria the shortlisted cities were Camden, Newark, Jersey City, and Patterson: The site selection criteria were:

- city with at least two HOPE VI projects,
- at least one project must be completed and operating for six months or more,
- relocation of residents, where applicable, must be completed, and
- at least two different redevelopment strategies must be evident (e.g., new construction v rehabilitation).

In reviewing the HOPE VI projects in New Jersey, I searched various websites for information about HOPE VI projects, including websites for HUD, the Council for Large Public Housing Authorities (CLPHA), the Housing Research Foundation, which documents information about HOPE VI projects, and the website of the HAs in New Jersey with HOPE VI projects. The HAs on the shortlist were then contacted for status updates on their HOPE VI projects and to inquire about the HAs interest in supporting this study. Based on the responses the shortlist was reduced to three cities that met all the criteria: Camden, Jersey City, and Patterson. Newark otherwise met the site selection criteria but the HA showed no interest in the study. In 2005, each shortlisted city had two or more HOPE VI projects completed or in progress. Camden was selected because its three HOPE VI developments fulfilled the criteria and provided opportunities to compare outcomes between the sites. The HA officials also consented to the research and to provide relevant information, which officials at the other shortlisted HAs had not done.

Camden had one completed project, one partially completed project and one project yet to complete relocation in 2006. Some consideration was also given to the city's extreme and widespread poverty (Census 2000 data showed that poverty exceeded 20 percent in all but one of

the city's 21 census tract neighborhoods) and widespread physical blight. With poverty being so widespread, rather than trying to find a low-poverty neighborhood, relocated residents may have to search for housing in low-poverty communities.

### 4.3 Study Sites

The study sites are McGuire Gardens, Westfield Acres/Baldwin's Run, and Roosevelt Manor. Site descriptions include resident characteristics, physical characteristics before redevelopment HOPE VI, and physical and social characteristics of surrounding areas. The three HOPE VI sites are in three different census tract neighborhoods. McGuire Gardens is in Marlton neighborhood (Census Tract 6013); Baldwin's Run is in Rosedale neighborhood (Census Tract 6011.02); and Roosevelt Manor is in Centerville neighborhood (Census Tract 6017). Figure 4.1 shows a map of Camden's 21 neighborhood. McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run are in the eastern part of the city and Roosevelt Manor is in the south. While all three neighborhoods have high poverty levels, the poverty rate is highest in Centerville and lowest in Rosedale (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Field observations on foot and by car confirm previous reports that housing in Camden is generally in poor condition, especially in Centerville where the three public housing developments dominate the housing market. The neighborhood observations reveal significant variability in housing condition and very poor to excellent (newer units) within and between neighborhoods, especially in Marlton and Rosedale. Overall, Rosedale appears to have the best quality housing. Table 4.2 shows the main physical characteristics of the original developments.

Table 4.2 shows that the three developments originally had 1,050 public housing units (368 at McGuire Gardens, 514 at Westfield Acres, and 268 at Roosevelt Manor). Redevelopment has reduced the total number of units to 680 units, including 403 public housing units and 277 non-public housing units. McGuire Gardens now has 253 units (all are public housing) while Baldwin's Run has 78 public housing units and 197 total units, and Roosevelt Manor now has 105 public housing and 230 total units.


**Table 4.2** Summary of Pre-HOPE VI Site Characteristics

Site (Acres)	McGuire Gardens <sup>a</sup>	Westfield Acres <sup>b</sup>	Roosevelt Manor <sup>c</sup>
Land Area	21 acres	25 acres	14 acres
Year Built	1954	1938	1955
Units	368	514	268
Type	Family	Family	Family
Unit density	18 units/acre	21 units/acre	13 units/acre
Building Type	51 two-story bldgs	18 four-story bldgs	38 two-story row bldgs


Sources: <sup>a</sup>Interim Assessment of the HOPE VI Program Cross-site Report, 2003

<sup>b</sup>Westfield Acres 2000 Revitalization Plan

<sup>c</sup>Roosevelt Manor 2003 Revitalization Plan



**Figure 4.1** Camden neighborhoods map showing location of HOPE VI sites. Each Neighborhood represents a census tract. Rosedale is same as Tract 6011.02, Marlton is same as Tract 6013, and Centerville is same Tract 6017.




**Figure 4.2** East Camden neighborhoods showing McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run  
*Source:* Camden Redevelopment Agency, 2008

#### 4.3.1 McGuire Gardens


This development occupies a 21-acre former garbage dump site (Holin, et al. 2003) in East Camden between Marlton Road, Federal Street, Route 30 (Admiral Wilson Boulevard), and Baird Boulevard (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). The site is near the center of Marlton neighborhood and only two city blocks from Dudley neighborhood (Figure 4.2). It is part of Block Group 4, Census Tract 6013 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Watson Street to the west, Bank Street on the east, South 20<sup>th</sup> and Randolph Streets on the south, and Morse Street to the north form the site boundary (Figure 4.4). The immediate environs include Watson Towers, which houses elderly residents and the HACC's administrative offices west of Watson Street, a small community of mostly two-story single-family row houses north of the Morse Street border, and a large open lot and a bowling alley along the Watson Street border. Between Morse Street and Marlton Road are six dilapidated

two-story houses and a new elementary school. There is a small residential community east of the site between Bank Street and Baird Boulevard. The houses in this community are mostly one- and two-story, single-family row houses and a few two-story apartment buildings.



**Figure 4.3** Marlton Neighborhood (Census tract 6013) and surrounding areas in East Camden. McGuire Gardens is at the center of the census tract.

*Source:* U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey.



**Figure 4.4** McGuire Gardens street map showing boundaries and local streets.  
*Source:* Google Maps, 20098

**4.3.1.1 Physical Characteristics.** Originally, McGuire Gardens had 368 units in 51 row buildings containing 25 one-bedroom units, 158 two-bedroom units, 172 three-bedroom units, and 12 four-bedroom units. One-bedroom units averaged 550 square feet, two-bedroom units averaged 700 square feet, three-bedroom units averaged 895 square feet, and four bedroom units averaged 1,040 square feet. The buildings had wooden frames on a concrete bases, concrete flooring and walls, brick facades, and flat roofs. The 368 units made McGuire Gardens the second largest public housing development in Camden. The site's defining characteristic was the absence of front and backyards. Before HOPE VI, in previous renovations, the flat roofs on half of the buildings were replaced with pitched roofs and new heating and hot water systems were installed in the buildings with the new roofs (Abt Associates Inc 1996). The physical issues that affected the development included flooding and ground instability. The site's location in the Cooper River flood plain most likely contributed to these problems. Socioeconomic problems, illicit drug activities, and violence had damaging effects on the development in the 1980s. In a survey of residents before redevelopment began, residents reported that the illicit drug trade and violence were major problems in the development and in nearby communities. They also the site lacked adequate police protection, which made them fearful. These problems and poor management led to vacancy skyrocketing to 34 percent in 1992 (Holin, et al. 2003).

**4.3.1.2 Resident Characteristics.** To compile a picture of the social and economic characteristics of residents at this site, the researcher examined several HUD documents. The available information about pre-HOPE VI residents was sketchy and as a result, this analysis relied on information from HUD's 1996 "Picture of Subsidized Households" report, the Historic and Baseline Assessment of HOPE VI, and the HOPE VI Cross-Site Report to create a profile of the residents. At the HOPE VI award date, about 346 households lived at the site and 93 percent of the heads of household were single females with dependent children under age 18 (HUD 1996). A large percentage of the householders were unskilled, had unstable employment, were

poorly educated, very poor, and dependent on public assistance such as welfare to meet daily needs (HUD 1996, Holin, et al. 2003, Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Up to 75 percent of the households relied on some form of government assistance, which was the main income for at least 50 percent of all households. Fifty percent depended on welfare alone for most income but only 18 percent reported employment as the primary source of income in 1993-1994. Median income for 1996 was only \$6,093 (HUD 1996). HUD's 1996 Picture of Subsidized Housing reported that the site had 287 households and that the average household income of \$7,300. About 81 percent of the households had less than \$10,000 per year in income. At that time, 15 percent of tenants had work-related income but 56 percent were welfare recipients. By the time rehabilitation began in 1999, only 131 households remained and 79 percent of them were in extreme poverty. Table 4.3 shows key resident characteristics for 1996 including income and race. Non-Caucasians were 97 percent of the population and the majority was African-American. The average household size was 3.5 and most householders were 25 to 44 years old. A sizeable percentage of tenants was also disabled. This included 60 percent of residents aged 62 and over and 13 percent of residents under age 62.

Initially, community services took precedence over self-sufficiency as HUD required HOPE VI recipients to formulate community service goals to help strengthen entire public housing communities (Holin, et al. 2003). However, Welfare Reform, which became law in 1996 and the Public Housing Reform, which followed in 1998 placed adult householders under the spotlight by requiring them to work or perform community service as a condition to continue receiving government assistance, including housing. This effectively shifted the focus from whole developments to family economic self-sufficiency. A previous HOPE VI study early in the implementation of the HOPE VI plan reported that some residents were self-starters and extremely capable but others had few skills and lacked motivation but virtually all residents lacked the experience of doing things for themselves (Abt Associates Inc 1996).



**Table 4.3** McGuire Gardens Population Characteristics, 1995/1996

Household Income Characteristics	Household (n=287)
Household Size	3.4
Average Annual Household Income	\$7,300
Median Household Income (1993-1994)	\$6,093
<i>Income Distribution:</i>	
\$0 - \$5,000 (ELI)	22%
\$5,000 - \$10,000 (ELI)	59%
\$10,000 - \$20,000 (ELI - VLI)	2%
>\$20,000 (VLI and above)	17%
<i>Source of Income:</i>	
Earned Income	15%
Public Assistance (TANF)	56%
Other Sources	59%
<i>Disability</i>	
Disabled < age 62	13%
Disabled >= age 62	60%

*Source:* A Picture of Subsidized Housing, 1996

Before HOPE VI, no program or service was in place to ameliorate poverty or to help residents become self-sufficient. The HACC operated primarily as manager of public housing properties. As a HOPE VI awardee, the HACC had to perform social service roles to reduce poverty and to help residents improve their economic and housing self-sufficiency.

**4.3.1.3 Neighborhood Characteristics.** The communities surrounding McGuire Gardens had similarly appalling socioeconomic conditions. According to Census 2000 data, in 1999, Block Group 4 had a population of 865 and the unemployment rate was 22 percent. The block group boundaries indicate that the majority of the 865 residents lived at McGuire Gardens. At that time, the block group median household income was \$9,135 compared to \$20,708 for the entire census tract, while the poverty rate was 79 percent and 41 percent for the census tract (Census Bureau website 2007). The Census Bureau estimated that the poverty rate Block for Group 4 was 37 percent in 1995/96 (Census Bureau website). The neighborhood population was 96 percent minority, 45 percent non-Hispanic African-American, and 45 percent Hispanic/Latino. The neighborhood population in 2000 was 5,049, which was 24 percent less than in 1990. In that time,

Camden's population declined by nine per cent. Census 2000 reports also indicate that the population was 53 percent African-American, 16 percent Caucasian, and 30 percent Hispanic. The neighborhood median household income was approximately \$20,708 compared to \$23,421 for the entire city. About 51 percent of the adult population aged 25 and over had a high school diploma, the same as Camden.

The neighborhood was about 75 percent residential and most units were single-family houses but a sizeable proportion lived in small multi-family buildings (US Census Bureau 2000). Approximately 55 percent of the housing was in the form of two- and three-story row houses and 30 percent in small developments of 5-10 units. In 1990, the neighborhood had a ratio of 56 percent rental housing to 44 percent owner-occupied housing with 80 percent of the housing stock being at least 60 years old (Census 2000). The census block data for 1999 showed a population of 131 households. Approximately 69 percent of them had less than \$15,000 in annual household income, 18 percent had between \$15,000 and \$24,000, and 11 percent had more than \$25,000 in household annual income (U.S. Census 2000). The block group data indicates the conditions immediately surrounding the housing site.

Neighborhood observations in summer 2007 and 2008 confirm a 2003 report that the communities surrounding the HOPE VI site were in poor physical condition (Holin, et al. 2003). The worst areas were the Carman Street area west of McGuire Gardens and the entire area north of Morse Street. The one- and two-story houses in these communities were severely deteriorated, the streets were in poor condition, and litter was everywhere. Residents reported that the north area has a long reputation for being "rough". East of McGuire Gardens, the area has a middle-income appearance with a mix of small and large apartment complexes and single-family row houses. The large vacant plot of land south of the project site was covered with tall grass and shrubbery. Immediately south of that is the limited access Route 30 highway with an on/off ramp in and out of the development.

A new elementary school adjoining McGuire Gardens that opened in 2009 is the only other civic institution found in Marlton. To obtain most services, residents must go to downtown Camden, Philadelphia, or suburban Cherry Hill. These areas also provide most employment opportunities. Although Marlton neighborhood lacked most neighborhood facilities, some facilities are available in adjoining neighborhoods. Nearby facilities include a post office a short walking distance away in Stockton; Dudley Grange Park, a new Community school and a Boys and Girls club near to Baldwin's Run in Rosedale and Stockton. Regarding public safety in 2002, communities surrounding McGuire Gardens had high levels of crime, prostitution, and limited police presence because the city lacked the resources to provide effective police patrols in all neighborhoods (Holin, et al. 2003).


These statistics for McGuire Gardens and the immediate surrounding environment revealed urgent social needs, including decent housing. However, decent and affordable housing alone cannot change the economic and social conditions. To break the cycle of poverty and hopelessness that beset the area, the residents need new opportunities to achieve housing self-sufficiency and economic independence such as education, childcare support to allow nursing mothers to work, better access to quality affordable healthcare, in addition to better housing.



**Figure 4.5** Westminster Avenue streetscape at entrance to McGuire Gardens


#### 4.3.2 Baldwin's Run:

**4.3.2.1 Physical Characteristics.** Baldwin' Run is a 197 unit HOPE VI housing development built between 2000 and 2008 to replace Westfield Acres, the previous development from 1938 that was demolished in 2001. According to several 1938 articles in the *Camden Courier-Post*, Westfield Acres was Camden's first public housing development and the largest (The Writers Program of the Works Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). The site is 25 acres on a moderately sloping property in the Rosedale neighborhood, Census Tract 6011.02, in the East Camden area. The property is located between Dudley Street (west), Pleasant Avenue (north), Westfield Avenue (south), and 32<sup>nd</sup> Street. Beideman Street bisects the site from Westfield Avenue to Pleasant Avenue. This street was only the point of vehicular entry and exit until demolition.



**Figure 4.6** Rosedale Neighborhood showing location of Baldwin's Run.

Source: CamConnect at <http://www.camconnect.org/fact/rosedale01.html>



**Figure 4.7** East Camden Census Tracts. Tract 6011.02 (Rosedale Neighborhood) is in the center.  
*Source:* Census Bureau website, 2008

Westfield Acres, the original development, consisted of 18 four-story walkup buildings and 514 apartments in one- to three bedroom configurations at a density of almost 21 units per acre. Housing occupied just 25 percent of the 25-acre site; the rest was mostly open space and a few communal areas for recreation and parking (HACC 2000, Writers Program of the Works Projects Administration in New Jersey 1942). Communal facilities included laundries in 10 of the buildings, a library, and space for indoor community and recreational activities and outdoor concerts. The apartments had kitchens with linoleum-covered floors, electric cooking stoves, and refrigerators. Bathrooms had tiled floors. Frequent flooding was a problem and it forced the housing authority to close 20 units. Based on an independent engineering assessment in 2000, the HACC declared that the site had deteriorated infrastructure, inappropriate site layout, institutional design, and large areas of indefensible open spaces made the development obsolete and costly to operate (HACC 2000). After receiving a \$3,138,500 demolition grant from HUD in 1998, the housing authority moved the residents out and demolished all units between 1998 and 2001.

**4.3.2.2 Resident Characteristics.** Just before the first demolition in 1998, Westfield Acres had 433 households and 1,116 residents. The 433 households became 580 when the housing authority split them into different family units because many of them were previously under-housed (HACC 2000). However, the Community and Supportive Service Evaluation report by Rutgers University noted that only 239 of the original households were still on the tenants list when construction of Baldwin's Run began in 2003. The HA had evicted some tenants, some moved away voluntarily, some were incarcerated, and some died (Wise 2005). Table 4.4 shows the distribution of residents by age. About 43 percent were working age adults, 50 percent were youths under age 18, and 7 percent were seniors age 62 years and above. About 78 percent of the youth population (437 youths) was 12 years or younger. Approximately 57 percent of the pre-HOPE VI population was dependent youths and seniors; two groups with special needs that self-sufficiency programs should target.

**Table 4.4** Householder Age Distribution in 1998

Household Characteristics	Households	
	Number	Percent
0 - 5 years	172	15
6 - 17 years	389	35
18 - 61 years	476	43
62 and over	79	7

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey

To understand poverty conditions in this development before redevelopment began, Census 2000 reports and the Westfield Acres 2003 Redevelopment Plan were reviewed and the data obtained used to construct Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. The information is incomplete but most residents had very low incomes and were dependent on government assistance (Table 4.5). Overall, about 75 percent of the original Westfield Acres households (438 households) received public assistance while 35 percent or 205 households had earned income. Received by 45 percent of households, Social Security Income was the largest contributor to public assistance and 30

percent of the households relied on welfare for most income (HACC 2000). According to the HOPE VI revitalization plan, average annual household income was \$11,062 from wages, \$3,935 from welfare, \$5,009 from Social Security Income, \$6,715 from Supplemental Social Security and Pension, and \$4,317 from all other sources (Table 4.5).

**Table 4.5** Sources of Household Income at Westfield Acres

<b>Income Source</b>	<b>Average Income</b>	<b>Number of Households</b>	<b>Percent of Households</b>
Wages/Salaries	\$11,062	205	35
Social Security Income	\$5,009	263	45
Supplemental Security/Pension	\$6,715	119	25
Welfare	\$3,935	175	30
Other	\$4,317	48	8
All Public Assistance	-	435	75

*Source:* \*Westfield Acres HOPE VI 2001 Redevelopment Plan

Table 4.6 shows the distribution of annual household income before demolition began. About 14 percent of the 580 families had no income; 90 percent had annual incomes of \$15,000 or less; and 10 percent had annual incomes between \$15,000 and \$30,000. No household reported income above \$30,000 (HACC 2000). The poverty rate for the site could not be determined from the available data. However, from the 2000 census, the poverty rate of 31 percent for the Census Block Group 1 shows a poverty rate for the site that exceeded 31 percent. With no other information available, in this study, Block Group 1 poverty rate of 31 percent represents the minimum poverty in Westfield Acres where the population was about 80 percent of the block group population in 2000.

Results of the resident needs surveys the HACC did before relocation showed that 50 percent of the residents cited employment as their greatest need, but the other 50 percent cited “quality of life” needs as barriers to improving self-sufficiency. For example, 45 percent cited their need for childcare, afterschool and evening programs; 58 percent said substance abuse counseling and treatment; and 47 percent cited a need for round the clock transportation service.

In addition, 56 percent cited recreational programs for youths, 67 percent cited access to quality medical care, including pre- and post-natal health care, 53 percent said family violence prevention and counseling, 39 percent said parenting skills, 56 percent cited senior services, 40 percent cited health care for youths, and 37 percent cited money management training (HACC 2000). With such a large percentage of the population citing quality of life needs, self-sufficiency programs that focus too much on increasing employment and income at the expense of these other needs are likely to bypass (and fail) sizeable portions of the population. For example, people with substance abuse and serious health problems may be better off getting help with their condition more than being placed in jobs but unable to keep those jobs due to their problems. Relocation was completed after the HACC received the \$35 million HOPE VI revitalization grant in 2001 to build a mix of new rental and homeownership (public and private housing) on the site.

**Table 4.6** Income Distribution before Demolition

<b>Income (\$)</b>	<b>Householders</b>	<b>Percent</b>
0	14	2
1 - 5,000	156	27
5,000 - 10,000	265	46
10,000 - 15,000	85	15
15,000 - 20,000	41	7
20,000 - 25,000	15	3
25,000 - 30,000	4	1
More than 30,000	0	0

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan

During the relocation process, previously under-housed households were split into different family units. This process increased the number of relocated families from 433 to 580, which is more than the number of dwellings in the development. Westfield Acres had 514 apartments and so HUD awarded 514 Section 8 Vouchers for relocation, but after the family splits, the HACC applied for additional vouchers (HACC 2000) but that outcome is not known.

Resident characteristics data in the redevelopment plan were sketchy and the HA refused to fulfill requests for additional information about relocated residents. The population profile



described here came from incomplete information in the Westfield Acres HOPE VI Redevelopment Plan and HUD databases. The information is a snapshot of the population prior to relocation and demolition and is used to compare self-sufficiency outcomes before and after redevelopment. When demolition began in 1998, there were 379 households in the development and 46 percent of them relied on welfare and other public assistance programs for most income.

In the residents' needs survey that the HACC did before relocation, 50 percent of the residents cited employment as their greatest need. However, unlike the HACC's focus on employment residents' other priority needs did not involve moneymaking activities. Instead, residents cite "quality of life" issues. This is somewhat different from the HACC single-minded approach to increase the level of employment. Youths comprised 50 percent of the population, which help to explain the big focus residents gave to youth activities. More than 50 percent of the residents mentioned need for youth-focused activities.

**4.3.2.3 Baldwin's Run: Neighborhood Characteristics.** Baldwin's Run is in the Rosedale neighborhood, which borders the Dudley neighborhood. The site's immediate surroundings therefore include communities in both neighborhoods. Rosedale is a very diverse neighborhood. The Census Bureau reported that in 2000, the population was approximately 4,954, which was 16 percent less than in 1990. In Dudley, the population was 3,730, which was 12 percent less than in 1990. Census 2000 data show a population distribution of 35 percent African-American, 23 percent Caucasian, 16 percent Asian, and 25 percent from "mixed" backgrounds. Dudley's population was just as diverse. Nearly 33 percent are African-American, 22 percent were Caucasian, 11 percent were Asian, and 25 percent from "other" backgrounds. Hispanics were 46 percent in Rosedale and 57 percent in Dudley. In both neighborhoods, about two-thirds of the population was between ages 18 and 44. In both neighborhoods, the African-American share of the population was significantly less than that of the city but the Hispanic population percentage in each neighborhood was a lot higher than that of Camden. The median household income was

\$25,400 in Rosedale, which is higher than that for Camden but lower than the \$31,065 in Dudley. Regarding education, 45 percent of Rosedale's residents and 43 percent of residents in Dudley over age 25 had a high school diploma. Although the median income in both neighborhoods was higher than Camden's, smaller proportions of their populations had completed high school.

### **4.3.3 Roosevelt Manor**

Named in honor of President Franklyn Roosevelt, for 50 years from 1954 until 2007 when the HACC demolished it, this was one of three family developments in Centerville, the oldest predominantly African-American community in Camden. It occupied a 14-acre site on Ferry Avenue between South Seventh and South Ninth Streets adjacent to Branch Village and Chelton Terrace. Construction was funded with money that the federal government allocated to Camden in the 1949 United States Housing Act in the early 1950s. No other neighborhood had more than one public housing family development. This was also the last public housing family development built in Camden. The first residents were World War II veterans.

Before redevelopment began, this site and the entire Centerville neighborhood had many extremely poor families. This site and the adjoining Branch Village public housing development comprise Block Group 3 of Census Tract 6017, which had very low levels of employment and household income. Census data from Block Group 3 supplements the missing information from the HACC about resident characteristics.

**4.3.3.1 Physical Characteristics:** The original development had 268 apartments, including 168 three-bedroom units, 68 two-bedroom units, and 32 four-bedroom units, in 38 barracks-like, brick-faced, two-story buildings on two superblocks (HACC 2009). Each building contained four to eight apartments. The buildings on the site were arranged in four sectors and the buildings in each sector aligned differently. One sector had buildings aligned diagonally to the street while facing other buildings and in another sector; the buildings were diagonal to the street. A few

building were paralleled to the street. All units faced inwards. The buildings were of the Bauhaus design and constructed to meet very strict federal cost guidelines (HACC 2003a).

By the 1980s, the buildings had begun to show signs of physical deterioration and the mechanical and electrical systems began to breakdown frequently. For example, in the 1980s, the central heating system that was built to support all the buildings on the property through underground pipes started to decay and was subsequently replaced. Some problems were the result of residents' actions, many were the result of aging, poor design and maintenance. Eighty units (30 percent) were removed from service in 2003 because they needed extensive modernization to bring them up to HUD's Housing Quality Standards. Consequently, only 70 percent of the units (188 units) were available when HUD awarded the HOPE VI grant in 2004. To make matters worse, in the 1990s, the illicit drug activities in South Camden became prevalent in Roosevelt Manor (HACC 2003a).

While pursuing HOPE VI funding in the late 1990s, the HA also used modernization funding from HUD to upgrade the existing facilities. Modernization included installation of new pitched roofs on all the buildings, new facades, individual boiler rooms for each building, and new kitchens and baths in several apartments. In 2004, HUD awarded the housing authority a \$20,000,000 HOPE VI revitalization grant for demolition and construction of new housing on the site. To facilitate redevelopment, some residents received vouchers to relocate to housing in the private market and some were relocated to nearby Branch Village, Chelton Terrace, and other public housing developments in the city. Some residents left voluntarily and some were evicted.

**4.3.3.2 Resident Characteristics.** As Tables 4.8 and 4.9 indicate, residents had very low incomes, even when employed. Poverty was pervasive and many residents depended on some form of government assistance. HACC data show that the average median household income was less than \$15,000 for about 91 percent of the families (209 families) and more than \$16,000 for the remaining 10 percent in 2004. Thirty-eight percent reported earned income and 58 percent

reported government assistance as primary income. About 26 percent received TANF and General Assistance benefits and 32 percent received Social Security or Supplemental Security Income. All but one family had total incomes below 50 percent of AMI but 97 percent had “extremely low incomes” or annual income of less than 30 percent of AMI (HACC 2003a, HACC 2005). The annual income for one householder exceeded 60 percent of AMI.

Because of their low employment and income status, Roosevelt Manor residents were highly dependent on government economic assistance (HACC 2005). Before demolition in 2006, the average annual household income for the 232 households was \$12,400 or just 16 percent of AMI (HACC 2005). Of the 232 households, 224 or 96 percent of them had total annual income of less than \$20,640, or less than 30 percent of the AMI of \$68,800 in 2004. That means HUD categorized 96 percent of the families as “extremely low income” households. Just three percent of households had average incomes above 30 percent of median income and only 38 had income from employment 24 percent depended on TANF and General Assistance payments as their main income, and 30 percent relied on SSI or SSI for most income. Before HOPE VI household income was so low, residents had little choice but to be dependent of government handouts.

**Table 4.7** Income Distribution at Roosevelt Manor before Demolition

<b>Percent of AMI</b>	<b>Income Range (\$)</b>	<b>Households</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Less than 30 percent	Less than \$21,000	224	97.6
30 – 60 percent	\$21,000 - \$41,300	7	3.0
61 – 80 percent	\$41,301 - \$55,040	1	0.4

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan

Considering that the dependent population of children under 18 and seniors over age 65 is 58 percent of the total population, many families needed a significant amount support services to facilitate their progress towards self-sufficiency. Support services facilitate employment because householders get the services they need such as childcare, which allows them to work outside the home. Often times public housing tenants are unable to leave home to work because of barriers to

affordable health care or due to a lack of childcare assistance. With the right kind of help, more tenants are able to work. An HACC survey showed 23 percent of household who required childcare services and 19 percent who needed after-school assistance.

**Table 4.8** Household Self-Sufficiency Characteristics before HOPE VI

Household Characteristics	Households	
	Number	Percent
Average Household Income (90% of households)	<\$15,000	90
Average Household Income (10% of households)	>\$16,000	10
<i>Sources of Income:</i>		
Wages/Salaries	88	52
Welfare/TANF	55	54
SS/SSI	69	30
Average Household Income	\$8,000	
<i>Income Distribution</i>		
\$0 - \$5,000		24
\$5,000 - \$10,000		53
\$10,000 - \$15,000		14
\$15,000 - \$20,000		5
\$20,000 - \$25,000		-
>\$20,000		23
<i>Self-Sufficiency Eligible Beneficiaries:</i>		
Children under 6	76	11
Children ages 6-18	319	46
Adults 19-64	288	41
Seniors (Ages 65+)	28	3

Source: HACC VI CSS Plan, approved April 2005

Regarding education and training, the CSS plan noted that there was a big need for education and training programs to improve employment opportunities. A resident needs survey that the HACC undertook in 2004 showed that 24 residents had college degrees, 77 had high school diplomas, 17 said they wanted to obtain GEDs, and 14 desired ESL instruction. About 40 percent of the residents requested vocational and job training, 45 percent requested entrepreneurship training, and 64 percent requested homeownership opportunities. Individually and collectively, these factors impinged on residents' employment and earnings prospects. The self-sufficiency plan has provisions to address these and other employment barriers and to equip residents with employment skills (HACC 2005).

**4.3.3.3 Neighborhood Characteristics.** Centerville, Census Tract 6017, is a predominantly an African-American neighborhood whose boundaries are Carl Miller Boulevard to the North, Mt. Ephraim Avenue to the East, Bulson Street to the South, and Interstate Highway 676 to the west. The neighborhood is primarily residential but industrial enterprises, two neighborhood parks, and a cemetery occupies a sizeable amount of the land. Industrial activities are concentrated in the southeastern and southwestern corners and open space and commercial land uses are primarily in the northern section. The limited commercial activities are generally interspersed within the residential areas. The three public housing developments--Roosevelt Manor, Chelton Terrace, and Branch Village—dominate the housing market. In 1941, Branch Village became the neighborhood's first public housing development but in the next 14 years, two other developments (Chelton Terrace in 1943 and Roosevelt Manor in 1955) were built. Before redevelopment, these three properties accounted for nearly one-third of the public housing units in Camden (Table 2.4 in Chapter 2). A 2002 report indicates that 37 percent of the 692 land parcels were vacant lots, 42 percent had occupied buildings, and 10 percent had vacant buildings (City of Camden 2002). There were 320 unused lots, 272 residential lots, 18 commercial lots and 13 mixed-used lots.

Private residences are mainly of brick construction in two-story single-family townhouses, twin type row houses, garden apartments (e.g., Nimmo Court Apartments), and the 85-unit Woodlyne Trailer Park development in the southeast part of the neighborhood (City of Camden 2002). Public use areas include Staley and Elijah Perry Park in the northern part of the neighborhood while private open spaces include Evergreen Cemetery. The cemetery is the single largest land use in Centerville. The newly built H. B. Wilson Elementary School, which replaced the previous school, is the sole public school in the neighborhood. The few commercial establishments include three grocery shops, a fast food outlet, a liquor store, and a tavern in close proximity to Roosevelt Manor. Seven protestant churches—two Baptist, a Seventh Day Adventist, two non-denominational, a Methodist, and an AME—are just a few blocks from the site.

Census 2000 data show a neighborhood population of 2,874. About 79 percent were African-Americans, 8 percent were Caucasians, 8 percent were mixed, and 18 percent were Hispanics. For 1999, the median household income was \$14,104 (\$11,012 in Block Group 3) while unemployment was 30 percent (42 percent in Block Group 3). An extremely large 55 percent of the neighborhood population (71 percent in Block Group 3) was in poverty. Just 39 percent of residents over age 25 had a high school diploma.

#### **4.4 City of Camden**

Camden city in Camden County is the largest city in southern New Jersey and fifth largest by population in the state. It is 27 km<sup>2</sup> or 10.4 square miles in area of which 15 percent is water. Philadelphia is directly across the Delaware River. In Camden borders five other New Jersey municipalities, namely, Collingswood, Gloucester City, Haddon Township, Pennsauken and Woodlyn. Camden became a Gloucester County city in 1828 but was transferred to the newly created Camden County in 1844. Camden built its economic base on industrial production and so the urban industrial decline in the United States has devastated the city. The economic decline has led to large population declines, demographic shifts, and escalating poverty, plus the dubious title as New Jersey's poorest city and one of the poorest in the country (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Crime and violence have become big problems too. The city has some of the highest rates of urban crimes nationwide. Morgan Quitno Press (2005) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2007) ranked Camden as the most dangerous city in America in 2003 and 2004

##### **4.4.1 Demographics**

After peaking at 124,555 people in 1950, Camden's population declined rapidly to 87,492 in 1989 and to 79,904 in 1999 and is projected to decline slightly to around 79,000 by 2010 (U.S.


Census Bureau 2009, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). The largest decline occurred during the urban renewal era between 1950 and 1970 when the city lost more than 17 percent of its residents. An influx of mostly Hispanics in the 1990s appeared to have stabilized the population to around 80,000 people. Camden's population decline between 1950 and 2000 contrasted sharply with the massive population increases in the surrounding suburban areas. This scenario was not unique to Camden as cities throughout the U.S. were similar affected after World War II ended in 1945.

Before 1960, Camden's population was majority Caucasian but became majority African-American by 2000 because Caucasians moved to the surrounding suburbs and, like many other cities in northern states, black urbanization increased rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century (Lehman 1991). Accelerating this population were economic and social pressures such as deindustrialization and public policies favoring white suburbanization but forced blacks to live in ghettos (Jackson 1985, Massey and Denton 1993). Figure 4.8 shows changes in the racial and ethnic composition in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses. During this time, the Hispanic share of the population more than doubled from less than 20 percent in 1980 to nearly 40 percent by 2000. In that period, the non-Hispanic Caucasian population decreased from more than 20 percent to seven percent and non-Hispanic African-Americans remain in the 50 plus percent range.

In 2000, approximately 49 percent of Camden's population over the age of 25 had not completed high school. Only 29 percent had only a high school diploma or equivalent level of education and eight percent had a college degree. Sixty percent speak English only and 35 percent speak Spanish of which 16 percent did not speak English very well.

Physical disability is common in the population and particularly among the lowest income households. In 2005, the rate of disability was 22 percent, compared to 15 percent for Camden County and 12 percent for the state. Among people with poverty-level incomes, the disability rate is more than a quarter of the population (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007).





**Figure 4.8** Racial Distribution in Camden, 1980-2000

*Source:* US Census Bureau (2007)

#### 4.4.2 Economy and Poverty

By U.S. standards, Camden is a very poor city. Poverty here is substantially higher than in Camden County for all age groups (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007). In 2000, the average annual household income for Camden was \$24,233 while per capita income was \$9,815. The annual income for the poorest 25 percent of the population averaged less than \$10,000 per year. For 2005, the estimated median household income was roughly \$18,000. In contrast, the median household income for Camden County exceeded \$53,000 for a family of four (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007).

Regarding employment, the job market has been depressed for a long time and so unemployment is very high, and is substantially higher than the unemployment rates for Camden County and the State of New Jersey. In 2000, unemployment reached 42 percent for civilians aged 16 and over (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). About 72 percent of Camden's residents received some form of public assistance in 1999 with 24 percent receiving social security (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).

Like many other cities, de-industrialization has left Camden's economy in ruin. Unemployment, poverty, vacant and abandoned buildings, and visible signs of physical deterioration characterize the city. Table 4.9 shows the extent of the economic decline over the last four decades as poverty rose. Whereas the average poverty rate was 21 percent in 1969, it climbed to a high of nearly 49 percent by 1993 then declined to 36 percent in 2003 and has hovered around that figure ever since (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 2008; State of the Cities Survey 2006). In 1990, poverty exceeded 20 percent in 18 census tracts and exceeded 40 percent in 11 tracts; but in 2000, poverty exceeded 20 percent in all but one census tract (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). In comparison, surrounding suburbs experienced massive population and economic expansion and almost no poverty. Today, health and government services employ the most people (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) but the city has very limited ability to provide essential services such as policing at housing developments due to financial constraints. Table 4.10 shows average poverty rates for Camden and surrounding suburbs from 1969 to 2003. Baldwin's Run is in Census Tract 6011.02 where the poverty rate exceeded 31 percent. McGuire Gardens is in Census Tract 6013 where poverty exceeded 41 percent in 2000, and Roosevelt Manor is in Census Tract 6017 (Figure 4.1) where poverty was nearly 55 percent in 2000. Of the three neighborhoods, only in Census Tract 6011.02 (Rosedale) was the poverty rate lower than that for Camden as a whole.


**Table 4.9** Poverty Rates in Camden and Suburbs, 1969 to 2003

<b>Year</b>	<b>Camden</b>	<b>Suburban</b>
1969	20.7	5.8
1979	36.9	6.5
1990	36.6	4.9
1993 (Estimated)	49.2	6.7
1995 (Estimated)	44.2	6
1997 (Estimated)	46.3	6.0
2000 (Estimated)	35.5	5.5

*Source:* State of the Cities Database (SOCD)

### 4.4.3 Housing

Census data show that 46 percent of occupied housing in Camden in 2000 was owner-occupied, 54 percent were renter-occupied and 19 percent was vacant. About 75 percent of the housing units were built more than 60 years ago; 34 percent were built more than 70 years ago; and two percent were less than 15 years old (Figure 4.9). Public housing accounted for approximately seven percent of total units (two percent nationwide) in 2008. At the end of 2007, the HACC operated eight housing developments, including the three HOPE VI developments. Five were low-rise family developments and three were high-rise developments for seniors (see Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 in Chapter 2).



**Figure 4.9** Camden's housing stock by year constructed  
*Source: U.S. Census 2000*

## 4.5 Data Sources

The quantitative analyses in this study use Census 2000 data and information gathered through the household survey in this study. The qualitative analyses used data from site visits, discussions with HACC officials with knowledge of the HOPE VI projects in the city, HACC HOPE VI Documents, HOPE VI studies, property managers, newspaper articles, and the householder survey, HUD HOPE VI documents, and HUD's public housing Resident Characteristic Reports

(RCR). RCRs are generated from the Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS), a HUD database containing personal information about residents and housing information concerning all public housing units in the country. The redevelopment plans for Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor were reviewed but not the plan for McGuire Gardens because it was not made available. That plan underwent numerous revisions before HUD accepted it.

#### **4.5.1 Census Data**

The study used data from 1990 and 2000 Population and Housing Censuses. Census reports provided information about neighborhood characteristics like population and race, education, housing types and number, employment, and poverty levels. The 1990 and 2000 censuses also provided important block group data. For location analysis, both tract level and block level census data were used to analyze poverty, housing conditions, and population characteristics from the 1990 and 2000 censuses for the City of Camden and census tracts in which the developments are located, and trends analyzed. Census data files were downloaded from the Census Bureau American Fact Finder website (Census Bureau 2009).

#### **4.5.2 HUD Data**

HUD data included press releases, Resident Characteristic Reports (RCRs), and HOPE VI documents on HUD's website. Press releases about the three HOPE VI grants to the HACC were reviewed to get information about the original plans and to compare outcomes regarding type, number, and arrangement of housing units. According to the webpage description, Resident Characteristic Reports summarize aggregate demographic and income information about public housing households. The report gives information in six categories: units, income, total tenant payments, race/ethnicity, household, and length of stay.

The data used in the reports come from HUD's Multi-family Tenant Characteristic System (MTCS). This database contains detailed information about public housing households and Section 8 recipients including addresses, occupancy status, householders' income and rental

payments, and descriptions of dwelling units. The information comes from the quarterly reports that PHAs send to HUD. PHAs send the required information electronically to HUD Public Information Center (PIC) from which the MTCS is updated monthly. The main limitations of the MTCS are that it does not have information for all units and the information may be slightly dated. The MTCS had household records for about 86 percent of all occupied public housing units in 1999 and each RCR covers 15 months activities. Despite these limitations, it is the most comprehensive and most reliable dataset of households across public housing agencies.

#### **4.5.3 HACC Reports**

HACC 2004, 2005, and 2007 Annual reports were reviewed. Among other things, the annual reports provide data about the total number of properties, number of units, occupancy, number of Housing Choice Vouchers (formerly Section 8 vouchers) the Authority manages, and status of modernization programs such as HOPE VI. The HOPE VI Coordinator provided copies of the HOPE VI redevelopment plans used to obtain the HOPE VI grants for Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor but not for McGuire Gardens because it was not available at the time.

#### **4.5.4 Site and Neighborhood Observations**

On my second visit to the housing authority offices in 2006 to discuss the possibility of Camden as the research location, the HOPE VI Coordinator and this researcher visited the three project sites and the surrounding communities and community facilities in Centerville. We also visited the Branch Village public housing development and the two completed phases of the newly redeveloped Chelton Terrace public housing development, and observed construction activities at the new 86-unit elderly property near the Roosevelt Manor site. This was Phase 1 of the Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI redevelopment. This was a familiarization tour to get visual sketches of each site and surrounding areas and to get photographing opportunities, especially of a boarded up Roosevelt before demolition. Before starting the research, I revisited these places on my own to become more familiar with the neighborhoods.

#### 4.5.5 Interviews

Several semi-structured Interviews with HOPE VI official, site management and residents were the key sources of information for this study. HOPE VI Coordinator and the Community and Supportive Services (CSS) Coordinator, and site manager at McGuire Gardens were interviewed about ownership structure, management challenges, maintenance, and resident services. The HOPE VI Coordinator provided descriptive, explanatory and policy information about the HOPE VI projects in the city. He provided current information about renovation, relocation, designs, and supportive services and details about project goals and objectives; design changes, including housing types and configuration; implementation; status and progress of HOPE VI projects; relocation processes and issues; supportive services; re-occupancy progress and issues; neighborhood plans; and revitalization plans and projects for other developments. Being the director for the HACC modernization department as well, he was very knowledgeable and well equipped to provide information on a broad range of redevelopment topics in addition to HOPE VI projects and linking the HOPE VI redevelopment projects to other modernization efforts the housing authority was undertaking. There were three face-to-face interviews with the HOPE VI Coordinator at different times during the research.

In three interviews, the CSS Coordinator addressed questions about Community and Supportive Services to residents, including information about re-occupancy, relocation, self-sufficiency programs/services, and project evaluation at Roosevelt Manor only. She provided no information about supportive services at McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres. The HOPE VI Coordinator had directed questions about resident services to the CSS Coordinator but that official did not provide the information requested for the first two developments because she was not involved with those projects. HOPE officials then refused to provide further information.

McGuire Gardens' site manager and social works answered questions about the operation of that development, but attempts to interview the manager at Baldwin's Run failed. While there was one formal interview with the site manager and none with the social worker (her employer,

Michael's Development Company, prevented her from doing the interview), much information was gathered through several information conversations with her and the social workers onsite. Format interviews were undertaken in 2008 and 2009 spring and summer.

#### **4.5.6 Household Survey**

To participate in the survey, householders had to be at least 18 years old and lived in the development for three months or more. Participants were interviewed in English only. Tenants who could not do interviews in English were excluded. In two instances, children translated for their mothers. A lack of funding precluded the hiring of a Spanish translator. Thirteen tenants at McGuire Gardens and 10 at Baldwin's Run were excluded on this basis.

**4.5.6.1 Respondents.** To learn about residents' experiences with living at each HOPE VI site, their concerns and their reactions to the redevelopment, in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted with 57 English-speaking householders (Appendix A). Thirty-three householders at McGuire Gardens and 23 at Baldwin's Run were interviewed. No interview was done at Roosevelt Manor because re-occupancy had not yet started and so the site did not satisfy the three-month minimum occupancy requirement. The HA experience delays in relocation and construction start-up which also delayed re-occupancy. The goal was to interview between 60 and 75 householders at this site.

**4.5.6.2 Procedures.** Initially, a two-step process was used to select study participants. Participants were then notified about the study by letter that requested their participation in the study. Before doing so, the questionnaire was pretested with seven residents who were not included in the final survey. After all modifications, letters were hand delivered to all households in the sample to inform them about the survey and to obtain their participation. The householders were randomly selected from the lists of addresses that the HACC provided for McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run. The Authority provided a list of 193 addresses at McGuire Gardens and 75 at

Baldwin's Run from which random samples of 100 from McGuire Gardens and 60 from Baldwin's Run were selected. Interviews began two weeks after recruitment letters were hand delivered to the 160 public housing addresses in the sample. Letters were addressed to heads of households and interviews were undertaken from spring 2008 through summer 2009 but most interviews were done during 2008. After the survey began at McGuire Gardens, the procedure was modified when it was discovered that the list that the housing authority provided excluded several addresses, including all households on Jones and Bank Streets, which had several original tenants. After consultations with the social worker to determine the addresses that were vacant and those with returning and new tenants, 20 addresses not on the HA's list were added to make it 213 addresses. Participation was extremely poor at first due to absent householders and few who wanted to take part. As a result, the sample was expanded to include all 213 tenants at McGuire Gardens and the 75 at Baldwin's Run. The response improved and 34 householders from McGuire Gardens and 23 from Baldwin's Run were interviewed. However, the use of non-random sampling techniques limits the generalizability of the study findings.

Eighteen addresses at McGuire Gardens and 14 at Baldwin's Run were excluded because the units were vacant or the tenants had lived there for less than three months. Twelve tenants at McGuire Gardens and 10 at Baldwin's Run who did not speak English and the three tenants at McGuire Gardens and two at Baldwin's Run who did the pretest were excluded from the survey as well. Most tenants either refused to participate or were not found. Approximately 80 percent of tenants at McGuire Gardens and 62 percent of the tenants at Baldwin Run were not located or they refused to participate. The majority who refused to participate did so by asking the researcher to return other days or at times when they were unavailable (Table 4.10).

The survey was done through face-to-face interviews mostly in householders' homes. Six interviews were done at the Community Center at McGuire Gardens with participants in the computer and art and craft classes. Interviews typically lasted about forty-five minutes. With participants' consent, interviews were tape-recorded but some residents objected to the recording.



Fifty-eight householders participated in the survey but two householders from McGuire Gardens did not complete their surveys. A few minutes into the interview, one tenant refused to continue without payment. The other householder abruptly stopped the interview mid-way through to get ready for work. She asked the interviewer to return but ignored the interviewer when he returned the next day. Households not found the first time received up to two other visits until interviews were done or the tenants refused to participate or were not found. When necessary, second and third visits were on different days of the week and at different times in the mornings, afternoons, and evenings to maximize the likelihood of finding the householder. When practical, the researcher obtained neighbors' advice concerning the most likely times the tenants were at home.

**Table 4.10** Survey Participation

HOPE VI Development	Addresses Targeted	Ineligible Addresses	Eligible Addresses	No Response	Outright Refusals	Participation	
						Number	Percent
McGuire Gardens	213	36	177	112	31	34	20
Baldwin's Run	75	14	61	16	17	23	38

"No Response" includes tenants who scheduled interviews and did not turn up.

**4.5.6.3 Survey Questions.** The survey consisted of seventy-two quantitative and qualitative questions. Some of the questions are similar to those used in the HOPE VI Panel Study (Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002), the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment Study (Abt Associates, et al. 1996), and the HOPE VI Tracking Study Residents Study (Burton, et al. 2002). Survey questions addressed housing design and conditions, education, employment status, public assistance status, availability of and satisfaction with self-sufficiency support services, site and neighborhood safety, neighborhood services, relations with neighbors in the development, employment, and income, and personal and household characteristics (Appendix H).

## FINDINGS

## CHAPTER 5

### PHYSICAL REDEVELOPMENT

There is more space here and all the children have their own rooms now so there is less fighting and arguing among them. I feel like I am in heaven; like a burden has been lifted. I feel so much better about myself now that I could go out to get a job. Before moving here, I was down. I did not want to do nothing.

New tenant at McGuire Gardens HOPE VI, June 2008

HOPE VI targets public housing developments with major physical defects. Based on HACC data and comments by residents, the three developments studied had major physical problems such as leaking roofs, unstable building foundations, cracked walls, drab exterior, mismatch between household size and bedroom configuration, and lack of private outdoor space, inappropriate site design, poor construction, and obsolescence (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). Redevelopment involved site redesign, rehabilitation of units, and demolition and replacement of deteriorated dwellings. The above quote from a new resident at McGuire Gardens shows some of the positive impacts of the physical improvements on residents. Unlike the original developments, the redeveloped sites have single-family housing, some of which are designed to resemble some of the housing in surrounding areas; defined public and non-public outdoor spaces; and streets that mimic the local street patterns. Site redesign removed superblocks that contributed to isolating the developments from their surroundings (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). However, HOPE VI funded demolitions have reduced the total number of units at the three sites from 1,050 before redevelopment to 680 built and planned, including a meager 403 public housing units but 677 homeownership and LIHTC units (Table 5.1).

**Table 5.1** HOPE VI Housing Units by Tenure Type and Site in Camden

<b>Development</b>	<b>All Units</b>	<b>Tax Credit Units</b>	<b>Private Units</b>		<b>Public Units</b>	
McGuire Gardens	253	0	0		253 onsite	
Baldwin's Run	516	300	119 onsite	100 offsite	78 onsite	130 offsite
Roosevelt Manor	668	286	86 onsite	16 offsite	72 onsite	208 offsite
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,437</b>	<b>586</b>	<b>305</b>		<b>741</b>	<b>338</b>

*Sources:* Manager's Office, Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Plan; Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Plan

## 5.1 McGuire Gardens

In the early 1990s, McGuire Gardens was reputed to be one of Camden's most deteriorated public housing developments. The site had flooding problems (it is in the Cooper River flood plain), was detached from the rest of the community, and many units were too small for their families. Rehabilitation rectified these issues and transformed the 368-unit development into a more attractive property of 253 units. In redesigning the site, the HA utilized the repeal of the federal one-for-one replacement rule for public housing to demolish 115 units without replacing them. This is Camden's first HOPE VI site and was funded by the \$42 million HOPE VI Revitalization grant that HUD awarded in 1994. Planning and management problems at the housing authority delayed project implementation, which took nine years to complete (Holin, et al. 2003). Rehabilitation began in summer 1999 with Michael's Development Company as the developer and ended in 2003 after extensive site and building reconfiguration and redesign. Site improvements included reopening of neighborhood streets, addition of front porches, addition of private entrances, and delineation of public and non-public outdoor spaces.

### 5.1.1 Site Condition Before HOPE VI

Before HOPE VI, the development had 368 two-story housing units at 17 per acre. In the late 1960s and 1970s, McGuire Gardens was arguably a well-kept, clean, and safe development that had four play areas for children (Holin, et al. 2003). Like other distressed developments however, analysts often cite deferred maintenance, suburbanization, and federal public housing policies that favor low-income residents as contributors to concentrated poverty, physical deterioration, and

crime. In the late 1970s, concerns developed about unstable building foundations that led to a federal investigation and eventual demolition of three buildings. The issue forced many residents to move and by 1993, vacancy had soared to more than 30 percent. Many of the close social ties that existed were severed as residents moved away out of fear (Holin, et al. 2003).

Original tenants reported that before redevelopment, the site had no recreational facility and lacked aesthetic appeal because the buildings all looked the same and noticeably different from other residential buildings in the area, which some analysts say isolated the site and the residents from its surroundings. Unlike most of the private single-family homes in the area, the units at McGuire Gardens had no front porch or other external facility and many of them did not face streets. Some buildings faced streets and some were perpendicular to streets (Holin, et al. 2003). Interestingly, the privately owned housing developments observed nearby also lack front porches or other outdoor facility but most units face streets. Other site features that led to physical distress included having no separation between public and private outdoor spaces, poor landscaping, and a large and very conspicuous communal dumpster near the front of the property (Holin, et al. 2003). These features helped to set the site apart in the neighborhood generally and local communities in particular. The private single-family houses face streets and most have defined front yard and back yards. The private apartments also have buildings that are uniform in design. A 2003 HOPE VI report suggests that a sizeable percentage of the residents viewed their housing negatively. This report cited a 1995 resident survey that showed about half (51 percent) of the residents were satisfied with their housing and 49 percent were dissatisfied. Just six percent were “very satisfied” while 29 percent were “very dissatisfied” (Holin, et al. 2003). Part of the dissatisfaction was due to the high levels of unemployment and poverty among residents. Census data and previous research indicate that poverty exceeded 38 percent in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000, Holin, et al. 2003). The high unemployment and poverty conditions may help to explain the presence of many young people who were observed idling with friends on the streets during the daytime.

Conditions in the surroundings areas were also appalling. A 2003 report indicates that gang violence, drug dealings, prostitution, vandalism, vacant, abandoned, and dilapidated buildings were prevalent (Abt Associates Inc 1996, U.S. Census Bureau 2000). A 1996 survey of residents showed that only 31 percent of them viewed their neighborhood as safe while 70 percent said it was unsafe. Six percent said it was “very safe”, 25 percent said it was “somewhat safe”, 33 percent said it was “somewhat unsafe” and 37 percent said it was “very unsafe”. Streets were in poor condition and many buildings were dilapidated and abandoned. This included housing units, many of which were derelict (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).

The main goals of the redevelopment plan were to improve the physical condition of the site and meet residents’ physical, educational, and psychological needs. The plan proposed a comprehensive overhaul of all major systems, modifications to existing unit plans, modification to the interior and exterior of units, and site improvements. The plan included a proposal to have the tenant council represented in management of the development. Other provisions included training residents in life and occupational skills, and small business ownership to serve the community (Abt Associates, et al. 1996).



**Figure 5.1** Partially occupied apartments on Carman Street adjacent to McGuire Gardens. The physical condition seen is widespread here.



**Figure 5.2** Carman Street housing adjacent to McGuire Gardens.


### 5.1.2 Site Improvements

HUD awarded the HACC the \$42 million HOPE VI grant in 1994 but rehabilitation began in 1999 due to several implementation setbacks. Redevelopment was completed in 2003. The basic building design remains the same but there were facade improvements and street realignments. The street realignment ensures that the entrance to every dwelling faces a street, which also gives each unit its own street number (Figure 5.4). The revitalized site has 253 public housing units.

Reconfiguring the site layout (Figure 5.4), fixing infrastructure problems, and reconnecting the site to the neighborhood were the major physical revitalization goals for this project. The result is a 115-unit reduction and dismantling of the superblock, a reconfigured site, new streets that connect to neighborhood streets and reopening of streets that the superblock arrangement had blocked. The remodeled units have street frontages, the own entrance, and own street numbers. Other site improvements include construction of new drainage and sewage systems and a multi-purpose community building.

Front yards and back yards are two notable additions to the site. The small front yards abut sidewalks and are semi-private. Between 4 and 28 units share a backyard (Figure 5.4). Rows of buildings and metal fences surround each backyard that residents access through the back of their units. Non-residents can easily enter most backyards by going over the perimeter fence.

The new street network has improved walkability and made the site safer for residents. It also helps to connect the development to the community and therefore remove the isolation that existed previously. However, although the site is not as isolated as before, it remains separate and distinct from the surrounding communities. By appearance, it is still easily identifiable as a distinct housing development but not readily recognizable as public housing because the site looks a lot better than its surroundings. The buildings are more attractive than other neighborhood housing and the streets are in better condition. The site is distinct because its design is unlike the two multi-family properties in that part of the neighborhood that are one block away.



**Figure 5.3** McGuire Gardens HOPE VI site layout plan. The small rectangles represent dwellings and the numbers on the rectangles represents the number of bedrooms. Most new units are on Jones and Bank Streets in Phase I and Phase II occupy the rest of the site.

Source: McGuire Gardens site manager (unknown date).

The revitalized development has town square, a community multipurpose building, a mini park, and a small playground for children in the mini-park. The facilities were absent from the original development. The original development had no green space to speak of but with the site redesigned with fewer units, backyards provide ample amount of open spaces for residents.



The play area has swings and slides for children to enjoy (Figures 5.5 and 5.5). From the dwellings that surround the town square, residents can easily monitor park activities. Residents said drug dealers often use the park to transact business. The community center is in a new 6,000 square feet building that also houses HACC offices, a social work office that the management firm operates, a resident's board office (resident board does not now exist), and a Neighborhood Network Computer Lab. The community center hosts HACC monthly meetings, training activities, community service events, church services, social activities, summer programs for children from the development, and activities for seniors.



**Figure 5.4** A shared backyard surrounded by a perimeter wall along Watson Street near the HACC Head office and two rows of residences. Shared backyards typically look like this one. Kennedy Towers, which house elderly residents and the HACC administrative offices, is the high rise building on the left side.

*Photograph:* Michael Brown



**Figure 5.5** McGuire Gardens Town Square showing the mini-park park and small children playground at the center.



**Figure 5.6** McGuire Gardens Town Square. The mini-park, children's playground, and a residential building can be seen.

### 5.1.3 Unit Design Today

The physical plan for McGuire Gardens aimed to improve the condition of the buildings to give residents a better living environment. The new development achieves this goal with fewer units and a more varied set of building designs. The remodeled buildings are more attractive and definitely do not all look the same but it would be inaccurate to say they represent the diverse architecture of in the neighborhood. Site design show strong influences from New Urbanism and Defensible Space. All buildings face a street and site appearance, amenities and community facilities are significantly improved. Reducing the number of units has helped to make the site more appealing.

Redevelopment took place in two phases from 1999 to 2003 during which 190 of the original units were demolished and 178 were rehabilitated. Seventy-five new units were constructed on existing and new foundations near the boundaries of the site to replace some of the demolished buildings. Phase I consists of 76 rehabilitated units and 65 new units and Phase II consists of 102 rehabilitated units and 10 new units (Holin, et al. 2003). Twenty percent of the new units are handicapped accessible. The rehabilitated buildings are two-story row house buildings and each contains six to eight units and two- to 4-bedrooms per unit. The new buildings

are a mix of two-story row house buildings, two-story semi-detached buildings, and one-story semi-detached bungalow-type units. The new buildings are smaller than the rehabilitated buildings and have no more than five units per building. The two-story semi-detached units have two- to four bedrooms each and the bungalow-type units have one, two, or three bedrooms.

To break up the monotonous appearance of the original buildings, improve the appearance of the site, and to make the buildings look more harmonious with residential architecture in the surrounding area, the HOPE VI Manager (Valentine 2008) explained that the exterior of the original buildings were modified to give each rehabilitated building a different appearance. One modification was to replace all flat roofs with pitched roofs. Roof overhangs vary slightly from building to building. In addition, a second-floor Bay Window has been added to every two-story unit to improve appearance and to break up the previous flat exterior of the buildings (Holin, et al. 2003). Other modifications included installation of rear patios and covered front porches. Each front porch has a pitched roof and painted wooden rails (Figure 5.6).



**Figure 5.7** Townhouse units at McGuire Gardens showing 2<sup>nd</sup> floor Bay windows.  
*Source:* Author



**Figure 5.8** Backyard area of rehabilitated buildings.  
*Source:* Author

New buildings also have Bay windows, covered front porches, and rear patios but look slightly different from the rehabilitated buildings at the back and front. New buildings have brick

veneer in front and white vinyl siding on the backs but rehabilitated buildings have brick facades on the back and front and no vinyl siding. Some of the new two-story buildings also have bungalows as end units.

The interior of rehabilitated units were remodeled as well to create more space. Demolishing some units and merging remaining adjacent units created larger interior spaces and changed the bedroom mix to create more two bedroom units at the expense of three-bedroom units (Valentine 2008).

Like the original development, building materials remain wood, concrete block, reinforced concrete, vinyl siding and brick facade (Abt Associates, et al. 1996, Holin, et al. 2003). The new and rehabilitated units have pitched roofs, which are common in the area. Figure 5.7 shows townhouses with pitched roofs, second floor bay windows, and front porches facing the street. Figure 5.8 shows a section of the typical shared backyard space and patios. Other physical changes include realigning units to face streets rather than the previous inward facing alignment or perpendicular alignment to the street. This alignment allows each unit to have its own street number, mailbox on the front door, and entrance from the street to the front porch. Individual entrances facing streets increase comfort and privacy and enhance safety and security in the development (Newman 1973) because they allow residents to keep “eyes on the street” (Jacobs 1961). Other improvements include the provision of central air conditioning and heating systems in every unit, as well as a laundry with washer and dryer hook-ups. Householders install their own appliances. Householders expressed delight with having these features, especially the central A/C system because the one unit cools the entire home.

The 253 apartments include 29 one-bedroom units, 119 two-bedroom units, 92 three-bedroom units, and 13 four-bedroom units (Table 5.2). Unit size varies based on whether they are rehabilitated or new and whether they are on new or existing foundations. Rehabilitated units range from 477 square feet for one-bedroom units, 632 and 732 square feet for two-bedroom units to 976 square feet for three-bedroom units. New units built on new foundations are generally

larger and range from 560 square feet for one-bedroom units, 753 square feet for two-bedroom units, 1,141 square feet for three-bedroom units to 1,302 and 1,327 square feet for the 4-bedroom units. New units built on old foundations range in size from 500 square feet for one-bedroom units to 1,132 square feet for three-bedroom units (McGuire Gardens Management Office).

Table 5.2 shows changes in the number and distribution of bedrooms resulting from the redevelopment. The changes in bedroom configuration were relatively small. The biggest changes were the reduction in three bedroom units from 45 percent to 36 percent of total and the increase in two-bedroom units from 43 percent to 47 percent of total. Because the development now has 253 units, the density is down from 17 units per acre before redevelopment to 12 units per acre. All units have individual utility meters and each household receives a monthly utility allowance.

**Table 5.2** Configuration of HOPE VI Units at McGuire Gardens

Bedroom Configuration	HOPE VI Units		Original Units	
	Number	Percent*	Number	Percent*
One-bedroom units	29	12	25	7
Two-bedroom units	119	47	158	43
Three-bedroom units	92	36	172	47
Four-bedroom units	13	5	13	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>		<b>367</b>	

*Source:* Property Manager's Office (no date).

\*Due to rounding, total percent may not equal 100.

Indefensible open space was one factor that led to distress in public housing (NCSDPH 1992). The project was redesigned with Defensible Space principles playing a strong role. However, the management firm limits its application. Residents' complained about the lack of backyard privacy but the property management company said it makes cutting the grass easier. Management also limits the kind of activities allowed in the space around the units. For example, residents are not permitted to do gardening or other landscaping to enhance the front yard, or barbeque in backyards, even though each unit has a small concrete patio at the back door. In fact,

residents are not permitted to do anything that may affect the spaces around the units or appearance of the site, including leaving patio furniture or toys on the front porch.

Despite HOPE VI's push towards mixed-income housing developments, McGuire Gardens remains a wholly public housing property. This is typical of sites that were redeveloped solely using HOPE VI funds (Holin, et al. 2003). The reduction in the number of units conforms to HOPE VI goal to build smaller-scale developments.

#### **5.1.4 Impact on Surrounding Areas Negligible**

The physical condition of the surrounding neighborhoods looked no better than the conditions in McGuire Gardens. In fact, some communities had worse conditions. The dilapidated condition of the communities west and north of the McGuire Gardens appears to be the same as before. The houses in these areas are mostly two-story row houses and apartments in two-story buildings. East of McGuire Gardens, the housing appears to be in fair to good condition but the housing to the west and north side, the houses are in very poor physical condition. The two communities west and north of McGuire Gardens has numerous dilapidated and abandoned houses, very poor roads, and overgrown empty lots littered with refuse the physical condition of the houses depicts extreme poverty (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The community to the east is much less physically distressed. Here, the housing is a mix of two-story apartment buildings, two-story row houses, and detached one story, single-family houses, most of which appear to be in good physical condition. Detailed observations in the community indicate that many of the row houses were in need of repair.

#### **5.1.5 Residents' Perceptions**

The real significance of the physical changes depends on their impact on residents. If the changes improve living conditions and the quality of life in the development, then the main physical redevelopment objective has been achieved. Householders were interviewed to learn how the physical changes affected them. Ten returnees and 24 new householders were interviewed.

Respondents from both groups gave positive comments about their HOPE VI housing. More than 90 percent of returnees and about 87 percent of new residents said their HOPE VI housing was more attractive than their previous housing.

Table 5.2 shows the results when householders were asked to compare their previous housing with their current HOPE VI home. Overall, the majority said their HOPE VI housing was better. Approximately 55 percent said it was “a lot better” and 24 percent said it was “a little better”. Considering how distressed the site was, it is hardly a surprise that 90 percent of returnees said their current unit was better. It may be a surprise to some that 22 percent of new tenants said their HOPE VI unit was the same quality as their previous unit. One returnee explained that she said her HOPE VI unit was the same quality as her previous unit at Westfield Acres due to the restrictions on residents’ use of the facilities and the outdoor space. No one said HOPE VI housing was worse than before. An interesting part of the results of these two questions is that even new tenants who came from private single-family homes and apartments overwhelmingly said their public housing units were better and looked better than their previous houses. This shows the substantial improvements in the physical environment at HOPE VI sites and also indicate that the poor quality of some low-income housing in the private market.

Householders in the survey also cited the three things they liked and disliked most about their HOPE VI houses. The three features chosen most frequently were “own entrance” with 46 percent, apartment design with 42 percent, and central air conditioning with 36 percent. One-third said they liked having a unique street number, and 21 percent said they liked having a backyard, even if it is not private. The results are in Table 5.4. These and other features, like houses facing the street and private front and back yards, are important aspects of Defensible Space and New Urbanism. When asked specifically how important these features were to them, survey participants overwhelmingly said they were very important. The results indicate near unanimity in the responses among returning and new residents.

**Table 5.3** HOPE VI Housing Compared to Previous Housing

Ratings	Percent of Householders Interviewed		
	%ALL Tenants (n=32)	% Returnees (n=10)	% New Tenants (n=22)
A Lot Better	55	70	48
A Little Better	24	20	30
About the Same	18	10	22
Don't Know	3	0	0

*Source:* McGuire Gardens Household Survey

Among returnees, 100 percent said private entries were “very important”, which validates their earlier selection of it as the feature they like best; 90 and 70 percent said having a unique street address and having a private backyard, respectively, were “very important.” Ten percent and 20 percent said having a unique street and a private backyard were “somewhat important”. Among new householders, 92 percent said having their own entrance and unique street addresses were “very important”, 75 percent said having a private backyard was “very important”, while 17 percent said the private backyard was “somewhat important”.

**Table 5.4** HOPE VI Features Householders Like Best

House Feature	Percent of Householders Interviewed		
	All (n=32)	Returnees (n=10)	New (n=22)
Own Entrance	47	50	45
Design	53	50	55
Central Air	50	30	59
Own Street Number	34	30	36
Having a Backyard	22	30	18

*Source:* McGuire Gardens Household Survey

Most householders like their HOPE VI homes but not all the features. The three features they disliked most were “open backyards” that 33 percent mentioned, “inadequate storage space”, which 24 percent cited, and “no basement”, which 24 percent cited. Another 15 percent said the rooms were small and 12 percent said the floor was not carpeted and 6 percent mentioned the absence of a doorbell. Some householders complained that interior paint was too flat for homes with young children because it is easily soiled and they were being charged for marks on the



walls that their young children made. They noted that a gloss paint would remedy the problem. They also said the flat paint makes the apartments dull. One tenant said: “The apartments need to be more lively or colorful; they are too dull”. Several tenants said the HA has denied their requests to repaint the walls but the site manager said tenants may repaint the inside of the units but would be required to return it to the original color and type paint upon moving. None of the residents said they got that permission.

The survey results show that one-third of the participants said the lack of backyard privacy was one of the things they disliked most. Nearly every interviewee complained about the backyard was too open. They also complained about the restrictions on their use of the spaces outside their units. For example, barbequing and swimming pools are not allowed in the backyards and flowers are not allowed in front yard. Some restrictions diminish the effectiveness of the Defensible Space features on the site. About backyards, one householder said:


“Right now there is no privacy. I can’t even barbeque because the place is too open and other people come over and destroy everything.”

Table 5.5 shows almost every householder expressing satisfaction with the HOPE VI units. Of the 97 percent who were satisfied, 50 percent said they were “very satisfied”. No householder expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the units.

**Table 5.5** Resident Satisfaction with McGuire Gardens HOPE VI Homes

Level of Satisfaction	Percent of Interviewees		
	All (n=32)	Returnees (n=10)	New Residents (n=22)
Very Satisfied	50	50	50
Somewhat Satisfied	47	50	46
Somewhat Dissatisfied	0	-	-
Very Dissatisfied	0	-	-
Don't Know	3	-	3

*Source:* McGuire Gardens Household Survey



**Figure 5.9** HOPE VI Housing Features Tenants Disliked Most (32 interviewees).

## 5.2 Westfield Acres/Baldwin's Run

Completed in 2007, Baldwin's Run has 78 single-family homes for public housing families and 119 affordable single-family, owner-occupied homes. In contrast, Westfield Acres had 18 four-story, brick-faced apartment buildings and 514 apartments for public housing families. The transformation is so dramatic that former residents and neighbors no longer call it "Acres". The lone street in the previous development is now part of a street network that mirrors that of the locality. The new development is called Baldwin's Run and has both public housing and non-public housing units and 11 different combinations of one-story and two-story detached, semi-detached, and attached single-family houses, ranging from two to four bedrooms (Research Works 2005). The redevelopment strategy used here is different from the strategy used at McGuire Gardens. The first set of 78 completed units received a 2003 "Best in American Living Award" from HUD and the completed development received a *Cottage Living Magazine*<sup>8</sup> "Best Cottage Communities Award" in 2008. In the January 2008 edition, the magazine described Baldwin's Run as "The Miracle Turnaround" because the "Before and After is Astounding". Residents and neighbors refer to Baldwin's Run as "mini Cherry Hill" because it resembles a

<sup>8</sup>Parent company, Time Inc., closed *Cottage Living* magazine and its website [cottageliving.com](http://cottageliving.com) in November 2008.

housing development one expects to find in affluent Cherry Hill<sup>9</sup> rather than a central city housing development containing public housing in poor and distressed Camden.

HUD rejected previous applications in 1998 and 1999 before awarding the HACC a second HOPE VI revitalization grant in 2000 for \$35 million to build a new mixed-income, mixed-tenure housing complex on the then vacant site. The main physical redevelopment goals were to improve the quality of the site and the housing and reduce density. Demolishing the original apartments and constructing Baldwin Run achieved those goals substantially. Almost 40 percent of the units on the site (78 units) are public housing rentals and 60 percent (119 units) are owner-occupied. The site and building designs reflect the strong desire to avoid previous public housing designs that engendered negative stereotypes such as being “dull” and “inappropriate design and scale” that isolated developments in their communities. Instead, the housing authority and the two developers adopted private sector housing styles.

### **5.2.1 Site Condition before HOPE VI**

Westfield Acres occupied a 25-acre gently sloping property between Westfield Avenue, Rosedale and Dudley Avenues, Beideman Avenue, 32nd Street, and railroad tracks to the south in the Dudley neighborhood in East Camden, bordering the Rosedale neighborhood. The development opened in 1937 with 18 three-story, brick-faced walk-up buildings and 514 apartments at nearly 21 per acre. Figure 5.8 shows the layout of buildings on the site. Westfield Acres had 275 one-bedroom units, 165 two-bedroom units, and 74 three-bedroom units. The 18 residential buildings were constructed using reinforced concrete with brick veneer and flat roofs. Inside, concrete slabs separated the apartments. Residents accessed their apartments from interior stairways shared that four to eight other units shared. The apartments ranged in size from 531 square feet for a one-bedroom unit to 802 square feet for a three-bedroom unit. Originally, there were no handicap accessible units but some of the units were modified to contemporary accessibility standards.

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<sup>9</sup>Cherry Hill is a prominent suburban township about six miles away.

Buildings occupied just 25 percent of the site, which left large areas of indefensible open space. This open arrangement fuelled security concerns among residents (HACC 2000). Additionally, the superblock design interrupted the neighborhood street grid and left only one street, Beideman Avenue, to connect the site to the outside world. The revitalization plan noted that Westfield Acres suffered from poor maintenance, mismanagement, structural and infrastructure failure, an outdated institutional type design, inappropriate layout, large areas of indefensible open space, high operating costs, high crime rates, and high vacancy rates, all of which made life miserable for residents. Several original residents interviewed said Westfield Acres was a dangerous place to live. With HOPE VI funding available, in 1998 the housing authority decided that the buildings and infrastructure were obsolete and no longer economically viable. This decline appears to have followed Camden's economic decline. When the economy performed well, Westfield Acres appeared to have done well too but residents' economic fortunes floundered with the city's economic decline. The HACC condemned the site and eventually demolished all buildings between 1998 and 2001 after receiving the \$3 million HOPE VI demolition grant in 1998. Using the \$35 million HOPE VI revitalization grant, the HACC leveraged another \$65 million to build Baldwin's Run.



**Figure 5.10** Aerial view of Westfield Acres buildings and layout before demolition.



**Figure 5.11** A Vacant Apartment Block at Westfield Acres Before Demolition in 2001.

*Source:* <http://www.dvrbs.com/hacc/CamdenNJ-HousingAuthority.htm>

### 5.2.2 Site and Housing Improvements

Baldwin's Run was built through a joint venture arrangement with St. Joseph Carpenter Society as the lead developer, owner, and operator of the new development. St. Joseph Carpenter Society is a non-profit community development corporation with several active investments in East Camden. The first 78 public housing units were completed in 2005 and the 119 homeownership units were completed in 2007 (HACC 2008). This mix of public and private housing created a new mixed-income development that is about 40 percent public housing rentals and 60 percent affordable owner-occupied units.<sup>10</sup> The public units have one- to four-bedrooms but the private units have two- to four-bedrooms (Table 5.4).

**Table 5.6** Bedrooms Per Unit by Tenure at Baldwin's Run

<b>Unit Type</b>	<b>Total Units</b>	<b>Public Housing</b>	<b>Private Housing</b>
One-bedrooms	10	10	0
Two-bedrooms	39	35	4
Three-bedrooms	122	25	97
Four-bedrooms	30	8	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>119</b>

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2003 HOPE VI Revitalization plan

Baldwin's Run site design is sharply different from that of Westfield Acres. The network of interconnected streets that mimics the neighborhood street grid illustrates the transformation in the site design considering that Westfield Acres had one street. This allows units to face streets. The entire site was redesigned and new single-family detached, semi-detached and row houses built. The new housing reflects the new ideas about public housing discussed in Chapter 3.

The street network mimics the neighborhood street pattern and is a deliberate attempt to integrate the development within the neighborhood. Unlike Westfield Acres, units face streets, have private entries from the street to the front porch, and private driveways (Figure 5.1). At Westfield Acres, most apartments faced interior courtyards, but in Baldwin's Run, all the units

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<sup>10</sup>HUD requires housing authorities to allocate at least 40 percent of new units to public housing tenants.

face streets. Each unit has a unique street number and own entrance. Defensible Space and New Urbanism principles shaped the site redesign. The site reorganization employs Defensible Space features. Defensible Space helped to transform the large areas of public outdoor space in the previous development into clearly defined public and private zones that allow residents to exercise care and control of the spaces around their units. No doubt, this feature has contributed to the marked improvements in site security and the peacefulness that several residents mentioned.




**Figure 5.12** Aerial View of Baldwin's Run showing public housing units on Baldwin's Run Lane on left side. The four-story building at the bottom of the picture is Baldwin's Run Seniors building. The right side of picture shows Westfield Towers (for seniors).

*Source:* Bing Maps

As a mixed-income development, the physical arrangement of the units on the site is important. It is important for homeowners and public housing tenants to be able to interact positively with each other for income mixing to be beneficial. In this development, 16 of the 25 acres of land contain the 197 houses and the rest consists of roadways, a small (non-functioning) children playground, and yard space. The site plan at Figure 5.12 shows the unit configuration. The northern half of the site has 16 public housing units and 35 owner-occupied units and the



southern half has 62 public housing and 84 owner-occupied units for 78 public housing and 119 homeownership units. HUD requires the public housing units to be interspersed with owner-occupied units to avoid clustering them. In reality though, most of the public housing units are clustered in the southern half along Baldwin's Run Lane, Saunders Street, Dudley Avenue, and the middle section of North 31<sup>st</sup> Street. In contrast, the bulk of the owner-occupied houses are concentrated in the northern half of the site. This arrangement does little to facilitate interaction between public housing tenants and homeowners and so it is no surprise that public housing tenants reported almost no interaction with homeowners.



**Figure 5.13** Baldwin's Run construction Phasing Plan

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Redevelopment Plan

### 5.2.3 Unit Design Today

Three underlying goals guided the final housing design choices for this development: providing public housing and non-public, owner-occupied housing on the same site; building all housing to the same standards; and using architectural and building styles that reflect the architectural character of the whole neighborhood. A windshield survey of neighborhood housing reveals a

wide variety of housing types and styles. The two-story framed single-family house with pitched roofs was the most popular housing type observed but there were several different variations of this type. Similarities in housing styles tended to be local to a community rather than the entire neighborhood. Baldwin's Run houses reflect just a few of the styles observed but mainly the designs of the newer private single-family houses in the 36<sup>th</sup> Street to 40<sup>th</sup> Street area near to the River Line train station. This area is not actually Camden but neighboring Pennsauken, which borders Camden at 36<sup>th</sup> Street. This style (Figures 5.12 and 5.13) dominates the owner-occupied units along 32nd Street below Saunders Street. Another model (Figure 5.14) is a two-story framed design with pitched roof and gabled end across the front and a porch facing the street. The steep pitch of the roof in this model made it attractive because it facilitates an extra room in the attic. Many of semi-detached two and three-family units and have this design. The main difference between this style and the previous is the roof design. All units have front and rear yards. The second model is a bungalow-style house with pitched roof facing the street, a partial hip near the peak, and porch extending across the front of the house (Figure 5.14). The steep pitch of the roof in this model also facilitates an extra attic room. The detached units use this model. Both models are used for public and homeownership units in one-, two-, and three-family configurations but most are two-story semi-detached units.

The housing density at Baldwin's Run is approximately eight units per acre (Westfield Acres had 20 units per acre). The housing authority also built a 74-unit, four-story development for seniors on a separate portion of the original site along the Westfield Avenue border. Two offsite properties next to the original site contain 73 and 49 public housing and tax credit units. The larger property is Baldwin's Run II. This family development occupies a Superfund site of the former General Color Company. This property is two blocks from Baldwin's Run. This site has 53 LIHTC rentals and 20 public housing rentals for formerly homeless women and their families (HACC 2000). The smaller offsite location is Carpenters Hill on 36<sup>th</sup> Street. This site was assembled from vacant and abandoned private properties and has 30 public housing units and



19 homeownership units. Another 81 abandoned properties in Dudley and Rosedale neighborhoods were to be rehabilitated as owner-occupied units. It is unclear how many of these units are completed. Westfield Acres Redevelopment plan indicates that when fully completed, there would be 219 homeownership units, 182 public housing units, and 115 LIHTC units but the HACC's 5-year Plan reported 219 homeownership units, 208 public housing units, and 66 LIHTC units (Table 5.7).

**Table 5.7** HOPE VI Onsite and Offsite Units by Tenure at Baldwin's Run

	Original	New Onsite	New Offsite	Total
Public housing	514	78	130	208
Homeownership	0	119	100	219
LIHTC	0	0	115	66
<b>All</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>493</b>

*Source:* Westfield Acres HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, 2000



**Figure 5.14** Semi-detached houses at Baldwin's Run. The fenced property in right foreground is a homeownership unit. Public housing tenants are not allowed to erect fences.



**Figure 5.15** Baldwin's Run two-story units on N 31<sup>st</sup> St. Shows some of the two-story units with pitched roofs, front porches, and off-street parking.



**Figure 5.16** Baldwin's Run Twin Units on 32<sup>nd</sup> Street. Twin style housing is in the foreground and detached single-family units are further down the street.



**Figure 5.17** Baldwin's Run houses showing a detached unit in the foreground. The white picket fence indicates that it is owner-occupied, not public housing.

Table 5.8 shows the bedroom mix at Westfield Acres and at Baldwin's Run. To account for changes in population composition and needs in public housing, Baldwin's Run bedroom mix differs from the previous bedroom mix, shifting the focus from one- and two-bedroom units (86%) to two- and three-bedroom units (80%). For the 78 public housing units, 45 percent are two-bedroom units compared to 32 percent before and 32 percent are three-bedroom units compared to 14 percent before. The changes orient Baldwin's Run towards larger families more than Westfield Acres did. The HOPE VI Coordinator said three-bedroom units meet the needs of larger households, which was a problem at Westfield Acres (HOPE VI Manager 8/2008).

**Table 5.8** Bedroom Size by Tenure Type at Westfield Acres and Baldwin's Run

Number of Bedrooms	Westfield Acres		Baldwin's Run					
			HOPE VI Units		Public Units		Private Units	
	Units	%	Units	%	Units	%	Units	%
One-bedrooms	275	54	10	5	10	13	0	0
Two-bedrooms	165	32	39	20	35	45	4	3
Three-bedrooms	74	14	118	60	25	32	93	78
Four-bedrooms	0	0	30	15	8	10	22	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>197</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan

Rental units come in single-family detached, single-family semi-detached and three-family attached forms, and homeownership units are single-family detached and single-family semi-detached dwellings. Rental and homeownership houses are built to the same standards to make them indistinguishable in appearance, quality, space, and basic amenities. Making public housing and homeownership housing visually indistinguishable is an important HOPE VI goal intended to change public perception of public housing as warehouses for the poor.

The homeownership units on the northern border of the site look similar to newer housing in the outside neighborhood in that area. Additionally, the houses and overall development has a suburban look and feel, which make conspicuous amidst the older houses surrounding the site. No other large housing development is in the area, so despite the physical appeal, Baldwin Run contrasts sharply with older and detached single-family houses in the area.

**Table 5.9** Housing Types and Bedroom Mix by Tenure at Baldwin’s Run

Tenure Type	Housing Style	Bedroom Configuration			
		1 BR	2 BR	3 BR	4 BR
Homeownership (119 units)	Single family detached	-	-	49	12
	Semi-detached unit	-	4	48	10
	<b>Subtotal</b>	-	<b>4</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>22</b>
Public Housing (78 units)	Single family detached	-	12	17	8
	Semi-detached (twin) unit	-	23	3	-
	Attached triples dwelling	10	-	5	-
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>30</b>

Source: Westfield Acres 2000 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan

#### 5.2.4 Residents’ Perceptions

Results from the household survey indicate that the majority of resident believe that their HOPE VI housing is better than what they had before and they are satisfied with their houses and physical aspects of the development as a whole. In Table 5.10, all returnees and 88 percent of new tenants said their current house was better, which is an overall rate of 91 percent. No householders said their HOPE VI house was worse but 12 percent said it was “about the same” as before. Asked to explain their responses, the 12 percent said their responses expressed their

dissatisfaction with the management of the property, not concerns about their homes. Most householders complained about too many restrictions and the time management takes to effect repairs. First public housing tenants who moved from their original family homes appeared to be those who complained the most.

Because Defensible Space is a key ingredient in the physical redevelopment, the interviewer asked householders how important having their own street address, private entrance, and private backyard was to them and the results shown in Table 5.11. Like McGuire Gardens, the public housing units at Baldwin's have shared backyards. Between 86 percent and 100 percent of returnees and new tenants said these features were very important. Many householders complained about lack of privacy in the backyard. The HOPE VI coordinator said the developer decided to leave backyards open because it made cutting the grass easier.

**Table 5.10** Tenants' View of HOPE VI Housing vs. Previous Housing

<b>Income Mixing</b>	<b>Returning (n=7)</b>	<b>New Residents (n=16)</b>	<b>All (n=23)</b>
A Lot Better	86	50	61
A Little Better	14	38	30
About the Same	0	12	9

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.12 shows the housing features that householders liked most. The top three choices among new tenants were private entrance, design, and having one's own street address. Returnees had the same three as their top choices but the percentages were different. Fifty-seven percent said "design", 29 percent said "private entrance", and twenty-nine percent said, "own street number address". Commenting on the design, residents who liked it said that it was comfortable. Additionally, 39 percent of all participants said "central air-conditioning". While few respondents mentioned it as one of the features they like most, several residents said they liked living in single-family houses more than in apartments.

**Table 5.11** Importance of Selected HOPE VI Housing Features to Householders (%)

Importance	Returning Residents (n=7)			New Residents (n=16)	
	Private Entrance	Street Address	Private Backyard	Private Entrance	Street Address
Very Important	100	100	87	94	94
Somewhat Important	-	-	0	6	-
Neither important nor unimportant	-	-	14	-	-
Don't Know	-	-	-	-	6

Source: Baldwin's Run Public Housing Household Survey

**Table 5.12** HOPE VI Housing Features Householders Like Best

House Feature	All (n=23)	Returnees (n=7)	New (n=16)
Own Entrance	47	29	56
Own St Address	43	29	50
Design	43	57	31
Central Air	39	14	50
Size	13	29	06

Source: Baldwin's Run 2008 Survey of Public Housing Household

Householders also cited the aspects of their housing that they disliked most. Table 5.13 shows the six aspects they disliked most. Fifty-seven percent complained about not having storm/screen doors. Householders noted that their absence made it more difficult to keep their homes warm in the winter and increased their utility bills. This was the only issue that more than 50 percent of householders mentioned. No more than 39 percent of residents mentioned any other single concern, including “too many restrictions” (39%), “lack of private backyards” (35%), and “small rooms”, “poor quality wall paint”, and “lack of roof lighting fixtures” (17% each). Even though a substantial proportion of householders liked the design of their homes, the features that they disliked most were also design-related. Greater proportions of new tenants than returnees also liked each feature.

**Table 5.13** HOPE VI Housing Features Householders Dislike Most

Housing Issues	Percent of Householders		
	Returning (n=7)	New (n=16)	All (n=23)
No storm door	43	63	57
Backyard not enclosed	29	44	35
Too many restrictions	14	44	39
No interior roof lighting	14	19	17
Rooms too small	14	19	17
Poor quality paint used	14	19	17

*Source:* Baldwin's Run 2008 Public Housing Household Survey

Considering that returnees and new householders liked and disliked the same features, the reasons for the percentage differences between returnees and new householders is not clear. Returnees may have lowered their expectations based on previous negative experiences at Westfield Acres. They might have a lower expectation of screen doors or private yards because they never had them before in public housing. Being familiar with public housing restrictions, they probably expected the same and were not inclined to voice their opinions because they expect nothing to be done. New householders, on the other hand, might have had higher service expectations since they do not have any prior experiences in public housing.

**Table 5.14** Householder Satisfaction with Baldwin's Run HOPE VI Housing

Satisfaction	Percent of Householders		
	Returnees (n=7)	New (n=16)	All (n=23)
Very Satisfied	57	56	57
A Little Satisfied	43	38	39
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	0	0	0
A Little Dissatisfied	0	6	4
Very Dissatisfied	0	0	0

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.14 shows responses to the question about resident's satisfaction with their HOPE VI housing. About 96 percent said they were satisfied with their housing, including 57 percent

who were “very satisfied” and 39 percent who were “a little satisfied”. About 57 percent of returnees and 56 percent of new householders were “very satisfied”. Given that householders rated the appearance and overall quality of their homes highly, the relatively high percentage of householders who said they were “a little satisfied” expressed dissatisfaction with restrictions on gardening, use of the outside water pipe, backyard barbequing, and use of swimming pools. They expressed the view that the restrictions interfere with their enjoyment of the facilities. When asked to explain her response, one returnee said her current house was “a lot better” than her previous but she was only “a little satisfied” because “it is boring”. “We can’t make any change”, she explained. Another former Westfield Acres resident of many years and one of the leaders at Baldwin’s Run, expressed strong sentiments about the development. She said:

“I like the way the outside looks and we have to take care of it, but we are limited in terms of what we can do, like planting a garden, which is therapeutic. We are not allowed to disturb or change or add to anything.”

Regarding the specific features of Baldwin’s Run that householders liked the most, the top three were having “own entrance and street address” and “safety” with 61 percent each and “private parking” with 57 percent (Table 5.15). Returnees and new householders’ views differed. Nearly 69 percent of new tenants cited “own entrance and address” compared to 43 percent of returnees. Similarly, private parking was joint first among new tenants with 69 percent but fifth among returnees with 29 percent, which is probably due to lower automobile ownership among returnees. The small sample size of seven returnees might have been a determining factor as well, although returnees’ share of the public housing population was unknown. (HOPE VI officials did not disclose the number of returnees among the 78 public housing households).

**Table 5.15** Baldwin’s Run Features Householders’ Like Most

Site Characteristics	Percent Householders Interviewed		
	All (n=23)	Returnees (n=7)	New (n=16)
Own Entry & Address	61	43	69
Safety	61	57	63
Parking	57	29	69
Backyard	39	43	38
Quiet/Peaceful	30	29	31

*Source:* Baldwin’s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Table 5.16 show householders’ main reasons for moving to Baldwin’s Run. About 75 percent of them said “appearance;” 48 percent said it was safer than where they lived before; 39 percent said “wanting to live in a new house or needing a bigger place” and 35 percent said it was the housing authority’s decision, not theirs. Several of them said they had applied for public housing a long time ago but their applications were placed on a waiting list and when Baldwin’s Run opened, they surprisingly received letters from the HA informing them of their selection for housing at Baldwin’s Run. Householders said that they accepted because the rent was lower than what they were paying then and the conditions were better than before.

**Table 5.16** Top Five Reasons Interviewees Moved to Baldwin’s Run

Site Characteristics	Percent Householder Interviewed		
	All (n=23)	Returnees (n=7)	New (n=16)
Appearance	78	86	75
Safety	48	43	50
HACC decision	35	27	38
New House	39	28	44
Bigger Size	39	-	38

*Source:* Baldwin’s Run Public Housing Household Survey

Virtually everyone said Baldwin’s Run was a lot better than Westfield Acres. The housing development is like an oasis given that the houses look better than the properties around



it. The low density and single-family housing features gives the site the appearance of a suburban type housing development rather than an inner-city project with public housing. In that regard the redevelopment achieved the physical transformation intended. It now appears to be the development of choice in East Camden in terms of attractiveness.

Safety is not a physical element, yet it can be enhanced or diminished by the quality of the physical environment. Since almost 44 percent of interviewees said they moved to Baldwin's Run for safety reasons; that is dramatic turn-around in perception about the site from the dangerous place that returning residents said Westfield was and indicates the success of the physical design changes. Table 5.17 shows the features that householders dislike most about Baldwin's Run were the many restrictions; the open backyard; the lack of speed traps on the streets to slow cars; and having no functioning playground for children.

**Table 5.17** Baldwin's Run Features Householders' Dislike Most (by Percent)

<b>Site Feature</b>	<b>Householders (n=23)</b>	<b>Returnees (n=7)</b>	<b>New (n=16)</b>
Restrictions	74	71	75
Backyard	61	43	69
Speeding Cars	61	86	50
No Children Playground	39	14	50
Crime/Safety	26	43	19

*Source:* Baldwin's Run 2008 Public Housing Household Survey

When asked, 91 percent of participants said their living situations had improved since moving to Baldwin's Run and nine percent said their living situations had not improved. A new tenant summed up the views of most interviewees:

Everything has been positive so far. It feels good to be able to return home from work at the end of the day to a home that one feels good about. I feel like I am home. It is a safer environment for renters and it makes you want to succeed more in life; it is motivating.


### 5.3 Roosevelt Manor

In 2004, the HACC received a third HOPE VI revitalization grant to demolish all original 38 two-story, barracks-like apartment buildings (Figures 5.19 and 5.20) and facilitate building new single-family type housing on the site and elsewhere in the neighborhood. The rebuilding plan included twin, row, and condominium type affordable units and public housing rentals and homeownership units onsite and offsite to serve households with a broad range of incomes (HACC 2003a). HUD later issued 166 housing vouchers for relocating all households. More than one year passed between relocation and demolition in 2007 and reconstruction did not start until late 2008 and was set to end in 2010. The completed development is expected to have at least 230 units onsite and 438 units in other parts of the neighborhood. At the time of writing this dissertation, the community center and a substantial number of housing units were completed and occupied. The community building was one of the first building constructed in order to have a place for supportive services.

#### 5.3.1 Site Condition before HOPE VI

Franklyn D. Roosevelt Manor was built in the early 1950s in Centerville for the mostly African-American population and was named in honor the United States 32<sup>nd</sup> President. When the development opened in 1954, World War II and Korean Wars veterans received preference for the 268 apartments. The 14-acre site is on Ferry Street adjoining Branch Village and a block from Chelton Terrace. Sixty percent of the units had 3-bedrooms, 25 percent had 2-bedrooms, and 15 percent had 4-bedrooms. Each building contained 4 to 8 apartments and up to four apartments shared a landing. The buildings had pitched roofs and brick façades but their barracks-like appearance made their design unattractive. Figure 5.18, original site plan, shows that some of the buildings were aligned to nearby streets and some were slanted to streets but all units faced inwards. The site was really two superblocks with no through street, which was common to public housing developments that were built in the modernist architecture tradition.

Major site improvements were carried out in the 1990s but by 2003, continued physical deterioration and social problems led to vacancy soaring to 32 percent of the 3-bedroom units and 20 percent of the 2-bedroom units (HACC 2003a). According to the revitalization plan, in addition to physical deterioration, the development had become obsolete and difficult to operate due to frequent flooding, mechanical and electrical systems breakdown, illicit drug activities, vandalism, and extreme poverty. The first became known in the 1980s when the electrical and mechanical systems began to malfunction and heavy rains began to flood certain areas because the storm-water drainage system on the site was no longer adequate. Maintenance and repair did not keep pace due to inadequate funding. Improvements done in the 1990s alleviated some problems but others remained and did not halt the deterioration. The improvement works included installation of new roofs and new facades, construction of boiler rooms for each building, and renovation of kitchens and baths. These improvements alleviated some problems. By then, the illicit drug trade had found its way into the development in a big way (HACC 2003a). With these and other problems, the HA obtained HUD's permission to demolish the property and replace it with a new mixed-income development. HUD rejected two HOPE VI requests before approving the revised application in 2004 and awarded the HACC a \$20 million HOPE VI revitalization grant.



**Figure 5.18** Original Roosevelt Manor site\buildings layout plan. Note that apartment buildings were oriented inwards. Most were angled diagonally or 90 degrees to streets.

*Source:* Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Redevelopment Plan, 2003



**Figure 5.19** Vacant Roosevelt Manor Buildings Awaiting Demolition, Spring 2007.



**Figure 5.20** Vacated buildings at Roosevelt Manor waiting demolition.

### 5.3.2 HOPE VI Improvement Plan

With 668 total units planned onsite and offsite, this is the largest of the three HOPE VI projects. Like Westfield Acres, the entire project was demolished to create a new development. The redevelopment plan includes 230 new single-family units onsite compared to 268 before and another 438 single-family units offsite but in the neighborhood. It includes 101 units already constructed in Phase II at Chelton Terrace. Overall, there will be 280 public housing units, 286 tax credit rentals, and 102 homeownership units (Table 5.17). That distribution will satisfy the project goal of 42 percent public housing, 43 percent LIHTC units, and 15 percent owner-occupied housing. The projected 230 onsite units include at least 105 public housing units, plus 86 affordable homeownership units, and 39 tax credit units (Table 5.18). The HOPE VI coordinator advised that the 86 homeownership units were to be on a separate 4-acre portion of the site but that plan was later modified to integrate the homeownership units with the rental units. The 438-offsite units include 16 affordable homeownership units, 208 public housing units, and 214 LIHTC rentals. The inclusion of homeownership units is a deliberate attempt to stabilize the neighborhood housing market (HACC 2003a). Chelton Terrace Phase III is to be a 66-unit scheme at the Chelton Terrace site. The original Chelton Terrace had 200 apartments that the housing authority demolished in 2005 and already built 167 new replacement townhouse units in

Phases I and II. These 66 Phase III LIHTC rentals will complete the redevelopment at that site, which will then have 233 single-family units.<sup>11</sup>

**Table 5.18** Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Development Proposed Unit Mix

Unit Type	Onsite		Off-Site		ALL	
	Units	Percent	Units	Percent	Units	Percent
Public Housing Units	105	46	175	40	280	42
Owner-occupied Units <sup>12</sup>	86	37	16	4	102	15
LIHTC	39	17	247	56	286	43
<b>Total Units</b>	<b>230</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>438</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>668</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Revitalization Plan

Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100.

This HOPE VI project has three developers--Pennrose Properties, Ingerman Affordable Housing Development, and Michael's Development Company. Pennrose Properties is responsible for the two homeownership phases and one rental phase, including all the onsite units. Ingerman is responsible for four offsite rental phases (all LIHTC units), including the Chelton Terrace Phases II and II and the senior property already constructed and described elsewhere in this section. Michael's Development, which also developed McGuire Gardens, is responsible for two offsite rental phases and the 16 offsite homeownership units. Each developer also has management responsibility for the units it builds. Each worked on two HOPE VI projects. Site reconstruction began in 2008, which was several months later than projected, and was scheduled to finish by the end of 2010. Ingerman began to build offsite units in Phase I in 2005. Phase I consisted of 64 units in the new three-story, rental facility named Antioch Manor for adults aged 55 and over on a previously vacant plot on Ferry Avenue that is adjacent to Roosevelt Manor. Sixty-six additional units were constructed later to complete this 130-unit facility in 2008. These 130 units are part of the offsite tax credit housing mix. This scatter-site approach to the redevelopment is one of the strategies being used to deconcentrate poverty. Table 5.19 shows the

<sup>11</sup>The two earlier phases did not involve HOPE VI funding. Funding came from other HUD and state sources.

<sup>12</sup> Unsubsidized Units sold to households earning 80 to 120 percent of median income.

unit mix before and after HOPE VI. By the end of 2009, 57 units in Phase V and 48 in Phase VII were completed and occupied.

**Table 5.19** Pre-HOPE VI and Proposed HOPE VI Housing Mix Roosevelt Manor Site

Bedrooms	Original Units	HOPE VI Units (onsite & offsite)				Total units
		Public Housing	Owner-occupied	Tax Credit	Seniors	
1-Bedroom	0	39	0	16	110	165
2-Bedroom	67	127	0	81	20	228
3-Bedroom	161	94	94	57	0	245
4-Bedroom	40	20	8	2	0	30
<b>Total</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>156</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>668</b>

*Sources:* Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI CSS Plan (12/2004) & Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI 2003 Application

### 5.3.3 Site Improvements

The entire site was reconfigured to reduce density, to construct new streets, and to build homeownership housing and public housing. The site was reconfigured deliberately to remove the superblock layout and to create a compact urban neighborhood complete with small city blocks and a street pattern that ties the development directly to the wider neighborhood. The 86 owner-occupied housing units, named Carl Miller Homes, are being constructed on 4.5 acres set aside in the middle of the property bordering Ferry Avenue and Carl Miller Boulevard. The public and tax credit rental housing occupies the remaining 10.5 acres north and south of the owner-occupied houses. This arrangement separates the homeownership units from the rental units even though HOPE VI requires the low-income units to be dispersed. It is not clear why the HACC proposed clustering the units but one strong possibility is that it was done to make the homeownership units more attractive to potential purchasers. The homeownership units are less attractive to prospective buyers when they are integrated with public housing units. At several HOPE VI sites visited, most of the owner-occupied units are separated from the rental units.

A new street system connects directly to neighborhood streets surrounding the development. The streets are also finished with sidewalks, curb walls, and crosswalks. On-street

parking allows residents to monitor their vehicles parked in front of their homes. In addition, Defensible Space measures make clear separations between public and private spaces. In addition, all houses face the street, and have individual private entrances defined by a street number. Site infrastructure work includes improvements to sewer and water systems.

Site amenities include a new 8,000 square foot multi-purpose community building (Figure 5.23), tot lot, and parking spaces. The multipurpose building has a small health center, a daycare center, a Neighborhood Network Computer Center, management office, and a multi-activity room. Neighborhood redevelopment already undertaken or to be undertaken includes a new community school and library (already constructed near the site before redevelopment commenced), renovating the Isabel Miller community center on Carl Miller Boulevard, Stanley Park, Elijah Park, and Johnson Park between Roosevelt Manor and Branch Village.

#### **5.3.4 Unit Design Today**

The physical plan seeks to transform the site by building semi-detached single-family houses and townhomes architecturally styled to reflect the neighborhood character. The redevelopment plan indicates that units are to be two-story semi-detached, two-story triples, quads, and townhouses in one-bedroom, two-bedroom, three-bedroom, and four-bedroom configurations. The floor plans for the 86-unit Miller Homes development include detached and semi-detached three-bedroom and four-bedroom units only. Unit designs reflect architectural themes from private housing in adjoining neighborhoods (HACC 2003a). In terms of size, the one-bedroom units range from 650 to 800 square feet, two bedroom units should range from 1,007 to 1,250 square feet, and three bedroom units should range from 1,300 to 1,342 square feet. The sizes for the 4-bedroom units were not disclosed. All units have front porches, semi-private front and backyards. Front porches facilitate social interaction among residents. Figures 5.23 and 5.24 show two models of row houses. The buildings in Figure 5.23 have prominent roof overhangs and units have prominent front yards. In Figure 5.24, roofs are simpler with no overhang and front yards are smaller.



Unlike the original development, the buildings and units are not uniform in design. However, to avoid the public housing stigma, public housing, tax credits housing, and homeownership housing have similar designs to make them indistinguishable from the outside. On the inside, the redevelopment plan outlined energy efficient heating and air conditioning systems, laundry connections, telephone and cable wiring for all units. Kitchens are to have energy efficient electric ranges, refrigerators, and dishwashers; bedrooms are to be carpeted; and bathrooms have tiled floors and mini blinds (HACC 2009). At the end of 2009, 57 public housing units were completed and occupied in Phase V and 48 in Phase VII.



**Figure 5.21** Multi-purpose Community Center building at Roosevelt Manor.



**Figure 5.22** Antioch Manor. Seniors housing facility by Antioch Baptist Church situated next to Roosevelt Manor.



**Figure 5.23** Town-house Units at Roosevelt Manor.



**Figure 5.24** A Six-family Rental Building at Roosevelt Manor.

#### 5.4 Defensible Space and New Urbanism at HOPE VI Sites

As the preferred design philosophies in HOPE VI, Defensible Space and New Urbanism principles are evident at all sites. A 1996 signed agreement between HUD and the Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU) formalized New Urbanism's role as the preferred site design paradigm in HOPE VI, while Defensible Space is used primarily to promote safety. HOPE VI developers redesigned and reconfigured each distressed development using New Urbanism and Defensible Space guidelines. The redeveloped sites do not occupy superblocks, densities are lower, internal street networks connect directly to local streets, public and private areas are well-defined, and all dwelling units face streets. Shared spaces include backyards and but every unit has a unique street number address. These changes helped to improve the attractiveness of the sites. Table 5.20 summarizes the main Defensible Space features used.

**Table 5.20** Defensible Space Features at Camden's HOPE VI Developments

<b>Development</b>	<b>Public &amp; Private Space defined</b>	<b>Units Face Streets</b>	<b>Private Entrance</b>	<b>Street # Address</b>
McGuire Gardens	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baldwin's Run	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Roosevelt Manor	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Source:* Site Observation

There are three types of single-family houses: detached, semi-detached, and row houses (Newman 1980). In single-family homes, there is no shared interior space between units and the grounds around the units are assigned to the individual units. Based on site observations and the site plans reviewed, all three sites have single-family units only. Public housing units share backyard space with bordering units but the owner-occupied units have private backyards. Perimeter fences around the shared backyards restrict access to outsiders and give residents access through the rear door of each unit.

Site observations and interviews with householders at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run indicate that householders had very limited use and almost no control of the spaces outside their dwellings. Management rules limit how residents use those spaces and the kinds of activities permitted. Because of the restrictions, several householders expressed indifference towards the developments. McGuire Gardens' manager said the restrictions were implemented to avoid ruining the appearance of the site. However, at Baldwin's Run the restrictions apply only to public housing residents. Each site has maintenance workers who maintain the grounds and do repairs. My conclusion is that the physical evidence of Defensible Space design exists but residents have no control of the space around their dwellings, which contradicts the basic tenets of Defensible Space: that residents, not management, control the outdoor space near their dwellings. Defensible Space is not only about erecting physical or symbolic barriers; it is also about defining the outdoor space and assigning responsibilities to residents however. Defensible Space seeks to protect developments by increasing residents' involvement in caring for and protecting their surroundings, to bring all residents into the social mainstream, and to give them a measure of respect of property rights by assigning them their own spaces (Newman 1996).

New Urbanism emphasizes traditional neighborhood forms such as mixed-use, walkability, public transit, diversity, houses with front porches that face streets, interconnected streets, separation of public and private spaces, and minimum sharing of space such as entrances to dwellings (Bohls 2000, Holin, et al. 2003, Congress for the New Urbanism 2010). Each development exhibits aspects of New Urbanism.

*Walkability* emphasizes pedestrian-friendly street design such as placing buildings close to and facing streets, and placement of porches, windows and doors to face streets, not each other. Walkability includes provision of on-street parking and attractively landscaped streetscapes to encourage walking. The three developments achieved some level of walkability through on-street parking, positioning of housing units close to and facing streets; prominent front porches, and doors and windows positioned to give residents adequate surveillance of their surroundings.

*Connectivity* refers to internal street networks to disperse traffic, facilitate walkability, and tie the development to the locality. Each development should have its own internal street system that matches the local street system. Walkability is limited because residents and vehicles battle for road access. At McGuire Gardens and at Baldwin's Run, competition for road access caused several tenants to express big concerns about speeding cars and motorbikes.

Diversity emphasizes a broad range of housing types, prices, and sizes to bring people from diverse social and economic backgrounds into regular contact to establish and strengthen personal and civic bonds. This principle applies most to Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor because they have diverse housing types (public and non-public) and facilitate a broader range of household incomes. Being public housing only, McGuire Gardens does not provide as much diversity as the two mixed-income sites. Still, within the 80 percent of AMI income limitation, site management achieved some level of income diversity by allocating units to households in different income bands. This helps to avoid poverty reconcentrating in the development. The two mixed-income developments provide housing for households from a more diverse range of economic backgrounds than the public housing only development.

New Urbanism emphasizes increased density to improve resource usage but the opposite occurred at all three sites even though the original densities were not high to begin with. In the case of Baldwin's Run, the original density was 20 units per acre but it is now eight units per acre. This is an example of expediency at work. This strategy is to attract higher income families to this inner-city housing development.

Overall, site and housing designs reflect strong efforts to incorporate architecture from the surrounding area. In this regard, the mixed-income developments achieved better results than the renovated site because modifications to existing structures were not required. Site observations indicate that the houses at Baldwin's Run, along the lower half of 32 Street, strongly resemble some of the housing styles in the adjacent community. Interestingly, the part of 32<sup>nd</sup> Street has only owner-occupied houses. One has to look elsewhere in the Dudley-Rosedale-

Marlton area to find most of the models at the opposite side of the development where most of the public housing units are located. In Centerville, where multifamily rental housing dominates, most of the few private houses in existence are of two-story townhouse designs with pitched roofs and covered front porches. Some of the new houses at Roosevelt Manor adopted this style while others were modeled from housing design in adjoining neighborhoods.

## 5.5 Summary

Redevelopment changed the physical environment dramatically at all sites but the changes were more dramatic at the two developments with both homeownership and public housing units. One is the was the former Westfield Acres site, where a 197-unit development consisting of detached, semi-detached, and attached single-family rental and homeownership houses and a 74-unit property for seniors replace 18 apartment blocks and 514 units. The of site is Roosevelt Manor where two and three-story single family houses are being built replace the previous 38 two-story barracks-like buildings. The redeveloped sites have fewer total units and ewer public housing units than before. As Table 5.21 shows, there is a 396-unit reduction in total units, a net loss of 415 public housing units but addition of 205 owner-occupied units.

The reopening of neighborhood streets through the developments makes each site appear to be a part of the neighborhood rather than isolated, which achieves a fundamental HOPE VI goal. Advocates argued that blocking neighborhood streets isolated the sites from their surroundings and encouraged crime and other anti-social behaviors within the developments. The most important outcome however is that large majorities of residents at both the rehabilitated site and the one new site expressed satisfaction with the site and housing improvements.

**Table 5.21** Housing Units Before and After HOPE VI changes onsite

<b>HOPE VI Development</b>	<b>Units Before</b>	<b>Units After</b>	<b>Onsite Public Housing</b>	<b>Offsite Public Housing</b>	<b>LIHTC Units</b>	<b>Private Units</b>
McGuire Gardens	368	253	253	0	0	0
Baldwin's Run	514	*271	78	50	53	119
Roosevelt Manor	268	230	105	175	39	86
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,150</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>205</b>

*Sources:* Westfield Acres 2000 and Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Redevelopment Plans and McGuire Gardens property manager office (no date)

\*Includes 197 family units and 74 senior apartments

<sup>1</sup> 74 elderly units are a mix of LIHTC and public housing

## CHAPTER 6

### POVERTY DECONCENTRATION

A key HOPE VI goal is to deconcentrate poverty at severely distressed public housing sites (Stegman Summer 2002). In this study, pre- and post-HOPE VI poverty characteristics data for each are examined. The HACC used four strategies to deconcentrate poverty: relocation, income mixing, strict re-entry criteria, and provision of self-sufficiency services to increase employment and income and reduce dependence. Like other HAs, the HACC uses its new power to set strict tenant policies to limit the return of very poor original tenants to redeveloped sites to reduce poverty, even when they wanted to return. This practice is common at HOPE VI developments (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). The analysis is limited to public housing tenants, not homeowners, and uses the income categories shown in Table 6.1. This analysis uses dependence on public assistance and income levels to assess poverty deconcentration. The percentage of households that received public assistance is a poverty indicator (Boston 2005). Reductions in public assistance may indicate increased income from other sources because public assistance receipts depend on income from other sources such as employment. However, decreases in welfare do not necessarily mean that income from other sources increased. Several other factors can cause welfare benefits to decrease. There is a five-year lifetime limit on receiving welfare benefits at which time recipients get less welfare benefits.

**Table 6.1** Camden County Area Median Income and Income Limits, 1996, 1999 & 2008

Year	AMI	Income Category			
		30% of AMI	50% of AMI	80% of AMI	> 80% of AMI
		Extremely low income (ELI)	Very low income (VLI)	Low income (LI)	Above low income (ALI)
1996	\$49,300	\$14,799	\$24,650	\$39,440	\$39,441+
1999	\$63,800	\$19,140	\$31,900	\$51,040	\$51,041+
2008	\$74,300	\$22,290	\$37,150	\$59,440	\$59,440+

Source: HUD's Resident Characteristics Reports; HUD website<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>[http://www.novoco.com/low\\_income\\_housing/facts\\_figures/income\\_limits.php](http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/facts_figures/income_limits.php), (HUD PIC 2010)

## 6.1 McGuire Gardens

### 6.1.1 Redevelopment Strategies

By the early 1990s, McGuire Gardens was known for being physically distressed, a haven for criminal activities, and many very poor, welfare-dependent families (Holin, et al. 2003). Most residents were African-American, including a large proportion of Hispanics.

As one of the first 13 HOPE VI grantees, redevelopment involved rehabilitation, demolition, and new construction. Rehabilitation minimized the need to relocate residents and the costs and disruptions associated with relocation. Seventy two households received housing vouchers to relocate to private housing, some moved to other HACC properties, but some remained onsite and the HA evicted so-called “problems tenants” (details were not provided). Physical redevelopment took place in two phases to facilitate onsite relocation. Upon completion of Phase 1, residents moved into the completed units to facilitate completion of Phase 2.

Conversations with the social worker and site manager revealed that in 2007 and 2008, most of the tenants were not original residents but first time public housing residents. Stricter re-occupancy rules kept many former residents out because they did not satisfy the new requirements. A 2003 Urban Institute study noted that the stringent re-entry rules were relaxed at first compared to some other HOPE VI sites (Holin, et al. 2003). Relaxing the rules might have allowed many original residents to return at first but some appeared to have moved out later. The householder survey done in this study also indicated that first time public housing tenants were the majority of residents in 2008. In fact, new tenants were twice the number of returnees (22 to 10) in the study.

HACC HOPE VI officials divulged very little information about the relocation and reoccupancy process, so the impact of the new rules on the initial return rate could not be determined. Interviews, anecdotes and comments by residents and staff familiar with the development provided valuable insights however. The admission policies manual that the site



manager provided set out very strict admission rules but these new rules might have been developed and put in place after the initial re-occupancy. The new re-occupancy rules require applicants to undergo credit and criminal history screening, rent payment verification, utility verification, employer proof of income, and home inspections, in addition to other previous requirements. Failure to satisfy any one of these requirements can disqualify an applicant.

Like rehabilitated developments in other cities, this development retains its public housing status after redevelopment (Holin, et al. 2003). The HOPE VI Coordinator said the HA uses a form of income targeting to broaden the range of household incomes and to avoid reconcentrating poverty in the development. Income targeting is a requirement under the QHWRA as well. The QHWRA requires HAs to maintain HUD specified income targets for new residents and the entire development. In practice, the HACC gives preference to applicants who have job. The income mix that HUD requires for this development was not revealed, but HUD generally requires 40 percent of new residents to have incomes in the “extremely low income category”. To achieve the income diversity that the QHWRA requires, the HA prioritizes applicants based on their income. Per HUD requirements, public housing units are rented to households with incomes of up to 80 percent of the median income and 40 percent of the units must be allocated to households with extremely low incomes (HACC 2009). In HOPE VI developments, households with the best income potential usually get priority.

Results from the household survey show a small clustering of higher-income tenants along one street and a preponderance of original tenants along another street in the development. The findings show a clustering of original tenants on Jones Street, which may have resulted from the phased redevelopment and onsite relocation. While the proportion of returnees to the development is not known, the profile of returnees who participated in the household survey and informal discussion with the onsite social workers indicate that returnees are generally older than new residents. In addition, most returnees who participated in the survey were retired or have a disability of some kind, and they depend heavily on government economic assistance programs.

### 6.1.2 Impact on Residents: Changes in Poverty Indicators

Survey results indicate that in “current dollar”<sup>14</sup> value, household income was higher than before redevelopment. In the householder survey, the average household income among participants was \$13,145 in 2008 (\$13,884 in the Resident Characteristics Report for September 30, 2008). In comparison, the average household income of approximately \$9,135 in the development before it was redeveloped was 44 percent lower than that of survey participants and 52 percent lower than the Resident Characteristics Report shows. Returnees reported 38 percent higher average household income while new tenants reported approximately a 21 percent higher average household income. One original two-adult household whose reported annual household income exceeded \$40,000 had a large positive effect on the overall average household income, but especially for returnees. Only eight of the 10 original householders interviewed reported household incomes and no other household reported income above \$25,000. Without this outlier, income distribution remains consistent between returnees and new tenants.

**6.1.2.1 Income and Poverty Levels.** Table 6.2 shows household income distribution in the Resident Characteristics Report. For comparison, the year 1996 is used because the site was still occupied then and that was the year for which reliable data was obtained. At that time, 81 percent of households had annual incomes of \$15,000 or less and 19 percent had between \$15,000 and \$25,000. None had more than \$25,000 annual income. With an AMI of \$49,300 in 1996 dollars, these figures indicate that close to 100 percent of residents had very low incomes, meaning they earn less than 50 percent of AMI and close to 81 percent of them had extremely low incomes (below 30 percent of AMI).

In the household survey, 70 percent of participants reported annual household incomes of \$15,000 or less and 26 percent reported household incomes between \$15,000 and \$25,000. Three percent reported household income exceeding \$25,000. Fifty percent of returnees and 77 percent

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<sup>14</sup>At current dollar values, inflation, time value of money, and purchasing power are not considered.

of the new tenants reported annual incomes of \$15,000 or less and nearly 38 percent of returnees and 23 percent of new tenants reported incomes between \$15,000 and \$25,000. Thirteen percent of returnees reported annual incomes above \$25,000 but no new householder did so. The Resident Characteristics Report also shows marked differences in income from the pre-HOPE VI levels. Approximately 63 percent had \$15,000 or less in income, 24 percent had between \$15,000 and \$25,000, and 14 percent had over \$25,000 in annual income. The RCR figures are somewhat similar to the survey results. The median income (AMI) for the Camden Metropolitan Area in 2008 was \$74,300 (HUD 2008). Comparing these results to the poverty estimates in Table 6.1 indicate that about 83 percent of survey participants had “extremely low incomes” compared to 81 before; 10 percent had “very low incomes” compared to 19 percent before; and seven percent had “low incomes” compared to none before. The comparative figures in the Resident Characteristics Report are approximately 75 percent, 22 percent, and 4 percent respectively.

**Table 6.2** 2008 Household Income Levels at McGuire Gardens

<b>Household Income Category</b>	<b>Households</b>	<b>Extremely Low Income</b>	<b>Very Low Income</b>	<b>Low Income</b>	<b>Above Low Income</b>
Household Survey	30	83	17	0	0
Resident Characteristics Report	236	75	22	04	0

*Sources:* McGuire Gardens Resident Characteristics Report at September 30, 2008

Further analysis indicates that about 75 percent of returnees and 86 percent of new tenants had “extremely low incomes” and 14 percent of returnees and 26 percent of new tenants had “very low incomes”. Clearly, then, despite the higher nominal incomes in 2008, poverty levels remain very high since at least 75 percent of the households had “extremely low incomes” of less than 30 percent of AMI.

**Table 6.3** Poverty Levels by Household Income at McGuire Gardens in 2007-2008

Data Source		n	Extremely Low Income	Very Low Income	Low Income	Above Low Income
Household Survey	All Participants	30	83	17	-	-
	Returnees	8	75	26	-	-
	New Households	22	86	14	-	-
						-

McGuire Gardens household survey

**6.1.2.2 Dependence on Public Assistance.** Research shows that high-poverty households have low levels of earned income and high levels of public assistance. The household survey and the RCR show that the largest source of income for public housing residents was public assistance, including welfare. Most households obtained some form of public assistance, other than housing, in 2007-2008. Approximately 60 percent of the 34 survey participants received Social Security and TANF/welfare benefits (64 percent in the Resident Characteristics Report including 43 percent in social security and pension and 21 percent in welfare), 42 percent received earned income, and 32 percent received income from other sources such as alimony and child support. Municipal and state assistance are not included, so in reality, more than 64 percent likely received some form of public benefit. Before redevelopment, 59 percent of residents received welfare benefits and only 15 percent had earned income as their main source of income. Welfare dependency appeared to have decreased substantially as the RCR shows but this may have to do with changes in welfare policy implemented after 1996 that limit welfare benefits to five years rather than to HOPE VI. Overall, there appears to be little change in dependence on government support. The relative share of income from each source changed but not the overall level of dependence. To be certain, more research is needed to fill the gaps in the data.

Before site redevelopment began in 1999, about 22 percent of the residents in Block Group 4 of Census Tract 6013, which includes McGuire Gardens, reported income from employment as their main income (Census 2000) compared to 15 percent at McGuire Gardens in 1996 (HUD 1996). In comparison, among survey participants, 32 percent (42% in the RCR for

September 2008) said earned income was their main income in 2007/2008. This suggests that a larger proportion of residents had jobs and earned more in 2008 than in 1996.

The specific deconcentration goals for this development are unclear but the findings show that five years after redevelopment, despite higher rates of employment and higher earnings, unemployment remains problematic, the average household income remains very low, and a high proportion of the residents still depends heavily on government aid programs even though most current residents are new tenants, not returnees. This being the case, can we say that concentrated poverty no longer exists in this development? There are indications of lower levels of poverty in the development but given the paucity of baseline information, it is not feasible to make that conclusion. The social workers onsite advised that it was difficult to find householders because many of them were at work. The survey results probably do not give an accurate representation of the employment or poverty situation because of sampling limitations, but the Resident Characteristics Report does not have that limitation since it covers almost every household in the development. Nevertheless, study survey results compare favorably with the RCR results. It is therefore fair to say extreme poverty remains a problem at this development in 2008.

### **6.1.3 Householders' Perceptions of Changes**

To gauge residents' views, householders were asked several questions about their impressions of the new development. Although McGuire Gardens has no owner-occupied housing, residents were asked about mixing public housing and owner-occupied (private) housing together, as done at nearby Baldwin's Run. Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show the results. Most householders said they were aware that Baldwin's Run had homeownership housing and thought that it was a good idea. About 68 percent of them agreed with the assertion that mixing households with different levels of income in the same development would improve the quality of life in a subsidized housing development. However, nearly 18 percent disagreed. New householders appeared to be much more sanguine about it than returnees because 75 percent of them agreed compared to 50 percent

of returnees. Approximately 68 percent of householders who said mixing owner-occupied and public housing would improve the quality of life in HOPE VI developments also said the presence of homeowners would motivate renters to achieve more for themselves on their own. A few residents also said it would motivate them to aspire to owning their own home as well. Most others said income mixing was the right thing to do because communities and people should not be separated based on income.

**Table 6.4** Householder Support for Mixed-Tenure Housing

Response	Households		
	ALL (n=34)	Original (n=10)	New (n=24)
Strongly Agree	56	40	54
Somewhat Agree	12	10	21
Strongly Disagree	18	40	15
Incomplete	6	10	4
Don't Know	9	0	8

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey

The householders who disagreed were emphatic in their opposition. They noted that there was no shortage of housing for wealthier families but this was not so for low-income people and so there was no need for homeownership housing. They also stated that owner-occupied housing would reduce the number of housing units available to lower income people. Several of them expressed concern that in mixed-tenure developments, homeowners may want to “show-off”.

When asked about the public and private housing mix they preferred, 50 percent of respondents said they should be mixed equally, 24 percent said all units should be public housing, and 15 percent said there should be more public housing units than private units. Nearly 50 percent of returnees said “public housing only” or “more public housing than private units” but only 33 percent of new tenants agreed. In addition, while 40 percent of returnees said they preferred an equal number of public and private housing units, more than 50 percent of new tenants did so. Overall, new tenants showed a greater preference for mixing public and owner-occupied housing than did returnees.

**Table 6.5** Householders' Preferred Mix of Public and Private Housing

<b>Responses</b>	<b>All (n=32)</b>	<b>Original (n=23)</b>	<b>New (n=8)</b>
Public Housing Only	24	30	21
Equally	50	40	54
More Public Housing	15	20	13
Don't Know	6	0	8
Incomplete	6	10	4

*Source:* McGuire Gardens Household Survey

## 6.2 Baldwin's Run

Demolishing Westfield Acres apartments removed about 433 poor families from the site, which automatically eliminated concentrated poverty from the site and reduced poverty in the neighborhood. At its peak, Westfield Acres had about 1,800 residents but when HUD awarded the HOPE VI grant in 2003 about 1,100 residents. Unlike McGuire Gardens where some residents remained onsite during redevelopment, all Westfield Acres residents were relocated offsite to facilitate redevelopment but the procedures used to deconcentrate poverty were the same. The existing residents had the option of moving to another public housing development or accepting vouchers to rent housing in the private market. Some residents were relocated to McGuire Gardens and Ablett Village developments but the majority accepted vouchers to relocate to private housing.

### 6.2.1 Redevelopment Goals and Strategies

Details of the actual relocation were not provided but the redevelopment plan indicates that the housing authority had planned to move 161 households to other public housing developments in the city and allocate housing vouchers to 208 households. Since the goal was to eliminate concentrated poverty at the housing site, the housing authority only needed to relocate the residents and demolish the buildings to accomplish that goal. However, the HA built new rental and homeownership units on the site. Constructing both rental housing and owner-occupied

housing was a part of the plan to avoid reconcentrating poverty in the new development. This is unlike the strategy used at McGuire Gardens, where all units remain public housing after redevelopment. The difference is in the financing arrangements. This project used mixed financing, which began in 1996, two years after the 1994 award to McGuire Gardens where HOPE VI funded the entire redevelopment.

To satisfy the requirements of the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, public housing units are allocated based on income. To do so, the HA grouped applicants' household incomes according to HUD's income limits as follows: less than 30 percent of AMI, 30 to 50 percent of AMI, 50 to 80 percent of AMI, and greater than 80 percent of AMI (Valentine 2008). For each income category, a fixed percentage of units are for households with incomes in that category. Figure 6.1 shows 197 total units, 119 private units, and 78 public units at a ratio of almost 60 to 40. HUD requires new developments to maintain a minimum of 40 percent public housing units. At Baldwin's Run, these figures represent reductions of 61 percent in total units and 85 percent in public housing units from 514 public units. Household incomes from 80 to 120 percent of median qualify for private housing, and those earning up to 80 percent of median income qualify for public housing. The initial redevelopment plan projected a 32 percent return rate after redevelopment (HACC 2000) but the actual number that returned was not ascertained.


Additionally, very strict re-entry criteria requiring returnees to meet standards of personal conduct, credit worthiness and employment standards act as a barrier to the redeveloped sites for the lowest income families. HUD notes that relocated residents "in good standing" have the opportunity to move to new housing units when they are available. The new HACC rules require returnees to complete new applications and satisfy stringent and intrusive income and credit verification; criminal history, employment history, and rental history checks; home inspections, and references (HACC 2005). These requirements keep low-income households out because they are not realistic for low-income households who generally do not have good credit and many who do not have jobs and have not had meaningful employment for long periods. Intended or not, the



requirements are a deterrent to some residents returning. Some end up moving to other public housing developments. The housing authority also said returning residents would get first preference for the 78 public housing units, yet the new requirements effectively ruled many of them out. The housing authority can easily use the new rules to deny HOPE VI housing to lower income original tenants who have irregular rent payment histories. In fact, the 2000 CSS plan indicates a preference for employed applicants with reliable incomes. The new procedures effectively eliminated some householders who wanted to return. Additionally, the HACC plan was for a return rate of 32 percent of original residents after redevelopment. The more restrictive re-entry criteria came about primarily because of the profit-making desire of private redevelopment partners, particularly mortgage lenders, for the public housing component of the HOPE VI project to be self-supporting (Freeman 1998).

## **6.2.2 Impact on Residents: Changes in Poverty Indicators**

**6.2.2.1 Income and Poverty Levels.** In the survey of 23 residents, the average household income was higher than before redevelopment. This does not necessarily mean that returnees have higher incomes. Based on the self-reported annual household incomes, the average household income for survey participants was approximately \$12,386. Based on a sample of 68 public housing households, the average annual household income in the RCR for June 30, 2007 to September 30, 2008 was \$16,431. In Table 6.6, which shows pre-redevelopment income, 90 percent of householders reported \$15,000 or less in annual income. In the household survey, 55 percent of householders reported \$15,000 or less in annual income and 46 percent reported more than \$15,000 in annual income in 2007/2008. The household survey figures show significant improvements in income distribution over pre-HOPE VI household income because current residents have somewhat higher incomes.



**Figure 6.1** The main sources of income reported by Baldwin's Run public housing tenants for 2007 to 2008 based on a sample of 23 householders.

The household survey and RCR data suggest that the percentage of households with earned income declined among public housing tenants. In the 2000 site revitalization plan, the HACC reported that 37 percent of the households had earned income but in the household survey, 30 percent of participants reported earned income for 2007/2008 (36 percent the RCR) (Figure 6.1). Based on these results, the poverty deconcentration measures do not appear to have had the anticipated impact. The evidence from the household survey and Resident Characteristics Report suggests no improvement because poverty among first time public housing householders appears to be marginally worse than that for the pre-HOPE VI householders. The new tenants appear to be just as poor as the original tenants, even the federal government implemented the HOPE VI program to improve living conditions for existing residents. Given these findings, the evidence suggest that at Baldwin's Run, homeowners and first time public housing tenants are preferred to original tenants who suffered through the years of distress.

**Table 6.6** Household Incomes for Westfield Acres and Baldwin's Run

<b>Household Income</b>	<b>Westfield Acres (n=581)</b>	<b>2008 Survey (n=23)</b>	<b>RCR 9/2008 (n=68)</b>
\$0	2	0	1
\$0 - \$5,000	28	32	3
\$5,001 - \$10,000	46	18	26
\$10,001 - \$15,000	15	5	22
\$15,001 - \$20,000	7	23	16
\$20,001 - \$25,000	3	23	12
Above \$25,000	1	0	19

*Source:* Westfield Acres 2003 Revitalization Plan, Resident Characteristics Report at September 30, 2008, and Baldwin's Run Household Survey

Note: Due to rounding, totals may not all equal 100 percent.

Regarding changes in poverty levels, analysis of household income data shows that the proportion of households reporting extremely low annual incomes of \$15,000 or less declined from nearly 90 percent before redevelopment to 50 percent and the proportion of households who reported annual incomes above \$15,000 increased from only 10 percent before redevelopment to 50 after redevelopment. Overall, 69 percent of the public housing tenants had “extremely low incomes,” while 25 percent had “very low incomes”, four percent had “low incomes”. Only two percent of households reported annual incomes above the low income mark of 80 percent of median income (Table 6.7). These are big improvements in income distribution from the pre-HOPE VI era but they are still very low incomes and therefore insufficient to lift tenants out of extreme poverty.

**Table 6.7** Poverty Levels for Public Housing Households at Baldwin's Run in 2007-2008

<b>Poverty Level</b>	<b>Household Survey</b>			<b>RCR (9/2008) (n=68)</b>
	<b>All (n=23)</b>	<b>Returnees (n=7)</b>	<b>New Households (n=16)</b>	
Below 30% of Median (extremely low income)	74	86	69	69
Below 50% of Median (very low income)	22	14	25	25
Below 80% of Median (low income)	0	0	0	4
Above 80% Median (above low income)	0	0	0	1
Data Unavailable	4	0	6	0

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey and Resident Characteristics Report for 9/2008

**6.2.2.2 Dependence on Public Assistance.** Overall, results from the household survey and the Resident Characteristics Report indicate that despite having higher average incomes than pre-HOPE VI households have, public housing households in this HOPE VI development remain heavily dependent on government economic assistance. About 65 percent said they received public assistance in 2007-2008, including 70 percent of returnees and 64 percent of new households. This 65 percent includes half of the new householders who had jobs but it does not include the two employed returnees. The presence of large numbers of households with disabled and elderly members who received public assistance such as disability income, childcare assistance, social security, and pension helps to explain these outcomes. Given that 50 percent of the new tenants in the household survey who were employed also received public assistance suggests that they earn very low salaries and wages. The RCR, which covers 95 percent of the households, showed a similarly high 65 percentage that received public assistance during the 15 month period ending September 30, 2008, as the study survey. Compared to the 56 percent of pre-HOPE VI tenants who depended on public assistance, HOPE VI public housing tenants appeared to be more reliant on public assistance in 2007-2008 than 1996 public housing tenants did. One of the self-sufficiency goals is to reduce dependence on public aid programs but that goal appeared to have missed in 2007-2008.

### **6.2.3 Householders' Perceptions of Changes**

Survey participants were asked to assess the poverty deconcentration measures implemented. Most agreed with the HOPE VI view that having public housing tenants and homeowners in the same development improves the quality of life in the development (Table 6.8). About 61 percent agreed (44 percent strongly agreed and 17 percent agree) whereas 31 percent disagreed (22 percent strongly disagree and nine percent disagree). A slightly higher percentage of new householders to returnees (63 percent) to 57 percent of returnees agreed but a bigger percentage

of returnees (43 percent to 25 percent of new householders) disagreed. Although the majority agreed, it was not a large majority.

**Table 6.8** Income Mixing Improves Quality of Life: Householders Views

<b>Response</b>	<b>ALL (n=23)</b>	<b>Original (n=7)</b>	<b>New (n=16)</b>
Strongly Agree	44	43	44
Somewhat Agree	17	14	19
Neither Agree nor Disagree	4	0	6
Somewhat Disagree	9	14	6
Strongly Disagree	22	27	19
Don't Know	4	0	6

*Source:* HOPE VI study Household Survey

During the interviews, some new residents appeared reluctant to disagree with the proposition but returnees were more emphatic in their disagreement. Most tenants who disagreed said they did so because there was a greater need for low-income housing than for middle-income housing. Some of them said they feared that income mixing would give homeowners the opportunity to “show off” or boast. In a June 2008 interview, a female householder who said she strongly disagreed with the proposition also said she believed income mixing would help renters make good decisions such as wanting to buy a house in the development. Although the majority of interviewees said income mixing would improve the quality of life in the development, many of them expressed concern that the existing income mixing arrangement did not benefit public housing tenants much because homeowners received preferential treatment from the private management firm and the housing authority. One householder said, “mixing is ok if every household has the same privileges but here at Baldwin’s Run, homeowners have more privileges than renters”. Another new tenant agreed, saying:

Homeowners get to do whatever they want, plus they have screen doors and so when people come here they can tell which ones are private and which ones are public. They make it seem like they are better than us public housing people. Yes, it would help to

keep the place but because they can have stuff and we can't, it cause separation, and people (visitors) question about the difference.

Concurring with the above comments, a Westfield Acres returnee said:

Mixing takes away the stigma of public housing as ghetto and for the poor. It makes people feel better about themselves and their surroundings, but the differences between private and public housing homes are obvious, which defeats the purpose of HOPE VI.

When asked about to state the public/private housing mix they preferred, 65 percent of respondents said they preferred an equal mix but 22 percent said all units should be public housing. Nearly 71 percent of returnees and 63 percent of new tenants wanted an equal number of public housing and private units but 14 percent of returnees and 25 percent of new tenants wanted all units to be public housing in the development. These differences may not be statistically significant but they show differences between returnees' and new tenants' perceptions of the income mixing and mixed-tenure arrangements. The results suggest that public housing householders support income mixing but they were ambivalent about it due to the lack of good quality low-income housing in the neighborhood. Given the small sample size however, these results are only indicative.

**Table 6.9** Baldwin's Run Householders Preferred Housing Mix

<b>Response</b>	<b>ALL (n=23)</b>	<b>Returnees (n=7)</b>	<b>New (n=16)</b>
Public Housing Only	22	14	25
Equally	65	71	63
More Public Housing	9	14	6
Don't Know	4	0	6

*Source:* Baldwin's Run 2007-2008 Household Survey

Mixed-income housing proponents are of the view the construction of mixed-income housing developments as necessary to eliminate concentrated poverty and to get lower-income people to learn acceptable middle class values regarding work, family, and education (Brophy and Smith 1997, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997, Smith 2002). For that to happen however, middle- and low- income residents need to interact with each other. To test this idea, survey participants were asked about their relationship with their neighbors. The responses show very limited interaction between public housing residents and homeowners but several close relationships among tenants. Two householders said they knew and communicate with homeowners but did not learn anything from them. Most others said they communicate regularly with other public housing tenants. Householders believed that homeowners received preferential treatment and that it was a source of tension between homeowners and tenants, which contrast with the friendly relations observed between tenants while conducting interviews. Some even stop by to say “hello”.

Several tenants described their relationship with neighbors as “good” but when questioned further, they described good to mean saying “hello”. Some residents said it meant the absence of conflict and being polite to one another. A few householders said they were too busy to maintain friendly relations with neighbors. Overall, the survey showed no evidence of values transferring from homeowners to tenants that would benefit them.

In interviews, several householders said their new housing environment had impacted their lives positively because their families were happier than before. Some householders said that their children were a lot happier and that there were fewer sibling conflicts. Householders with disabled/handicapped family members said they were very pleased to live in units that were “handicap accessible” because they no longer climb stairs to get to their apartments.

## 6.3 Roosevelt Manor

### 6.3.1 Redevelopment Goals and Strategies

The HOPE VI plan outlined the following poverty deconcentration goals for this project:

- 1) reduce the percentage of “very low-income” households to 34 percent or less,
- 2) having at least 58 percent of households with earned income as primary income,
- 3) reduce to 34 percent or less the number of households with annual incomes of less than 50 percent of AMI,
- 4) fewer than 11 percent of households having TANF as primary income, and
- 5) reduce the share of households whose main income source is “other than wages and TANF” (HACC 2003a).

Poverty deconcentration strategies included relocation, demolition, and income mixing and very strict re-entry criteria. Owner-occupied housing and LIHTC housing are mixed with public housing to create a mixed-income development. The 2005 CSS plan outlined the criteria to obtain HOPE VI housing. To be considered for HOPE VI housing, HACC requires original residents to submit new applications and undergo a rigorous assessment. The assessment includes credit, employment, and criminal history checks; employment and income verification; rent payment history and home inspections. New tenants must also pass utility verification checks. All household members age 17 and over must undergo criminal history background checks, which must show no record of criminal activity that the HA deems threatening to the development. Applicants must show continuous employment for six consecutive months or demonstrate at least one year participation in a CSS program and actively seeking employment. Returning residents may not have housekeeping deficiencies for the past nine months. Some of these requirements are unrealistic for some public housing residents but they are effective in keeping “undesirable” tenants out of the new development. The HACC might not have intended the rules to be a poverty deconcentration tool but that is the effect. The new rules effectively eliminate some households on economic terms because they are just too poor to have good credit and other requirements.



The April 2005 revised Community and Support Services plan noted that the 166 original households would receive housing vouchers to rent a private market house or apartment or relocated to other developments, unless they are evicted or if they move out voluntarily. Relocation sites included neighboring Branch Village, which is itself visibly distressed and slated for demolition as soon as possible. The number of residents who received vouchers to move to private housing was not disclosed but the HOPE VI Coordinator said HUD awarded 166 Housing Choice Vouchers for the development, which is one voucher per occupied unit. The 2003 redevelopment plan also mentioned that more than 50 percent of the original residents expressed the desire to return after redevelopment but the CSS Coordinator said only 15 percent would receive HOPE VI housing offsite and onsite (Pagan 2008).

The project incorporates Phase III of Chelton Terrace redevelopment. Using its own funds and non-HOPE VI funds, the HACC demolished Chelton Terrace in 2005 and replaced 166 of the units in two phases, Phases I and II. Phase III will complete the rebuilding process. HUD added 66 families from Chelton Terrace to the 166 from Roosevelt Manor to make 232 original families eligible for HOPE VI benefits. The 232 families consisted of 701 persons; 41 percent were adults 18 to 64 years, 56 percent were dependent children under age 18, and three percent were seniors 65 and over.

To avoid poverty reconcentrating at the site, the new development will have Public housing, owner-occupied, and LIHTC housing to satisfy different household income needs. However, only 39 percent of the original 268 public housing are being replaced. That means no more than 63 percent of the original would be able to return in the unlikely event that all public units were awarded to returnees. The 95 or so public housing units to be built offsite will compensate for some but not all of the reduction in onsite units. Ultimately, the goal is to have no more than 34 percent “very low-income” tenants (tenants with incomes less than 30 percent of AMI). Homeownership and LIHTC units are for higher income households to ensure so that not all tenants have very low incomes. Households earning up to 80 percent of AMI are eligible for

public housing and households earning up to 120 percent of AMI qualify for the homeownership units (HACC 2003). Table 6.11 shows the income guidelines the HACC uses in HOPE VI.

**Table 6.10** Income Band used to Income Mixing

<b>Type of Unit</b>	<b>Income Requirement</b>
Public Housing	Up to 80 percent of AMI
Tax Credit Family/Senior	30 to 50 percent of AMI
Section 8 Family/Senior	Up to 50 percent of AMI
Owner Occupied	Up to 120 percent of AMI

*Source:* Roosevelt Manor 2003 HOPE VI Application

### 6.3.2 Changes in Poverty Indicators

Since there was no survey at this site, only data from the Residents Characteristics Reports for Phase V and Phase VII, the completed sets of occupied public housing onsite. According to HUD data on its website, the 2009 AMI for Camden area is \$77,800. Thirty percent is \$23,340 and the RCR shows that almost 85 percent of Phase V households had incomes lower than 30 percent of the AMI while about 15 percent had incomes above 30 percent of AMI (Table 6.11). Households in Phase VII fared even worse since 89 percent of them had incomes lower than 30 percent the AMI and only 11 percent had incomes above that figure. Since 98 percent of pre-demolition households had incomes lower than 30 percent of AMI, the HOPE VI households had higher incomes in 2009 to 2010 than the previous households but the HOPE VI households are still very poor. In terms of income distribution, all household incomes were below \$20,000 annually.

The number of returnees also appears to be well below the 15 percent the CSS Coordination said the HACC had expected to return (Brown-Pagan interview, 10/2008). In the Resident Characteristics Reports, 13 percent of Phase V householders and 2 percent in Phase VII lived in public housing previously. Thus, of the 100 HOPE VI public housing households, 93 percent are new and 7 percent are returnees. The number of Roosevelt Manor returnees may even be lower because the eight tenants may include tenants from other developments (the data does not show origin). Because returnees are so few, most of the original families who endured the distressed conditions before redevelopment and who wanted to return, did not return.

**Table 6.11** Poverty Levels for Roosevelt Manor Public Housing Households in 2009-2010

Income Level	Percentage	Income	Phase V	Phase VII
Extremely Low Income	(< 30% AMI)	\$23,340	85	89
Very Low Income	(30% - 50% AMI)	\$23,340 - \$38,900	11	15
Low Income	(51% - 80% AMI)	\$38,900 - \$62,240	0	0
Above Low Income	(> 80% AMI)	\$62,240+	0	0
Income Source:				
Welfare	-	-	24	35
Pension\SS\SSI	-	-	39	37
Work	-	-	39	46

*Source:* Resident Characteristics Reports for 15 months ending December 2010

### 6.3.3 Impact on Residents

The Resident Characteristics Reports show higher percentages of residents at both locations who receive public assistance. The RCRs show that 63 percent of Phase V households and 72 percent of Phase VII households received public assistance payments as their main income in 2009. Compared to the pre-HOPE VI figure of 58 percent, a higher proportion of current householders received public assistance in 2009. This is a surprising outcome because one of the project goals is to decrease dependency on public assistance and because nearly all the householders were new. Public assistance includes welfare benefits and pension, social security (SS) and supplemental security income (SSI) but the welfare portion of these totals were smaller than the pension\SS\SSI contribution. Although the HOPE VI tenants had higher incomes than the pre-HOPE VI tenants did, a higher percentage of HOPE VI tenants received public assistance in 2009 than the pre-HOPE VI tenants did.

HOPE VI impact on earned income was negligible among Phase V residents in 2009 because 39 percent of households had earned income as their main source of income. This is marginally better than the 38 percent before of pre-HOPE VI residents who had earned income as their main income source. Phase VII residents fared better as 46 percent of the households there reported income from employment as their main source of income.

Overall, HOPE VI households have higher incomes and poverty levels appear to be somewhat lower since redevelopment. However, the average household income at both locations remains about the same as before demolition. Improvements in income diversity appear to be the reason for the poverty levels improving. Based on Table 6.12, just 10 percent of pre-HOPE VI residents had annual household incomes exceeding \$15,000 but about 37 percent of Phase V residents and 43 percent of Phase VII households achieved that figure. Since the number of returnees is so few, it is not clear why public assistance receipts were higher. These figures from the RCRs indicate that the project's five poverty deconcentration goals mentioned earlier (Section 6.3) for 2009-2010 did not materialize.

**Table 6.12** 2009 Household Income Distribution and Income Category

Particulars	RCR Phase V	RCR Phase VII	Poverty Category
Household Income	Percent of Households (n=48)	Percent of Households (n=54)	
\$0	0	0	Extremely low Income
\$1 - \$5,000	11	7	Extremely low Income
\$5,001 - \$10,000	24	30	Extremely low Income
\$10,001 - \$15,000	22	26	Extremely low Income
\$15,001 - \$20,000	15	11	Extremely low Income
\$20,001 - \$25,000	17	11	Extremely low Income
Above \$25,000	11	15	to Very low income Very Low income

*Source:* Roosevelt Manor 2003 Revitalization Plan and Resident Characteristics Reports for Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Phases V and VII at April 30, 2010.

#### 6.4 Summary of Findings

Based on the data shown, the three HOPE VI developments have less poverty and increased income diversity. Each has a smaller proportion of public housing households with average annual incomes of less than 50 percent of AMI and a higher proportion of households that have incomes above 50 percent of AMI. The main strategies used to deconcentrate poverty were relocation, demolition, and income mixing and original residents are replaced in the new onsite units with higher income households. Residents had three relocation choices: 1) housing vouchers

to rent private market housing, 2) move to a different public housing, or 3) leave federally public housing altogether. Redevelopment strategies varied from one site to site. Whereas most units at McGuire Gardens were rehabilitated, the two later developments were completely demolished and replaced with new housing. In addition to income mixing, the housing authority uses income-tiering to diversify the population mix to avoid reconcentrating poverty. Income tiering was used mainly at McGuire Gardens where all the units are public housing. Income targeting does not appear to be consequential however because poverty remains very high.

Except for Roosevelt Manor, the poverty deconcentration goals were unclear. It is therefore difficult to assess poverty deconcentration at Baldwin's Run and McGuire Gardens. Most of the public housing residents are new to public housing and only a few original tenants returned. The return rate was higher at the rehabilitated site than at the mixed-income sites. At the rehabilitated site, all units are public housing and the onsite relocation ensured that not all original tenants were relocated. The redevelopment strategies at the mixed-income sites were different and required the HA to apply higher selection standards to appease the private homeowners at those sites and the private investors. At the rehabilitated site, the HA did not have those demands to contend with. Deconcentration addressed concentrated poverty at the HOPE VI site but ignored it in the communities that received relocated residents. In none of the projects did the poverty deconcentration strategies involve reducing concentrated poverty in the wider neighborhood. The focus was always the housing site. If the wider neighborhoods were involved, it is not evident.

## CHAPTER 7

### RESIDENT SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Having my own bills helps me to budget better and teaches me how to be responsible with my finances.

(New tenant at McGuire Gardens in 2008)

The absence of economic resources among and assistance to public housing residents is a consistent, pervasive, and inexorably destructive contributor to distress.

(NCSDPH 1992, p. 3)

The statement above by the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing describes the situation that confronted residents at the three study developments before redevelopment. Many residents were desperately poor and depended heavily on public assistance programs. Whether or not residents intend to return after revitalization, HOPE VI revitalization grants fund supportive services to the original residents and new residents to enable them to make progress towards achieving economic self-sufficiency and leave assisted housing eventually (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003).

Self-sufficiency support is related to poverty deconcentration since the goal is to increase employment and income and reduce dependence on government. According to the HACC website, the self-sufficiency mission is to provide employment, education, entrepreneurship, and healthcare opportunities to residents to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on government.<sup>15</sup> The supportive services provided at each site ranged from a few initiatives at McGuire Gardens to several programs at Roosevelt Manor. The list of services include vocational skills training, language training; childcare, youth, family, and senior services; and case management services. Case managers assess the needs of each family and make referrals where necessary to the appropriate service provider(s).

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<sup>15</sup>The HACC web address is <http://www.camdenhousing.org/Departments/HOPEVI/tabid/88/Default.aspx>

The HACC does not have specific measures to assess residents' self-sufficiency progress and the service/program ends when the HOPE VI project end or earlier if funds the run out. The study uses the level of dependency on public assistance, employment and unemployment levels, average household income, and poverty status to assess self-sufficiency outcomes among at each HOPE VI site. The self-sufficiency questions in the householder survey addressed employment, income, education, and training to understand the impact of the services.

## **7.1 McGuire Gardens**

A survey by Abt Associates in 1996 noted that some residents were self-starters and extremely capable of helping themselves but most had few skills and lacked self-motivation. Virtually all residents lacked the experience of doing things for themselves (Holin, et al. 2003) and therefore needed much self-help assistance. Nevertheless, before HOPE VI, the HACC had no program in place to assist poor residents escape poverty and dependency on public assistance. Despite lacking the experience and the in-house capacity to provide social services to residents, the HOPE VI contract required the HACC to develop and implement community support and self-sufficiency programs to move residents towards greater economic independence.

### **7.1.1 Goals**

The full list of self-sufficiency initiatives implemented at McGuire Gardens during redevelopment is not clear because the HOPE VI officials did not provide answers to repeated requests for information about the actual programs implemented. Inquiries to three key HOPE VI officials did not reveal any information about the programs implemented or their outcomes. After one senior officer promised to supply the requested information, another officer emailed to say the HA had no more information to provide. Information about the self-programs implemented at this site and used in this study came from the 1996 HOPE VI Baseline Assessment, the Interim Assessment of the HOPE VI Program Cross-Site Report, and residents' comments.

Holin, et al (2003) reported that the HA prepared an elaborate self-sufficiency plan but its implementation was problematic and hampered by numerous delays that forced the HACC to drop most of the initial proposals. The initial CSS plan proposed life and occupational skills training, small business ownership opportunities, and several initiatives to help lift residents out of poverty and dependency.

The revised CSS plan included case management services to help families formulate strategies to move from poverty and dependency to economic self-sufficiency and training in occupational and entrepreneurial skills (Holin, et al. 2003). Abt Associates (1996) noted that Case Management” was the core resident service proposed in the Community and Supportive Services plan. Case managers were supposed to help families create family plans to guide them towards economic self-sufficiency. Other services planned included parenting seminars, budget and credit counseling, medical services, homemaking and life-skill workshops, and educational opportunities such as GED classes and English language training for non-native speakers. The HACC even planned to facilitate small resident-owned business start-ups. Unfortunately, few services were available to help residents make the transition to better housing and greater self-sufficiency while the site underwent rehabilitation (Holin, et al. 2003) and few residents reported receiving any services. Only three services were said to be available to residents during redevelopment, namely: a drug prevention program, an after-school program that the Residents’ Council operated, and a referral service that operated out of the tenant relations office (Holin, et al. 2003, Abt Associates, et al. 1996). Original residents reported that they also participated in family counseling and parenting classes.

Despite the revision, additional implementation problems forced the housing authority to enter into contractual arrangements with social service providers in Camden for limited services that the HA provided. In the end, despite the lengthy redevelopment period and several changes, residents received few self-sufficiency services during redevelopment (Holin, et al. 2003). Since reoccupation of the site however, residents have had opportunities to participate in other



programs and services arranged by the management office. HOPE VI Coordinator, Chuck Valentine, explained that the problems experienced were typical of early HOPE VI projects that had implementation problems because no one knew what to do (Valentine 2008).

As the management problems at the HACC worsened the implementation delays continued, HUD assumed control of the housing authority (Holin, et al. 2003). The management problems included frequent changes in senior management personnel. In the two years before site rehabilitation began, the HA changed its Executive Director three times. McGuire Gardens qualified for a HOPE VI grant in 1994 because the HA was on HUD's "troubled housing authority" list. Because HUD took control of the housing authority, the redevelopment was implemented under HUD's direct supervision. Rehabilitation began five years after the HACC received the HOPE VI award and was completed within three years (Holin, et al. 2003).

After redevelopment, the private management company's onsite social service office assumed responsibility for implementing most self-sufficiency services at the site. The office has two trained social workers who have initiated several social programs. Implemented programs have included a six-week computer training course for all residents, a weeklong art and craft class for senior residents, and an orientation class for new tenants in 2008. For completing the computer course, participants received certificates of completion. Participants said they learned new skills that could help them get jobs in the future. Participants in the art and craft and computer classes said they appreciated the opportunities. Several senior residents in the art and craft class said the class allowed them to meet other seniors, share with them, and stay active. Participants who were required to perform community services used these activities to fulfill those requirements. At the orientation session, new householders were informed about the self-sufficiency programs and services available and how to access them.

The social work office also arranges and conducts other activities to promote self-sufficiency among residents such as parenting seminars, GED classes, and even higher education courses or training program through external agencies such as Camden County College. The

annual summer program for pre-teen and young teenage residents give older teens opportunities to gain valuable leadership skills and earn money as counselors. Participants learn positive work habits, leadership and management skills, responsibility, and other valuable life skills.

### **7.1.2 Self-Sufficiency Outcomes**

This section presents the results of the analysis of self-sufficiency outcomes at this site showing changes in employment, income, and dependence on government assistance for 2008 and five years since redevelopment. The analysis used data from the household survey and the Resident Characteristics Report (RCR) for the site for the 15-month period from June 30, 2007 to September 30, 2008. The householder survey and RCR results were compared with resident characteristics information from 1996. Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 show residents' employment and income status in 2008. Table 7.1 shows household survey data and Table 7.2 shows the findings from the household survey and the Resident Characteristics Report.

Thirty-five householders were interviewed but two are incomplete. One of them was an original tenant who abruptly stopped the interview to ask for payment and refused to continue when reminded that there was no compensation. The other tenant interrupted the interview half way through to get ready for work and asked the interviewer to return the next day. However, when the interviewer returned at the agreed time, she did not respond to the call at the door but the interviewer heard her talking inside. Ten interviewees were original tenants and 25 were new tenants. Not every interviewee answered all the income questions and so the total responses vary depending on the question posed. Table 7.2 shows self-sufficiency outcomes.

**7.1.2.1 Employment and Income.** Disability and illness greatly affected employment and income in this development. Of the 30 householders (88 percent) who provided employment information, 33 percent said they were employed (80 percent employed full time and 20 percent employed part-time) and 20 percent said they were unemployed. Nearly 37 percent were ill/disabled or had childcare needs that prevented them from working and 10 percent were retired

or in college studying full-time. They were not considered unemployed because they were not in the labor force. The most frequently cited reasons for not working were disability and/or illness, childcare demands, and lack of jobs. Nearly 55 percent said they were unable to work due to one of these factors. Some households were themselves ill or disabled or they had disabled or severely ill children. In one case, a motor vehicle accident left a young female tenant paralyzed, wheelchair-bound, and completely dependent on public aid. Returnees were 20 percent of the employed tenants; the others were new tenants. Ten percent of the returnees said they could not find work while 60 percent said they were disabled, ill, or retired. The results revealed continued reliance on government assistance, particularly among households with children, disabled, and chronically ill members. Among current residents, employment was somewhat higher than before redevelopment but only because of higher employment among new tenants. Table 7.1 shows the employment figures for survey participants in 2007-2008.

**Table 7.1** McGuire Gardens HOPE VI Householders' Employment Status, Sept. 2008

Households Type	Working		Not Working	Totals	Reason Not Working				
	Full Time	Part Time			Disability /Illness	Retired	No job available	No childcare	Study
Returnees (n=10)	2	0	8	10	5	1	1	0	1
New (n=20)	6	2	12	20	6	1	5	5*	0
<b>All(n=30)</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5*</b>	<b>1</b>

\* Included under "disability/illness" and "no jobs" when respondents chose more than one option

Regarding income, estimates from the household survey indicate that the average household income for 2008 was about \$12,250. This is almost 68 percent higher than the \$7,300 for 1996 reported in Chapter 4. HOPE VI householders reported higher average household incomes than 1996 householders did. Interestingly, the average annual household income for returnees was higher than that for new households. This is unusual because the reverse normally occurs. In this case, however, two householders with incomes exceeding \$20,000 and \$40,000 skewed the overall results substantially. One of the original householders with the high income

had a bachelor's degree and worked full time and the other was a two-adult household with both adults having full time jobs. Of the three new householders with annual incomes exceeding \$20,000, none exceeded \$30,000. Given that there were only eight original tenants in the survey, the two high incomes had a large impact on the results.

From a 94 percent sample, the Resident Characteristics Report showed a higher average household income of \$13,884 for returnees. Comparing the survey results with the RCR results suggests that the survey did not include some of the higher income households. Conversations with the onsite social workers indicate that several employed householders either refused to participate in the study or were unavailable.

The main income sources for HOPE VI householders were employment (earned income), government assistance. In this study, government assistance includes Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Pension, TANF/Welfare. 'Other' income such as unemployment benefits and child support payments also contributed greatly to overall income. Before relocation, 15 percent of householders depended on earned income for support in 1996 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1996) but 30 percent of HOPE VI householders depended on earned income. RCR figures show 42 percent of householders depending on earned income. Since a key self-sufficiency goal was to improve earned income, this outcome showed that the goal was achieved.

The percentage of householders who received public assistance was expected to decrease but the survey results indicate the reverse. Instead of being lower, the percentage of HOPE VI residents who said they received public assistance in 2008 was higher, at 65 percent, than the 56 percent who reported public assistance as their main income in 1995/96. Some caution is needed here however. This 65 percent represents all householders with government economic assistance, not only those for whom it is the main source of income. HOPE VI tenants said they received social security/supplemental security income (SS/SSI), TANF/welfare, disability income, unemployment income, and food stamps. Children and disabled persons appeared to have

received the most government aid but 50 percent of employed new householders also received public assistance in 2008.

**Table 7.2** McGuire Gardens. 2008 HOPE VI Household Income Characteristics

Household Characteristics	Household Survey (2007-2008)			RCR (9/2008)	1996 Income
	All	New	Returning	All Households	
Households (n)	30	22	8	236	287
Average size	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.1	3.4
Average income	\$12,250	\$11,023	\$15,625	\$13,884	\$7,300
Income	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
<i>Distribution of Income (\$):</i>					
0 - \$5,000	23	23	25	16	22
\$5,000 - \$10,000	26	27	25	30	59
\$10,000 - \$15,000	19	27	0	17	0
\$15,000 - \$20,000	13	9	25	14	17
>\$20,000	19	14	25	24	2
<i>Income Sources:</i>					
Earned Income	30	40	20	42	15
Public Assistance <sup>1</sup>	*165	*64	*70	64	56
• Welfare (TANF)				21	-
• SSI/SS/Pension	-	-	-	43	59
Other Income	-	-	-	32	

Source: Residents Survey, Residents Characteristics Report for September 30, 2008.

Notes: \*This figure includes food stamp

Due to rounding, some totals may not equal 100% exactly

**7.1.2.3 Education and Training.** Despite the existence of a detailed CSS plan, no education or work-related training program actually existed during redevelopment (Holin, et al 2003). Responses in the study survey seem to confirm this. None of the survey respondents said they participated in any HOPE VI-sponsored education or other training program during redevelopment. Fifteen householders (44 percent) said they had participated in one or more self-sufficiency program since redevelopment. Five started GED classes (two completed, one in progress, and two dropped out); two obtained job skills training; two attended parenting seminars; one received welfare-to-work training; one received household management training; and one obtained family counseling. Six residents took the computer course at the Neighborhood Network

center but it was not a HOPE VI program. Fifteen interviewees said they received self-sufficiency assistance after moving to the site.

Table 7.3 lists the benefits that respondents said they obtained from their participation in the different programs. Only two householders or seven percent of the survey participants, said the self-sufficiency training helped them to get jobs and increase their income. One participant said HOPE VI allowed her to get the job that she wanted. She could not afford to pay the cost of nursing studies and the HOPE VI program financed her training. She said she liked her job as a nurse assistant. Other respondents reported intangible benefits such as improved self-esteem and motivation (Table 7.3). Residents who completed the computer training received certificates and said the training would help them get jobs in the future.

**Table 7.3** McGuire Gardens Household Self-Sufficiency Benefits Reported

<b>Self-sufficiency Benefits</b>	<b>Householders (n=15)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Employment	2	6
Increased Earnings	2	6
Computer literacy	1	3
Typing skills	2	6
Resume preparation	2	6
Intangible benefits:		
Becoming smarter	4	12
Motivation	2	6
Improved self-esteem	1	3

### **7.1.3 Householders' Perceptions**

Notwithstanding the strong impacts of the physical improvements on residents, improving self-sufficiency is likely to have the most important and lasting effects on residents' lives. Consequently, residents are likely to view self-sufficiency improvements as the most significant measure of HOPE VI success. However, the survey results show self-sufficiency as having the worst outcomes. Householders' perceptions can explain some of the reasons for the poor results.

Many survey participants who said they received no self-sufficiency support also said they did not know the services were available. When told about some of the post redevelopment services that housing authority officials and the social workers said were available to residents, respondents often said “I did not know about it” or “I was not aware of that.” Of the 46 percent who received assistance, 48 percent were the new householders and 40 percent were returnees.

Householders were asked whether they believed the HACC had done enough to help residents improve their lives, how satisfied they were with the self-sufficiency programs available, and how much the quality of their lives had improved with the self-sufficiency programs implemented. About 54 percent said the HA was doing enough to assist residents become self-sufficient but 20 percent disagreed and 26 percent said they did not know. Less than half of the returnees (45%) and about 55 percent of new tenants expressed satisfaction with the HA’s self-sufficiency efforts to help residents. Meanwhile, 45 percent of new householders and 27 percent of returnees said the HA was not doing enough to help residents. These results show that a significant proportion of residents believed that the HA should do more to help residents become more self-sufficient.

Regarding programs that the HA implemented to help residents become more self-sufficient, approximately 88 percent of the participants responded and about 84 percent said they were satisfied while 16 percent said they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied or did not know. At the same time, 72 percent also said the HA should do more to help residents and cited the types of programs they felt were needed. The suggestions emphasized youth and skills focused programs, GED training, parenting skills, and money management counseling.

Regarding changes in the quality of their lives attributable to HOPE VI, most respondents mentioned intangible changes relating to family well-being. They responded with statements such as “my children are happier now and don’t fight a lot anymore.” “I am not as stressed out as before.” “I have fewer headaches now”. One new resident said her life had turned around since she moved to McGuire Gardens from a private housing development in south Camden. She

stressed that before moving, she was very depressed by her housing situation and did not want to do anything, not even to get a job. Her three children were also very unhappy and frequently argued and fought. She then excitedly emphasized that her current home was much better than her previous home and that the change in housing quality brought a massive turnaround in her life. She and her children were very happy to live in a decent home so much so that she felt motivated to get a summer job, and the children did not fight as much. Other householders also mentioned positive changes in their lives but this was one of the most moving. It demonstrates that HOPE VI has had positive impacts in some resident's lives.

In summary then, five plus years after redevelopment, the evidence indicates some progress towards improved self-sufficiency among residents but those improvements were very small. Compared to the pre HOPE VI era, in 2008, HOPE VI residents had slightly lower levels of joblessness, a higher percentage of wage-related income, higher household incomes overall, and household income was more diversified. However, dependency on government assistance was higher than in 1996. Given the small number of householders who participated in the survey, some of the results may not accurately reflect residents' actual self-sufficiency status. If dependency on government assistance were, in fact, higher than before HOPE VI, as the survey suggests, it would be due to the large number of elderly and disabled residents who received pension and social security and the large number of children with TANF and food stamp benefits.

The survey might have also oversampled the non-working population. Based on information from the social work office, several working householders did not participate in the survey either because they refused to participate or because they were not available. It is not clear to what extent over-sampling skewed the outcomes towards greater dependence on government assistance. The RCR, which represents over 90 percent of the households showed a higher level of dependency on government aid as well. Consequently, the evidence does show that in 2007 and 2008, a higher percentage of residents received government assistance than in 1996. Readers should bear in mind that the higher average income does not mean residents are economic status



improved because it does not include inflationary effects and most residents still have extremely low incomes.

## **7.2 Baldwin's Run**

To learn about the self-sufficiency programs implemented and their outcomes at Baldwin's Run, this analysis used data from the 2004 CSS Final Monitoring Report by Rutgers University, Camden and face-to-face interviews with the HOPE VI CSS Coordinator and Baldwin's Run residents.

### **7.2.1 Goals**

For this development, the main goal was to provide services that help families become economically self-reliant. The main self-sufficiency goals were to increase employment and income and reduce welfare dependency (HACC 2000). Table 7.4 shows the programs and services used to achieve these goals, the specific targets and outcomes.

Specific goals included removing all 175 welfare recipients from the public dole by getting them into full-time, unsubsidized employment paying at least \$10 per hour within three years of project startup. Another specific goal was to increase the earned income of at least 80 of the 205 residents who already had jobs from an average of \$11,062 per year to \$20,000 per year within three years of project start-up. Other goals included training 150 residents in technical, vocational, and professional skills; in resume writing, interviewing and job search; and create a computerized job/skills database to match residents to jobs. These goals were intend to increase the proportion of the original households with earned income as their main income from 35 percent to 57 percent, reduce TANF/Welfare recipients to just 8 percent, and keep income from "other" sources at 35 percent by the completion of the redevelopment.

**Table 7.4** Westfield Acres Self-Sufficiency Goals and Outcomes

<b>Goals</b>	<b>Target</b>	<b>Outcomes (12/2004) CSS Evaluation</b>	<b>Achieved Target</b>
Family plans prepared	433 families	Unknown	Don't know
<i>Employment</i>			
Full time jobs at \$10/hour or more	60 persons	60 persons	Yes
40 Part time jobs	40 persons	23 persons	No
Increased earnings to \$10,000/ year	30 persons	All <sup>1</sup>	Yes
>/=6 months continuous employment	134 persons	199 persons	Yes
20 transitional jobs	20 persons	32 total	Yes
New Employment	Unknown	65 persons <sup>2</sup>	Unknown
Job loss	none	23 jobs lost	No
<i>Education</i>			
Skills training: Number enrolled	149 persons	51 persons	No
: Number completed	76 persons	47 persons	No
Obtained GED	47 persons	13 or 14	No
ESL Training	11 persons	3 persons	No
Entrepreneurial training	42 persons	14 enrolled 2 complete	No No
<i>Homeownership</i>			
Counseling: enrolled	144 persons	19 persons	No
: completed	80 persons	15 persons	No
Purchased House	26 persons	4 persons	No

*Sources:* Housing Authority of the City of Camden Westfield Acres 2001 Redevelopment Plan, and Wise 2005, Baldwin's Run CSS Final Evaluation Report.

<sup>1</sup>New Jersey minimum wage increased to \$5.25 per hour

<sup>2</sup>Previously unemployed residents

Regarding education, the plan was to assist 47 persons to obtain GEDs, provide English language training to 11 Spanish-speaking residents and life skills training such as parenting, financial management, safety and community protection, and self-esteem to 100 residents within three years of project start. About 149 residents were to receive technical, vocational, and professional skills training with 76 expecting to complete the training in 4 years of startup.

The planned entrepreneurship program was to promote self-employment. The main goals were to train 40 persons in entrepreneurial skills within 24 months of program startup, create a revolving loan fund within 12 months of program start to provide business start-up assistance and to facilitate startup of five resident-owned businesses. The Latin American Economic

Development Association, Rowan University, and Rutgers University were to provide business development services to participants.

The homeownership program was intended to provide homeownership opportunities to 30 Westfield Acres families through homeownership counseling in areas such as the home buying process, home loans and mortgages, and encouraging Westfield Acres and other public housing residents to buy homes in the new development. The purchase target was 26 of the original residents. There was also a plan to provide drug rehabilitation and treatment, family and youth counseling, childcare services, mental and physical health services for families, after-school and weekend educational and recreational activities, and transport services for seniors (HACC 2000).

Case managers were to play a key role in the delivery of supportive services. They were to help families develop family plans that outline steps towards self-sufficiency; act as intermediaries between residents, the housing authority and service providers; provide counseling services; and help residents with job search, application and employment preparation. Some of the services were available in-house but most were contracted out to external agencies. For example, Camden County College provided GED classes and Camden County Bureau of Social Services provided child-care and medical assistance to TANF-eligible families.

### **7.2.2 Services and Outcomes**

Table 7.5 shows that the HA achieved some employment targets but most other outcomes fell well short of projections (Wise 2004). For example, 60 persons out of 60 obtained full time employment that paid at least \$10.00 per hour but most of the other activities were less successful. The Final Monitoring Report noted that there were successes in job training and placement but not in job retention. The report noted that many residents failed to sign up for the various self-sufficiency programs available and many of those who signed up failed to complete the programs.

In the household survey, just 13 percent (3 respondents) said they participated in any HOPE VI self-sufficiency program but 30 percent said they participated in self-sufficiency programs not explicitly connected to HOPE VI. The vast majority said they received no assistance whatsoever and did not know that the housing authority provided self-sufficiency assistance to residents through HOPE VI. Based on conversations between this author and HOPE VI officials and survey responses, some householders appeared to have been somewhat confused about HOPE VI programs and non-HOPE VI program because the HA did not always make that distinction clear. For example, the computer class at McGuire Gardens was available to any public housing resident, not only HOPE VI residents, but resident from other developments did not appear to know. Only two householders said they receive job skills training, two attended computer appreciation classes (one at McGuire Gardens' Neighborhood Network center, five took GED classes, and two said they attended parenting seminars (Table 7.5).

**Table 7.5** Householder Reported Self-Sufficiency Services Received

<b>Self-Sufficiency Support</b>	<b>Householders (n=23)</b>
Computer training	2
GED	5
Job skills training	2
Parenting	2
Household Management	1
Family Counseling	1
Welfare-to-work	1

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey

The household survey results differ from some of the results reported in the CSS Evaluation. One reason for the different results is that the CSS evaluation reported results for all residents--returnees, non-returnees, and new tenants--and the household survey showed outcomes for onsite tenants only and the majority of original tenants did not return after redevelopment. Given the low level use of HOPE VI self-sufficiency services, it would appear that either the household survey missed most of Baldwin's Run householders who participated in HOPE VI

self-sufficiency programs or few Baldwin's Run householders overall participated in the self-sufficiency programs or services that were available. Given that less than 33 percent of residents participated in the survey, the former is possible. If the latter is accurate, then the positive employment results that the evaluation report cited do not apply to current onsite residents. Nonetheless, the study found little evidence of improved self-sufficiency among existing public housing tenants in 2008. The Resident Characteristics Report findings support these results.

The two householders who participated in job training programs were the only ones who gained jobs and increased their income through HOPE VI. Others reported non-monetary benefits such as improved self-confidence, improved communication and leadership skills. One person obtained computing certification. These outcomes did not produce jobs or higher incomes but they build character and put each household in better position to get and keep jobs in the future.

Residents said their non-participation has to do with not knowing about the programs, which indicate there was a communication problem between the HA and residents about the redevelopment. It is quite possible that the HA did not adequately inform residents about the self-sufficiency programs, although the redevelopment plan documented several meetings with residents. Maybe some householders did not respond to information from the HA or mistrusted the HA's plans. A few householders admitted that they were aware of some programs and chose not to enroll. However, most householders said if they had known about the services available to them they would have used the opportunities to improve their employment prospects. Another likely reason for the low participation may be the requirements for participation. Participation in government aid programs often requires residents to divulge private information and some residents probably were not comfortable doing so.

**Table 7.6** Benefits Householders Reported from Self-Sufficiency Services

<b>Benefit</b>	<b>Householders (n=23)</b>
Employment	2
Increased Earnings	2
Computer literacy	2
Communicating skills	1
Leadership skills	1

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey

### 7.2.3 Self-Sufficiency Outcomes

This section uses data from the household survey, the Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report for the Community and Supportive Services component of the HOPE VI project, and the Resident Characteristics Report for July 2007 to September 30, 2008. Despite the implementation of programs/services to reduce employment barriers, increase employment, and otherwise help residents achieve self-sufficiency, the study found little difference between current public housing tenants and pre-HOPE VI public housing tenants in measures of self-sufficiency and dependency.

**7.2.3.1 Employment and Income.** Table 7.7 shows that 10 of the 23 survey participants were employed, one was retired, and 12 were not employed. Eight householders had full-time jobs and two had part-time jobs. One household had two adults with full time jobs. Based on these figures, more than 45 percent of respondents were employed. Before redevelopment, nearly 54 percent of Westfield Acres householders had employment income as their main income. Only the eight Baldwin's Run householders with full-time jobs had their main income from employment. The situation is less clear for the two householders with part-time jobs however. Even if all 10 had most of their income from employment, it would still be lower than the 54 percent at Westfield Acres.

**Table 7.7** Baldwin’s Run Public Housing Residents’ Employment Status for 2008

Households	Working		Not Working	Total	Reason Not Working/Not Working FT				
	Full Time	Part Time			Disability / Illness	Retired	Lack of jobs	No Childcare	Study
Returnees	1	1	5	7	5				0
New	7	1	8	16	6				1
<b>All</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7*</b>	<b>1</b>

\*Part of “Disability/Illness” and “No Jobs”. Some participant chose more than one option

Employed and unemployed householders cited disability, illness and lacking childcare as the main impediments to employment. Some of them cited both illness and disability and some reported disability and family or childcare demands. Thirty percent of them said a family disability or serious illness and 30 percent said lack of childcare assistance limited their employment opportunities. The problem is quite widespread as 54 percent of those without work said they stopped looking for work for these reasons. Only two of the 12 unemployed tenants said they could not find work.

Although fewer householders appear to be employed, the householder survey and the Resident Characteristics Report both show that 2008 public housing tenants had higher average annual household incomes than pre-HOPE VI householders at Westfield Acres. The householder survey shows a little less than \$12,400 in average household income and the RCR shows more than \$16,400. In comparison, 90 percent of pre-HOPE VI average household income at Westfield Acres in 2000 was less than \$15,000. Despite the apparent increase, the majority of public housing households still have very low incomes as unemployment is still very high. Considering the housing authority’s efforts to improve employment, these results are disappointing. These results are consistent with similar efforts that other HOPE VI studies reported at other sites.

**Table 7.8** Baldwin Run 2008 Household Self-Sufficiency Characteristics

Household Characteristic	Household Survey			RCR
	All Households	New Households	Returning Households	(Sept. '08)
Households (n)	23	16	7	68
Average Annual Household Income	\$12,386	\$13,167	\$10,714	\$16,431
Income Distribution				
\$0 - \$5,000	32%	27%	43%	4%
\$5,000 - \$10,000	18%	20%	14%	26%
\$10,000 - \$15,000	5%	7%	0	22%
\$15,000 - \$20,000	23%	20%	29%	16%
> \$20,000	23%	27%	14%	31%
Source of Income:				
Wage	35%	36%	38%	46%
Public Assistance	65%	64	63%	16%
Welfare	-	-	-	56%
Other	-	-	-	41%

*Sources:* Wise 2005. Baldwin's Run CSS Final Monitoring and Evaluation Report, and Baldwin's Run Resident Characteristics Report, 9/2008, Baldwin's Run Household Survey, 2008-2009.

**7.2.3.2 Education and Training.** The HA fell well short of its goals to provide English as Second Language (ESL) training to 11 residents and assist 47 to obtain the GED by 2004. The Final Monitoring Report noted that only three persons undertook ESL training and 13 or 14 residents actually pursued GED by December 2004. In contrast, the HA had noteworthy success in job skills training as 51 residents enrolled and 47 completed the training, including two participants in the household survey in this study. However, the goal was to train 149 persons with 76 completions. The outcome was 34 percent enrollment of target and completion was 62 percent of target.

#### **7.2.4 Householders' Perceptions**

When asked if they believed the HACC had done enough to help residents improve their lives and if the HA had done enough for residents, householders, as indicated in Table 7.9, said the HA had not done enough. About 43 percent said the HA had done enough to help residents but 52 percent disagreed. Returnees were much more dissatisfied than new tenants. About 29 percent said the HA had done enough to help residents compared to 50 percent of new tenants. This outcome



probably reflects the fact that not all the supportive services that the HA promised were implemented or most returnees experienced no improvement in their economic circumstances.

**Table 7.9** Householders' Satisfaction with the HACC Efforts to Assist Residents

Survey Question	Household Type	Percent of Household Responses		
		Yes	No	Don't know
Has the HACC done enough to assist residents?	Returnee (7)	29	57	14
	New (16)	50	50	0
	All (23)	43	52	6

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

Table 7.10 shows residents' satisfaction with the self-sufficiency support services that they knew about. The majority (61 percent) said they were satisfied but a sizeable minority of 26 percent said they had no opinion because they did not know anything about the services available. Interestingly, a much higher percentage of new tenants than returnees said they did not know. One explanation for the difference between returning and new tenants is the higher percentage of new tenants who were employed and saw no need to get involved in a self-sufficiency program. Another possibility is that the HA promoted the supportive services less among new tenants.

**Table 7.10** Householders' Satisfaction with the Self-sufficiency Support Available


Householder	Percent of Households Responding					
	Very Satisfied	A Little Satisfied	Neither	A Little Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied	Don't know
Returnees (n=7)	0	57	0	29	0	14
New (n=16)	38	25	0	0	6	31
All (n=23)	26	35	0	9	4	26

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

Although the majority of survey participants expressed satisfaction with the supportive services that were available to them, a substantially large 87 percent also said there was need for additional support, particularly youth-focused programs. Householders expressed a strong need

for youth recreational and skills training programs, parenting and money management counseling.

Figure 7.1 shows the most common types of supportive services residents mentioned.



**Figure 7.1** Other types of services Baldwin's Run public housing residents need.

While acknowledging that their economic situation remained substantially unchanged, 91 percent of the respondents said their living situation had improved in some way since they moved to Baldwin's Run (Table 7.11). An even larger majority (100 percent returning and 94 percent new residents) expressed satisfaction with the overall quality of life in in the new development (Table 7.12).

**Table 7.11** Percent of Householders with Improved Living Situation

Response	Percent of Householders		
	All (n=23)	Returnees(n=7)	New(n=16)
Yes	91	100	81
No	9	0	13
Don't Know	4	0	0

Source: Baldwin's Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

Returning and new tenants alike said Baldwin's Run looked a lot better and was much safer than Westfield Acres. Even tenants who moved from private single-family homes said their HOPE VI units were better than their family homes. Some said they liked the development because it was quiet and neighborly. Some returnees said life at Baldwin's Run was a lot better than at Westfield Acres because they experienced less interference from outsiders.

**Table 7.12** Householders' Satisfaction with Quality of Life at Baldwin's Run

Level of Satisfaction	Percent of Householders		
	All (n=23)	Returnees (n=16)	New (n=7)
Very satisfied	70	71	69
A little satisfied	26	29	25
Not satisfied nor dissatisfied	4	0.0	6
A little dissatisfied	0	0	0
Very dissatisfied	0	0	0

*Source:* Baldwin's Run Household Survey, 2008-2009

The survey results show clear improvements in quality of life indices based on householders' perspectives. However, there is not much to show that self-sufficiency has improved among returnees and there is no information available to assess progress among new tenants. Although the sample size used might be small, when the survey results are compared to the Resident Characteristics Report, which over 90 percent of the households, the results are remarkably similar. The conclusion that can be drawn is that although improved housing quality has had significant impacts on residents' well-being, it has not and cannot change their economic circumstances. The results also indicate that supportive services for short periods are not sufficient to effect substantial changes in residents' economic well-being. Better results may be achieved over longer periods.

### 7.3 Roosevelt Manor

The self-sufficiency plan for this project is similar to the self-sufficiency plan used previously at Westfield Acres HOPE VI project. Roosevelt Manor's goals are more explicit however. The primary overall objective was to help HOPE VI beneficiaries obtain long-term employment and earn at least \$10 per hour. However, the self-sufficiency plan noted that there was a great need to reduce barriers to employment, especially in education and skills training, employment preparation and family support. As a result, the ongoing self-sufficiency program attempts to increase employment among the original residents (HACC 2003). The services implemented included employment preparation and placement, vocational skills training, and English language training, and sponsoring GED and High School Diplomas classes. Family support services included substance abuse counseling and treatment, family counseling, transportation, healthcare, childcare, and various youth and senior services (HACC 2003a).

Regarding income, 38 percent of the 232 households had earned income as their main income, 24 percent had TANF and General Assistance payments as main income, and 30 percent had Social Security/Supplemental Security/pension as primary income.

#### 7.3.1 Programs and Goals

The HACC said that prior to relocation, a resident needs survey was done and the results used in developing the self-sufficiency plan. This survey identified unemployment, inadequate job training, low technical and vocational skills, poor education, low computer knowledge, poor money management skills, lack of community-based healthcare services, and inadequate childcare services as the main issues that limit residents' ability to become self-sufficient (HACC 2003a). Programs were implemented to increase employment and income and provide supportive services to enhance residents' employment potentials. Other programs implemented included credit and homeownership counseling, technical and vocational skills training, educational and childcare services, computing technology assistance, and neighborhood-based health care. Table

7.13 shows the main self-sufficiency programs implemented, the number of residents projected to register for each program, the number of completion projected per program, and the number of residents who actual registered for and complete each program through 2007.

**Table 7.13** Projected and Actual Enrolments in Self-Sufficiency Services at Roosevelt Manor

Self-Sufficiency Program	Project Enrollment Goals	2004-2007 Goals		Actual Outcomes	
		Enrolment	Completion	2007	2004-2007
Job preparation & placement	100	30	No data	13	No data
Vocational skills training	80	No data	No data	No data	39
Section 3 job placement	75	-	16	6	No data
High School Diploma or GED	35	5	No data	5	8
English language training	17	5	No data	0	No data
Family Literacy Workshops	6	2	No data	0	No data
Entrepreneurship Training	28	8	No data	8	4
Resident-owned business startups	3	2	No data	0	2
General Counseling	No data	No data	No data		44
Substance Abuse Counseling	No data	2?	No data	0	10
Homeownership: Counseling	88	25	No data	4	45
Purchase	-	-	1	-	10
<i>Youth Initiatives:</i>					
Afterschool homework & life-skill	No data	50	No data	225	No data
Internship Program	No data	30	No data	240	No data
	50	25	No data	25	No data
Eye Care Services	100	20		20	No data
Youth Health Services	250	60		60	No data
Childcare Services	60	20		25	No data
Adult healthcare	200	?		?	60
Ride-to-Work Bus Voucher	No data	30		34	135

*Sources:* Housing Authority of the City of Camden Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI Quarterly Report, and Roosevelt Manor CSS Plan, 12/2005.

The HA provided some services directly through the CSS office and other services through partnerships with social services agencies serving the area. Leading partner agencies include CamCare, Camden County Workforce Investment Board, Camden County College, Save Our Waterfront, and American Community Partnership as (Table 7.14). The HA uses the case management approach so each family has a case manager who assesses the family's needs, help the family set self-sufficiency goals and obtain the services required to meet their goals. Case

Managers are trained social workers. Table 7.15 summarizes the main service goals and outcomes reported in the CSS plan and December 2007 HOPE VI CSS Quarterly Progress Report.

**Table 7.14** CSS Providers and Services Provided to Roosevelt Manor Residents

<b>Service Provider</b>	<b>Service Provided</b>
Workforce Investment Board	Job search and job readiness training, retention and supportive services
CamCare	Hiring and training of residents in health care, clerical and as pharmaceutical technicians
Camden County College	GED training and other education goals
Save Our Waterfront	Credit and homeownership counseling
American Community Partnership	Construction skills training
HACC	- Case management services - Youth Build program providing apprenticeship (on-the-job) training for youths 16-21 years old

*Source:* HACC Community and Supportive Services 2005 Plan for December 2005.

### 7.3.2 Outcomes

Because no household survey was done at this site, this review is based on information in the 2007 HOPE VI Progress Report and December 14 Final Community and Supportive Services Plan that the CSS Coordinator supplied. Table 7.13 and Table 7.15 show outcomes reported in the CSS plan and the Quarterly progress report. Although HOPE VI officials provided documentation about the self-sufficiency programs already implemented and those yet to be implemented, getting information about enrollment targets and outcomes proved elusive, as the many “unknowns” in Table 7.13 indicate. The nearly two-year delay in project startup and lack of information from the housing authority also affected the analysis of outcomes. For example, up-to-date information about the annual goals/targets in the CSS plan were not provided and so only aggregate data from the 2007 status report could be used. The 2007 report was the only report provided and it had numerous data gaps.

Overall, 13 residents enrolled in and completed job search coaching, job skills training, and job retention coaching by December 2007. A successful HOPE VI internship program boosted participation in 2007 and ensured that the employment targets were achieved.

**Table 7.15** Successful Completion of Self-Sufficiency Services at 12/2007

Self-Sufficiency Services	Target	Actual	Comments
Jobs Skills Training: - construction, professional, office skills, and pre-apprentice training	12	10	Four persons placed in jobs
High School Diploma /GED	3	2	Two persons obtained GEDs
New job placements	18	10	Goal not met
Entrepreneurial training	2	6	Goal exceeded
Homeownership counseling	15	4	Four enrolled
Homebuyer counseling	0	3	3 residents completed program, and
Home Purchase	0	1	One former tenant purchased a house

*Source:* HACC Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI 2007 Quarterly Report to HUD, HACC 2008.

**7.3.2.1 Education Outcomes.** Education programs allow residents to pursue GED or even college level courses. Residents have the opportunity to pursue English as a Second Language (ESL) course without charge to the resident. Based on needs assessment done in 2002, in the CSS plan, the HA anticipated five enrolments in High School Diploma or GED classes and five in ESL courses. At the end of 2007, the education goals for Baldwin's Run had not been achieved. Five persons enrolled in high school or equivalency education but no one registered for ESL training.

**7.3.2.2 Employment Outcomes.** Given the limited employment data that the HA provided, employment levels could not be determined accurately. However, using the March 30, 2010 Resident Characteristic Reports for Phases V and VII, the employment rates were estimated to be at least 39 percent for Phase V and 46 percent for Phase VII. These estimates are based on the percentage of residents who had earned income as main income source. The figures are only slightly higher than the 38 percent employment rate prior to redevelopment. The reader should

bear in mind that this data is for the employment levels among public housing residents before and after redevelopment. It does not refer to homeowners in the new development. Lack of information about non-returnees made it impossible to examine outcomes for them. While the 80 percent target was not achieved, it may be too early to draw conclusions because of the start-up delays and because the project is ongoing. Eighty percent was the overall goal, not an intermediary goal. Nevertheless, in the worst economy in the state, 80 percent employment appears to be an unrealistic employment goal for public housing residents.

**7.3.2.3 Income Outcomes.** Based on the Resident Characteristics Reports, average annual household incomes for public housing tenants remain roughly the same as pre-redevelopment. Compared to less than \$15,000 for 90 percent of residents before redevelopment, Phase V and Phase VII residents reported average annual household incomes of \$14,889 and \$14,736 respectively. Income diversity appeared to be better however. Table 7.16 shows the distribution of household income in Phases V and VII and it shows 63 percent of Phase V households having annual household incomes of \$15,000 or less and 37 percent had in excess of \$15,000 in annual income. At Phase VII, 57 percent of the households had annual household incomes of \$15,000 or less and 43 percent reported income in excess of \$15,000. About 72 percent of Phase V households and 74 percent of Phase VII households had incomes of \$20,000 or less, and only 11 percent of Phase V and 15 percent of Phase VII households had incomes above \$25,000. Before demolition, 90 percent of households reported average incomes of \$15,000 and less, so the average annual income improved by more than percent in both Phase V and Phase VII. Similarly, only 10 percent of pre-HOPE VI residents had annual household income in excess of \$15,000, but 37 percent of Phase V residents and 43 percent of Phase VII residents did so. Notwithstanding these improvements, poverty remains widespread and there is no sign of improved self-sufficiency **but that could improve in the near future**. The biggest unknown issue however concerns the housing and neighborhood outcomes of original residents who have not returned.



**Table 7.16** Post Redevelopment Household Economic Characteristics at Roosevelt Manor

Household Information	Projected	Phase V (n=54)		Phase VII (n=48)	
	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Households		54/57	97	46/48	96
Average Household Income		\$14,736	100	\$14,889	100
<i>Income Distribution:</i>					
\$0 - \$5,000	unknown	4	7	5	11
\$5,000 - \$10,000		16	30	11	24
\$10,000 - \$15,000		14	26	10	22
\$15,000 - \$20,000		6	11	7	15
\$20,000 - \$25,000		6	11	8	17
Above \$25,000		8	15	5	11
<i>Income Sources:</i>					
Wages	80	21	39	21	46
Welfare Payments	26	13	24	18	39
SS/SSI/Pension	-	21	39	15	33
Other Sources	60	19	35	16	35
With no income	-	0	0	0	0

*Source:* Resident Characteristics Reports for Roosevelt Manor Phases V & VII at March 31, 2010.

**7.3.2.4 Other Self-Sufficiency Outcomes.** Six residents completed entrepreneurship training but none had started a business because they did not have the resources to do so. The HACC quarterly report cited problems in executing this aspect of the plan because fewer residents than anticipated participated in the program and because the job developer position was vacant until June 2007 because the previous job developer moved to another agency.

Regarding homeownership, the HA targeted 25 householders for training through December 31, 2007 but only 4 householders enrolled by then. Three of the four completed the training. The HACC reported that 16 householders with stable employment and income above \$16,000 would be encouraged to purchase offsite homeownership units and that original residents would be given priority for the 86 homeownership units on the site. Eligible residents must complete the homeownership training. At the end of 2007, one householder had purchased a home elsewhere and did so without assistance from the housing authority. It was not clear if any

of the original residents who undertook the homeownership training actually bought homes in the Roosevelt Manor HOPE VI development.

Family support services provided included family health and counseling, adult mental health, optical services, youth primary health care, health services for seniors, family health literacy workshops, and childcare services. Except mental health services, enrollment and completion targets were met for the other service in 2007 (HOPE VI Quarterly Progress Report for December 2007). The Quarterly Progress Report noted that this failure to achieve mental health targets was due to residents' reluctance or unwillingness to accept mental health interventions. The HACC employed a certified drug and alcohol counselor and provided a facility where residents with substance abuse problems can have confidential meetings with the counselor but that did not motivate any HOPE VI beneficiary. The HA provided this service even though the needs survey did not identify any resident with a substance abuse problem.

#### 7.4 Summary

The overall outcome for all three sites suggests little progress towards economic self-sufficiency for the majority of public housing residents, but particularly for returnees. The results indicate weaknesses in the self-sufficiency plans such as placing too much emphasis on work related training, wrong assumptions about the availability of decent paying jobs in the Camden area, and not accounting sufficiently for resident participation in the programs or services provided. Not all residents lack employment because of education or skills deficits that adult education and job preparation and skills training can fix. Some residents experience barriers that none of these things can remedy. In such cases, programs to increase employment and income such as English language courses, GED or high school diploma classes, or job preparation classes are not for them. At Baldwin's Run for example, the majority of non-working tenants cited poor health, disability, and child/family-care demands as the three main reasons for not working. Job training skills is not their main concern. In several HOPE VI studies, the Urban Institute address this

issue. Popkin (2009) noted that due to poor health and disability, many residents are “hard-to-house” and need self-sufficiency services tailored to their special circumstances. Job-related training does not address the particular issues that keep them unemployed.

The poor health of the Camden area economy is another issue that appears to undermine self-sufficiency results. Poorly performing local and regional labor markets are likely to limit employment and income opportunities for residents and HOPE VI self-sufficiency goals. With unemployment hovering around 36 percent (U.S. Census Bureau 2000) since the industrial economy collapsed, Camden is the poorest city in New Jersey (Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007). Finding employment in this poor economy is extremely difficult. Skills training may need to target the growth sectors in the economy and train residents in those areas to give them a realistic chance of getting and keeping jobs. The HACC probably may need to work closely with agencies such as Camden County Workforce Development Board to target the growth sectors of the economy and to ensure that residents get the training needed. The housing authority could use the weak self-sufficiency results to assess areas of weakness in the self-sufficiency plans and adjust them accordingly.

The 2004 Final Evaluation Community and Supportive Services Report for the Westfield Acres HOPE VI redevelopment project by Rutgers University (Camden) noted that the program achieved early success in getting residents into full-time jobs but many of them were unable to keep the jobs. Although the report did not give reasons for the job losses, the CSS plan indicated that some were temporary jobs (e.g., construction jobs). The city’s declining economy most likely played a major role as well. Understanding the reasons for the job losses is an important evaluation step towards improving the quality of the services provided. A possible explanation for the poor self-sufficiency outcomes is the non-participation of large numbers of residents in the available programs or services available. Even residents who participated in self-sufficiency improvement programs experienced little or no change in self-sufficiency and employed tenants do not earn enough to lift them out of poverty and dependency. These results show that

redevelopment has not effected the improvements in the socioeconomic status of original residents expected. Despite higher employment and income, the main benefits that residents experienced from the self-sufficiency program are improvements in self-esteem and motivation. Self-esteem and motivation are not readily are not measurable in monetary terms but they important factors in achieving success.

Inadequate information about the actual self-sufficiency initiatives implemented, and the outcomes of those initiatives, made assessing self-sufficiency outcomes time consuming. In the case of McGuire Gardens, the HA provided no self-sufficiency information about the site despite repeated requests and the site information in the HOPE VI Baseline Assessment report was inconsistent.

## CHAPTER 8

### DISCUSSION

This research was an as an inquiry into the HOPE VI program but especially its impact on residents' lives. HOPE VI not only replaces the physical structures at "severely distressed" public housing sites with housing solutions to satisfy a diversity of household incomes but also provides opportunities for the families who endured the terrible conditions in the distressed developments to improve their economic well-being by moving to better housing in new or rehabilitated developments or move to housing in less poor and less stressed neighborhoods (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Housing officials expect redeveloped sites to have substantially less poverty and improved site and housing conditions. Positive results from the Gautreaux program had led housing officials to believe that dispersal and income-mixing initiatives would improve the economic and social circumstances of residents of severely distressed developments (Goetz 2004, Goetz 2010, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009, Rosenbaum and Zuberi 2010, Steinberg 2009).

The program's assumptions and goals are based on the "neighborhood effects" literature, which hypothesizes that neighborhood conditions strongly influence residents' social and economic circumstances (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997, Ellen and Turner 1997, Goetz 2010, Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1987). Poor distressed neighborhood conditions tend to deepen or prolong poverty and the better physical and social conditions in non-poor neighborhoods have the opposite effect on residents. HUD officials used this argument to conclude that public housing distress resulted from concentrated poverty and HOPE VI proponents assume that moving residents from concentrated poverty neighborhoods to non-poor or "better neighborhoods" will improve their lives (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). This assumption gives the impression that leaving public housing for low-poverty neighborhoods, n and of itself, improves the economic circumstances of the relocated residents but that is not the case.

The overall results showed that redevelopment improved the housing and site conditions substantially and reduced concentrated poverty drastically but had little effect on resident self-sufficiency. The most positive outcomes found resulted from the improvements to the housing quality and site conditions and from reductions in concentrated poverty.

Apparently, the physical improvements led to substantial psychosocial benefits for residents because they said their families were happier and they were feeling more self-confident because they were satisfied with their housing. This outcome shows that the quality of the physical environment in which residents live is very important to their psychological and social well-being. The psychosocial impact of the physical improvements is one of the profound findings of this study. Meanwhile, the study found no evidence that income mixing was having the transformative effect at the redeveloped sites as HOPE VI officials had predicted. There was no indication that public housing residents at Baldwin's Run, a mixed-income site, received the benefits HOPE VI officials assumed would accrue to them from living in the same development as homeowners with higher levels of income.

### **8.1 Physical Improvements**

Even though social scientists now believe that poor public housing families need additional social and economic support beyond a quality housing unit, the HOPE VI program still concentrates heavily on physical design and appearance. The three sites therefore underwent extensive physical redevelopment and so it not surprising that the study found the physical improvements to be the aspect of the project that residents benefitted from the most. Baldwin's Run physical transformation is so dramatic that the site received two "outstanding architectural design" awards.

At McGuire Gardens, some units were built on new foundations and some were rehabilitated on existing foundations. This site therefore has rehabilitated and new housing but the development retains the basic design of the original units. In contrast, all units at the new Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor developments are completely new and bear no resemblance

to the original units. HUD shifted HOPE VI's focus from rehabilitation to complete demolition and replacement and from public financing only to public-private financing to facilitate the increased focus on mixed-income housing. It is a rule change that makes HOPE VI a redevelopment catalyst since leveraged funding now exceeds HOPE VI funding substantially. Given that HOPE VI emphasizes building mixed-income developments in place of strictly public housing developments, an observer might expect significant differences in resident outcomes between the earlier HOPE VI developments, where all the units are public housing, and the newer mixed-income developments that have both public and non-public units. That is not the case however because the study found only slight variation in residents' satisfaction with the physical improvements at the two completed sites, with Baldwin's Run residents being somewhat more satisfied than McGuire Gardens residents. Approximately 97 percent of the interviewees from McGuire Gardens and 100 percent of those from Baldwin's Run expressed satisfaction with the physical improvements. These results indicate that the different redevelopment strategies used at the rehabilitated site and the mixed-income site where interviews were done did not produce substantially different outcomes.

### **8.1.1 Site and Building Design Changes**

All three developments underwent radical design changes, but at McGuire Gardens, the changes were less radical compared to those at the two mixed-income sites. However, certain site and housing design features are common to all sites irrespective of the redevelopment strategy used. Reducing density was an important goal as was site security, integrating the development into the neighborhood fabric, and providing community amenities. All the sites therefore incorporated features that improved living conditions substantially. The changes emphasized these features:

- single-family dwellings designed based on a narrow selection of architectural styles in surrounding neighborhoods
- a street network that resembles and ties into the surrounding street system
- outdoor space with demarcated public, private, and semi-private zones

- fewer total and fewer public housing units and lower unit density
- a multi-purpose community building,
- small front porches, private entrances, individual street numbers, small semi-private front yards and shared backyard space, larger interior space, and central air-conditioning.

These changes eliminated superblock design, which architects and social scientists believe failed because it helped to isolate public housing from the surroundings and induced crime and disorder. Eliminating superblocks improved site security, enabled local streets to be restored, and facilitated smaller-scale developments to fit the architectural character of the local community. HOPE VI planners assumed that building houses instead of apartments and making the housed look similar to regular neighborhood houses would dispel negative perceptions about public housing design. Interview results indicate that the negative perceptions have largely disappeared but these new developments look different from their surroundings, which make them stand out. One reason for the distinctive appearance is that the housing at the HOPE VI developments is newer than the housing in the surrounding communities. Another reason is that the housing designs do not vary as much as the neighborhood housing.

HUD did not want HOPE VI housing to look distinctive in their locality; the developments were supposed to blend into the neighborhood fabric and look like regular houses. However, selecting New Urbanism as the only design paradigm produces developments that look similar. This may not be a problem in the short or medium term but could become problematic later in the same way that previous developments became problematic. Now, as new housing, the distinctiveness is attractive.

An important physical redevelopment goal was to reduce the density at each site in line with the average density in each neighborhood to make the housing more attractive to potential buyers (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). At the three sites studied, the original densities ranged from 16 to 21 units per acre, which were not particularly high densities to begin with and did not differ substantially from the densities in the surrounding areas. These densities were typical for multi-



family developments of their size and type (Newman 1980). At Baldwin's Run, the main motivation for the drastic reduction in density from 21 units per acre to eight units per acre appears to be a desire to build single-family houses and to attract middle-income homebuyers. The motivation does not appear to have been a desire to improve public housing for public housing residents since only 78 are on that site when there were 514 before. For the other sites, the motives are less obvious.

Considering the substantial emphasis given to redeveloping the physical environment plus a long history of undertaking bricks and mortar reform, it should be no surprise that physical redevelopment has been the most successful aspect of HOPE VI. However, the pre-occupation with physical appearance detracts attention from effective relocation and residents' self-sufficiency services. Good quality living space is critical, no doubt, but it is not the only important aspect of the redevelopment. Physical redevelopment does not solve the main problem with distressed public housing as HOPE VI framed it--concentrated poverty. Physical redevelopment is merely one of the critical areas of redevelopment. Trying to create suburbia, in the inner-city does little, if anything, to improve residents economic well-being or poverty. Preoccupation with the physical appearance of the redeveloped sites means not enough attention and resources are devoted to other aspects of the redevelopment.

A hotly debated aspect of large public housing developments and evidenced at the three study sites before redevelopment was the palpable confusion between public and non-public space and the security risks involved (Newman 1996, 1980). HOPE VI addressed this issue by using real and symbolic barriers, as Defensible Space principles suggest, to delineate outdoor areas into public, private, and semi-private zones. Each of the three HOPE VI sites therefore exhibits several Defensible Space features but the findings indicate that the most important ingredient in a Defensible Space program--residents' control of the space surrounding their dwellings--is severely missing. Newman stated clearly that Defensible Space does not end by creating physical or symbolic barriers. For Defensible Space to be effective, residents must be

able to exercise care and control of the spaces around their homes (Newman 1996, Newman 1973). The study found that at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run residents lack any kind of control because their leases and instructions from the private management firm restrict their use of the space around their dwellings. Residents said they were satisfied with the physical changes to the site but very dissatisfied with the numerous restrictions on their use of the facilities. Some residents said they liked their homes but expressed apathy towards their development. This is unfortunate, because the restrictions defeat the whole purpose for having a Defensible Space program in the first place (Newman 1996). Residents at both sites complained about the restrictions but there were more complaints from residents at McGuire Gardens than from residents at Baldwin's Run. Since a different firm manages each site, different management styles appears to be a factor in the restrictions imposed. Additionally, at Baldwin's Run, the restrictions on public housing residents do not apply to homeowners. Site observations show many private homes that are nicely decorated with flowers while the public housing units are not. Some private homes even have backyard pools and perimeter fences, including picket fences but public housing tenants are not allowed these privileges. These management practices undermine the spirit and intent of Defensible Space.

Additionally, at Baldwin's Run, the site configuration does not promote community building or facilitate interaction between tenants and homeowners even though as a mixed-income site, it is supposed to encourage interaction between homeowners and tenants.

Another issue is that despite the impressive physical improvements in the development, the communities surrounding the two HOPE VI developments in East Camden remain physically distressed. The redeveloped properties, especially Baldwin's Run, are like little islands of HOPE in a sea of despair. HOPE VI promised neighborhood-wide improvements but there is little evidence of neighborhood-wide redevelopment to date. McGuire Gardens' redevelopment was completed six years ago in 2003 yet the only noteworthy neighborhood improvement activity observed was the construction of a new community elementary school a short distance from

Baldwin's Run. Vacant lands and dilapidated and abandoned residential buildings otherwise surround this development. Similarly, the only neighborhood improvement project observed in the Baldwin's Run vicinity was a new community school with a Boys and Girls Club built on Westfield Avenue nearby. A Camden County plan to convert the abandoned private housing complex on the southern border of Baldwin's Run into a park is yet to begin. In its current abandoned state, the site is vulnerable to illicit activities. Poverty, vacant buildings, poor roads, and violence are prevalent in the area. Several residents even expressed fear of surrounding communities.

### **8.1.2 Impact at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run Residents**

The biggest impact of the physical redevelopment on new and returning residents at McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres appears to be mostly psychological in nature. A majority of respondents from both sites mentioned psychosocial benefits more than any other benefit. More than 50 percent said the physical improvements improved their mental and emotional well-being overall. They felt better about themselves, their self-confidence and self-esteem improved, they felt and acted more responsibly, they felt safer, and less anxious, and the children were happier and had fewer conflicts. Other than acting more responsibly, the extent to which these psychosocial benefits translate to actual behavioral changes and improvements in employment, income, and economic self-sufficiency is uncertain. The fact that employment remains low and poverty is still rife is cause for concern. Changes in environmental conditions alone are not likely to produce consistently positive outcomes, as Goetz (2010) explained. Improvements in economic self-sufficiency involve a complex interaction of several variables at different levels of which the residential environment is just one variable. Perceptions of self, exogenous environmental factors such as job availability, racial and class discrimination, employees' willingness to hire public housing residents, and individual attributes like education and training, language, health status, and social contacts all contribute to life outcomes for public housing residents. Similarly, social

capital formation, one of the ideals on which HOPE VI is predicated, depends on a varied mix of system variables and not just on changes in the physical environment (Goetz 2010).

Safety was a very important issue to returnees and new tenants because, prior to redevelopment, crime and violence were big problems at all three sites, which made the residents fearful and tense. One report said McGuire Gardens experienced some of the worst violence in public housing in Camden. In the case of Westfield Acres, newspaper reports, residents, and the HOPE VI redevelopment plan noted that the development was over-run by crime and violence prior to demolition (HACC 2000, Courier News). At Baldwin's Run, most householders said problems still exist but safety was not a big concern to them anymore. A few residents expressed concern about drug activities and vandalism but most said they felt safe. Returning and new tenants who are familiar with the former Westfield Acres said Baldwin's Run was very safe compared to Westfield Acres. Householders said they were not afraid to sit on their porches at night anymore or allowing their children to play outdoors. These activities original residents feared doing at Westfield Acres. New residents expressed similar sentiments about their previous neighborhoods as well. A large percentage of new tenants said crime and violence in their previous communities made them fear for the safety of their families but experienced much less fear and anxiety at Baldwin's Run.

McGuire Gardens' householders were more concerned about safety in the development. Despite the big improvements in safety, some residents felt that the development was unsafe due to violence and illicit drug activities. There were two shootings incidents in the developments during the survey period. One shooting caused the death of a young man the night before one of my visits to the site. After that shooting, the Camden police maintained a 24-hour presence in the development for an entire week but disappeared thereafter. Several times before and after those incidents, residents advised me to stay away after dusk. During interviews, several residents were even reluctant to speak about safety issues. Some of them said the section of the development where they lived was safe but they could not speak about safety in the entire development. Others

were not so coy; they explicitly said crime and illicit drug activities were still present in the development but had declined significantly since redevelopment. Overall, interviewees said that since redevelopment McGuire Gardens was a lot safer and attributed most of the improvements in safety to the physical improvements. It appears then that the physical redevelopment not only improved housing quality and site appearance substantially but also contributed to declines in crime and fear of crime in both developments. The result is that resident's overall psychological and social well-being improved.

### **8.1.3 Householders' Satisfaction**

Large majorities said they were satisfied with their HOPE VI housing because it was better than their previous housing. Tenants at both McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run said they were satisfied with the design changes but complained about restrictions on their use of the spaces around their units. Despite substantial design differences and one site being mixed-income and the other being public housing only, residents' responses suggest no major difference in overall satisfaction in housing quality between Baldwin's Run and McGuire Gardens.

## **8.2 Changes in Concentrated Poverty**

In the mid-1990s, as HOPE VI increasingly stressed poverty deconcentration, HUD increasingly pushed PHAs to implement strategies to deconcentrate poverty. Relocation and income mixing became the centerpieces of that strategy. The HACC used a combination of relocation, demolition, and income integration strategies to deconcentrate poverty. The findings suggest that these strategies may be too simplistic to address the complexities of severely distressed public housing adequately. This approach to deconcentrating poverty is simplistic because it fails to take into account other housing developments, communities, and neighborhoods that relocation affected. By definition, deconcentrating poverty means moving people from one area to another and that means the receiving areas are negatively affected. The program does not appear to have

planned for this reality however and as a result, relocated families often end up in other poor communities.

The HACC used a push-pull strategy of relocation and income mixing to deconcentrate poverty at the HOPE VI sites. On the one hand, relocation is used to push poor households from the distressed sites to reduce poverty and income mixing is used to pull comparatively higher-income families into redeveloped sites to avoid reconcentrating poverty. As explained in Chapter 4, the theory underlying poverty deconcentration and relocation holds that extreme neighborhood poverty leads to neighborhood distress because it has negative effects on residents' social and economic well-being, social behavior, and neighborhood quality (Brooks-Gunn and Duncan 1997, South and Crowder 1999, Ellen and Turner 1997, Jencks and Mayer 1990, Wilson 1987). Conceptualizing the problem in this way leads to the assumption that the economic and social well-being of poor public housing residents depends on them adopting middle-class values and means living among and interacting with middle-income households. The HACC used this assumption to pursue relocation and mixed-income housing as key redevelopment strategies because income mixing would give poor households better opportunities to improve their lives in non-poor neighborhoods. However, this paternalistic idea did not work before and there is no evidence of it working now. A 1999 article from the Shimberg Center for Affordable Housing noted that this idea assumes that poor families can be taught how to behave like good middle-class citizens by putting them in good housing in middle-class type neighborhoods and that this will produce "good citizens". It gives the impression that poor residents in distressed public housing have values that perpetuate poverty. It is an idea that has elements of both the conservative "culture of poverty" ideology that blames the poor for being poor and liberal ideologies that view structural factors like distressed public housing as impediments to economic independence and self-sufficiency. Interestingly, results from the householder survey in this study suggest that a sizeable share of respondents support economic integration in public housing on the assertion that public housing tenants would learn positive values from middle-income households.

The findings from Baldwin's Run, the mixed-income site where householders were interviewed, show that relocation lessened onsite poverty levels substantially, which was the goal but the low-income public housing residents have not benefited from income mixing. Householders say public housing residents and homeowners rarely interact with each other. Only two public housing tenants interviewed acknowledged knowing any homeowners but nearly everyone knew and interacted with other public housing residents. Contrary to HOPE VI's prediction, positive interactions have not taken place between public housing tenants and homeowners.

Deconcentration works in other ways as well. The HOPE VI developments have populations that are certainly more economically diverse than before revitalization because current tenants have a wider range of incomes. Returnees are few because only a small percentage was allowed to return. Most received vouchers to relocate to private housing. The result is that the majority of current public housing tenants at the three HOPE VI sites are new to public housing. This is one of the major problems with poverty deconcentration. The proportion of returnees is so small that one has to wonder if HOPE VI was intended for them.

### **8.2.1 Relocation Was Not Enough**

Relocation is based on the assumption that moving to a "better" neighborhood will boost economic outcomes (Massey and Denton 1993, Wilson 1987). Relocation proponents also argue that relocation to non-poor neighborhoods will improve social capital because non-poor neighborhoods provide opportunities for making new contacts. By itself, moving to new neighborhoods does not make poor people less poor. Relocation outcomes depend on several personal and non-personal factors. Thus, emptying public housing of its poor residents is not likely to affect movers' fortunes much since it does not change the obstacles to employment such as low education and skills, lack of work experience, poor health, disability, and racial and class prejudice. Additionally, movers still have difficulties accessing affordable healthcare, childcare,

and transportation services, even when these services are available. Relocation programs often incorrectly assume that poor public housing families can move to low-poverty neighborhoods as easily as middle-income families. The limited economic means of poor families make relocation less attractive and make it difficult to maintain established support networks (Venkatesh and Celimli 2004).

Housing vouchers serve as a government rent subsidy for relocation to private housing for original residents. Vouchering may well be a great option for some residents but voucher holders frequently experience the problem of lack of suitable affordable housing because of tight housing markets and reluctance of landlords to rent to voucher holders. Vouchering succeeds when the housing market is receptive to voucher holders. The HACC even acknowledged that there were problems with deconcentrating poverty using vouchers because many residents from McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres could not find housing at acceptable standards (HACC 2003a). The HACC noted, “Redistributing low-income families to date has only served to reconcentrate poverty in other neighborhoods, so the vouchers approach in Camden has not provided for the community building effect desired by residents, HACC, and the City” (HACC 2003a, p. 90). Vouchering is not valid in all housing markets. In economies like that of Camden, poverty is widespread throughout the city. As a result, low-poverty neighborhoods are almost non-existent. Census 2000 data poverty in excess of 20 percent in 20 of Camden’s 21 principal neighborhoods and poverty was as high as 51 percent in at least one neighborhood (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Additionally, a large portion of the city’s housing stock is severely deteriorated. Under those conditions, the poor results of the voucher relocation process that the HACC reported should surprise no one.

This issue is not unique to the HACC or to Camden. Studies of other HOPE VI developments reported similar outcomes (Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). Relocation plans that ended with residents returning to high-poverty neighborhoods, as the HACC indicated, suggest shortsightedness in planning and implementation. The relocation plans may not have



adequately accounted for market conditions or the impact of deconcentration on receiving communities. It is also clear that relocation was focused solely on reducing poverty onsite although it is clear that moving poor residents from a public housing site negatively affects poverty in the receiving neighborhoods.

### **8.2.2 Income Mixing Has Not Shown the Predicted Results**

Former HUD Secretary, Henry Cisneros said: “When public housing residents are integrated into mixed-income communities, those communities can fulfill multiple roles that are crucial to the urban workforce, to the housing mission of cities, and to the metropolitan economy (Cisneros 2009, p. 13). This statement shows the remarkable faith HOPE VI leaders placed in the untested (there is little empirical evidence to support the claims) mixed-income public housing arena. Conventional thinking assumes that low-income residents will benefit from living in proximity to higher-income residents such as homeowners. However, homeowner’s earnings may be as low as 80 percent of the area median income, which is the upper income limit for public housing. While the mixed-income idea sounds good, its viability is certainly not free from risk (Abravanel, Levy and McFarland 2009). At Camden’s two mixed-income HOPE VI developments, the non-public housing includes low-income tax credit rentals and homeownership units. To prevent concentrated poverty in HOPE VI developments and to help residents achieve economic self-sufficiency, since 1996, HOPE VI has pursued a mixed-income housing policy (Brophy and Smith 1997, Goetz 2003, Popkin, Harris, et al. 2002, Zhang 2004). Policymakers and public housing authority officials embraced income mixing as a strategy to deconcentrate poverty based on the NCSDPH’s critical report about distressed public housing and scholarly research indicating that concentrated poverty is the main contributing factor. On the face of it, greater income mixing seems to be the way to achieve income diversity and avoid a preponderance of low-income households in HOPE VI developments. However, at the mixed-income site where

householders were interviewed, the study found no impact on residents' economic well-being or the behavior of public housing families because of income mixing.

Neither the HACC nor HUD appears to have a blueprint for creating successful mixed-income developments. Furthermore, even though income mixing is a top priority in HOPE VI, no one knows what works and what does not work in mixed-income developments that include public housing (Brophy and Smith 1997, Joseph 2010, Rosenbaum, Stroh and Flynn 1998, Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997). A common perception is that mixed-income and mixed-tenure arrangements in HOPE VI were conceived to facilitate private financing and details regarding long-term social and cost implications were not well thought out (Abravanel, Levy and McFarland 2009). Brophy and Smith (1997) and Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) suggested several ways for HOPE VI to create mixed-income developments that include public housing units, such as combining the public and non-public units in equal numbers, having more public housing units than non-public housing units, or having a greater number of non-public units than public units. Camden's two mixed-income developments used the latter. Respondents viewed income mixing positively but differed from the housing authority about the proportion of public housing units the HOPE VI developments should have. Most of the householders suggested equal numbers of public and homeownership units. None suggested more homeownership units than public housing units. The reality however is that both mixed-income developments have more homeownership units than public units. Brophy and Smith (1997) and Schwartz and Tajbakhsh (1997) said it was also important to make rental and owner-occupied units indistinguishable to the outside observer. Based on physical revitalization plans, conversations with the HOPE VI Coordinator, and site observations, public housing and non-public housing units were designed similarly and to the same standards.

While HACC has embraced the mixed-income housing concept and has applied some mixed-income ideas, we still do not know important information such as the level of income mixing that must be reached, if any, for the quality of life in the mixed-income development to

improve and the poor families to experience upward mobility. It is equally important to know what the most effective policy interventions are for creating the appropriate housing mix.

Despite similar design characteristics, site observations at Baldwin's Run show clear differences in appearance between rental units and owner-occupied units. Owner-occupied units had decorations and amenities such as pools, perimeter fences, and gates but the public housing units do not have external amenities or decorations. Survey participants reported that the private management firm treated renters and homeowners differently, which resulted in the differences in the appearance between public units and owner-occupied units that visitors often ask about. The issue is that homeowners can amend and decorate their homes as they see fit but tenants are not allowed such privileges. They are not even allowed to use the outside water pipes. With this decision, one has to question the reason for putting the pipes there in the first place.

One of the most influential arguments for income mixing is that low-income householders will benefit from the presence of higher-income residents. Proponents argue that the higher-income residents will attract high-quality services such as high-quality management and private and public neighborhood services that would benefit the poor households. Advocates of mixed-income housing also assume that mixed-income projects can help low-income residents become self-sufficient because it encourages upward mobility and "good" personal conduct and give them opportunities to form influential social ties. Peter Calthorpe, a founding member of the New Urbanism movement, noted that children would have role models living next door to them and social experiences that are often missing from public housing projects (Calthorpe 2001). Much less patronizing, Mark Joseph (2010), a Case Western Reserve University professor, noted that good behavior depends more on good quality management, ongoing social service provisions, and residents' level of engagement in the development than on the income mix of the residents. In addition to mixing incomes and good management, upward mobility of low-income households in HOPE VI developments requires comprehensive and ongoing social services that address barriers to self-sufficiency such as low educational achievement and lack of employment

skills. In addition, he suggested that social ties might be overrated. If true, this may help to explain the poor self-sufficiency outcomes found at Camden's two mixed income sites.

Most of the public housing tenants interviewed agreed that providing public and private housing in the same development was a positive step but were concerned the reduction in low-income housing. This concern is valid because that is exactly what has happened. Householders who supported mixing public housing with non-public housing said it could force public housing tenants to take better care of their homes and encourage them to work harder to buy their own homes in the future. Interestingly, the potential benefits householders cited were similar to those that mixed-income housing proponents also assumed, including the assumption that public housing tenants would adopt middle-class values of good conduct.

Survey participants reported few interactions between renters and homeowners and that they had not learnt anything from homeowners. The reasons are not clear but clustering of units by tenure may be one reason because most public units have other public units as neighbors. The physical distance between most public housing units and most non-public housing units may be another reason. Another factor appears to be the preferential treatment (perceived or real) that public housing tenant said homeowners received. A few tenants said they resented the restrictions on them while homeowners were free to do anything they wanted. Without meaningful interaction between renters and homeowners, the transfer of values from higher income to lower income residents that housing mobility advocates assumed would take place in mixed-income housing developments is not likely to take place.

Although relocation and income mixing reduced concentrated poverty in all three HOPE VI developments, poverty remains very high among public housing households. There is recognition in the HOPE VI program that concentrated poverty by itself does not cause distress but its acceptance appears to be weak. Supportive services help residents deal with personal issues like poor health and disability, but substance abuse counseling, family counseling, long

term job and skills training, and education need greater financial support over the long term because short term fixes are not nearly enough for “hard to house” tenants.

### 8.2.3 HOPE for Whom?

Research by the Governmental Accounting Office (GAO) suggests that the proportion of original residents that returned to redeveloped sites varied considerably from about 10 percent to 100 percent (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). Other research suggests a narrower range of 10 percent to 75 percent, with the largest numbers returning to rehabilitated sites rather than to sites that were demolished completely and rebuilt (Comey June 2007). Based on estimates in the HOPE VI redevelopment plans for McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres and interviews with HOPE VI officers, 15 percent of original residents from Roosevelt Manor and about 32 percent from Westfield Acres returned after redevelopment. No data was available for McGuire Gardens but given that some residents remained onsite during redevelopment, more than 32 percent appeared to have returned initially but many of them have since moved out. The picture that emerges here is that for most original residents, HOPE VI has meant relocating to private housing rather than moving to improved housing in a HOPE VI development (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009, Comey June 2007). HOPE VI officials made the decision for them to live elsewhere despite the fact that the majority of them wanted to return. The evidence suggests that the HA and the private management firms preferred to deal with new tenants even when they are as poor as the original tenants. Results from the householder survey indicate that most HOPE VI families were first time tenants and very poor. Most had annual incomes of less than \$10,000.

At all sites, original tenants who endured the distressed living conditions for years and whom HOPE VI promised improved living environments benefited the least from HOPE VI. Those who benefitted had to meet restrictive and somewhat unrealistic (for public housing families) selection criteria. Interestingly, per HUD requirements, original householders in “good standing” who desired to return were promised HOPE VI housing. However, considering that the

HA had planned to replace just 64 percent of original public housing units in all three developments and 43 percent in the mixed-income developments, achieving that goal was highly unlikely. Theoretically, given the limited availability of public housing units, the HA might have denied improved housing to tenants in good standing. At Baldwin's Run for example, if more than 78 original tenants met the "good standing" criteria, some would have had to obtain housing elsewhere because the site has only 78 public housing units. Noting the irony, a December 1998 report by HUD's Office of Inspector General stated that the very people whose living conditions made distressed developments eligible for HOPE VI funding were not the ones who benefitted most from HOPE VI grants (Pitcoff 1999).

### **8.3 Self-Sufficiency Outcomes**

Study results suggest that the HACC provided several different supportive services to residents from the three sites but the services varied by site. From the limited information received, some services appear to have yielded some positive results but the overall impact on resident self-sufficiency has been small. The different redevelopment strategies and increases in the quantity of services at successive sites do not appear to have had much differential impact on resident self-sufficiency outcomes. The sharp differences in support services to original residents at Westfield Acres and McGuire Gardens during redevelopment were expected to produce notable differences in self-sufficiency outcomes between the two developments but that is not what the results show.

Overall, at McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run, employment and average household income among HOPE VI public housing residents were higher in 2008 than for pre-HOPE VI residents. The differences vary by site and generally not substantial. Inflation appears to have played a substantial part in the higher incomes reported but additional research is required to determine the actual inflationary impact. While the average household income for returnees at McGuire Gardens was higher than the average household income for new residents at Baldwin's Run, new tenants had a higher average household income than returnees in 2008.

HOPE VI residents also had higher levels of employment than pre-HOPE VI residents but the differences were small. Dependency on government assistance also varied between the sites. The big picture shows lower unemployment but the decreases were due primarily to the replacement of original tenants with new tenants having higher levels of employment and income, even at McGuire Gardens where the higher than average annual incomes of two returnees skewed the average income in favor of original tenants. Otherwise, the majority of returnees at this site had lower incomes than new tenants. Most of the improvements shown at all sites resulted from population changes, not improvements in the actual economic well-being of original residents. Interestingly, although the data show slightly better averages, residents' overall economic circumstances have not improved. That means HOPE VI has not yet met its goals to improve resident self-sufficiency. There are mitigating factors however, such as the fact that Camden has a very poor and struggling economy and jobs are very scarce. With jobs scarce, even skilled residents have difficulties finding employment.

The study also indicates that most public housing residents who are not employed have special needs that job training and employment preparation will not fix. A large proportion of householders have disability, healthcare, and child-care needs that prevent them from working outside their homes. Some are long-term dependents on government assistance. Long-term dependents on government programs require a lot of support to become truly independent of government aid. The HA probably should do more to target self-sufficiency services to these needs in order to improve economic self-sufficiency. As Ellen and Turner (1997) explained, the housing environment does not affect everyone in the same way. Popkin, Levy and Buron (2009) previously advised that for "hard to house"<sup>16</sup> residents, relocation and supportive services alone would not reduce employment substantially because they have special needs such as healthcare, disability, childcare, or criminal history. Employment focused self-sufficiency programs have

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<sup>16</sup>The 'hard to house' are residents with complex problems such as mental illness, severe physical illness, substance abuse, weak labor-market histories, criminal records, and families with large numbers of young children (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009).

little impact on the disabled and residents with chronic health problems and critical childcare needs.

The self-sufficiency plans reviewed for Baldwin's Run and Roosevelt Manor focused on increasing employment and income because public housing residents usually have problems getting and maintaining employment and decent income. Even the best plan depends on the local economy to succeed. Given the poor self-sufficiency outcomes at redeveloped sites, it may be that the CSS plans did not sufficiently account for the poorly performing local labor market and economy. The local officials assumed that once trained, residents would get jobs and reduce their dependency on public assistance. In declining economies such as Camden's, substantial improvements in the key self-sufficiency variables may not be a realistic option for distressed public housing residents over the life of a HOPE VI project.

### **8.3.1 Impact on Residents**

Study results indicate that through succeeding HOPE VI projects, the HACC became more adept at the provision of supportive services to residents. Thus, while McGuire Gardens' residents received few self-sufficiency services during the redevelopment, Westfield Acres and Roosevelt Manor residents had several supportive services options. The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act, improved monitoring of HOPE VI projects by HUD, and the HACC becoming more adept in the HOPE VI process all played major roles in the improvements. The QHWRA made self-sufficiency services a HOPE VI requirement so the HACC had no choice but to provide said services.

This improvement in services to increase employment and income appear to have had few successes however. Survey results indicate little progress towards economic self-sufficiency and reduction in barriers to self-sufficiency among public housing residents at the redeveloped sites. Between McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run, only four of the householders interviewed, two from each site, attributed gains in either employment or income to HOPE VI. One likely



reason for this lack of self-sufficiency progress by the majority is the large proportion of residents who did not participate in any self-sufficiency initiative. Forty-two percent of the respondents from McGuire Gardens and twelve percent from Baldwin's Run acknowledged receiving self-sufficiency assistance during or after redevelopment. Most of the others said they did not know about the services. Additionally, household dependence on government assistance showed no decline in the review period. Without more than the initial self-sufficiency plans and the information householders provided in the survey, the reasons for the poor self-sufficiency impacts are not clear. One possibility is a need to change the way resident services are administered. Communication appears to be one area that needs to improve substantially. One possible reason for the low participation may be inadequate or ineffective communication between the HA and residents about the HOPE VI redevelopment. Another reason may be residents' own failure to act upon information received from the housing authority, and a third possibility is that the majority of interviewees were new tenants who did not know that they too were eligible for HOPE VI self-sufficiency assistance. If so, the HA might not have promoted its self-sufficiency services among new tenant as much as it did with original tenants. Another possible reason is that many tenants who obtained self-sufficiency benefits did not participate in the survey. Although HAs may use up to 20 percent of HOPE VI grants for CSS activities (McCarty 2005), the amount available is usually much less and woefully inadequate to satisfy needs and are exhausted soon after re-occupancy (Holin, et al. 2003). To meet the HOPE VI economic self-sufficiency goals, HUD and the HACC should devote more funding to self-sufficiency programs, develop services that target residents' needs, not only the desires of HUD, HOPE VI or the HA to make the developments financially.

Poor self-sufficiency outcomes are not uncommon in HOPE VI projects. Several studies reported similarly poor self-sufficiency outcomes at other HOPE VI developments. For example, recent findings from the five HOPE VI Panel Study sites showed no gain in employment (Popkin et al. (2009). Goetz (2010 and 2005) pointed to research consistently showing that dispersed

HOPE VI households did not benefit from relocation in terms of employment or income. Given that several HOPE VI studies also reported poor self-sufficiency outcomes, it may be that the policy assumptions and program level interventions in HOPE VI underestimated (or misdiagnosed) the complexity of the social and economic issues confronting distressed public housing residents and have prevented them from achieving economic self-sufficiency (Clampet-Lundquist and Massey 2008, Levy and Wolley 2007, Goetz 2010). Is it also possible that HOPE VI policy assumptions are premature conclusions from the neighborhood effects literature? As Ellen and Turner (1997) reasoned, with so many unknown variables, policy prescriptions based on neighborhood effects theory have strong possibilities of underestimating or overestimating the effects of concentrated poverty on public housing residents, for example. Policymakers, policy analysts, HOPE VI officials and advocates can learn much from the excellent analysis of the neighborhood effects literature by Ellen and Turner (1997).

Despite the poor self-sufficiency outcomes, householders reported positive psychosocial benefits from living in HOPE VI developments. When asked about the benefits of HOPE VI to them, the overwhelming majority of comments expressed increases in self-confidence, less family tension and improvements in tenant and family emotional well-being. The most frequent comments were: "I feel better about myself". "I have a more positive outlook on life". "I feel more confident about my family's future and myself". "I am less depressed". "I am not anxious anymore". "I feel safe". "My children can play outside now without me worrying." Tenants said these benefits came from finally living in decent housing and developments where they felt a lot safer than before. They mentioned housing quality and design, having adequate interior space for their families, quietness, and safety in the developments as important facets that made them comfortable. While all householders pointed to positive benefits from the physical improvements, two householders from McGuire Gardens and two from Baldwin's run cited self-sufficiency services as major benefits to them. One tenant at McGuire Gardens said she used her improved motivation to find new employment and an improved path towards self-sufficiency.

There is no doubt that HOPE VI transformed the physical and demographic environment at the three formerly distressed housing developments such that poverty is less concentrated now and living conditions are much better than before. There is also no doubt that HOPE VI developments are safer than the distressed developments they replaced. The physical and safety improvements have reduced anxiety among residents and have helped to improve their self-confidence. However, if the extremely poor living conditions in the distressed developments resulted from concentrated poverty, then physical improvements alone or combined with poverty deconcentrating initiatives like relocation, will not make residents less poor. Site conditions may improve but that will not reduce dependency, improve literacy, reduce unemployment, or increase income among public housing tenants. The HA can easily replace extremely low-income tenants with higher-income tenants but unless the economic well-being of the extremely low-income and very low-income returnees improves, poverty and dependency on government will remain high and economic self-sufficiency elusive. Resident needs must receive no less attention than the physical environment or poverty deconcentration initiatives (NCSDPH 1992).

Given the poor state of the Camden's economy, the high levels of poverty, and the poor housing and neighborhood conditions, improving resident self-sufficiency is a considerable challenge for the HACC. The 2008 sufficiency standards for a three-person household with an adult (mother) and two school age children in Camden County, which is the typical HOPE VI public housing family unit in Camden city, ranged from \$23,233 to \$48,867, and 34 percent to 72 percent of the Area Median Income. The average household income for residents across all three sites is approximately \$13,000. These figures do not point to any easy path to decreasing dependency and improving self-sufficiency among tenants.

#### **8.4 Summary**

HOPE VI began by promising meaningful changes to the physical, social and economic environment at severely distressed public housing developments, including residents' lives

(Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Positive outcomes from the Gautreaux program in Chicago had convinced HOPE VI advocates that a nationwide program similar to the Gautreaux program would reap positive benefits as well.

While nearly all tenants who were interviewed experienced improvements in the quality of lives, the improvements were due to the changes to the physical environment. A few tenants cited self-sufficiency benefits but most said HOPE VI made them feel better about themselves. The quality of life improvements reported were related to the physical improvements, not to any gain in employment or income or less dependence on government assistance. Among onsite public housing households, HOPE VI has had little impact on self-sufficiency. However, interviews repeatedly stressed that their children were a lot happier, that fighting had declined, and that they now play outside safely for the first time. Householders reported that they experienced less stress and were much less nervous too. Residents reported fewer headaches because they were less fearful about their families' safety and living conditions. Other than improvements to the physical environment and lowering poverty levels at distressed sites, the findings indicate that HOPE VI also helped to improve residents' emotional well-being. The HOPE VI literature has not sufficiently acknowledged this achievement however. The psychosocial benefits that residents reported had the biggest impact on their lives. One previous HOPE VI study reported similar findings. Boston (2005) reported that a significant number of former residents from Harris Homes in Atlanta attributed positive social-psychological behavioral changes to relocation out of public housing. Those residents cited improved self-esteem, feeling stronger, being more responsible, and substance abuse treatment and recovery as the biggest changes in their lives (Boston 2005, p. 405).

Despite the methodological shortcomings and the many data gaps in this study, a powerful lesson learnt is that HOPE VI successes so far have been mostly place-based such as transforming the physical environment, providing decent housing, and reducing the concentration of poverty on the site. People-based outcomes such as improvements in residents' socioeconomic

well-being have eluded HOPE VI at the three sites studied. These results are not limited to the three developments studied however; they are a consistent feature of HOPE VI developments nationwide. Consequently, although HOPE VI was created to improve the lives of residents of severely distressed public housing, the most consistently positive outcomes from redevelopment are the improvements to the physical environment and reductions in concentrated poverty at HOPE VI sites. When it comes to the people side of HOPE VI, a large percentage of original residents has not yet benefited from redevelopment (Goetz 2005).

## CHAPTER 9

### IMPLICATIONS

HUD launched the HOPE VI program in 1993 amidst despair and concern about appalling conditions in federal housing. The program's key provisions are based on the recommendations of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing in 1992. Since then, HOPE VI has become the main tool used to re-engineer severely distressed federal public housing. The program's articulated aims are to transform the physical environment, end the isolation of residents from the wider urban environment that resulted from concentrated poverty, and foster upward mobility by providing opportunities for residents to live among more prosperous neighbors who can put them in contact with employment opportunities.

This study explored how HOPE VI redevelopment projects in Camden impacted the lives of the public housing residents at three HOPE VI sites and found results consistent with previous research. The physical changes improved site and housing conditions markedly and contributed substantially to improving residents' psychosocial, personal, and family well-being. Nearly all householders spoke about personal growth or improvement in personal and family well-being from living in decent housing and housing that they like. Concentrated poverty onsite declined as well. Regarding resident self-sufficiency, the study found few signs of real progress as more than 90 percent of interviewees said their economic circumstances had not improved under HOPE VI. There were some undesirable consequences as well, such as reductions in the number of public housing units at each site and displacement of residents. The Camden housing authority also reported that problems in the relocation process forced many voucher holders from McGuire Gardens and the former Westfield Acres developments to return to similar or worse housing and neighborhood conditions as before relocation.

## 9.1 Research Implications

Several study results point to a need for more empirical research to deepen understanding of HOPE VI affects the lives of original and new public housing residents at HOPE VI sites and the lives of original residents who moved to private housing. Housing and neighborhood outcomes for displaced families are two of the unknown issues in HOPE VI that need exploration. Knowing how former tenants fare after received vouchers to move to private housing or after they stop receiving federal housing assistance is important to understanding the program's overall impact.

Like many other housing authorities, the HACC is not able to account for former residents from McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres who no longer receive subsidized housing benefits. This issue is common in HOPE VI, particularly among grant recipients in the 1990s. Several HOPE VI studies documented concerns regarding the whereabouts of displaced residents (Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). It is also unclear what percentage of original residents who were moved to other public housing developments to facilitate redevelopment have since moved on to better housing, what percentage remains in public housing, and if their economic well-being improved. The fact that the housing and economic outcomes of many former tenants that HOPE VI projects displaced are unknown should be of serious concern to HOPE VI administrators (Kingsley, Johnson and Pettit 2003). Because relocation is such an integral part of HOPE VI, the housing and economic circumstances of displaced residents are important to understanding HOPE VI's full impact and critical to the effectiveness of future policy interventions.

Relocation is the primary means of deconcentrating poverty in HOPE VI. Some original residents moved to private housing and some were moved to other public housing developments, even though those moves did nothing to improve their housing or economic circumstances. This study did not research outcomes for permanent relocatees, yet their HOPE VI experiences are also crucial to understanding HOPE VI's overall impact. Housing authority data indicate that the largest group of relocatees received vouchers to rent private market housing (HACC 2000, HACC 2003a). The HACC also reported that voucher relocation did not work well for residents from the

first two HOPE VI sites, McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres, because many voucher holders were forced to return to poor housing in distressed communities (HACC 2003a). Since HOPE VI seeks to deconcentrate poverty, reconcentration of poverty elsewhere contradicts the program's intent. Future HOPE VI research should examine voucher relocation.

Homeowners, who account for 60 percent of the householders at Baldwin's Run and almost 38 percent at Roosevelt Manor, were not included in this study, but they are very important to deconcentrating poverty. Since perceived benefits from income integration were key HOPE VI assumptions, homeowners' experiences are also important to HOPE VI's overall impact. Research about homeowners is therefore needed to learn about the success or otherwise of providing public and private housing on the same site. The mixed-income experiences at one site can provide valuable lessons to help guide future planning interventions. Finally, further research is needed to understand why dependency on government assistance increased amidst increasing income diversity.

## 9.2 Policy Implications

Study results have several policy implications. To the public housing residents, the housing and site improvements have had the biggest effects on them to date. These physical improvements contributed substantially to improving the health and psychological well-being of HOPE VI residents. Imagine living in a house in a location where your children can play safely outside and which satisfies your family's needs, for the very first time. That is the HOPE VI experience for several households who were interviewed. This finding is significant because it reinforces the importance of good quality housing to people's mental well-being and signals to housing officials the need to maintain housing quality to ensure that HOPE VI housing is sustainable.

Despite talk about PHA flexibility in the HOPE VI redevelopment process, HUD failed to realize that the lack of alternative design ideas to New Urbanism in HOPE VI developments does not engender local flexibility in design. The public therefore does not know if alternatives to



New Urbanism would have produced better outcomes than those that New Urbanism produced. To encourage local ingenuity, HUD should reconsider this “one size fits all” policy in future programs. Openness stimulates creativity in design and encourages HAs to create housing developments that have genuinely diverse housing types and housing styles. A truly diverse urban housing development would have a mix of multi-family and single-family housing; detached, semi-detached houses and townhouses; low-rise and mid-rise housing types; housing for the elderly and non-elderly; and low-income and middle-income housing. After all, that is the way most urban neighborhoods are. That would be the best way to make the HOPE VI developments fit the character of their neighborhoods, instead of them merely having units designed to resemble selected housing styles from the surrounding areas.

One of the most controversial HOPE VI outcomes is the small percentage of original residents that returned to HOPE VI developments (Cunningham 2004). HOPE VI was set up to improve the living environment in public housing for residents but in Camden, few original residents received either new or rehabilitated HOPE VI housing. At Baldwin’s Run, less than 32 percent returned and at Roosevelt Manor, a mere 15 percent are expected to return, yet in both instances, most tenants wanted to return. The HACC should reconsider its re-entry policy to allow a larger percentage of original residents to return after redevelopment. Re-entry rules that require tenants to have good credit, continuous employment, and no record of rent and utility delinquency are prohibitive and somewhat unrealistic at best. Simply taking the “best” tenants while and excluding very disadvantaged families with children, for example, is counterproductive to public housing mission. Reviewing the re-entry policy is particularly important considering that the HACC said relocating original families to private housing did not produce the desired results because a large number of families from the first two sites were forced to return to high-poverty environments. Having endured the poor living conditions in the distressed projects, these residents, who are unfamiliar with the private housing market that failed them in the first place, should not end up in similar or worse housing conditions as the ones they moved from earlier.

HOPE VI administrators ought to bear in mind that the fundamental mission of the public housing program is to serve low income families that the private housing market does not serve.

The HACC should also revise its HOPE VI relocation policy to avoid the problems that prevented residents from finding suitable housing in better neighborhoods. Vouchers are not for everyone, especially “hard-to-house” tenants or those with special housing needs (Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). Families with several children, families with disability needs, and families having members with questionable backgrounds and credit problems do not do well in housing voucher programs (Martens 2010) and therefore need special attention during relocation.

The majority of original residents received little or no economic benefit from living in new or renovated housing and upgraded sites even though the HOPE VI program was created to benefit them. That means self-sufficiency outcomes lagged well behind other outcomes. Consequently, HOPE VI overall results are not as positive as expected. Self-sufficiency plans need to be developed based on actual conditions in the local and regional economies, including the housing market, so that realistic projections can be made. Optimistic projections about higher employment and income potentials in a poorly performing economy such as Camden’s are of little value or comfort to residents. Economic self-sufficiency outcomes are often based on factors outside the control of HOPE VI or the housing authority but linked intimately to the labor market and the performance of the local and regional economies (Cunningham 2004). At times, the HOPE VI literature gives the impression that relocation alone would improve economic prospects for relocatees but that is not the case. Even if the job market happens to be robust, that does not automatically translate to jobs and improved self-sufficiency for public housing residents, as adult residents know well. The fact is that public housing residents face formidable employment barriers based on their status as public housing tenants, plus other barriers based on personal circumstances such as lack of employment skills or transportation, and poor education. Additionally, in very poor economies such as Camden’s, employment opportunities are scarce for most residents but more scarce for low-skilled public housing residents.

Poverty deconcentration plans need to include potential negative impacts of relocation on receiving neighborhoods. Even though relocating most of the poor residents from the distressed housing affects the site positively, the effects on receiving neighborhoods are negative. HOPE VI deconcentration plans should therefore take into consideration, the impacts of deconcentration on receiving communities to avoid serious consequences in those areas. A well-planned and carefully managed relocation program ensures that relocation does not result in poverty reconcentrating elsewhere or tip other already poor neighborhoods into higher poverty brackets. This is critical for cities like Camden where virtually all neighborhoods are already poor. HUD's role is not housing only; it also has an urban development role. When HOPE VI shifts poverty from one neighborhood to another or from one part of a neighborhood to another, HUD still has the responsibility to address the problem. Poverty appears to have consolidated in other areas in Camden as some displaced residents with vouchers experienced difficulties finding suitable alternative housing (HACC 2003a). In that case, can the housing authorities realistically claim success in deconcentrating poverty when families who were forced to move cannot find housing?

Relocation may move some families into better housing and better neighborhoods but that does not automatically change their economic circumstances. Unless their economic circumstances improve, residents will continue to face problems due to their low levels of education, skills, and work experience, poor health and disabilities, and racial discrimination. It depends on where relocated families end up. Programs that provide self-sufficiency support beyond the project life along with relocation are more likely to produce positive outcomes. At the same time, relocation may unintentionally spread poverty to other areas.

Self-sufficiency goals are not well articulated. The absence of outcome goals and confusion about the meaning of self-sufficiency and poverty deconcentration require attention. The False HOPE (2002) study suggested that this issue requires attention. It is not clear if self-sufficiency means independence from all forms of public assistance or merely independence from welfare assistance. It is also not clear what poverty threshold(s) HAs should use to assess

progress towards eradicating concentrated poverty. None of the two redevelopment plans examined or interviews with HOPE VI officials provided poverty benchmarks to assess progress in deconcentrating poverty. If the goal is simply to reduce poverty to less than 40 percent, it is not clearly stated. With no clear guidance from HUD, HOPE VI goals differ from project to project, which makes program evaluation difficult because, in effect, several HOPE VI programs exist.

Redevelopment should also preserve the existing levels of public housing for needy families. At two of Camden's three HOPE VI developments, there was a net reduction of 342 public housing units from 892 units to 550 units, and this in a city with severe housing deficiencies and long waiting lists for public housing and Section 8 housing. At the minimum, redevelopment should preserve the existing stock of low-income housing. HAs often ignores vacant units to paint a more palatable picture and allow them to abandon units to make the site more attractive for redevelopment.

The findings of this study suggest that the HACC's redevelopment goals were focused on inputs instead of outcomes and this may well be one reason for the poor self-sufficiency outcomes. Program policies should emphasize outcomes, not inputs so that HAs do not emphasize what they did but what they achieved instead. No longer would they be able to only point to the number of units demolished or the self-sufficiency programs implemented or to the number of residents whom they relocated as meaning success. Instead, they would point to the number of replacement units, to specific self-sufficiency achievements such as the number of residents whom the program placed in jobs or higher education, and to the percentage of families who now live in better housing and neighborhood conditions.

Wilson (1987) emphasized the need for policy initiatives to improve human capital among the poor but HOPE VI emphasizes physical transformation and mixing tenure and income. As discussed earlier, physical redevelopment is important to improving living conditions but in the absence of substantially more resources and time devoted to human capital improvements, the HOPE VI projects are going to be hard-pressed to have any meaningful impact on the

socioeconomic circumstances of families affected by the program. Residents need long term support to reach greater economic self-sufficiency. The HACC needs to devote more resources to this effort and do so beyond the life of a project. Additionally, it seems clear that self-sufficiency means more than just having a job and earning just enough income to be weaned from public assistance. For example, some residents may be skilled but are unable to hold decent paying jobs due to drugs use, family problems, or lack of childcare assistance. They need assistance beyond job intensive training programs to get them on the road to self-sufficiency. Furthermore, too many residents, particularly at Baldwin's Run, claimed ignorance about the availability of self-sufficiency services and therefore not benefiting from the programs offered. It is not clear where the problem lies but it is something that the HACC needs to address promptly. The HACC's biggest challenge may well be the fact that virtually all of Camden's neighborhoods are poor, which makes plans to move public housing residents to low-poverty neighborhoods meaningless.

For the new Choice Neighborhood Program that is to replace HOPE VI, HUD needs to establish a clear definition for self-sufficiency and set performance standards. The standards should be based on outcomes not inputs and apply to program goals and HOPE VI awards. A built-in reward system to encourage superior performance would also help to improve HA performance. Clear performance standards facilitate evaluation across projects and the HOPE VI program. Greater investments in self-sufficiency and other supportive services would help residents find better housing and adjust to their new housing (Fraser and Nelson 2008).

Negative outcomes indicate weaknesses in the program. After 17 years, the \$6.5 billion invested has reduced the low-income housing stock substantially but improved housing conditions for selected tenants only. Reducing the low-income housing stock makes it more difficult for low-income people to find safe and decent housing that they can afford. A core objective was to improve self-sufficiency but results show employment, income and dependence on government assistance that are similar to the pre-redevelopment period. Could the \$6 billion achieve more? If done differently, could it have improved the distressed public housing and

simultaneously expanded the affordable housing stock? Would more housing developments have benefited? The questions highlight a need to rethink HOPE VI approaches to:

- The provision of self-sufficiency services to ensure that initiatives implemented actually match residents' needs, including barriers to meaningful employment such as disability and child/family care needs;
- Allocation of funding for self-sufficiency improvements to give more emphasis to improving residents' well-being, as the NCSDPH recommended;
- Developing mixed-income housing to create real neighborhoods by expanding the mix of building and units types at each site such that there are low and mid-rise apartment buildings in addition to the detached and semi-detached single-family units;
- Poverty alleviation for poor families to give it as much priority as building mixed-income developments to attract higher-income householders.

### **9.3 Research Limitations**

The study has limited generalizability since all three research sites are in the same city, controlled by the same PHA, and given the small sample sizes used, the outcomes are not representative of most HOPE VI projects. Camden's political, social, and economic environment is not representative of most cities in the United States. The city is so physically and economically distressed, it is reputed to be the poorest city in New Jersey and one of the poorest cities in the country (Morgan Quitno Press 2005, Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute 2007). Even a casual observation of the city's physical condition reveals widespread poverty.

Despite these limitations, some of the findings are similar to findings that other studies found at other HOPE VI sites around the country (Boston 2005, Goetz 2010, Holin, et al. 2003, Popkin, Levy and Buron 2009). One example is poor self-sufficiency outcomes among original householders. Most reported psychosocial or perceptual type benefits. Boston (2005) reported similar outcomes in Atlanta.

Several issues limit the scope and depth of the research, including the following:

- A lack of information about relocation outcomes for voucher recipients
- A lack of information about the number of voucher recipients

- A lack of information about relocation to other public housing developments
- Not enough information about the number of returnees
- Insufficient information about the self-sufficiency services implemented
- Non-participation of a large number of householders in the household survey due to inability to speak English well, lack of interest, and their unavailability

There were problems with getting important information from the HACC about the three HOPE VI developments. HOPE VI officials provided no information and only partial information in some other instances. For all three projects, some of the information in the redevelopment plans that the housing authority provided were outdated and conflicting. In the case of McGuire Gardens, since the housing authority did not provide the redevelopment plan and the information about the site in the 1996 HOPE VI Baseline Assessment report was used but the information was inconsistent.

The two revitalization plans received appeared to have been the original plans, which contained a great deal of information that varied significantly from the actual plan implemented. Revitalization plan statistics were often inconsistent and incomplete and the HACC HOPE VI personnel did not provide all the necessary clarifications. The lack of insufficient or outdated information made it impossible to continue pursuing the original study objectives and restricted assessment of impact on resident characteristics. For example, changes in poverty levels at each site could not be determined because the relevant pre-redevelopment poverty information was not provided. Similarly, despite repeated requests, HOPE VI officials did not provide any information about self-sufficiency services at McGuire Gardens during redevelopment or about the self-sufficiency programs implemented at Baldwin's Run. For Roosevelt Manor, the main setbacks concerned the late start to construction and re-occupancy, sketchy and incomplete data regarding poverty, employment and income, and enrolments and completions in self-sufficiency programs.

The study also suffered from a dearth of pre-HOPE VI resident characteristics data for each development to facilitate formulation of cogent profiles of residents' social and economic characteristics at the start of the HOPE VI process. The resident characteristics information in the two revitalization plans that the HACC provided was not consistent and lacked several pieces of valuable information. The revitalization plan for Roosevelt Manor contained more details about residents and conditions in the development prior to HOPE VI than the Westfield Acres revitalization plan but still lacked key baseline data. This improvement appears to show the HACCs growing knowledge of the HOPE VI process and increased competency in preparing HOPE VI redevelopment plans.

#### **9.4 Conclusion**

Housing is one of life's necessities and housing quality is a key indicator of social standing because it contributes to fixing one's place in society. Living in substandard housing and neighborhoods tends to lead to restricted employment, education, public service, and other life opportunities. HOPE VI's primary mission is to eliminate severely distressed public housing units from the public housing stock and improve the overall living conditions in distressed developments. The main goals have changed since the program began and especially away from the most severely distressed developments to distressed developments that are more amenable to private investment (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2003). The three redeveloped properties in Camden were among the worst in Camden and redevelopment was necessary.

Camden's HOPE VI experiences provide several lessons. One is that with the right commitment, positive change can take place in public housing, even in one of the poorest cities in the country. Another is that shifting poverty to other parts of a neighborhood or to other neighborhoods and replacing poor original tenants with higher income tenants may dilute poverty but does not, by itself, improve the relocated tenants' economic circumstances. The results also show that relocation needs very thoughtful planning and implementation. It is not enough to



simply return some of the original residents to new or rehabilitated housing and expect transformation in their economic circumstances. Neither is fixing the distressed housing sufficient to make residents self-sufficient. Some families need employment-focused assistance and some need assistance in other areas in order to move from dependence to self-sufficiency. Employment-related training alone does not result in improved economic self-sufficiency for all households. HACC needs a more effective communication strategy with residents before, during, and after redevelopment to inform residents about HOPE VI's benefits and the ways to access those benefits. Another lesson is that improvements in housing conditions impact residents' psychological well-being and hence their general welfare.

Addressing the distressed public housing problem requires much more attention to the issues that lead to the distress in the first place. Physical deterioration is one part of the equation but giving priority attention to this part fails to recognize and accept the full impact of economics and racial discrimination. Physical revitalization is very important but so is human development. Residents' needs should receive the highest redevelopment priority (NCSDPH 1992). Bricks and mortar focused redevelopment has been tried before yet the problems remain. When the people whose lives the program was meant to improve experience little or no material improvements, HOPE VI has not fulfilled its mission. Program success ultimately depends on improvements in the economic well-being of residents. With self-sufficiency secured, residents can escape dependency on public housing.


In the nation that considers itself the most generous in the world, is it not ironic that the largest transfer of federal aid to housing annually (about \$84 billion in 2004) to homeowners in the form of mortgage interest deductions raises little dissent but assistance to low-income tenants, which is four times smaller (Bratt, Stone and Hartman 2006) is contentious? The biggest challenge that public housing faces is not concentrated poverty or deteriorated units. The biggest problem appears to be the conflict between people who believe in government promoting the general societal welfare and people who assert that the best way to achieve general welfare is

through everyone pursuing their own self-interest through the private market and government doing as little as possible (Bratt, Stone and Hartman 2006). The latter argument fails to realize that the consequences of inaction, such as homelessness and crime, are greater than the cost of government intervention (Turner, Popkin and Kingsley, et al. 2005).

## **APPENDICES**

APPENDIX A

SCHEMATIC OF ROOSEVELT MANOR HOUSING MODELS




2/3 BDR RENTAL TOWNHOUSES  
(Physically Accessible Ground Floor Units)



3 BDR RENTAL TWINS



2/3 BDR RENTAL TOWNHOUSES



2 BDR RENTAL TWINS



3 BDR HOMEOWNERSHIP  
TOWNHOUSES  
AND TWINS




4 BDR HOMEOWNERSHIP  
TOWNHOUSES  
AND TWINS



1 BDR RENTAL TWINS  
(Physically Accessible Ground Floor Units)



attachment 35 / C



Revitalization Plan  
PTUAL BUILDING ELEVATIONS

**APPENDIX B**

**CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED**

Particulars	McGuire Gardens (2008)		Baldwin's Run (2008)	
	Households	Percent	Households	Percent
Number of housing units	253	100	78	40
Eligible households			72	96
Householders interviewed	35		23	33
		%	%	%
Total household members	108	100	82	100
Average household size	3.3	-	3.6	-
<i>Household Income:</i>				
Average household income	\$12,250	100	\$14,200	100
Less than \$5,000	7	27%	8	35%
\$5,001 - \$10,000	8	20%	4	17%
\$10,001 - \$15,000	6	13%	1	4%
\$15,001 - \$20,000	4	13%	5	22%
\$20,001 - \$30,000	4	3%	5	22%
Above \$30,000	0	-	-	-
<i>Source:</i>				
Wage as major income	11	33%	40%	
Welfare as major income	-	-	-	
SS/SSI/Pension as major income	-	-	-	
"Other" major income		%	50%	
<i>Income Distribution:</i>				
51 - 80 percent of median income	0	00%	21%	
30 - 49 percent of median income	3	10%	97%	
Below 30 percent of median income	27	90%	75%	
<i>Household Composition:</i>				
Two or more adults in household	27	77%	5	22%
One Adult in household	8	23%	18	78%
1 Person in household	9	26%	4	17%
2 Persons in household	4	11%	1	4%
3-4 Persons in household	15	43%	16 (5+11)	70%
5+ Persons in household	7	20%	2	9%
Households with children	25	71%	19	83%
Female Head of household	33	94%	23	100%
Female householder with children	25	71%	19	83%
Householder has a disability		16%	8%	
<i>Education</i>				
No high school diploma	8	23%	4	17%
High school diploma or equivalent	18	51%	7	30%
Attended college	4	11%	5	22%
Have Associate degree	0	0	0	0%
Have bachelor degree or higher	2	6%	0	0%
Unknown	3	9%	7	30%

Particulars	McGuire Gardens (2008)		Baldwin's Run (2008)	
	Households	Percent	Households	Percent
<i>Age:</i>				
Mean Age of householder				
Householder members under age 6	15	14%	11	
Household members ages 6-17	50	46%	26	
Household members ages 18 – 50	25		19	83%
Household members ages 51 – 61	4		2	9%
Household members ages 62 -82	4		2	9%
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>				
Percentage Black	19	54%	10	43%
Percentage Caucasian	3	9%	1	4%
Mixed	13	37%	12	52%
Hispanic	16	46%	14	61%
Non-Hispanic	19	54%	9	39%
<i>Bedrooms:</i>				
1 bedroom	7	22%	1	4%
2 bedroom	9	28%	7	30%
3 bedrooms	14	44%	13	57%
4 bedrooms	2	06%	2	9%

**APPENDIX C**

**HOUSEHOLDERS' SURVEY SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE**

HOPE VI PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS' SURVEY

BALDWIN'S RUN

(Camden, NJ)

2007/2008

Date: \_\_\_/\_\_\_/2007

### Introduction

Hello, my name is Michael Brown, from New Jersey Institute of Technology and I am following up on a letter concerning a research that I am doing about the HOPE VI program. I am here to talk with the head of the house about his/her of living in a HOPE VI development

Are you the household head?

- Yes [Go to next question]  
 No

If no, when respondent arrives read:

Hello. I am doing a survey about HOPE VI, the program that fixes up distressed public housing developments like the one that Baldwin's Run replaces, and I talk with you about your experiences with HOPE VI. This will take about 45 minutes of your time.

The study is for public housing families only. Are you a public housing resident?

- Yes [Go to next question A1]  
 No [Go to Closing]

You do not have to take part but your participation is important to the study. Taking part will not affect your current or future housing situation or benefits in this or other housing program in any way whatsoever. In addition, your identity and the answers you give will be kept confidential. This means that your name will not be given to anyone.

A1. Do you agree to participate in the study?

- Yes [Ask householder to read and sign consent form, then go to A2]  
 No [Go to Closing]

If you have any questions, I would be happy to answer them for you.

A2. Do you have any questions at this time?

- No [Go to A3]  
 Yes [Address questions then go to A3]

A3. May we begin now?

- Yes [Go to Q 1]  
 No [Go back]

(Start) \_\_\_:\_\_\_

(End) \_\_\_:\_\_\_

### Previous Housing

I am going to start with a few questions about your previous housing situation.

1. Where did you live before you moved here?

- Another public housing development (State name) \_\_\_\_\_  
 The old housing development on this site  
 Private housing development  
 Private single family home

2. How long did you live there?

- \_\_\_\_\_ years, \_\_\_\_\_ months



3. Why did you move?
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Given notice to move	<input type="checkbox"/> Renovation work
<input type="checkbox"/> Poor living conditions	<input type="checkbox"/> To live in a better neighborhood
<input type="checkbox"/> I needed a bigger place	<input type="checkbox"/> Crime and violence in area
<input type="checkbox"/> Other reason(s): _____	
<input type="checkbox"/> Refused to answer	
  
4. In total, how long have you lived in public housing?
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 Years	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-4 Years
<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/> Refused	
  
5. As an adult, have you ever lived in a private apartment or house?
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/> Refused
------------------------------	-----------------------------	-------------------------------------	----------------------------------

Current Housing

Now I will talk about the design of the house/apartment that you live in now.

6. How long have you lived in this apartment/house
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Less than 1 year	<input type="checkbox"/> 1-2 years	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-3 years	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-4 years
<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	<input type="checkbox"/> Refused		
  
7. What is the size of your apartment/house?
 

<input type="checkbox"/> 1-bedroom	<input type="checkbox"/> 2-bedrooms	<input type="checkbox"/> 3-bedrooms	<input type="checkbox"/> 4-bedrooms
<input type="checkbox"/> 5-bedrooms			
  
8. How satisfied are you with this size apartment/house?
 

<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Very satisfied</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Satisfied</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Dissatisfied</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Very dissatisfied</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Don't Know</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> <i>Refused</i>		
  
9. How do you feel about the change from high-rise apartments at Westfield Acres to single-family houses here at Baldwin's Run. Would you say the decision was:
 

<input type="checkbox"/> Very good	<input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat good	<input type="checkbox"/> Neither good nor bad
<input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat bad	<input type="checkbox"/> Very bad	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know [Go to Q10]
<input type="checkbox"/> Refused [Go to Q10]		
  
- 9b. Why do you feel that way?
 

<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
<input type="checkbox"/>	_____

10. How important are the following to your family?

	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Undecided	Somewhat Unimportant	Not Important	Refused
a. Having own private entrance to your home						
b. Having own private mailing address						
c. Backyard fenced off						

11. Rank these things about your HOPE VI home from most important to least important. Use one (1) for the most important and seven (7) for least important.

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> The number of bedrooms in the apartment | <input type="checkbox"/> The size of the rooms       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Having my own private mailing address   | <input type="checkbox"/> Having own private entrance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Having a front yard                     | <input type="checkbox"/> Having a backyard           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Air conditioning unit in home           |  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know                              | <input type="checkbox"/> Refused                     |

12. What do you like most about your HOPE VI home?

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> The number of bedrooms                | <input type="checkbox"/> The size of the rooms       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Having my own private mailing address | <input type="checkbox"/> Having own private entrance |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Having a front yard                   | <input type="checkbox"/> Having a backyard           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Having own air conditioner            | <input type="checkbox"/> Backyard is fenced off      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know                            | <input type="checkbox"/> Refused                     |

13. What do you dislike the most about your HOPE VI home?

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- Don't know

14. Overall, how do you feel about the design of your HOPE VI home? Are you:

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very satisfied        | <input type="checkbox"/> A little satisfied | <input type="checkbox"/> Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied |
| <input type="checkbox"/> A little dissatisfied | <input type="checkbox"/> Very dissatisfied  | <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know                         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Refused               |   |   |

15. Would you say that the place you live in now is better than what you had before?

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, much better   | <input type="checkbox"/> Yes, a little better | <input type="checkbox"/> No, about the same |
| <input type="checkbox"/> No, a little worse | <input type="checkbox"/> No, much worse       | <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Refused            |   |   |

15a. Please explain why you feel that way.

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#### HOPE VI Development

I will now ask you about [INSERT DEVELOPMENT NAME].

16. What were your main reasons for moving to .....? [DEVELOPMENT NAME]

- To be near family/friends
- Had no choice: this is what the Housing Authority gave me
- The opportunity to live in a new home
- The houses are better than what I had before
- It had better support services for residents
- Liked the way the houses are designed/built
- Wanted to live in a mixed-income housing development
- The neighborhood is safer and more secure than where I was living
- The development looks nice
- Other (Specify): \_\_\_\_\_
- Don't know
- Refused

17. What are the five things that you like most about your development?
- Each home has a private entrance and a private mailing address
  - Has both public housing and private housing together
  - Each home has a backyard for children to play
  - No elevator needed to get to my home
  - Not as crowded as the projects were
  - I feel safe here
  - Residents look out for each other
  - Other: \_\_\_\_\_
  - Do not know  Refused
18. What are the five things that you dislike most about this development?
- It is too open to neighborhoods outside
  - Backyards not fenced off
  - No children's playground
  - It has more private housing than public housing
  - Private housing and public housing are separated from each other
  - Too many speeding cars
  - Too much crime - I do not feel safe here
  - Public housing residences have no screen doors but the private residences have.
  - Not permitted to change anything about my home
  - Don't know
  - Other \_\_\_\_\_
19. What is the main thing you would like to have changed about the development?
- \_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know  Refused
20. Do you notice any difference in the way the private housing and the public housing look?
- Yes, major difference  Yes, small difference  No difference [Skip to Q21]
  - Refused [Skip to Q21]
- 20a. If yes, how are they different?
- \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
  - \_\_\_\_\_
21. How would you describe the racial or ethnic make-up of the people in the development?  
Would you say most residents are of one race or ethnic group or from several races and ethnic groups?
- Almost entirely of one race or ethnic group
  - A mixture of races and ethnic groups
  - Don't know
  - Refused
22. Which is the most common racial/ethnic group in the development?
- Black/African-American  White/Caucasian  Asian
  - Hispanic  Non-Hispanic
  - Other: \_\_\_\_\_
  - Don't know  Refused

23. How satisfied are you about this racial/ethnic makeup?
- Very satisfied     Somewhat satisfied     Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Somewhat dissatisfied     Very dissatisfied  
 Don't know     Refused

23a. Why do you feel this way?

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24. How safe do you feel living in this development compared to where you lived before?
- A lot safer     A little safer     About the same  
 A little less safe     A lot less safe     don't know     Refused

24a. Please explain the reasons for your answer.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

#### The Surrounding Neighborhood and Services

Now, please think about the neighborhood immediately outside of Baldwins Run.

25. How would you rate the safety of the neighborhood outside the development since moving here? Would you say :
- Very safe     Somewhat safe     Neither safe nor unsafe  
 Somewhat unsafe     Very unsafe     Don't know  
 Refused

26. How satisfied are you with the following services in the neighborhood?

(a) Health care:

- Very satisfied     A little satisfied     Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Dissatisfied     Very dissatisfied     Refused

(b) Childcare services

- Very satisfied     A little satisfied     Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Dissatisfied     Very dissatisfied     Refused

(c) Public Transportation

- Very satisfied     A little satisfied     Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Dissatisfied     Very dissatisfied     Refused

27. Which of these do you see as big problems in the surrounding neighborhood?

- Unemployment     Use of drugs     People just hanging out  
 Robbery     Gangs     Shootings and violence  
 Garbage collection     Graffiti     Policing

28. Mixing Income and Neighbors

Most HOPE VI developments have a mix of both public housing and private housing. Private housing households are homeowners.

29. How do you feel about this mixing of public housing households and homeowners in the same housing development?

- Strongly agree       Somewhat agree       Neither agree nor disagree  
 Somewhat disagree       Strongly disagree       Don't know [Skip to Q28c]  
 Refused [Skip to Q28]

30. Why do you feel that way?

- \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

31. Which of these statements would you agree with? HOPE VI developments should have:

- More public housing than private housing  
 More private housing than public housing  
 Equal number of public housing and private housing  
 Only public housing  
 Only Private housing  
 Don't know  
 Refused

32. How *often* do you stop to chat with a neighbor?

- Almost every day       About once a week       About once a month  
 A few times       Once [Go to Q33]       Never [Go to Q33]  
 Don't know [Go to Q33]       Refused [Go to Q33]

33. Whom do you chat with most, your public housing neighbors or private housing neighbors?

- Public housing neighbors       Private housing neighbors  
 Neither one  
 Don't know [Skip to Q33]       Refused [Skip to Q33]

34. Why is that?

- \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

35. Since moving here, how often do you or any other person from your household have a meal or refreshments like coffee or tea with a neighbor?

- Almost every day       About once per week       About once per month  
 Once in a while       Once [Skip to Q35]       Never [Skip to Q35]  
 Don't know       Refused [Skip to Q35]

36. Whom do you do this kind of thing with more; would you say:

- Public housing tenants       homeowners       None  
 Don't know [Go to Q33]       Refused [Go to Q33]

37. Why is that?

- \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

37. How would you describe your relationship with your immediate neighbors? Would you say

- ...
- Very good [Go to Q36]     Good [Go to Q36]     Poor
  - Very poor     Don't know     Refused

38. Are there problems between homeowners and public housing tenants?

- Yes, many problems     Some problems     A few problems
- No problem at all     Don't know     Refused

39. Please describe the overall relationship between public housing residents and homeowners in your development.

- Very good [Go to Q36]     Good [Go to Q36]     Neutral
- Poor     Very poor     Don't know
- Refused

40. Why do you feel that way?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

41. Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the statements in the box below.

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Undecided	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Refused
a. Both public housing residents and private housing residents in ..... value education highly?						
b. Both public housing residents and private housing residents in ..... have high family values?						
a. Both public housing residents and private housing residents in ..... put a high value on work?						

**Self-Sufficiency**

These next questions are about programs that help residents become self-sufficient.

42. Have you or any other householder completed any program to help public housing residents improve their lives such as job training, computer training or parenting skill?

- Yes     No [Go to Q41]
- Don't know [Go to Q41]     Refused [Go to Q41]

43. If yes, what programs did you or other householder complete? [Read options to householder].

- Adult education (GED)     Household management
- Job training and placement     Household management
- Vocational/Skills training     Child care services
- Computer literacy skills training     General counseling

- Drug or Alcohol prevention                       Parenting training  
 Drug or Alcohol treatment                       Youth Sports or after school programs  
 Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

44. In the past 12 months, which welfare-to-work training program or class have you or other adult household member participated in? [Give program name(s)].

- \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 None  
 No comment

45. How has the training you receive help you?

- \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

46. Do you think that Camden Housing Authority has done enough to help public housing residents improve their lives?

- Yes                       No                       Don't know                       Refused

47. Overall, how satisfied are you with the programs offered?

- Very satisfied                       A little satisfied                       Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Dissatisfied                       Very dissatisfied                       Refused

48. What other types of programs would you like to see available to residents?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

#### Relocation Process (ORIGINAL RESIDENTS ONLY)

I want to ask you about the relocation process

49. How would you describe the process? Would you say it was ...

- Very difficult                       Somewhat difficult                       Neither difficult nor simple  
 Somewhat simple                       Very simple                       Don't know  
 Refused

50. Do you think that the selection process was fair to the original public housing residents?

- Yes                       No                       Don't know                       Refused

51. How satisfied are you with the methods used to select residents?

- Very satisfied                       A little satisfied                       Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
 Dissatisfied                       Very dissatisfied                       Refused

52. Where did you live during the renovation period?

- In another public housing development  
 Private family housing  
 Private apartment/house

Employment Situation

Now I want to ask you a few questions about work.

53. Do you have a job now?

- Yes  Don't know (Skip to Q51)  
 No (Skip to Q50)  Refused

54. Including part time work, how many jobs do you have?

- Number of jobs \_\_\_\_\_  Refused

55. How many hours do you normally work per week?

- Under 20 hours per week  20 - 35 hours per week  
 Over 35 hours per week  Don't know  
 Refused

56. Is your (main) job in your neighborhood, in the city, in the suburbs, or elsewhere?

- In my neighborhood  In the city  In the suburbs  
 Elsewhere  Don't know  Refused

57. If no job, why are you not working? Would you say .....

- Illness  Disability  Retired  
 Studying  Taking care of home/family  Cannot find work  
 Other: \_\_\_\_\_  Don't know  
 Refused

58. Have you ever worked for pay?

- Yes  No (Skip to Q53)  Don't know  Refused (Skip to Q53)

59. When was the last time you had a job?

- Less than one year ago  More than one year ago  Never  
 Don't know  Refused

60. Have you looked for work at any time during the last 12 months?

- Yes  No  Don't know  Refused

61. Which of the following makes it difficultly for you to find work or to keep a job?

- Lack of working experience  Not having child care service  
 Lack of transportation  Not speaking English well  
 Disability  Having a criminal record  
 Drug or alcohol problem  Lack of jobs in the neighborhood  
 Racial or gender discrimination (specify): \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other: \_\_\_\_\_  
 None of the above  
 Don't know  
 Refused

62. Does any other adult householder have a job?

- Yes  No (Skip to Q59)  
 Don't know (Skip to Q59)  Refused (Skip to Q59)



63. How many hours per week does that person work? [Record data for each person that works].  
 Under 20 hours per week       20 - 35 hours per week  
 Over 35 hours per week     Don't know       Refused
64. Other than housing, do you currently get welfare support such as TANF, social security income, unemployment, disability income or any other form of public assistance?  
 Yes       No       Don't know       Refused
65. Have you had any difficulty paying your rent since moving here?  
 Yes       No       Don't know       Refused

#### BACKGROUND INFORMATION

I will close with a few background questions.

66. In what year were you born?  
 [Record 4-digit year]    \_\_\_ \_\_\_ \_\_\_       Don't know  
 Refused
67. What is the best estimate of your total household income before taxes for 2006? (Please include income from all jobs, public assistance, or social security).  
 Under \$10,000       \$10,000 - \$20,000       \$20,000 - \$30,000  
 \$30,000 - \$40,000       more than \$40,000       Don't know  
 Refused
68. What is your racial and/or ethnic background?  
 Black/African-American       White /Caucasian       Asian (\_\_\_\_\_)  
 Native American /Alaskan Native       Hispanic       Non-Hispanic  
 Other: \_\_\_\_\_
69. What is the highest grade or year of schooling did you complete?  
 Elementary/Middle School (grades 1-6)  
 Bachelors degree  
 Junior High School       Graduate/professional degree  
 High School       Other: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Some College, but no degree       Don't know  
 Associate degree       Refused

#### Family Status/Family Structure

70. What is your marital status?  
 Single       Married       Widowed  
 Divorced       Separated       Domestic partnership  
 Don't know       Refused
71. Including yourself, how many adults over age 18 live with you?  
 \_\_\_\_\_       Don't know       Refused
72. How many children ages 6 to 18 live with you?  
 Number of children 6-18    \_\_\_       Don't know       Refused

How many children under age 6 live with you?

Number of children < 6 \_\_\_\_  Don't know  Refused

73. Record gender of respondent (if unsure, ask householder)

Male  Female

We have come to the end. Would you like to add any comments at this time?

Yes [Continue to comments]  No [Go to closing]

Comments:

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(Continue on separate sheet if necessary).

#### CLOSING

Please confirm your address in case I need to follow-up with you regarding this interview.  
If a follow-up interview is needed you will be informed by mail and a telephone call.

Confirm address with address in database

Street Address: \_\_\_\_\_ Apartment/Bldg. No.: \_\_\_\_\_

Development: \_\_\_\_\_ Camden Telephone #: \_\_\_\_\_

Record Time: \_\_\_\_:\_\_\_\_

In closing, I want to say thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this survey.

## APPENDIX D

### INTERVIEW GUIDE: HACC HOPE VI COORDINATOR

#### Physical Redevelopment

1. Tell me about the physical redevelopment at each HOPE VI site.
2. HOPE VI goals accomplished?
3. HOPE VI goals not accomplished?
4. Public housing residents view about the HOPE VI changes?
5. Residents' and Community's views about HOPE VI changes?
6. Are there sufficient replacement public housing units for all original residents?
7. Proportion of new and proportion of rehabilitated units at McGuire Gardens?
8. Total number of housing units at Baldwin's Run?
9. Total number of public housing units at Baldwin's Run?
10. Location of off-site replacement housing for mixed-income developments?
11. Are off-site housing situated in mixed-income neighborhoods?
12. Proportion of original households that returned to McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run?
13. Status of the Roosevelt Manor redevelopment?
14. Relationship between public housing residents and homeowners?
15. Proportion of HOPE VI households at each site who have earned income?
16. Proportion of households in previous developments with earned income?
17. Proportion of households receiving public assistance?

#### Community Centers

18. Are residents allowed to use the community center?
19. Are neighborhood residents allowed to use the community center?

#### Property Management

20. How are property management firms selected?
21. What role does the HACC have in management of HOPE VI developments?
22. Do tenants participate in management of HOPE VI developments?

#### Tenant Selection

23. Role of HACC in tenant selection
24. Role of the property management firm in tenant selection?
25. Vacancy rates?
26. HACC's role in lease preparation and enforcement?

#### Evictions

27. Number of crime-related evictions?
28. Number of other evictions?

#### Site Safety

29. How has the incidence of illicit activities in developments changed since redevelopment?
30. What is the crime situation in each development since redevelopment?
31. What is the crime situation in adjacent communities since redevelopment?

## APPENDIX E

### INTERVIEW GUIDE: HOPE VI CSS COORDINATOR

#### **Questions about Self-Sufficiency Services**

1. What is the HACC's definition of "self-sufficiency"?
2. Types of self-sufficiency services available to residents?
3. Services are offered onsite?
4. Services are offered off-site?
5. Services that the HACC provides and services that outside agencies provide?
6. General eligibility rules for participants in self-sufficiency programs and services?
7. Length of time for each SS programs and services?
8. Method(s) used to inform householders about services offered?

#### **Services Offered Onsite to HOPE VI Residents**

9. Targeted number of persons to be served by self-sufficiency programs/services?
10. Number of persons who enrolled in self-sufficiency programs/services?
11. Number of householders that graduated from all self-sufficiency programs/services?
12. Participation rates for each program/project?
13. Number of existing programs expanded? Number of new programs created?
14. Education levels of residents participating (by program and total)?

#### **Services Offered Off-site to HOPE VI Residents**

15. What types of self-sufficiency services are available to HOPE VI residents off-site?
16. Number of residents who enrolled in self-sufficiency programs and services?
17. Number of residents completing self-sufficiency programs and services?
18. Retention rates?

#### **Impact of Services**

19. Residents currently employed?
20. Number of residents who gained employment after CSS/self-sufficiency intervention?
21. What types of job skills do residents typically need?
22. How are residents' CSS needs determined?
23. Number of households that achieved self-sufficiency and moved out of public housing?
24. Number of residents who participated in education programs
25. Number or percentage of residents having earned-income after self-sufficiency training?
26. Change in social security or welfare dependency since implementation of HOPE VI?
27. Obstacles to residents achieving self-sufficiency?

**APPENDIX F**  
**IRB APPROVAL LETTER**



**Institutional Review Board: HHS FWA 00003246**  
**Notice of Approval**  
**IRB Protocol Number: E103-07**

Principal Investigators: Michael Brown and Karen Franck  
Urban Systems

Title: Learning from HOPE IV: Revitalizing Distressed Housing in  
Camden, New Jersey

Performance Site(s): Off Campus Sponsor Protocol Number (if applicable):

Type of Review: FULL  EXPEDITED

Type of Approval: NEW  RENEWAL  MINOR REVISION

Approval Date: September 27, 2007 Expiration Date: September 26, 2008

1. **ADVERSE EVENTS:** Any adverse event(s) or unexpected event(s) that occur in conjunction with this study must be reported to the IRB Office immediately (973) 642-7616.
2. **RENEWAL:** Approval is valid until the expiration date on the protocol. You are required to apply to the IRB for a renewal prior to your expiration date for as long as the study is active. It is your responsibility to ensure that you receive and submit the renewal in a timely manner.
3. **CONSENT:** All subjects must receive a copy of the consent form as submitted. Copies of the signed consent forms must be kept on file with the principal investigator.
4. **SUBJECTS:** Number of subjects approved: 150.
5. The investigator(s) did not participate in the review, discussion, or vote of this protocol.
6. **APPROVAL IS GRANTED ON THE CONDITION THAT ANY DEVIATION FROM THE PROTOCOL WILL BE SUBMITTED, IN WRITING, TO THE IRB FOR SEPARATE REVIEW AND APPROVAL.**

Dawn Hall Apgar, PhD, LSW, ACSW, Chair IRB

September 27, 2007

## APPENDIX G

### LETTER TO PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS

January 9, 2007

Dear Householder

During the next 4-6 months, I will be undertaking a research study of the HOPE VI program in the HOPE VI developments of McGuire Gardens and Baldwin's Run. I write to you because I need your help to understand how HOPE VI has affected public housing families, like yours, that live in these developments. Your household was one of those randomly selected to participate in the study.

The research includes a residents' survey where I interview heads of households like you about their HOPE VI experiences. Questions in the survey cover (a) residents' satisfaction with their units, (b) improvements in living conditions, (c) services that the housing authority provides to public housing residents, and neighborhood conditions and services. The interview will take about 45 minutes.

Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and will not affect your current or future housing benefits in any way. Although you do not have to participate, your participation is very important for the study to succeed and will be greatly appreciated. The study findings may even help the Housing Authority to improve its services in the future. Both your identity and the answers you give will be kept strictly confidential. Your personal information will therefore not be given to anyone or used in any publication without your written consent.

Within the next two weeks, I will contact you to arrange a date for the interview. If you prefer, you may also call me at 973-596-6277 to set up a date for the interview. I look forward to and welcome your participation in this study, which I am doing as part of my studies towards a Ph.D. degree at the New Jersey Institute of Technology.

Thank you very much for your time.

Sincerely,

Michael Brown

APPENDIX H

LETTER OF APPROVAL FROM THE HACC



**HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF CAMDEN**

2021 WATSON STREET, CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY 08105  
TELEPHONE: (856) 968-2775 FAX: (856) 968-2754

**Deborah Person-Polk**  
*Board of Commissioners  
Chairperson*

**Maria Marquez, Ph.D.**  
*Executive Director*

**Deborah Keys**  
*Commissioner*

**Andres Camacho**  
*Commissioner*

Mike Brown  
The School of Architecture  
New Jersey Institute of Technology  
University Heights  
Newark, NJ 07102

**Scot McCray**  
*Commissioner*

September 4, 2007

**Alan Miller**  
*Commissioner*

Dear Mr. Brown:

**Meishka Ruiz**  
*Commissioner*

This letter is to acknowledge that the Housing Authority of the City of Camden is aware of the HOPE VI research that you intend to conduct with the residents of McGuire Gardens and Westfield Acres.

Although the Housing Authority is prohibited from disclosing to you any names or other information about public housing residents, without the consent of these residents, we understand that you will be notifying the residents yourself and may be interviewing those residents who agree voluntarily to participate in your research.

We wish you the best in your endeavor.

Sincerely,

Charles Valentine  
Director Modernization Department

Cc: Maria Marquez – Executive Director

# APPENDIX I

## HUD'S RESIDENT CHARACTERISTICS REPORTS

Resident Characteristics Report As Of March 31 2010																			
PHASE V																			
Program Type:	Public Housing																		
Level Of Information:	Project within State and Housing Agency NU010																		
Effective Dates Included:	December 01 2008 through March 31 2010																		
NOTE:	Percentages in each area may not total 100 percent due to rounding.																		
<b>UNITS CATEGORY</b>																			
Project	ACC Units	50058 Required	50058 Received																
NU010	1718	1535	1438																
NU010000008	57	54	54																
<b>INCOME CATEGORY</b>																			
Distribution of Average Annual Income as a % of 50058 Received																			
Project	Extremely Low Income		Very Low Income		Low Income		Above Low Income		Unavailable Income										
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent									
NU010	530556		55	165029	17	70198	7	25480	3	179269	18								
NU010000008	0		0		0		0		0	54	100								
Average Annual Income (\$)																			
Project	Average Annual Income																		
NU010	13414																		
NU010000008	14889																		
Distribution of Annual Income as a % of 50058 Received																			
Project	\$0	\$1-\$5000	\$5001-\$10000	\$10001-\$15000	\$15001-\$20000	\$20001-\$25000	Above \$25000												
NU010	5	13	34	20	11	6	11												
NU010000008	0	7	30	26	11	11	15												
Distribution of Source of Income as a % of 50058 Received ** Some families have multiple sources of income **																			
Project	With Any Wages	With Any Welfare	With Any SSI/SS/Pa	With Other Incom	With No Income														
NU010	32	29	55	22	2														
NU010000008	39	24	39	35	0														
<b>TTP / FAMILY TYPE CATEGORY</b>																			
Distribution of Total Tenant Payment as a % of 50058 Received																			
Project	\$0	\$1-\$25	\$26-\$50	\$51-\$100	\$101-\$200	\$201-\$350	\$351-\$500	Above \$501											
NU010	0	4	8	6	23	32	13	15											
NU010000008	0	0	6	2	15	39	15	24											
Average Monthly TTP (\$)																			
Project	Average Monthly TTP																		
NU010	315																		
NU010000008	355																		
Distribution of Family Type as a % of 50058 Received																			
Project	Elderly No Children Non-Disabled		Elderly With Children Non-Disabled		Non-Elderly No Children Non-Disabled		Non-Elderly With Children Non-Disabled		Elderly No Children Disabled		Elderly With Children Disabled		Non-Elderly No Children Disabled		Non-Elderly With Children Disabled		Female Headed Household with Children		
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	
NU010	161214		17	6205	1	131643	14	339092	35	122700	13	6374	1	160162	17	43142	4	353932	36
NU010000008	2		4	0	0	7	13	33	61	0	0	0	0	8	15	4	7	35	65
Average TTP By Family Type(\$)																			
Project	Elderly No Childr	Elderly With Childr	Non-Elderly No Childr	Non-Elderly With Childr	Elderly No Childr	Elderly With Childr	Non-Elderly No Childr	Non-Elderly With Childr	Female Headed Household	with Children									
NU010	346	568	375	300	297	452	256	345	293										
NU010000008	242	0	265	387	0	0	233	552	394										
<b>FAMILY RACE/ETHNICITY CATEGORY</b>																			
Distribution by Head of Household's Race as a % of 50058 Received																			
Project	White Only	Black / African Am	American Indian Or	Asian Only	Native Hawaii	White American	White Black / Al	White Asian Or	All Other Combinations										
NU010	51	45	1	2	0	0	0	0	0										
NU010000008	0	98	0	0	0	0	0	0	2										





## APPENDIX J

### WESTFIELD ACRES HOPE VI GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT

#### *Representative Robert E. Andrews New Jersey — First Congressional District Message of the Day*

##### REP. ANDREWS ANNOUNCES \$35 MILLION FEDERAL GRANT TO HELP REVITALIZE HOUSING FOR LOW INCOME FAMILIES IN CAMDEN

December 11, 2002

I am pleased to announce that the City of Camden has received a \$35 million federal grant to help revitalize low income homes the Baldwin Run, where 281 public housing units will be integrated with 235 rental, mixed income and market rate homes. This federal grant will help fund the \$100 million Baldwin Run development project. Public and private agencies are funding the \$65 million balance. The first phase of the \$100 million Baldwin Run development project is already completed, where 49 homes with front yards and porches have replaced the dangerous and crumbling Westfield Acres public housing. This federal grant will also help ensure that residents now live safely in areas where drugs and violence often dominated the housing development. I believe that every American should have a safe, clean and decent place to live. I am proud to have worked with Camden Housing Authority, City of Camden and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) officials to help bring this funding to Camden.

While this funding is great news for the City of Camden, more work needs to be done. The Camden Housing Authority has developed a \$125 million plan to rebuild Roosevelt Manor. The Authority has applied for a \$20 million federal grant from the Hope VI program to help with funding for the Roosevelt Manor project. Hope VI Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere emerged from a national commission report on severely distressed public housing in the early 1990s. The report found that there were nearly 100,000 units of "severely distressed" public housing units in the United States. The Hope VI program works with cities to eradicate distressed public housing units, and deconcentrate the poverty by redeveloping them into mixed-income communities. If Roosevelt Manor were successful in securing a Hope VI grant, this would be the 3rd Hope VI grant that the City of Camden would have received since 1993. I helped McGuire Gardens secure a \$42 million Hope VI grant in 1994, and Westfield Acres secure a \$35 million Hope VI grant in 2000. My office is presently working with Camden Housing Authority and Camden City officials to help secure a Hope VI grant for Roosevelt Manor. I wrote a letter of support on behalf of Camden City to Housing and Urban Development Secretary Mel Martinez earlier this month to support Roosevelt Manor's Hope VI application. I remain committed to helping Camden City revitalize housing for low income families.

<http://www.house.gov/andrews/archive/121102.html>

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